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1. INTRODUCTION 
1.1. INTRODUCTION 
 
The global financial crisis of 2007-2009 has culminated into severe losses for 
institutions, financial markets and international economies alike. What started as a 
mere banking crisis –  triggered by the collapse of the U.S. housing market due to an 
unprecedented level of borrowers’ defaults – rapidly spill over within and across 
sectors, industries, and national economies, with dramatic consequences. 
The effects of the crisis have led to renewed attention on a) how interconnected 
modern financial institutions and markets are, b) the inherent risks of the current style 
of financial intermediation (Berger, Molyneux and Wilson, 2009) and, c) how easily – 
otherwise pure – idiosyncratic shocks can nowadays manifest into systemic crises of 
global nature and reach. Not only that, the consequences of this crisis have also 
highlighted the inherent flaws within the current financial regulatory system, adeptly 
analysed in Moshirian (2010a; b). Given the unique role of financial institutions in the 
mechanics of modern economies (Saunders and Cornett, 2008), the above problems 
have refuelled the longstanding debate on bank risk, contagion and systemic risks, and 
regulation. The debate becomes even more apparent if one considers one of the major 
recent developments in the banking industry; the emergence of financial 
conglomerates. This was made possible through the abolition of existing regulatory 
firewalls that prevented the integration of players operating in the financial services 
industry. The first to allow financial intermediaries to combine banking, insurance 
and other financial services under the same corporate umbrella was Europe, through 
the Second Banking Directive of 1989. Europe’s initiative was subsequently followed 
by the U.S. that introduced similar incentives through the Gramm–Leach–Bliley Act 
of 1999, otherwise known as the Financial Services Modernization Act of 1999. 
The main concern among regulators, with respect to large financial conglomerates, 
is whether the risk inherent in their operations, under financial crises, will have a 
greater potential to spill over across sectors, and to spread from these sectors to the 
real economy, bringing about crises such as the 2007-2009 one (Parsons and 
Mutenga, 2009). These concerns materialised during the crisis, with a number of “too-
 2 
 
big-to-fail1
2009
” institutions being bailed out at the expense of taxpayers. As expected, 
discussions for more effective regulation and/or supervision of large banks and 
conglomerates intensified. For example, in November 2009, the managing director of 
the International Monetary Fund (IMF), Dominique Strauss-Kahn called for a more 
effective supervision of systemically important financial institutions and pointed out 
the need to minimise the moral hazard issues associated with bailouts of such 
institutions. Strauss-Kahn ( ) also discussed renewed claims for ‘narrow banking’, 
where a growing number of academics and policy makers are debating on whether the 
size and permissible activities of financial institutions should be re-constricted due to 
increased systemic risk. Narrowing the scope of large financial institutions requires 
the reintroduction of firewalls such as those imposed by the Glass-Steagall Act, that 
opted to limit the risks that deposits are exposed to (Boot and Thakor, 2009; 
Morrison, 2009). In a somewhat similar vein, the notion of increased systemic risk – 
arising from the broadened scope of banking activities – has been recently gaining 
ground in both theoretical (Acharya, 2009; Ibragimov, Jaffee and Walden, 2010; 
Wagner, 2010) and empirical contributions (De Jonghe, 2010). 
In line with this notion, questions have been raised as to whether the global 
financial intermediation process is at stake, with some arguing that re-regulation is a 
virtual certainty (Walter, 2009). However, history is there to remind all stakeholders 
that entering a new series of cyclical interactions between regulation, regulatory 
avoidance and re-regulation, or deregulation, as depicted in Kane (1981), does not 
represent an optimal solution to the problem. Neither will constraining the degree of 
product diversification of financial institutions eliminate the risk of future systemic 
crises, as implied in Wagner (2010). An important issue that must be clarified by 
policymakers is the distinction between types of bank diversification that add value 
for shareholders without adding to systemic risk, and those that might pose a threat to 
financial stability irrespective of the possible benefit to the individual firms’ 
shareholders. 
In general, the above serve as the motivation for this thesis, which seeks to address 
the issues of risk-return and spillover effects from bank-insurance mergers. 
Nevertheless, before looking at the motivation, research question and objectives of 
                                                 
1 Too-big-to-fail institutions are those that not only are important to markets because of their sheer size, 
but also those that their positions are so intertwined with the positions of other institutions that their 
failure would seriously damage economic stability. This concept is further discussed in the following 
chapter. 
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this thesis in more detail in the following sections, it is important to look into the 
evolution of mergers and acquisitions in financial services industry over the past 20 
years, and the subsequent eruption of financial conglomerates.  
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1.2. THE GLOBAL M&A LANDSCAPE 
 
Over the last two decades the financial services industry has experienced a 
burgeoning of mergers and acquisitions (M&As, hereafter). Specifically, over the 
course of this period, the financial industry has witnessed a rapid increase in both in 
numbers and comparative size of deals. According to M&A data reported in 
Bloomberg, more than 13,000 international deals, worth $3.36 trillion, were 
announced and subsequently completed between 1990 and 2006. Figure 1.1 shows the 
distribution of the top acquirers and targets (figures in U.S. dollars, billions), in terms 
of industry and country of origin, respectively. 
 
Figure 1.1. Top FI acquirers and targets by industry and country 
 
Source: Bloomberg 
 
Looking at Figure 1.1, it is evident that non-U.S. Commercial Banks have been the 
most active acquirers, both in terms of deal numbers (1,618) and total value, followed 
by Money Center Banks, Super Regional U.S. banks, Multiline Insurance and 
Diversified Financial Services. In a similar fashion, non-U.S. Commercial Banks have 
also topped the targets list. Shifting the focus to the top acquirers and targets by 
country, the U.S. tops the list with the total value of deals being $1.50 trillion and 
$1.61 trillion for acquirers and targets, respectively. Finally, U.S. financial institutions 
are followed by European and Japanese firms in terms of the total value of deals 
assigned to target firms. 
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Figure 1.2. Deal size breakdown 
 
Source: Bloomberg 
 
Figure 1.2 shows the deal breakdown by relative size (figures in U.S. dollars). It is 
evident that more than 90% of the deals are in the $0-$500 million range. However, it 
seems that megamergers have not been uncommon, with 61 of these reaching $1.21 
trillion in total value. According to Pilloff (2004) the consolidation can be largely 
attributed to mergers of healthy institutions and has resulted in the number of banking 
organisations in the U.S. dropping twofold, from about 16,000 in 1980, to about 8,000 
in 2003. 
Looking into the four five-year sub-periods2
                                                 
2 The four sub-periods under examination are 1987-1991, 1992-1996, 1997-2001 and 2002-2006. 
 within 1987-2006 it is evident that the 
numbers and total value of deals in the financial services industry has been increasing. 
In addition, there are common patterns emerging both at the regional and sector 
levels. Specifically, Thomson Financial data show that the number of worldwide 
M&As in the financial services industry rose from 1,437 in the first sub-period to 
2,627 in the second, an increase of 82.8%, while their value went up 118.6% from 
$148.6 billion to $324.8 billion. Moving forward, the 1997-2001 period has seen both 
the value and number of deals at peak levels as their total size reached $1.66 trillion 
(+410.9%) and their number increased to 3,743 (+42.5%). However, the bear market 
of 2001 has resulted in a slowdown of the M&A activity, with the total value and 
number of deals dropping 56.9% and 34.6% respectively, relative to the previous five 
year period. As previously pointed out, deal activity in the financial services industry 
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followed more or less the same pattern globally, with the period 1997-2001 
accounting on average for 55% of the total value of international M&As in the last 20 
years3
Shifting the attention to the banking sector, the value of M&As increased from 
$96.2 to $199.1 billion (+107%) between the first and second 5-year periods and then 
reached a peak of $817.9 billion in the 1997-2001 period. Banking M&As have 
experienced an equivalent downturn at the international and regional levels in the last 
5 years – dropping almost 50% – both in terms of their total size and number. 
Moreover, consistent with the aggregate figures from the financial services industry, 
banking mergers from 1997 to 2001 accounted on average for 53% of the total M&A 
value across regions within the 1987-2006 period
. 
4
International M&A deals within the insurance sector have flourished as well. 
Starting with a total number of 204 deals valued at $10.7 billion in the 1987-1991 
period, M&As between insurers increased to a total of 314 deals worth $42.5 billion. 
In the following five year period, both the total number and value of M&As in the 
insurance industry increased 96% and 560%, respectively, or otherwise, involved 614 
deals valued at $280 billion. The largest nine deals were sealed between 1997 and 
2001, with the biggest being completed in 2000, when Switzerland’s Zurich Allied 
merged with U.K. arm Allied Zurich in a $19.4bn transaction
. 
5
Amel, Barnes, Panetta and Salleo, 2004
. Following the terrorist 
attacks in the U.S. in late 2001 however, M&A deals in insurance hit the wall as both 
direct and indirect losses from the World Trade Center had a massive impact on the 
insurers’ balance sheets that were already affected by the 2001 bear markets. It is 
important to note that the phenomenon was not restricted to the banking and insurance 
sectors, as M&As between other financial firms also exhibited a spectacular increase 
( ). An interesting pattern seems to arise when 
emphasis is put on the economic drivers of the consolidation in the financial services 
industry. The booming stock markets of the 1990s have expanded the capital bases of 
financial companies which subsequently used their stocks as currency for expansion 
through M&As. The role of the stock markets in the M&A activity worldwide is 
mostly evident if we consider the observed increase in M&As during the bull markets 
                                                 
3 For a more detailed representation of the financial services industry’s M&A statistics both at the 
global and regional level see Table A.1 in appendix A. 
4 For a more detailed representation of the banking sector’s M&A statistics both at the global and 
regional level see Table A.2 in appendix A. 
5 For a more detailed representation of the insurance sector’s M&A statistics both at the global and 
regional level see Table A.3 in appendix A. 
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of 1995-2000 and the subsequent decrease in M&A activity during the global equity 
market decline in the 2000-2002 period. 
The above pattern is evident in the following figures. Figure 1.3 illustrates the 
worldwide financial services M&A trend between 1987 and 2006 in terms of the 
quarterly total values (U.S. dollars, millions) and number of deals, while the 
respective trend of the stock markets, as captured by the MSCI world index, is 
illustrated in Figure 1.4. 
Figure 1.3. M&A deals in the financial services industry 
 
Source: Thomson One Banker 
Figure 1.4. MSCI world index 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Global Financial Services Industry Completed M&A Deals 1987-2006 
% shares owned after deal = 50% and above
0.00
50,000.00
100,000.00
150,000.00
200,000.00
250,000.00
300,000.00
1s
t Q
ua
rt
er
 1
98
7
4t
h 
Q
ua
rt
er
 1
98
7
3r
d 
Q
ua
rt
er
 1
98
8
2n
d 
Q
ua
rt
er
 1
98
9
1s
t Q
ua
rt
er
 1
99
0
4t
h 
Q
ua
rt
er
 1
99
0
3r
d 
Q
ua
rt
er
 1
99
1
2n
d 
Q
ua
rt
er
 1
99
2
1s
t Q
ua
rt
er
 1
99
3
4t
h 
Q
ua
rt
er
 1
99
3
3r
d 
Q
ua
rt
er
 1
99
4
2n
d 
Q
ua
rt
er
 1
99
5
1s
t Q
ua
rt
er
 1
99
6
4t
h 
Q
ua
rt
er
 1
99
6
3r
d 
Q
ua
rt
er
 1
99
7
2n
d 
Q
ua
rt
er
 1
99
8
1s
t Q
ua
rt
er
 1
99
9
4t
h 
Q
ua
rt
er
 1
99
9
3r
d 
Q
ua
rt
er
 2
00
0
2n
d 
Q
ua
rt
er
 2
00
1
1s
t Q
ua
rt
er
 2
00
2
4t
h 
Q
ua
rt
er
 2
00
2
3r
d 
Q
ua
rt
er
 2
00
3
2n
d 
Q
ua
rt
er
 2
00
4
1s
t Q
ua
rt
er
 2
00
5
4t
h 
Q
ua
rt
er
 2
00
5
3r
d 
Q
ua
rt
er
 2
00
6
V
al
ue
 o
f D
ea
ls
0
50
100
150
200
250
N
um
be
r o
f D
ea
ls
Value
Number
 8 
 
During the same period, the financial services industry has also witnessed a 
considerable increase in international cross product M&A activity and more 
specifically, in bank-insurance partnerships. Thomson Financial statistics reveal that 
during the period of 1987-1991, the world has observed 22 bank-insurance deals 
valued at $12.7 billion. In the following five year period, although more 
bancassurance deals were completed with a total of 42 deals, their total value dropped 
68% to $4 billion. However, with the emergence of multibillion dollar deals, such as 
the Citicorp-Travelers6, Allianz-Dresdner and Credit Suisse-Winterthur mega-
mergers, among others, bancassurance has taken off, with a total number of 131 deals 
valued at $131 billion during the period 1997-2002. Similar to the trend in the 
financial services sector, the bancassurance trend has also slowed down in the 2002-
2006 period, during which 110 deals were completed with a total value of $4 billion. 
Bank-insurance deal activity followed more or less the same pattern globally, with the 
exception of the Africa/Middle East, Japan and South America regions, where 
regulation has somewhat restricted the expansion of the phenomenon7
                                                 
6 By joining their banking, brokerage and insurance divisions on October 8, 1998, Citicorp and 
Travelers Group completed an $84 billion mega-merger that formed the largest firm in history. The 
merged company, named Citigroup, had all the characteristics of a “financial supermarket”, being 
able to underwrite and sell insurance products in addition to the wide variety of banking and 
investment services. This mega-merger not only shook the financial services arena because of its size 
and prospects, but also created regulatory implications given the fact that Citigroup was the first U.S. 
company to combine banking with insurance underwriting since the Great Depression. This merger 
was of great significance for the future of bancassurance since it directly lobbied regulators to 
introduce new legislation that would allow the interface between banking and insurance in the United 
States. 
. 
The following figure illustrates the pattern of the international bancassurance 
M&A trend between 1987 and 2006, in terms of the quarterly total values (U.S. 
dollars, millions) and number of deals. It is worth noting that the large spike observed 
in the value of deals in 1998 is largely attributable to the Citicorp-Travelers merger. 
 
7 For a more detailed representation of the bancassurance M&A statistics both at the global and regional 
level see Table A.4 in appendix A. 
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Figure 1.5. Bancassurance M&A deals 
 
Source: Thomson One Banker 
 
1.3. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND MOTIVATION 
 
According to Berger, Molyneux and Wilson (2009), Goddard, Molyneux, Wilson 
and Tavakoli (2007), and Herring and Santomero (1990), among others8
Walter, 2009
, this wave of 
consolidation can be largely attributed to technological and financial innovations. 
Specifically, technological advances have facilitated the emergence of new capital 
market products that introduced direct competition to traditional financial 
intermediaries’ services. This has resulted in an international disintermediation 
process, with capital flows being reallocated from financial intermediaries to capital 
markets ( ). This disintermediation process, coupled with the increased 
competition from international firms due to globalisation, had a radical impact on the 
financial statements of traditional intermediaries. 
Specifically, banks have experienced significant reductions in their interest rate 
margins and subsequently their net income, while insurers have seen their product 
prices being squeezed due to competition, their distribution costs9
                                                 
8 See chapter 3 for a detailed review of the literature. 
9 These costs refer to the fees charged by traditional distribution channels such as insurance agents and 
brokers. 
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their revenues plunging. Furthermore, new, risk-based capital requirements imposed 
by supervisory authorities such as Basel II10 for banks and the long-anticipated 
Solvency II11
The response of financial institutions came in the form of a considerable wave of 
mergers and acquisitions between banks, investment firms and insurance companies, 
and in the subsequent eruption of financial conglomerates. This consolidation trend 
has stimulated a longstanding debate, which relates to the benefits versus concerns 
and opportunities versus threats of bank cross-product diversification and financial 
conglomerates (
 for insurance companies have intensified the need for strong capital 
bases and risk diversification. Given these alterations in the financial companies’ 
external environment, it was crucial for financial institutions to reduce costs, search 
for alternative sources of revenues, and to strengthen their capital bases, in order to 
become more efficient and compete effectively within this new, antagonistic 
environment. 
Flannery, 1999; Herring and Santomero, 1990; Parsons and Mutenga, 
2009; Saunders and Walter, 1994; Staikouras, 2006; Walter, 1997)12. More 
specifically, at the firm level, some expect synergies from bancassurance and 
financial conglomerates. These synergies are expected at both the corporate and retail 
level, in the form of geographic and revenue diversification, scale and scope 
economies, efficiency, and cross selling opportunities13
Aggarwal 
and Samwick, 2003
. Yet, others expect no 
diversification benefits and raise concerns for the existence of diseconomies of scale 
and scope and inefficiencies. Another stream of research contends that managers 
pursue private benefits in diversifying the activities of their institutions (
; Jensen and Meckling, 1976). At the public policy level, the main 
concerns relate to extended monopoly powers, conflicts of interest between the 
institutions and consumers, “too-big-to-fail” guarantees, and finally, increased 
                                                 
10 Basel II is an international initiative that requires financial services institutions to have a more risk-
based framework for the assessment of regulatory capital. The Basel Capital Accord sets 
international capital adequacy standards. In 1988, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision 
established a method of relating capital assets, using a straightforward method of risk weights and a 
minimum capital ratio of 8%. The planned implementation date for Basel II is December 2006 with 
parallel running from January 2006. 
11 Solvency II that is expected to be fully implemented in 2009/2010 is an essential review of the capital 
adequacy requirements for the European insurance industry that aims to establish a revised set of 
EU-wide, risk-oriented capital requirements. These requirements are expected to help supervisors 
protect policyholders' interests by reducing the probability of prudential failure, and thus making 
consumer loss or market disruption less likely. 
12 A more detailed review of the theoretical contributions with respect to this debate is provided in 
sections 3.1 and 3.2.1 in chapter 3. 
13 The overall benefit of these synergies should lead to shareholder value maximisation that is 
considered as the primary motive for consolidation by Berger, Demsetz and Strahan (1999). 
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systemic risk (Acharya, 2009; De Bandt, Hartmann and Peydro, 2009; Ibragimov, 
Jaffee and Walden, 2010; Wagner, 2010). The interaction between market forces that 
demand convergence and the associated concerns by policymakers have led to a series 
of cyclical interactions between regulation, circumvention of the rules and re-
regulation or deregulation (Kane, 1981)14
The above issues have led to a series of empirical contributions looking at the risk-
return effects of bank diversification and financial conglomerates. Despite the various 
methodological approaches, the above strand of research offers mixed and/or 
inconclusive findings. For example, one stream of event studies looks into bank 
mergers and reveals negative excess returns for bidders and positive for targets around 
the time of the merger announcements (
. 
Houston, James and Ryngaert, 2001; Houston 
and Ryngaert, 1994), while others find evidence that focusing mergers are value 
enhancing, while diversifying ones are value destroying (DeLong, 2001). Mixed 
results are reported in studies that examine the impact of non-bank activities on the 
risk-return profiles of banks (Acharya, Hasan and Saunders, 2006; Baele, De Jonghe 
and Vander Vennet, 2007; DeYoung and Roland, 2001; Stiroh, 2004). 
The question of whether diversification leads to premium or discount valuations, 
has led to another series of contributions with contradicting results. For example, 
Servaes (1996) and Berger and Ofek (1995) report a diversification induced discount, 
yet the latter suggest that the discount is smaller when related diversification is 
considered. On the contrary, Elsas, Hackethal and Holzhäuser (2010) report a 
diversification premium, whereas Villalonga (2004a; b) suggests that the discount is 
an artefact of Compustat segment data. Nevertheless, the discount reappears in 
Laeven and Levine (2007) who look into financial firms and control for the segment 
data issues. Studies that focus on the bank-insurance interface and its effect on the 
risk-return profiles of the involved institutions, also fail to offer an overall conclusive 
result. First, positive excess returns are reported in indirect event studies that look into 
the effect of the Financial Services Modernisation Act (FSMA, 1999) on the stock 
prices of banks and insurers (Carow and Heron, 2002; Hendershott, Lee and 
Tompkins, 2002; Mamun, Hassan and Maroney, 2005; Neale and Peterson, 2005; 
Yildirim, Kwag and Collins, 2006). Second, mixed stock price reactions by banks and 
insurers are reported in studies of the effect of rulings allowing the sale and 
                                                 
14 See chapter 3 for a more detailed review of Kane’s work on the interaction between regulators and 
financial firms trying to expand their scope and reach. 
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origination of insurance products by banks (Carow, 2001b; Cowan, Howell and 
Power, 2002), while positive excess returns are established in studies that look into 
the effect of the Citicorp-Travelers merger on the stock prices of peer financial 
institutions (Carow, 2001a; Johnston and Madura, 2000). Third, mixed results are 
reported in direct studies that delve into the effect of actual bank-insurance mergers 
on the stock prices of acquirers and/or targets. In particular, Cybo-Ottone and Murgia 
(2000) find positive wealth effects for the combined entity on a limited bank-
insurance sample, Fields, Fraser and Kolari (2007a; b) report positive bidder excess 
returns, yet they do not differentiate between bank bids for insurance companies and 
bank acquisitions of insurance agents/brokers, while Chen, Li, Moshirian and Tan 
(2007) find negative bidder excess returns for a European sample of deals. The 
positive excess returns however, reappear when a sample of large international 
bancassurance deals is considered in Staikouras (2009). 
Considering the above, the motivation for this research mainly stems from the 
existing controversies in the empirical literature concerning the risk-return effects of 
bank diversification into the insurance business. The current research focuses on the 
most comprehensive sample of bank-insurance mergers and seeks to address the 
following research questions: First, what is the effect of bank-insurance deals on the 
risk-return profiles of acquiring firms? Second, what are the firm and deal specific 
factors that determine bidder excess returns and risk? Third, what are the risk-return 
effects of bank-insurance deals on acquirers after controlling for the presence of 
ARCH effects in bank stock returns? Finally, do the above effects spill over to peer 
banks and insurance companies and, do spillover effects exhibit competitive or 
contagion nature? 
1.4. MAIN FINDINGS AND CONTRIBUTION 
  
The effect of bancassurance partnerships on the returns of acquiring institutions is 
examined in chapter 4. The chapter sets out to explore the wealth effects of a large 
international sample of bancassurance deals, and in this way contribute to the 
bancassurance literature, where more research is deemed necessary. This is because 
the existing literature has provided either indirect evidence regarding the wealth 
effects of bank diversification into the insurance business, or mixed evidence in a 
limited number of studies that have examined the direct impact of a number of bank-
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insurance deals. This chapter provides new and broader findings on the stock price 
reaction to all available bank-insurance deals that led to bancassurance structures 
between 1990 and 2006. Specifically, the sample involves 226 deals, where, 100 deals 
correspond to bank bids for insurance companies, 20 represent insurance company 
bids for banks, 90 incorporate bank bids for insurance agents/brokers and, 16 involve 
bank-insurance divestitures and spin-offs. A standard event-study methodology is 
employed to assess the abnormal returns on and around various time intervals around 
the deals’ announcement. Deals between banks and insurance companies are isolated 
and assessed independently of deals between banks and insurance agencies/brokers. 
Moreover, sub-samples are formed to examine whether the bidder’s nature (bank or 
insurer) leads to different market valuations. Further sub-samples are formed to 
examine the effects of geographic, size and cultural characteristics on bidder excess 
returns. Finally, all available bank-insurance divestments and spin-offs are examined, 
in order to provide further insight into the market expectations with regards to exits 
from bancassurance. The main findings are the following. On average, bancassurance 
mergers trigger positive and significant excess returns for bidders. Banks increase 
shareholder value in bids for insurance firms, while, on the contrary, insurance 
companies do not create value in analogous bids for banks. The univariate results also 
show that investors have higher expectations from domestic deals, large deals, and 
those initiated by U.S. acquirers. Finally, the analysis of bancassurance divestitures 
and spin-offs shows insignificant reactions by the market on and around their 
announcement. 
Chapter 5 seeks to address the question with regards to the determinants of excess 
returns. By building on the sample of deals of chapter 4, this chapter sets out to 
explore the accounting and deal characteristics that play an important role in the 
subsequent market valuations, within a multiple regression framework. Specifically, a 
number of accounting measures and deal specific characteristics are considered as 
potential factors driving abnormal returns15
                                                 
15 The excess returns that are used as endogenous variables in the models are those estimated in chapter 
4. 
. In summary, the cross section analysis 
yields the following results. First, bidders already reliant on significant amounts of 
non-interest income experience negative valuations around the announcement of 
bancassurance deals. Second, the market favours deals with greater potential for scale 
economies, and deals where the acquiring institution is U.S. based. Third, controlling 
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for other factors, bank bidders are found to lose value and domestic deals do not result 
in higher excess returns. Fourth, the decomposition of the sample into deals before 
and after the FSMA, reveals that deals before the Act are valued by investors based on 
estimates of bidder growth opportunities, the potential for scale economies and 
whether the deal was initiated by a U.S. financial institution, whereas deals 
announced following the passage of the Act are valued based on estimates of the 
bidders’ capacity for further functional diversification and past profitability. Finally, 
the market does not consider any company or deal characteristics when valuing bank 
acquisitions of insurance agents/brokers. 
Chapter 6 delves into the risk effects of bank-insurance deals and the subsequent 
evaluation of the factors determining the risk components of acquiring firms. Using 
the same sample of bancassurance deals, the intention of this chapter is to examine a) 
whether bancassurance deals affect the total, market and idiosyncratic risk of 
acquiring institutions b) the factors that determine the risk attributes of firms that 
enter into bancassurance deals and c) whether these factors change following the 
deals. The methodological framework employed is a risk decomposition approach that 
is used to estimate the risk components and is followed by cross section regressions 
that attempt to shed light on the relationship between a selection of factors and the 
estimated bidder risk attributes, on a pre- and post-deal basis. The main findings are 
the following. First, bancassurance deals do not significantly affect the total and 
idiosyncratic risk of acquiring institutions, yet, the exposure of banks to market risk is 
found to increase following bancassurance partnerships. Second, bank combinations 
with insurance agencies expose the former to higher systematic risk than bank 
acquisitions of insurance underwriters. Third, banks are more exposed to firm-specific 
risk than to market risk, while insurance companies are relatively equally exposed to 
both types of risk. Fourth, banks that bid for agencies are highly exposed to 
idiosyncratic risk. Fifth, the cross section analysis of the determinants of risk reveals 
that the additional non-interest income coming from bancassurance operations is no 
longer positively correlated with market betas following the mergers. Sixth, the 
negative and significant relationship between non-interest income share and 
unsystematic risk fades away following bank acquisitions of insurance companies, but 
remains significant after bank acquisitions of insurance agencies. 
Finally, chapter 7 sets out to analyse the effects of an international sample of deals 
on the risk-return profiles of acquiring firms as well as the presence of wealth and risk 
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spillover effects of those partnerships across the financial services sector. Not only 
that, it measures the determinants of excess returns, using a selection of accounting 
and deal specific variables. This chapter represents a special application on a subset of 
50 international banks that were involved in acquisitions of insurance firms and the 
stock returns of which exhibit ARCH effects. The methodological framework 
employed builds upon a Generalized Auto-Regressive Conditionally Heteroskedastic 
(GARCH) framework. In particular, this chapter examines a) the bidder equity 
response around bancassurance deals, b) the existence of wealth spillover effects, c) 
whether the nature of these effects is contagion or competitive, d) the determinants of 
bidder excess returns, e) the effect of bancassurance deals on the risk of bank bidders, 
f) the presence of intra and inter-industry risk-spillover effects, and g) the nature of 
these effects as contagion versus competitive. The main results are the following. 
First, bank acquisitions of insurance firms lead to positive bidder stock valuations and 
reduce the risk of the acquiring firms. Second, the results verify the presence of 
contagion effects from these deals and the fact that the reaction of insurance peers is 
stronger and slower to compete. Third, the market takes into account factors such as 
the bidders’ leverage, the size of the deal, the method of payment, growth 
opportunities and whether the acquirer is located in the U.S., when evaluating bank-
insurance deals. Fourth, the bank-insurance interface reduces the total, market and 
idiosyncratic risk of acquiring firms and, finally, the risk reduction spills over to 
bank/insurer peers. 
Considering the above, the main contributions of this research are the following: 
First, the most comprehensive sample of bank-insurance deals is employed. Second, 
deals between banks and insurance companies are examined separately from deals 
between banks and insurance agencies/brokers. This is because the differences in the 
risk-return profiles of banks when they merge with insurance underwriters as opposed 
to merging with insurance agents/brokers, can distort the findings. Third, this is the 
first study that examines the wealth effects of the available bank-insurance 
divestitures and spin-offs. Fourth, this is the first time a risk decomposition approach 
is being applied to examine the overall effect of bancassurance partnerships on the 
risk components of acquiring firms before and after the deals’ announcement / 
completion. Fifth, the current study provides original evidence with regards to the 
determinants of total, market and systematic risk on a pre- and post-merger basis. 
Sixth, this is the first time a GARCH methodology is applied within an event study 
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and risk decomposition framework, to study the effects of bank-insurance 
partnerships. Finally, the current research offers novel results with respect to the 
existence of risk-return spillover effects from acquirers to their bank and insurance 
peers. 
1.5. OUTLINE OF THESIS 
 
The remainder of this study is organised as follows. Chapter 2 focuses on the 
qualitative aspects of the bancassurance model. It offers a definition for the 
bancassurance model and proceeds with a review of the historical roots of the 
phenomenon. In addition it analyses and compares the different ways in which the 
model can be implemented. The regulatory framework with respect to the interface 
between financial companies and the subsequent evolution of the bank-insurance 
model are then analysed. Chapter 3 sets out to organize and review the existing body 
of research on financial conglomerates and bancassurance. More specifically it 
involves a thorough discussion of both the theoretical contributions on the 
phenomenon and a critical analysis and summary of the empirical contributions on the 
effects of bank diversification into the insurance business. 
Chapter 4 provides a thorough examination of the wealth effects of bank-insurance 
deals and divestitures/spinoffs. Chapter 5 analyses the determinants of bidder excess 
returns using a selection of accounting and deal specific variables. Chapter 6 delves 
into the risk effects of bank-insurance deals before and after the respective 
announcements. In addition, the relationship between total, market and idiosyncratic 
risk and a variety of accounting variables is assessed, on a pre- and post-deal basis. 
Chapter 7 represents a special GARCH application that looks into the wealth and risk 
effects of large bancassurance deals on bidders as well as the determinants of excess 
returns. Moreover, the existence of wealth- and risk-related spillover effects to the 
banking and insurance industry is also examined. 
Finally, Chapter 8 concludes this thesis. In particular, it summarises the main 
contributions and discusses the findings and their application to the financial services 
industry. In addition, it also considers the limitations of the current research and sets 
out possible avenues for future research. 
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2. THE BANCASSURANCE PHENOMENON 
 
This chapter aspires to explore the current knowledge on the concept of 
bancassurance. Section 1 introduces the bancassurance model by discussing its 
background, and historical roots. Moreover, it attempts to build on the current 
knowledge in order to provide an overall definition for the phenomenon16
More specifically, the rest of this chapter presents an historical overview of the 
bancassurance phenomenon, in an attempt to trace its roots and provide a 
straightforward definition. It also involves a close examination of the different levels 
of integration between banks and insurance companies that are required to put 
bancassurance into operation. The critical examination of the advantages and 
disadvantages of each level of bancassurance integration sets the foundations, upon 
which an initial distinction between the potentially successful bancassurance 
strategies and those that are too risky to be put in practice, can be made. The 
regulatory background that has been instrumental in influencing the expansion of the 
bancassurance phenomenon is also examined. Finally, the analysis of the evolution of 
the model entails a statistical overview of the penetration and expansion of 
bancassurance in various parts of the world. An important aspect of the above analysis 
is that it provides a fertile terrain for initial conclusions regarding the critical success 
factors for bancassurance. In particular, those factors include the political, regulatory, 
economic, demographic and cultural characteristics of each country, which are 
expected to play a central role in the evolution, and the respective success or failure of 
bancassurance
. Section 2 
provides a timeline of the regulatory environment across a number of regions and 
discusses the various adjustments made to it in order to accommodate bancassurance. 
Finally, section 3 provides a detailed examination of the evolution of the model 
around the globe, in terms of current practices and market penetration. 
                                                 
16 It is important to note that the definition of bancassurance still remains a source of debate. 
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2.1. BACKGROUND 
 
The fundamental changes in the financial services industry over the past decades 
such as advances in technology and deregulation had a radical impact on the 
infrastructure of the financial services industry. 
One of the most considerable transformations undergone by the financial services 
segment over the past decade has been the emergence and expansion of 
bancassurance. Its appearance was the outcome of a well structured reaction of the 
banking and insurance sectors to the fundamental changes in their external 
environments. Assigning a rather philosophical dimension to this argument, one can 
assert that the development of bancassurance is somewhat similar to a well witnessed 
phenomenon in nature; that is evolution. Within nature’s ever-changing external 
environment, organisms are constantly evolving in order to adapt and survive, and 
typically, the most successful ones are those which eventually acquire hybrid 
characteristics. In a somewhat similar vein, in order to acclimatise and thrive in the 
transformed financial industry, banks and insurance companies evolved by forming a 
hybrid or synthetic entity; that is bancassurance. 
In its simplest form, the bancassurance model entails the provision of insurance 
products through a bank’s channel. The insurance dictionary of LIMRA17 defines 
bancassurance as “the provision of life insurance services by banks and building 
societies”. Nonetheless, although one might imagine that the model only applies to 
life insurance products that are exclusively offered to individuals, practice has 
revealed that bancassurance has, in some cases, made victorious inroads into the non-
life insurance lines and that it is also on the rise in the small-medium enterprise sector. 
Additionally, the phenomenon is much more than a novel life insurance distribution 
network, if one takes into consideration its history, its evolution and the diverse 
strategies that banks and insurers have so far implemented around the world. In one of 
its publications18
                                                 
17 The Life Insurance Marketing and Research Association. 
, Munich Re gives a more systematic definition of bancassurance: 
“Bancassurance is the provision of insurance and banking products and services 
through a common distribution channel and/or to the same client base”. An holistic 
approach however, requires a categorisation in terms of the organisational relationship 
18 See Munich Re (2001). 
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between the bank and the insurer into six groups, starting from the more integrated 
models to the less integrated ones19
• Complete Integration (underwriting, distribution and management at 
group level – supported by a single capital base) 
. 
 
• Partial Integration (insurance activities conducted through separately 
capitalized subsidiary owned by bank or universal bank) 
• Holding Company Structure (bank and insurer as separate 
subsidiaries owned by a holding company) 
• Joint Ventures (bank and insurer provide capital to form joint venture 
firm) 
• Strategic Alliances (tie-ups between bank – insurer to pool various 
resources) 
o Informal agreements – no equity ties 
o Formal agreements – cross equity ownerships 
• Distribution Agreements (banks acting as an intermediary; 
broker/agent) 
o Exclusive 
o Non-exclusive 
 
Taking into consideration the various forms under which bancassurance can be 
implemented, a better definition for the phenomenon is offered in Staikouras (2006) 
who states: “The notion of bancassurance is essentially the provision of financial – 
and insurance – related products through a single corporate provider. The 
phenomenon, however, has taken various forms over the years, such as provision of 
services by different subsidiaries of the same holding company, often using different 
channels, or embracing alliances of two separate business entities aiming to sell each 
other’s products”. 
Figure 2.1 below offers a graphical representation of the different organisational 
structures under which banks and insurers can work together in offering 
                                                 
19 See Saunders and Walter (1994), Skipper Jr. (2000) and Walter (1997). Note that the analysis here is 
restricted to the integration of banking and insurance. However, the same categorisation can also be 
applied when more financial firms are involved, within a “universal banking” or “financial 
conglomerate” setup. 
 20 
 
bancassurance services. On the left hand side of the diagram one can find 
bancassurance models that require a higher level of integration between the 
companies in cooperation. These models are quite common in countries where 
regulation is less restrictive with respect to the combination of banking and insurance. 
Moving towards the right hand side of the diagram, the bancassurance models become 
increasingly open, requiring a less significant degree of integration between the 
cooperating companies. These models are generally applied in countries where strict 
regulatory firewalls are imposed on the affiliation between banks and insurance 
companies. This relationship between the degree of integration and regulation is 
graphically illustrated in the bi-directional arrow located at the bottom of the diagram. 
It must be noted that although regulation is a major determinant of the choice of 
bancassurance model, there exist many other factors that influence this decision. 
These factors are examined in the following paragraphs.    
 
Figure 2.1. Available organisational structures for bancassurance 
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More specifically, when full integration is adopted, bank and insurance services are 
underwritten (produced), marketed/distributed as well as financially supported by the 
same corporation using a single capital base. As such, this model generates an 
environment where the entire spectrum of the integrated company’s diverse activities 
is managed at the firm-wide level. This structure was adopted by Citigroup after the 
merger between two of its subsequent components, Citicorp and Travelers Group in 
1998. Under this model the bank or holding company develops, underwrites and sells 
its own insurance products through its own distribution network and under its own 
brand. In order to identify the opportunities and threats arising out of this model a 
further categorisation is required, with respect to the lines of insurance involved. This 
includes life insurance, personal non-life insurance and commercial non-life 
insurance. Life insurance underwriting can be easily carried out by banks since it is 
not very complicated. With respect to the inherent risks, life insurance does not 
represent a hurdle for banks given that actuarial science has been proved to be very 
precise in estimating the probability distribution of human life. As a result, banks do 
not have to set aside a great deal of capital to cover their liabilities. Nevertheless, the 
experience from the industry suggests that life insurance does not represent a great 
source of profits and that during the last years it is experiencing a drastic downturn in 
its attractiveness. Although new products, such as unit-linked contracts were 
developed during the past decade, banks should be very careful in selling them. Bank 
clerks do not have the expertise to sell those complex products effectively, and in case 
they are not successfully trained, they can lead their institution to mis-selling 
scandals, damaging their value and reputation. 
On the other hand, non-life insurance underwriting is far more complex than life 
insurance. Not only requires deep knowledge of specialised risks that banks are not 
familiar with, but also creates the need for a set of complementary activities, such as 
intense risk assessment, risk pricing, claims handling, loss adjusting etc., that deviate 
from a bank’s core competencies. Even though general insurance is far more 
profitable than life insurance during the upswings of the underwriting cycle, it can 
become devastating during its downturns; and once again, bank managers do not have 
enough experience on the dynamics of the underwriting cycles. Moreover, the non-
life market and especially the commercial lines are experiencing chaotic problems 
that during the last decade have almost shattered the insurance industry. Insurers are 
forced to pay huge claims for long-tail risks that were neither anticipated in the past 
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nor correctly priced. As such, non-life insurance and especially commercial lines 
underwriting is not considered as a fruitful strategy for the bancassurance model, in 
view of the fact that it is very risky, capital intensive and it does not provide a steady 
flow of profits. 
Moving down the integration ladder, partial integration is achieved via a parent-
subsidiary configuration with a bank parent holding an insurance subsidiary or vice 
versa. In this case the parent company owns the subsidiary which is independently 
capitalised and produces either banking or insurance products depending on the 
orientation of the parent company. This is the dominant model in the U.K. with the 
examples of Barclays plc and Lloyds TSB.  
The third level of integration entails the existence of a holding company that holds 
a controlling stake in the bank and insurance affiliates which are separately 
incorporated and capitalized. This structure was the U.S. norm up until the passage of 
the Financial Services Modernisation Act of 1999. The opportunities and threats 
stemming from these two models will be briefly analysed, given the models’ close 
resemblance to the full integration one, which was analysed above. Proponents of this 
model argue that bank subsidiaries are strengthened when a bank holding company 
(BHC) operates nonbank subsidiaries profitably, and that even if those firms incur 
losses, bank subsidiaries are immune by the legal separateness of the BHC corporate 
structure. Moreover, nonbank activities offer opportunities for diversification and can 
consequently reduce the risk of failure of bank subsidiaries (Boyd and Graham, 1986). 
Opponents on the other hand, argue that bank subsidiaries are not insulated by the 
corporate structure of the BHC and might indirectly incur losses in case a nonbank 
subsidiary experiences financial trouble (Brewer, 1989). Indeed, if a bank 
acquires/sets up its own insurance subsidiary, or, if both are subsidiaries of the same 
holding company, all participants will be indirectly exposed to the same underwriting 
risks. This is mainly true if one considers that the underwriting profits or losses of the 
insurance subsidiary will be either transferred to the balance sheet of the bank or to 
the financial statements of the holding company. Second, a BHC might engage in 
more risky activities if it is allowed to have a broad choice of investment 
opportunities (Boyd and Graham, 1986). 
Moving on to the less integrated models, joint ventures are separate legal entities 
that are formed through the joint contribution of capital and pooling of resources from 
two or more parties (bank/s and insurer/s). Under such configuration, control as well 
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as revenues, expenses and risk are equally shared by the companies that initiated the 
venture. 
Further on, strategic alliances can be considered as a “connecting bridge” between 
the integrated and non-integrated models, as they represent a hybrid form of 
organisational structure. Strategic alliances exhibit a hybrid character due to their 
ability to bring together various coordinating functions of integrated companies with 
the decentralised structure of autonomous companies (Chan, Kensinger, Keown and 
Martin, 1997). The level of risk involved under the strategic alliance models largely 
depends on whether there are equity ties between the partnering companies or not. In 
the case of the presence of formal agreements with equity ties, both parties are 
indirectly exposed to each other’s risks to the extent of the cross-ownership of shares. 
In case of no equity ties, although financial risk is minimized, there still exist 
operational risks that are discussed below.    
Last but not least, distribution agreements can be positioned outside the integrated 
models, given that under such configuration, the bank and insurance companies are 
not affiliated in any way that requires pooling of resources. What brings the two 
companies together in this case is some sort of a unilateral or bilateral formal 
agreement under which one or both companies’ services are cross-sold to their 
indigenous client bases respectively. Such arrangements can either have an exclusive 
character, limiting one or both parties to the distribution of the counterparty’s services 
only, or have a non-binding nature, leaving both parties free to form analogous 
agreements with other companies. As for the opportunities and threats arising out of 
this model, there is little concern about the inherent risks. This activity falls into the 
set of the core competencies of banks, because they exhibit great ability in selling 
products. By using this strategy, banks are able to boost their profitability levels for 
two main reasons. First, because they can earn a steady flow of risk-free commissions 
from the insurers and second because their distribution costs will be marginal. 
Brokerage activities can become very profitable if the institution that undertakes them 
is capable of achieving high sales volumes and this is not uncommon in banking. 
Nonetheless, as suggested in Nurullah and Staikouras (2008), insurance brokerage 
activities entail operational risks as well as the risk of potential professional liability 
for errors and omissions, within the course of marketing and administering the sale of 
such products. Furthermore, recent developments in regulation and changes in public 
 24 
 
awareness20
Overall, it seems that the best bancassurance strategies according to their risk-
return profile are insurance broking and life insurance underwriting. They both are 
less risky than non-life underwriting and, on average, provide a steady flow of income 
streams. A further comparison of life insurance underwriting and brokerage suggests 
that the latter is the most beneficial for banks given that it is less risky and exploits 
one of the core competencies of banks; that is, selling. As suggested in Felgran 
(
 are not in favour of brokers, since nowadays class-actions against such 
companies, especially for mis-selling scandals are not unusual. 
1985), banks would not extract much gain from providing insurance underwriting 
services, because of the elevated risk involved. Finally, one may argue that 
bancassurance is a very promising strategy for banks and insurers. However, both 
institutions should be very careful in determining their strategies, because although 
bancassurance may seem to enable them to exploit synergies, it is pragmatic this 
might come at a cost. 
As such, the selection of the appropriate bancassurance model, both in terms of 
organizational structure and insurance activities depends on a battery of diverse 
exogenous and endogenous drivers. With respect to the former, the political, 
regulatory, economic, demographic and cultural characteristics of each country play 
an important role in the selection of the correct organisational approach. Moreover, 
the endogenous or company-specific factors such as the business culture/cycle, 
organisational focus, strategic targets, brand recognition, market shares etc. are of 
great importance in choosing the bancassurance model that best fits to the company’s 
strategic and operational orientation (Staikouras, 2006)21
                                                 
20 This mainly refers to the recent “deep pocket” approach by many claimants, especially in the 
insurance world, which in order to obtain large amounts of compensation are starting to sue 
brokerage companies or their directors and officers (known in insurance terms as D&O claims), on 
the grounds of mis-selling, errors and omissions etc.  
. 
21 Staikouras (2006) analyses the dynamics underlying the provision platform of hybrid financial 
institutions and elaborates on the endogenous and idiosyncratic risk-success factors of bancassurance 
operations. A more detailed analysis of this paper is provided in chapter 3. 
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2.2. REGULATION 
 
Regulation has always played an important role in the evolution of the financial 
services industry. One of the central responsibilities of the regulatory authorities is to 
facilitate constant growth in the industry and consequently to the national economy 
without risking the stability of the respective financial system. For instance, a rapid 
liberalisation of the financial services industry without previous implementation of a 
regulatory ‘safety net’ would pose significant risks on consumer protection. On the 
other hand, it is pragmatic that strict regulation and consumer over-protectionism may 
slow down the evolutionary process in the industries and can slowdown economic 
growth. As such, a regulatory system that continuously controls and counterbalances 
the interests of the industry with those of the consumers is considered vital. 
The regulatory environment has been instrumental in influencing how the 
bancassurance phenomenon has evolved, particularly in the U.S. In contrast to the 
European financial services industry, that was liberalised in 1989 when the Second 
Banking Directive was adopted by the EU Council of Ministers22, the industry in the 
United States remained extremely fragmented until 1999. In the U.S., regulation 
dating back to the 19th century constrained the geographical expansion of banks into 
other states23 as well as their ability to affiliate with other types of financial firms, 
such as investment banks, securities firms, and brokerage and insurance companies24
                                                 
22 The implementation of the Second Banking Directive by all 15 member states was completed 
between 1991 and 1994. For further details, the interested reader is referred to Chen (
. 
Due to these legal barriers, U.S. banks were unable to benefit from scale and scope 
economies through consolidation.  
The majority of the legislative barriers between banks and non-bank financial 
companies were imposed by Section 24 of the National Banking Act of 1864. Under 
this section of the Act, banks were permitted to exercise “all such incidental powers 
as shall be necessary to carry on the business of banking”. As such, all the activities 
that were considered as ‘non-incidental’ to banking were prohibited. 
2007). 
23 The geographic expansion of banks into other states before the 1930’s was heavily regulated by the 
Federal as well as State Authorities up to 1927, when the McFadden Act was passed. However, the 
latter’s passage did not introduce significant relaxations. See the following paragraphs for a further 
analysis. 
24 In chronological order, section 24 of the National Banking Act (1864), section 20 of the Banking Act 
(1933) and the Bank Holding Company Act (1956). See the following paragraphs for a further 
analysis. 
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Further on, in the aftermath of the stock market crash of 1929, the United States 
was in deep economic recession. According to Benston (1990), 40% of the banks had 
either failed or been forced to merge. Banks were considered to be responsible for the 
chaotic situation in the financial system because of the general concern that they were 
engaging in very risky and speculative activities through their securities subsidiaries. 
Section 20 of the Banking Act25
Kroszner and Rajan, 1994
 that was enacted in 1933, opted to reintroduce 
stabilisation and public trust in the financial system by prohibiting commercial banks 
from affiliating with companies that were “principally engaged” in the issue, flotation, 
underwriting, sale or distribution of securities. In simple terms, what the Act 
accomplished was the separation of commercial and investment banking. 
Nevertheless, the findings of the literature suggest that the concerns in the aftermath 
of the crash were unfounded and illogical ( ; Puri, 1994). 
Moreover, in an attempt to provide a rationale for the separation of commercial and 
investment banking, Ang and Richardson (1994) examine the performance of bond 
issues underwritten by different classes of underwriters prior to the passage of the 
Glass-Steagall Act. They find no evidence that bonds underwritten by security 
affiliates of commercial banks prior to the passage of the Glass-Steagall Act, were in 
any way inferior to those underwritten by investment banks. They conclude that the 
bad underwriting practices of two banks26
                                                 
25 The Act is also formally known as the Glass-Steagall Act. In particular, Sections 16, 20, 21, and 32 of 
the Banking Act (1933) are designated as the Glass-Steagall Act. 
 may have condemned the whole financial 
services industry.  
In the subsequent years, commercial banks managed to circumvent both 
restrictions imposed by the National Banking Act (1864) and the Glass-Steagall Act 
(1933). The loophole was found in that holding companies were not explicitly 
forbidden to own a commercial bank, investment bank or insurance company. 
Therefore, through holding company structures, commercial banks managed to 
affiliate indirectly with other types of financial companies. In order to close that gap, 
regulators brought into force the Bank Holding Company Act in 1956. What the Act 
accomplished was to confine holding company affiliates to activities that were 
“closely related to banking”. 
26 Ang and Richardson (1994) also isolate the performance of bonds underwritten by National City 
Company and Chase Securities Corporation. They find that these two banks were issuing bonds of 
lesser quality than other bank affiliates. 
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In addition to these restrictions, state level legislation as well as the Federal 
Government in the U.S. limited the geographical expansion of commercial banks. 
Prior to the McFadden Act of 1927, banks were heavily regulated both by the Federal 
Authorities and individual states and were not permitted to have any branches at all. 
After the passage of the McFadden Act banks could only set up branches in the 
community of their main office. The amendment of the McFadden Act in 1933 
granted permission to national banks to be able to establish branches outside the 
community of their main office, including other states. Nevertheless, banks were 
captives of a provision that required state-level law to be granting equal authorities to 
state banks. As such, banks found themselves in a position of being unable to expand 
geographically since, even after the Act’s amendment, the majority of state laws 
prohibited external banks from acquiring in-state ones. In order to circumvent these 
restrictions, banks established holding companies which, at the time were not 
prohibited from acquiring banks in other states. As a result they achieved interstate 
expansion under the canopy of holding companies. In a delayed response however, 
regulators managed to close that loophole by introducing the Douglas Amendment of 
the Bank Holding Company Act in 1956 which brought into force a provision 
identical to that of the McFadden Act’s Amendment; that is, holding companies were 
prohibited from acquiring out-of-state banks unless state law provided otherwise. 
Not surprisingly, these pieces of legislation that were introduced in order to 
safeguard consumers and maintain stability in the financial system, inevitably slowed 
down the evolutionary process in the U.S. financial services industry. In other words, 
at the time when players in other industries were consolidating at a torrid pace, the 
financial services industry was highly fragmented and unable to evolve and benefit 
from consolidation. Commercial banks, insurers, investment banks, securities firms 
and brokerage houses could neither become larger through interstate mergers or 
acquisitions, nor diversify their product portfolios via cross-industry consolidation. 
During the following years, competitive pressures increased the need for 
consolidation in the financial services industry. Financial companies started to press 
regulators to eliminate most of the barriers that hampered their efforts to consolidate. 
As a result of this pressure, most of the barriers were progressively removed by the 
regulatory authorities, as will be seen below. 
On 30 April 1987 the Federal Reserve authorised Citicorp, Bankers Trust and J.P. 
Morgan to engage in limited underwriting and dealing in a set of securities. That 
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included, municipal revenue bonds, mortgage related securities, consumer receivable 
related securities and commercial paper. This decision was based on the interpretation 
of the word ‘principally’ within the Glass-Steagall Act. The Federal Reserve held that 
subsidiaries would not be principally engaged in underwriting if they derived no more 
than 5% of their gross revenues from impermissible underwriting and dealing within 
any given two-year period. On 18 January 1989, the Federal Reserve made a step 
forward towards liberalisation in allowing BHCs to underwrite corporate debt and 
equity. It was the first time since the passage of the Glass-Steagall Act that banks 
could expand into the corporate underwriting market. On 13 September 1989, the 
Federal Reserve raised the limit on gross revenue from the initial 5% to 10%. In a last 
attempt to press the Congress to repeal the Glass-Steagall Act, the Federal Reserve 
expanded the limit to 25% and concurrently reduced the regulatory barriers between 
commercial and investment banking. 
With respect to the geographic expansion of commercial banks, although 
individual states had started passing bills that permitted interstate banking and 
branching since 1982, it was not until the passage of the Interstate Banking and 
Branching Efficiency Act (IBBEA)27 that banks became totally free to expand into 
other states. The Act, which was enacted in 1994, repealed the Douglas Amendment 
and accomplished to consolidate a chaotic set of Federal and state regulations, by 
allowing BHCs to acquire banks in any state with a few trivial restrictions28
The majority of the remaining barriers between financial institutions that were 
imposed by the National Banking Act (1864), the Banking Act (1933), and the Bank 
Holding Company Act (1956) were removed by the Financial Services Modernisation 
Act (FSMA)
.   
29
                                                 
27 The Act is formally known as the Riegle-Neal Act 
28 These restrictions correspond to a set of conditions that must be met by a BHC in order to be granted 
authorisation to acquire out-of-state banks; a) it must be financially safe and sound in terms of its 
capital adequacy and managerial competency, b) it has to comply with deposit concentration limits 
that restrict it from controlling more than 10% of nation-wide deposits or 30% of deposits in the 
respective state and c) its community reinvestment record must be checked by the Federal Reserve 
Board. 
29 The Act is also known as the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act. 
 of 1999. Under this Act, banks could affiliate with investment banks, 
insurers and securities firms through a holding company structure. What is more, the 
passage of the Act sought to remove the substantial asymmetries between players in 
the financial services arena that previous regulations had systematically fashioned. 
More specifically, it targeted one of the most serious anomalies in the financial 
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services sector; the fact that commercial banks were relatively allowed to acquire 
investment banks and insurance companies, whereas the latter were not permitted to 
own commercial banks. The FSMA makes financial conglomeration achievable, since 
it is possible for a single financial institution to conduct simultaneously the business 
of commercial banking, investment banking, investment management, insurance and 
securities underwriting. However, this is only permitted at a holding company level or 
alternatively through subsidiary structures. On the regulatory side, the FSMA has 
consolidated the supervision of bank holding companies, with the Federal Reserve 
being the ‘umbrella’ regulator and the Securities and Exchange Commission 
regulating the banks’ securities activities 
Overall, the long anticipated FSMA paved the way for the creation of a ‘one-stop-
shopping’ financial environment that promises to benefit all participants; namely the 
financial institutions and their stakeholders as well as the regulators and the 
consumer. 
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2.3. MARKET PRACTICES 
 
The first pioneers that ventured into the field of bancassurance were the French, 
where in the early 1970s ACM (Assurances du Crédit Mutuel) life and general 
decided to bypass the middlemen for loan protection insurance by insuring their own 
banking clientele themselves. Spanish banks have followed the French paradigm in 
the early 1980s when Banco de Bilbao Group acquired EuroSeguros SA. However, 
due to legal barriers, their control was only financial until 1991 when those barriers 
were subsequently removed. 
Although the phenomenon, as it is known today, first appeared in France and Spain 
in the 1980s, it rapidly expanded across Europe until the mid-1990s and continued to 
spread in other parts of the world such as the USA, Canada and Australia. Moreover, 
banks and insurers have started making inroads into emerging markets such as Asia 
and South America since the early 2000s with bancassurance strategies being 
implemented there at a torrid pace. 
In the European front, the bancassurance market was totally liberalised by the 
Second Banking Directive (1989) that has been implemented by all member states in 
1991. Due to the early removal of the restrictions imposed on the affiliation of 
financial services in the EU when compared to the practices in other continents, the 
model has achieved a considerable success in the majority of the European member 
states. Overall, bancassurance enjoys a market share of approximately 35% of life 
insurance sales in the European market and is the prevailing method of distribution in 
several countries such as Belgium, France, Italy, Spain and Portugal. Nevertheless, 
bancassurance remains a negligible distribution channel in the majority of non-life 
insurance markets in Europe. According to a recent report by Swiss Re30
Figure 2.2
, the average 
share of bancassurance in the European non-life market is 10%. The non-life market 
in Europe is clearly dominated by agents and brokers, which are followed by other 
channels such as direct sales. However, bancassurers have achieved a significant 
penetration in some market segments related to their banking activity. Additionally, 
bancassurance is gaining market share as a growing number of banks enter the non-
life insurance market to reinforce their customer loyalty.  shows the market 
share by distribution channel in key European markets.  
                                                 
30 See Wong, Barnshaw and Bevere (2007). 
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We can easily observe that the model has achieved significant levels of penetration 
(above 50%) in countries such as Finland, Norway, Italy, Belgium, France, Spain and 
Portugal. 
More specifically, France, which is considered as the “birth place” of 
bancassurance, has witnessed a vivid development and expansion of the bank-
insurance model between 1990 and 2001, with its levels of life insurance penetration 
rising from 40% in 1990 to 66% in 2001. Since then, the expansion of bancassurance 
in France has somewhat slowed down, with the current market share being 64%. It is 
worth noting that the rapid growth of bancassurance in France has been facilitated by 
a favourable tax-system, with a number of insurance products that enjoy tax privileges 
being only available through banks. However, this growth has somewhat settled down 
after 2000, as bancassurance reached zenith levels of life insurance market share. This 
might be linked to the gradual reduction in tax advantages related with life insurance 
products in the second half of the 1990s and the 2000s. The deceleration of the 
expansion of bancassurance is one of the main justifications behind the French 
bancassurers’ growing desire to expand into the comparatively ‘virgin’ – from the 
bancassurance perspective – non-life market, where the model only accounts for about 
10% of all collected premiums. It is expected that in the near future, French banks 
will be controlling a large part of the personal non-life market though their 
subsidiaries. In Belgium, bancassurers have, up until recently, been controlling the 
life insurance market with a 56% share in premiums. Similar to France, bancassurance 
in Belgium has also somewhat slowed down, with the current market share in the life 
insurance market being 48%. It is also worth noting that the five market leaders in 
Belgium belong to either a banking or to an insurance group (Staikouras, 2006).  
Bancassurance enjoys considerable success in Spain and Portugal, with market 
shares of 77% and 80%, respectively. More recent figures show a deceleration in 
Spain, where bancassurance currently controls 72% of the premiums and an 
expansion in Portugal where it accounts for 88% of the market. The success of the 
phenomenon in Spain is mostly attributable to the presence of an extensive network of 
regional building societies as well as to the positive tax system that favoured the 
development of bancassurance products. Similar to France, these tax-benefits have 
been gradually reduced, which might be one of the reasons why bancassurance has 
lost about 5% in market share since 2005. On the other hand, although bancassurance 
in the Portuguese market exhibits a record penetration level, the latter only represents 
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€4 billion in premiums and this is due to fact that Portugal represents a relatively 
small market. In addition, the Spanish and Portuguese bancassurers are currently 
facing the same challenges as their French peers, seeking an expansion into the non-
life lines in order to increase their profits. 
Furthermore, the Italian bank-insurance market has witnessed remarkable growth 
in the aftermath of the Amato law, effective July 30 1990. Its passage not only made 
the affiliation between banks and insurance companies possible, but also provided the 
appropriate regulatory approvals with respect to the ability of banks to sell insurance 
products – produced by one or more partner insurers – to their client base. However, 
several restrictions still apply. First, insurance policies must be underwritten by the 
insurance company, while banks have no permission to alter them. Second, it is 
obligatory for bank staff to be trained by the partner insurer/s and third, several other 
conditions which are laid down in the exclusivity principle, must be met by the bank 
when selling insurance contracts to its clientele. Nevertheless, the presence of a 
favourable tax environment promoted growth in life insurance and effectively in 
bancassurance. As figures suggest, bancassurance in Italy grew from 8% of all life 
insurance premiums in 1992 to 58% in 2005 and enjoys a current market share of 
59%. On the general insurance side however, the model has been unsuccessful, 
accounting for less than 1% of the overall market, which is clearly dominated by 
agents who control more than 85% (2005 figures). Although current market figures 
suggest an expansion of bancassurance share in the non-life market in Italy, the figure 
still stands at around 2%. Nonetheless, this can be viewed as a considerable 
opportunity for the future expansion of the model in Italy. 
Despite the considerable success of the phenomenon in the above regions, 
countries such as the Netherlands, Germany, United Kingdom and Greece have opted 
for more traditional networks such as brokers and agents. In the UK in particular, the 
Financial Services Act of 1986 has somewhat restricted the expansion of the model, 
by allowing only authorised financial advisers who had obtained minimum 
qualifications to sell most investment-based products. This has, to a large extent, 
limited the ability of branch staff to sell insurance products. In addition, contrary to 
France, the U.K. tax system does not provide any sort of tax advantages for insurance 
products purchased through banks. The market share of bancassurance in the UK has 
been constrained to a mere overall 18% and to 10% of new premiums, yet the 
restructuring undergone by the market in the early 2000s, coupled with the creation of 
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stakeholder pensions, generate substantial growth opportunities for the phenomenon 
(Benoist, 2002; Falautano and Marsiglia, 2003). Despite these efforts, bancassurance 
in the U.K. has yet to take off since it currently enjoys a 20% share. Similar to other 
European countries, bancassurance in the U.K. exhibits low penetration in the non-life 
market, which currently stands at 10%. Two other facts are also responsible for the 
rather futile operation of bancassurance in the U.K. First, its development has been 
somewhat constrained by the strong role of independent financial advisors (IFAs). 
Second, the U.K. has a rather mature private pensions market that has led to the 
emergence of more complex financial products. In turn, this has created an important 
role for brokers and sidelined bancassurers. Similar issues are present in the 
Netherlands, where the model enjoys a market share of 32%. 
In a somewhat similar vein, the bank-insurance model in Germany has not yet 
realised its full potential, accounting for only 23% of total premiums generated in 
2005. Current figures suggest a small increase of 2% in the market share of 
bancassurance in the life market. Nevertheless, pension reforms create a promising 
setting for banks and insurers and the phenomenon is expected to bear fruits in the 
years to come. Surprisingly, German bancassurers lead the market in Europe in terms 
of their penetration in non-life insurance, which currently stands at 12%. 
It is important to note here that the very nature of the U.K. and German markets 
may provide an additional explanation for the erratic success of bancassurance in 
these markets, when compared to other European countries. Both their economies are 
predominantly centred upon their equity markets, whereas the majority of the 
economies of other European countries – where bancassurance has been successful – 
are predominantly based on their respective banking systems. 
In Greece, even though bancassurance enjoys a mere 15% market share, there are 
great opportunities for bancassurers there, since this limited share mostly stems from 
customer unawareness regarding the bank-insurance products offered there, rather 
than from their willingness to buy such products, which seems to be noteworthy31
                                                 
31 See Lymperopoulos, Chaniotakis and Soureli (
. 
Similar figures can also be found in Poland, where bancassurance enjoys a 15% share 
in life insurance. Despite its growth in the life insurance market, the respective 
penetration of bancassurance in the Polish non-life insurance market is still in its 
infancy, with market share below 1%. On the contrary, bancassurance has witnessed 
2003). A more detailed analysis of their work is 
offered in chapter 3. 
 34 
 
increasing success in Turkey, where it accounts for 23% of life and 10% of non-life 
insurance premiums, respectively. Finally, in Switzerland, a country that is not 
included in Figure 2.2, bancassurance has so far failed due to laws on banking secrecy 
that had a catastrophic impact on the joint venture and merger models that banks and 
insurers attempted to implement there. 
   
 
Figure 2.2. Market share by distribution channel in Europe32
 
 
 
On the other side of the Atlantic Ocean, the Glass Steagall Act of 1933 has 
hampered the evolution of bancassurance in the U.S. Despite the long-awaited 
Financial Services Modernization Act (FSMA, 1999) that expanded the mix of 
permissible activities for players in the financial services field, bancassurance is still 
struggling to take off. The fact that there is huge growth potential in the U.S. that 
mysteriously remains unexploited has fuelled numerous debates in the literature on 
the subject. The typical conclusion seems to be that the long-lasting barriers that 
existed between banks and insurers have in a way managed to create an ill market, 
                                                 
32 See Chevalier, Launay and Mainguy (2005). 
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where, even after the removal of those barriers, differences and misunderstandings 
between banks and insurers are acting as a brake in the expansion of the bank-
insurance model. Another major reason for the low interest that U.S. banks show in 
insurance is the perceived low margins of insurance products versus banking 
products. As such, U.S. banks have traditionally preferred to invest in other banking-
related businesses that offer higher rates of return. For example, the high profile exit 
of Citigroup from the insurance business through the divestiture and spin-off of 
Travelers, was mainly due to the latter’s low rate of return and high risk. On the 
contrary, recent U.S. bank acquisitions show the banks’ increasing interest in 
insurance distribution. This is mainly due to the fact that insurance brokerage 
provides higher returns and lower volatility than insurance underwriting. 
Bancassurance is also experiencing huge difficulties in the Canadian market with 
the exception of Quebec. Canadian banks that are controlled by the Federal 
Authorities are only allowed to sell travel and loan protection insurance through their 
branches. Even though the majority of Canadian banks have life insurance 
subsidiaries, they are only allowed to sell their products through other distribution 
networks, which have no connection whatsoever with the bank branches. 
Having analysed the status of bancassurance in the mature markets, we can now 
shift our focus to the emerging ones, which seem to offer substantial opportunities for 
the growth of the phenomenon. In Latin America, deregulation in the financial 
services sector in most countries has promoted the expansion of the model. The ability 
of banks to sell insurance products directly to their customers is now, in general, 
legally recognised with the exceptions of Argentina, Chile and Colombia, where some 
restrictions still apply. 
 Brazil for instance, represents a gigantic opportunity for bancassurers and the 
model in this market has started to flourish in recent years. The tremendous prospects 
in this market stem from three analogous dimensions, namely the demographic, 
economic and regulatory characteristics of the country. On the demographic front, 
Brazil is the sixth largest country in the world and has an enormous population of 
approximately 184 million inhabitants33
                                                 
33 However, as figures suggest, the declining birth rates and increased life expectancies will inevitably 
force the population to stabilise at around 200 million in the following 15 to 20 years.  
, almost 60% of which are under the age of 
30. These demographic attributes generate a significant challenge for bancassurers 
because it is pragmatic that, it is the economically active layers of population that are 
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most in need for financing (banking) and savings-protection (insurance) solutions. As 
a result, a successful blending and promotion of such products via the implementation 
of bancassurance is deemed to engender gigantic profit opportunities for banks and 
insurers. Additionally, in terms of its economic environment, Brazil is the leading 
market in Mercosur34 and in fact in the entire region of Latin America and that makes 
it one of the most preferable countries for foreign investment. More noticeably, the 
country has surmounted an economic recession which was mostly evident within the 
1980-1992 period and since then has been recovering its dynamics and economic 
growth at a promising pace. More specifically, as statistics suggest, between the years 
1999 and 2003 Brazil’s GDP and per capita income had an average growth rate of 
approximately 12.40% and 10.60% per annum respectively. Moreover, the realities 
and trends in Brazil’s insurance industry further magnify the opportunities for the 
bancassurance model which, as mentioned above, already thrives there over other 
insurance distribution channels. The strong growth in all lines of insurance and 
particularly in personal life insurance lines, combined with the so far low per capita 
insurance penetration, provide strong foundations for the future development of the 
model. Besides the promising economic characteristics, a battery of regulatory 
relaxations such as the opening of the internal market to foreign players, and the 
privatisation of reinsurance and personal accident insurance35
According to figures, bancassurance is the prevailing method of distribution in 
Brazil, accounting for 86% of all individual life premiums
 provide a fertile terrain 
for bancassurers. 
36
                                                 
34 Mercosur (Spanish) or Mercosul (Portuguese) is a trading zone between Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay, 
and Paraguay, founded in 1991. Its purpose is to promote free trade and the fluid movement of 
goods, peoples, and currency. Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador and Peru have associate member 
status. On 9 December 2005, Venezuela was accepted as a new member, but it will be officialised in 
late 2006. After changes in Venezuelan policy to adhere to existing Mercosur rules, Venezuela will 
become a voting member. On 30 December 2005 it was announced that Bolivia would be invited to 
join as a full member. 
35 The latter generated a market of about US$ 5 billion. 
36 This figure includes premiums generated by VGBL (Vida Gerador de Benefício Livre), a retirement 
product dedicated to the accumulation of funds firstly introduced by Itau Bank. If this product is 
excluded, bancassurance accounted for 66% of life premiums in Brazil in 2004. The current figures 
stand at 55% for life insurance and 10% for non-life insurance.  
 (2004 figures). 
Interestingly, the ten largest banks and/or insurance companies in Brazil have selected 
and use bancassurance as their main distribution outlet. Bradesco, the top Brazilian 
bank in terms of insurance premium generation, controls 34% of the life market 
through the bank-insurance model, and Itau, Unibanco AIG, Santander and Caixa 
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Seguros – CNP, follow with 17%, 5.5%, 5.1% and 4.9% respectively. The annuities 
market is also massively dominated by bancassurance which accounts for 93% of all 
premiums generated, with Bradesco, Itau, Brasilprev and Unibanco controlling 38%, 
17%, 11% and 8% respectively, via their bank-insurance operations. 
On the other hand, the existing restrictions on the direct sale of insurance products 
to a bank’s customer base in Argentina and Colombia have somewhat hampered the 
expansion of the model in these countries. Argentinean and Colombian regulations 
require insurance products to be sold through separate intermediaries rather than one 
insurer, something common in other countries. 
In a somewhat similar vein but within a rather more relaxed environment, Chile 
restricts the direct sale of insurance products to a bank’s customer base unless the 
insurance product accompanies a banking transaction. Moreover, banks are not 
allowed to own insurance companies, yet the bank-insurance combination can be 
achieved within a holding company structure. Despite the restrictions in Chile, 
estimates37
In Asia, bancassurance has mainly emerged as a diversification vehicle for banks 
and insurers after the financial crisis of 1997. Since then the model has been 
 show that bancassurance has still managed to control about 10% and 19% 
of the life insurance and non-life insurance premiums, respectively. 
Last but not least, Mexico allows the combination of all financial services at the 
holding company level and participating companies are free to cross-sell their 
products to each other’s clientele. However, it is mandatory for every insurance policy 
to involve an agent. The most considerable characteristic of the Mexican 
bancassurance market is the fact that banks are the principal private pension suppliers 
in the market, something that can be mainly attributed to the catalytic involvement of 
Mexican banks in the establishment of pension funds during the 1997 pension reform. 
Bancassurance in Mexico however, has yet to take off, as it currently enjoys a small 
penetration of 10% in both the life and non-life markets. 
Clearly, Latin America represents a huge opportunity for bancassurance if we 
consider a number of diverse realities. The so far low insurance penetration rate in 
this region, the recent relaxations of the regulatory barriers in many countries, the 
potential for economic growth and the low average age of the region’s population, are 
in favour of the successful expansion of the bank-insurance model there.  
                                                 
37 See Wong, Barnshaw and Bevere (2007). 
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successfully operating and expanding in several markets were regulation is 
favourable. The pioneering country was Singapore when DBS (Development Bank of 
Singapore) signed an exclusive distribution agreement with Aviva, immediately after 
the latter had purchased DBS’s insurance operations. As of 2002 bancassurance in 
Singapore enjoyed a market share of 15% of all premiums and 24% of new business 
in the life insurance sector. As for the non-life lines, it is estimated that bancassurance 
in Singapore enjoys a satisfactory – at least for the time being – 5% to 10% market 
share38
                                                 
38 This is an estimate taken from Swiss Re, Sigma No. 7/2002. See Wong and Cheung (
. 
The Japanese market on the other hand is still in its infancy, since it was not 
liberalised until 2001, when banks were allowed to own an insurance subsidiary and 
sell a limited range of insurance products to their customers directly. However, 
bancassurance in Japan has been witnessing rapid growth since the second and third 
phases of financial services deregulation that went into effect on October 2002 and 
December 2005 respectively. More analytically, the 2002 reform allowed banks to 
distribute annuities while the 2005 reform lifted restrictions on the distribution of 
other single premium products through bank branches. Banks and insurers have 
applauded deregulation by pursuing the formation of multiple ties, mainly in the form 
of non-exclusive distribution agreements. Yet, due diligence needs to be exercised in 
the formation of such multiple ties, as they could easily become unstable if they 
generate incentives for banks to promote the insurance products of companies that 
guarantee the highest commission. This possible conflict can not only traumatise the 
relationship between banks and insurers but can also lead to mis-selling scandals, if 
inappropriate or overpriced products are marketed via the bancassurance channel. In 
terms of figures, although the above mentioned reforms paved the way for the model, 
bancassurers still enjoy a minimal market share of less than 1% that is mostly due to 
the presence of significant remaining restrictions that exist so as to protect consumers 
and the insurance sector from weakening to the benefit of banks. Nonetheless, 
bancassurance in Japan has strong potential as the Japanese Financial Services 
Agency (FSA) and the respective Life Insurance Association are planning to 
progressively allow banks to distribute all insurance products through their branches 
by 2007. 
2002). 
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The phenomenon is also underdeveloped in Thailand where it controls 2% of the 
premiums respectively. On the other hand, bancassurance has really taken off in 
Malaysia, where it expanded its penetration in the life insurance market from 6% in 
2002 to 45% in 2007. Moreover, in Korea, although banks have been allowed to sell 
insurance products since 2003, they are restricted from entering into exclusive 
distribution agreements with insurers. In fact, they are obliged to have such 
agreements with at least three insurers, with none of the latter being able to 
underwrite more than 50% of the bank’s insurance business. In other Asian countries 
such as Indonesia and Philippines, bancassurance in average only generates about 5% 
of the life insurance premiums. Conversely, bancassurance in Australia has 
experienced rapid growth after the progressive lifting of the strict regulatory firewalls 
during the 1980s and 1990s. Within fifteen years the Australian insurance industry 
was transformed from one of the most regulated financial sectors to one of the least 
regulated industries. As such, deregulation promoted reorganisation in the insurance 
sector and paved the way for bancassurance which currently controls 43% of life 
insurance premiums. 
Finally, the bancassurance phenomenon is expected to thrive in the huge Chinese 
and Indian markets. Even though the model is still in its infancy in those two 
chaotically large markets, the fact that the local insurance markets are still 
unexploited with respect to their penetration levels yet, growing at burning rates, is 
very promising for the success of bancassurance. More specifically, the phenomenon 
in India has been rapidly expanding in the last years, with banks/insurance companies 
continuously shifting their focus to the alternative solutions that bancassurance 
offers39
                                                 
39 For example ICICI Prudential increased the percentage of policies sold through bancassurance from 
15% in 2002 to 30% in 2004, SBI Life from 15% to 50%, Birla Sun Life from 25% to 40%, Aviva 
Life from 50% to 70% and HDFC Standard Life from 10% to 40%. Source: Tapen (
. Although bancassurance in India has an overall market share of less than 5% 
of life insurance premiums, the share of new business grew from 0% to 20% percent 
within the last two years. Moreover, the distribution of life insurance products via 
bank branches is expected to be further boosted by the pension reform which is under 
way in India. The latter can play a catalytic role in the victorious transformation of 
banks into private pension vehicles. On the other hand, bancassurance is still in its 
infancy regarding the distribution of non-life insurance products in India. However, 
although it controls a negligible market share, the latter is mounting at a very 
2005). 
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promising rhythm, expanding the opportunity horizons of the phenomenon to 
unparalleled levels. Moving north-east, the bank-insurance model in China has not yet 
taken off. Although regulations there do not significantly constrain bancassurers, the 
model accounts for only 5% or less of life insurance premiums. Nevertheless, this 
figure may be somewhat misleading, given that statistics show that its penetration is 
noticeably higher in major cities (approx. 20%). On the non-life side however, the 
bancassurance model has a very insignificant market penetration of less than 1%.       
Overall, regardless of the erratic success of the bank-insurance model in some 
markets, traditional networks still control the distribution of life and non-life 
insurance products in Asia. The following diagram shows the market share by 
distribution channel in Asia. 
 
Figure 2.3. Market shares by distribution channel in Asia 
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3. REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 
 
During the last decades several forces have radically altered the ways in which 
financial institutions can operate. The opportunities for higher profits offered by 
technological innovations and the increasing popularity of capital markets have 
resulted in a structural evolution in the traditionally fragmented functions of financial 
services firms. After a series of lagged responses between regulation, circumvention 
and deregulation, the consolidation and the creation of very large, multi-product firms 
with global reach and power is currently the norm rather than the exception. The 
research on bancassurance falls under the wider canopy of restructuring in the 
financial services industry and the creation of financial conglomerates. As such, the 
current chapter aims to analyse the extant body of academic literature on financial 
conglomerates and consequently bancassurance. Section 1 focuses on the broader 
concept of financial conglomerates and reviews the literature on the causes and the 
benefits and costs associated with this phenomenon. Following the analysis of the 
general concept of convergence and of the debate associated with it, section 2 moves 
on to present the theoretical and empirical contributions on bancassurance. This 
facilitates a comparison between the proclaimed benefits and costs discussed in the 
theoretical contributions, and the empirically confirmed realities. Finally, a summary 
of the literature is presented in section 3, which at the same time sets the foundations 
for the research questions laid out in this study. 
3.1. FINANCIAL CONGLOMERATES 
 
In order to gain a perspective on the changing structure of financial institutions one 
has to address what the changes are, what are the forces driving them and what are the 
implications of such changes (Santomero, 1989). In what follows, the extant literature 
is thoroughly analysed in an attempt to shed light to the above questions. 
As noted above, the financial services industry is undergoing a major shake-up 
during the last decades. Specifically, the long-established distinctions of the functions 
of financial firms are becoming increasingly opaque with the creation of universal 
banks and financial conglomerates. Financial conglomerates are institutions that may 
offer the entire range of financial services. In particular, they may perform traditional 
banking operations and at the same time underwrite securities and/or insurance, or act 
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as a broker for their clients’ security transactions and/or insurance purchases. 
Universal banks on the other hand may also hold equity stakes in non-financial firms 
in addition to their financial company holdings (Benston, 1994; Vander Vennet, 
2002). 
3.1.1. THE DRIVING FORCES 
 
A number of studies on financial conglomerates consider the market forces behind 
the creation of such structures. For example, Walter (2009) points out that market 
dynamics are responsible for the structural change in the global financial services 
industry. He argues that the main cause is the growing trend towards the reallocation 
of financial flows from financial intermediaries to the capital markets. Specifically, 
technological and financial innovations are considered to have facilitated the creation 
of both conventional and structured capital market instruments that provide investors 
(users of funds) similar or even superior functionality than traditional banking 
products. The increasing consumer demand for such products is inevitably driving the 
disintermediation process, where traditional intermediaries are experiencing major 
declines in their market shares of financial flows. Under this perspective, the move 
towards financial conglomeration can be seen as a structured response of financial 
intermediaries to external developments fostering changes in customer needs. Along 
the same lines, Allen and Santomero (2001) compare the role of intermediaries across 
the U.S., U.K., France, Germany and Japan in relation to the levels of the competition 
they receive from capital markets. They argue that banks located in countries where 
financial markets are highly developed40
                                                 
40 Economies in countries where capital markets are highly developed are considered market-based, 
whereas economies that mostly rely on the traditional banking system are considered bank-based. 
 are losing ground to finance companies, 
securities markets and to mutual funds both on the asset (loans) and liability (deposits) 
side of their balance sheets. They find that this is particularly the case in the U.S. and 
U.K., whereas German, French and Japanese banks are still experiencing less 
competition of this sort due to the nature of their economies. The authors suggest that, 
as a result of the declining role of the traditional intermediation process, banks are 
moving away from traditional functions, while at the same time they are increasing 
their dependence on fee-based activities. The former argument provides further 
support to the notion that the creation of financial conglomerates is a natural reaction 
of banks to the growing competition from their external environment. 
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In addition to advances in technology and financial innovation, others also consider 
globalization and deregulation as factors contributing to the creation of financial 
conglomerates. Along these lines, Taylor (1999) parallels the structural changes in the 
financial services industry to a Darwinian shakeout and examines its causes and 
implications. He considers three major trends as the driving forces leading to the 
emergence of financial conglomerates. The forces discussed are deregulation and 
privatization, the introduction of new technologies and development of new products, 
and finally increased cross-industry and cross-border competition. Foreign 
competition is also analysed in Herring and Santomero (1990) who look into the 
structure of the U.S. financial system prior to the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999 
(FSMA), as well as the rationale behind and consequences of the creation of financial 
conglomerates. They point out that, apart from technology, another reason for the 
transformation of U.S. financial institutions is the increasing competition from foreign 
institutions. As suggested, regulatory competition by foreign markets has brought 
U.S. financial firms at a competitive disadvantage to a number of their non-U.S. 
counterparts that operate in less regulated financial industries. The determinants and 
driving forces of cross-border bank mergers is also part of the focus in a recent survey 
by Buch and DeLong (2009). They conclude that the lowering of implicit and explicit 
barriers to the integration of markets fostered cross border merger activity and, 
naturally, facilitated the evolution of financial conglomerates. 
Another strand of literature considers technological advances as the main driving 
force behind the blurring of the functional distinctions among financial services, while 
financial innovation and deregulation are viewed as the mere consequences of the 
former. In a study of the firm-level and public policy effects of the changing structure 
of financial services, Santomero and Eckles (2000) consider technological advances 
as the main force driving the formation of financial conglomerates. They view the 
emergence of innovative products as the result of advances in technology and 
deregulation as an accommodation to the continuing practice of explicit or implicit 
circumvention of the rules by financial firms. In turn, they point out that regulatory 
evolution introduces fierce competition between financial firms and fuels the creation 
of new product delivery channels that are challenging the role of traditional banks. 
Furthermore, in a review of two volumes of conference articles on universal banks 
and financial change, Santomero (1989) concludes that the shift towards universal 
banking seems to be happening on a global scale, to the extent allowed by the 
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permissiveness of each national regulatory environment. In terms of the main forces 
behind this trend, he points to advances in technology and telecommunications, the 
emergence of new financial products, globalization of the marketplace and 
deregulation. He suggests that advances in the area of telecommunications have not 
only increased the range of products available to consumers, but also have made a 
number of products cost-effective for the first time, while financial innovation has 
brought about new products. With respect to globalization and deregulation, he argues 
that these are the outcome of the former forces. 
To sum up, there seems to be a consensus with regards to the causes of the 
consolidation wave. In particular, technological advances have altered the financial 
services arena to the extent where traditional intermediaries need to adapt or let their 
market shares be severely affected by cross-industry and cross-border competition. 
Having analysed the causes, this section proceeds to review the literature on the 
implications of the conglomerate wave in an attempt to shed light on the second 
question of Santomero (1989). 
3.1.2. BENEFITS VS. CONCERNS 
 
The benefits and costs of a more integrated financial system have caused an 
ongoing debate in the academic literature. As a result, financial conglomerates and 
universal banks have attracted both fervent supporters and ardent detractors. 
Following Santomero and Eckles (2000), the benefits and costs of a more integrated 
financial system can be broken down into firm-level effects and public policy level 
effects. 
3.1.2.1. FIRM LEVEL 
 
Starting with the firm-level benefits and costs associated with financial 
conglomerates, the question of whether these institutions are in a position to benefit 
from increasing their size and scope has been at the centre of academic as well as 
strategic and regulatory discussions. These benefits and costs are typically related to 
increased cost and profit efficiencies (inefficiencies) due to scale and scope 
economies (diseconomies). 
On one hand, the financial services industry is an information and distribution 
intensive industry with relatively high fixed costs and, as a result, increasing firm size 
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may lead to size-related reductions in operating costs due to better utilization of 
existing resources. The latter include physical and human resources such as the branch 
networks, electronic distribution systems, the infrastructure software and personnel 
(Santomero and Eckles, 2000). Given the above, the financial services industry is 
considered to exhibit high potential for economies of scale as long as the expansion 
fits to the business and/or a specific size threshold is not exceeded. This is because, 
while size can add value for some lines of business, it may be value destroying for 
others. In a similar vein, there is an upper limit to expansion which, if exceeded, can 
bring about diseconomies of scale attributable to administrative overheads, agency 
problems and other cost factors (Walter, 1997). Despite the size related advantages, 
the formation of financial conglomerates cannot be justified by the potential for 
economies of scale per se. This stems from the fact that economies of scale are more 
related to size increases, whereas the core function of financial conglomerates is the 
fusion of multiple products and services under the same corporate umbrella. As such, 
economies of scale in isolation can only justify size increases of existing financial 
conglomerates that can be achieved through organic growth or via mergers and 
acquisitions (Skipper Jr., 2000). 
For this reason, the potential for scope economies can provide a more subtle 
justification for the creation of financial conglomerates. This is especially the case 
given the presence of high fixed costs and the complementarities across different 
products in the financial services industry. Economies of scope can be achieved both 
at the production and the consumption levels. 
The first, usually referred to as cost scope economies, stem from cost efficiencies 
related to the joint production of an array of services. Specifically, cost economies of 
scope are achieved if financial conglomerates can produce a given mix of products at 
a lower cost than individual institutions producing the same array of products 
separately (Berger, Hunter and Timme, 1993). Cost scope economies could come 
from a number of sources. In particular, they may be the result of a) spreading the 
fixed expenses of managing client relationships, such as human resources, 
information technology and sustaining good reputation, over a broader output mix, b) 
the efficient use of established distribution channels for delivering additional products 
at lower marginal costs and c) synergies in the use of knowledge related to the 
production of services (Herring and Santomero, 1990). Despite the cost related 
benefits that can be attributable to scope economies, supply side diseconomies may 
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arise from a number of factors. Specifically, the sheer size and the respective 
bureaucracy in financial conglomerates may create inertia, making the institution 
unable to respond to changing customer needs, prone to “turf battles” and profit 
attribution conflicts, while finally, cultural differences in management and staff may 
disturb the flow in delivering a broad range of financial services (Skipper Jr., 2000; 
Walter, 1997). 
The second, or consumption scope economies, are also known as revenue 
economies and can be achieved through the efficient cross-selling of an array of 
products from the same outlet. In particular, consumers might find it more 
advantageous to purchase multiple products from a single outlet (conglomerate), 
given the reduced overall cost, as compared to the cost of purchasing the same 
services from separate suppliers. These cost savings might arise due to supply side 
(production) scope economies, such as reduced service prices, transaction and 
contracting costs, or due to lower information, search and monitoring costs at the 
consumer level (Herring and Santomero, 1990; Vander Vennet, 2002; Walter, 1997). 
In this respect, financial conglomerates may benefit from demand side scope 
economies if consumers are willing to pay a premium for joint provision of services, 
up to the amount of savings they obtain from joint consumption. This in turn implies 
that financial conglomerates can increase their revenues directly, through higher fees 
or prices, or indirectly, through lower interest paid on deposits (Berger, Humphrey 
and Pulley, 1996). 
From another perspective the above practice may bring about scope diseconomies 
caused by customer disappointment with regards to cost savings not being passed on 
to them. What is more, demand side diseconomies are also likely to arise given that, 
as Herring and Santomero (1990) suggest, the broader the array of financial products 
offered, the greater the possibility that conflicts of interest will arise. Such conflicts 
could be in the form of agency costs due to personnel acting against the interests of 
clients in product tie-ins (Saunders, 1994), or the mishandling of the interests of a 
group of clients vis-à-vis those of other client groups. Another possibility where 
diseconomies can arise is the case where client information that is transferred across 
the conglomerates’ operations is against the formers’ interests (Walter, 1997). This is 
highly possible to come about in the form of information abuses, where the ignorance 
of counterparties is exploited using information flows across different operations, to 
the benefit of the conglomerate firm. 
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While both production and consumption economies may offer considerable 
opportunities to financial conglomerates, demand-side economies of scope are easier 
to achieve. This is particularly the case in restricted markets such as the U.S. financial 
services industry, where the full potential from scope economies, particularly at the 
production level, was somewhat hinged by the regulatory product-mix restrictions that 
existed prior to the passage of FSMA in 1999. Therefore, there are greater 
opportunities for revenue expansion from demand-side economies via effective cross-
selling, given that, in contrary to cost reduction opportunities, revenue economies can 
be achieved at a less than full organisational integration level (Saunders, 1994). 
Another argument against the effects of scale economies on financial 
conglomerates is that the product of efficient management can sometimes be mistaken 
for scale economies, especially when firms compete well and become large (Berger, 
1993). For example, large, multi-product firms may also be in a position to gain from 
improvements in X-efficiency, or in other words, superior management of available 
resources. For instance, managers of financial conglomerates might be able to manage 
labour, capital and existing technology in a more efficient manner, or be more 
effective in acquiring productive inputs and producing optimal outputs, than managers 
of single product firms (Walter, 1997). Moreover, the organisational design of 
financial conglomerates and their ability to quickly develop hybrid products, or to 
contain costs by reallocating inputs across different products, puts them in a better 
position with respect to adapting to changing technological or market conditions 
(Skipper Jr., 2000). 
In addition to the above, corporate diversification is often cited as one of the most 
important advantages stemming from the creation of financial conglomerates. 
Theoretically, if the returns of banks and other firms are imperfectly correlated, the 
integrated or aggregate profits of a universal bank or conglomerate will exhibit lower 
variance than those of standalone/specialised institutions. This becomes more 
apparent if one considers the case discussed previously, where clients bypass banks 
and raise funds directly in the capital markets. Although this could be a devastating 
scenario for focused banks, financial conglomerates will be able to offset the decline 
in their lending activities by the respective increase in their securities activities (Barth, 
Brumbaugh Jr. and Wilcox, 2000), or via concentrating on other fee generating 
activities like insurance. In addition, the ability of such institutions to spread their 
income across geography is considered to be equally important in stabilising risk and 
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returns. The lower profit variance also leads to a number of indirect benefits. First, the 
risk of insolvency and the probability of incurring distress related costs are reduced 
and, as a result, financial conglomerates may benefit from better credit scores and 
lower financing costs. Second, the expected corporate tax can decline given the 
reduced volatility of earnings. Third, a less volatile income stream not only 
regularizes dividend payments, something which emits positive signals about the 
company, but also paves the way for long-term and sound financial planning 
(Gaughan, 2002). Considering the link between the above attributes and profits, 
financial conglomerates are expected to exhibit superior capacity in generating returns 
for shareholders (Santomero and Eckles, 2000). Finally, it is often argued that by 
allowing banks to integrate with other firms, the former will be able to boost their 
capital levels and in this way experience a direct improvement in their financial status 
(Saunders, 1994). 
However, the concept of diversification in financial conglomerates has not been 
able to escape criticism over the years. First, corporate finance theory is against 
mergers where diversification is highlighted as the key motive. This is mainly due to 
the notion that companies that choose to diversify are offering a redundant service to 
their stockholders who could instead diversify their portfolios themselves at lower 
costs. Consistent with that notion, Levy and Sarnat (1970) employ portfolio theory to 
prove that in the absence of synergistic gains and capital cost economies41
Van den Berghe and Verweire, 
2001
, the 
diversification benefits that are stemming from such mergers cannot produce 
economic gains in a perfect capital market. In addition, examples from the 
manufacturing industries show that the conglomerates that where created on the 
grounds of diversification, subsequently destroyed shareholder value and were forced 
to refocus on their core businesses. The counter-argument for financial conglomerates 
however is that instead of relying on mere portfolio diversification benefits, they bring 
about related diversification, which leads to synergies at various levels of the value 
chain and more integration at the operational level (
). This is in line with early theoretical evidence that suggests that related 
diversifiers outperform unrelated diversifiers (Rumelt, 1974), and sends a very 
positive signal for financial conglomerates given that there is a great degree of 
similarity in the operations of their subsidiaries. 
                                                 
41 The term capital cost economies is used by the authors in order to describe cost savings that stem 
from better access to capital markets and reduced lender’s risk following diversifying mergers. 
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3.1.2.2. PUBLIC POLICY LEVEL 
 
Other than the firm-level benefits and costs discussed above, a great deal of focus 
has also been placed on the public policy level effects of financial conglomerates. 
These typically relate to concerns that financial conglomerates will bring about 
increases in systemic risk, assume increased access to the governments’ safety net, 
create unhealthy concentration of power and lead to conflicts of interest between the 
firm and consumers. The fact that private profits, such as the firm level benefits 
analysed previously, are not aligned with social profits is one of the main reasons why 
the financial services industry has been heavily regulated, with authorities aiming to 
facilitate constant growth in the industry and consequently to the national economies 
without risking the stability of the respective financial system. 
Focusing on the social costs of the creation of financial conglomerates, the 
mainstream of concerns has been principally related to the scale and reach of these 
institutions or, in other words, the possible consequences of their sheer size. It is often 
argued in the academic literature that these mega-firms might pose a threat to the 
stability of the financial system as a whole. This is specifically the case if the 
proclaimed diversification potential that is expected to reduce the risk of failure of 
these institutions is either overstated or non-existent42
Alternatively, even if diversification benefits are indeed present, Wagner (
. 
2008), 
presents a model where, although beneficial per se, diversification can reduce welfare 
given that it can promote excessive risk taking by banks. Irrespective of the above 
scenario, potential distress or failure of one of the component firms can extend to the 
holding company and its subsidiaries (Santomero and Eckles, 2000). In addition, the 
possibility of risk spillover is considered to be amplified by diversification in Wagner 
(2010), who argues that institutions are becoming increasingly similar through related 
diversification and, hence, systemic crises are becoming more likely. As such, the 
sheer size and scope of a distressed conglomerate, coupled with the growing linkages 
between firms and increased capital flows in the modern financial markets, can affect 
the entire sector and, this can spread to the economy as a whole. The notion of 
increased systemic risk arising from the broadened scope of banking activities has 
been recently gaining ground in other recent theoretical contributions that delve into 
                                                 
42 See section 2 for a detailed review of the empirical findings on the risk effects of expanding the scope 
of financial institutions. 
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systemic risk and market crashes (Acharya, 2009; Ibragimov, Jaffee and Walden, 
2010). In particular, the above articles offer two complementary models of systemic 
risk and generally find that although actions of diversification are optimal for 
individual intermediaries, they may be suboptimal for society. Complementing the 
theoretical approaches, recent empirical evidence on systemic risk is also available. 
Specifically, De Jonghe (2010) probes the relationship between bank tail betas 
(defined as the probability of a crash in a bank’s stock conditional on a crash in the 
banking index) and measures of functional diversification, controlling for other 
factors. His overall findings complement the conclusions of theoretical approaches in 
that they imply that the creation of financial conglomerates and universal banks does 
not improve the stability of the banking system. Notwithstanding the above studies, 
(De Bandt, Hartmann and Peydro, 2009) offer a comprehensive analysis of the 
concept of systemic risk along with a systematic review the existing body of 
theoretical and empirical literature. 
On the other hand, even if diversification indeed leads to lower risk of failure, it is 
feared that the sheer size of these institutions will inevitably increase the severity of 
the effects of a likely failure on the financial system (Skipper Jr., 2000). Given the 
possible ramifications of a large conglomerate’s failure on the financial system and 
the economy, these institutions are often characterised as “too big to fail” and thus 
gain access to the government’s safety net. This forms the basis of a set of two 
interlinked concerns. 
The first is whether government guarantees will be extended to a broader range of 
financial activities to cover the whole spectrum of the conglomerates’ functions. If 
this is the case, not only conglomerates will exhibit an unfair advantage over their 
specialised or non-bank competitors (Barth, Brumbaugh Jr. and Wilcox, 2000), but 
also further convergence will be stimulated, which can ultimately lead to a more 
concentrated financial system. Some fear that such a landscape will inevitably pose 
undesirable systemic problems, given that a failure will bring about government 
bailouts and excessive taxpayer bills (Santomero and Eckles, 2000; Walter, 1997). 
Similar conclusions are drawn in Kwan (2004) who calls for attention in the ever 
growing scale and concentration of financial institutions because of systemic risk 
concerns. He points out that “too big to fail” institutions may gradually become a 
burden to the tax-payers. 
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The second is government induced moral hazard. As noted in Kane (2000), the 
increased size and market share of financial institutions enhance their market power 
and political clout43, thus intensifying conflicts between regulators and making it 
harder for them to monitor and limit the institutions’ risk exposures44
Benston, 1994
. The difficulty 
to monitor these mega-firms, coupled with their access to the government’s discount 
window, can introduce serious moral hazard issues, where managers take on excessive 
risk. In turn, regulators dealing with this issue, would face the dilemma of 
implementing tight regulation, preventing efficiency, versus the possibility of a large 
bailout ( ). The recent financial crisis of 2007-2009 clearly demonstrated 
both the moral hazard-induced excessive risk taking by these companies and the 
subsequent devastating social costs from governments’ efforts to contain a systemic 
collapse through massive bailouts of large financial institutions. 
The above facilitated the re-surfacing of the old argument around the ‘narrow 
banking’ concept, adeptly analysed in Bossone (2001). As discussed in Boot and 
Thakor (2009) and Morrison (2009), supporters of this concept argue that firewalls, 
such as those imposed by the Glass-Steagall Act, should be reintroduced in order to 
limit the risks that deposits are exposed to and, hence, reduce systemic risk. Along 
these lines, Vesala (2009) considers the advantages and disadvantages of narrowing 
the size and scope of banking institutions. He argues that narrow banking would cause 
significant losses in terms of bank synergies, without guaranteeing the elimination of 
systemic risk. In fact, he stresses that an artificial restriction of bank margins may 
increase bank manegement incentives to gamble so as to to maintain profitability. 
Under such scenario, narrow banking may have to be supported by ultra strict 
supervision, a solution that is not optimal. 
Furthermore, the possibility that convergence in the financial services industry will 
lead to an unhealthy concentration of power is another issue that concerns regulators 
and academics alike. The issue of concentration of power can be seen from two 
different angles. First, large financial institutions may be able to benefit from 
increased monopoly power. Specifically, some worry that sheer size or, controlling a 
full range of financial product substitutes, may permit conglomerates to extract 
                                                 
43 Herring and Santomero (1990) disagree on the issue of excessive political influence exercised by 
financial conglomerates and suggest that small institutions can exhibit and exercise similar powers, 
as in the case of extreme lobbying by the thrift industry in recent years.   
44 Kane (1999) refers to these institutions not only as “too big to fail” but also as “too big to discipline 
adequately”. 
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economic rents – and redistribute them to shareholders – by raising prices above 
marginal costs (Herring and Santomero, 1990; Walter, 1997). In line with this view, 
Walter (2009) draws attention to the fact that the financial services sectors of many 
countries exhibit oligopolistic trends, with excessive market power allowing these 
firms to benefit from monopoly by charging more, or monopsony by paying less. 
Nevertheless, he argues that monopoly power is difficult to be sustained in markets 
where barriers to entry are low and thus new entrants can destroy oligopolistic 
structures through effective competition. Others fear that conglomerates may be able 
to affect the flow of capital by allocating funds (making credit available) only in 
particular segments of the economy, or limiting credit to small businesses (Santomero 
and Eckles, 2000). 
Finally, there is growing concern that conglomerates will be subject to severe 
conflicts of interest as discussed earlier. The six most cited conflicts of interest in the 
literature can be identified as the salesman’s stake, stuffing fiduciary accounts, 
bankruptcy risk transference, third-party loans, product tie-ins and information 
transfer (Saunders and Cornett, 2008). First, proponents of the presence of conflicts of 
interest argue that when a bundle of products is promoted by the same institution, 
managers no longer offer appropriate advice to customers with regards to which 
products to buy. Instead, it is believed that they are subject to a salespersons’ stake in 
pushing the affiliates’ or subsidiaries’ products, to the detriment of the consumers’ 
interests. Second, another potential conflict reported in the literature arises when firms 
that act as underwriters are unable to place the securities in a public offering. As such, 
in an effort to avoid being exposed to unwanted underwriting risk, the conglomerate 
might seek to minimize the risk of underwriting losses by “stuffing” unwanted 
securities in accounts managed by its own investment subsidiary and over which the 
conglomerate has discretionary investment powers (Saunders and Cornett, 2008; 
Walter, 1997). Third, conglomerates might misuse private information obtained 
through their lending activities in order to transfer bankruptcy risk to the unsuspecting 
public. Under such a scenario, a bank subsidiary that holds private information on the 
inability of one of its debtors to pay-off loans made by it, might be induced to use its 
securities affiliate to underwrite securities that will be then offloaded to the public and 
subsequently use the proceeds to pay down the bank loan (Puri, 1996; 1999). Fourth, 
critics of financial conglomerates also argue that a bank subsidiary may direct below 
market loans to outside investors, conditioned upon their purchasing securities 
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underwritten by the conglomerate’s securities arm, in order to extend the latter’s 
revenues (Walter, 1997). In a similar vein, a conglomerate can use its market power in 
one sector to promote the products of its affiliates. Such tie-ins, which represent the 
fifth concern, might come onto the surface if, for example, a bank subsidiary with a 
strong market presence, only offers bundled services to customers in order to support 
one of its affiliates. Specifically, the decision of issuing a loan to a customer may be 
solely based on the customer buying a supplementary product such as securities or 
insurance (Herring and Santomero, 1990; Saunders and Cornett, 2008; Walter, 1997). 
Nevertheless, tie-in sales need not be necessarily detrimental to the consumer. In this 
respect, Benston (1994) offers two explanations for this. First, he argues that even in 
markets dominated by conglomerates, competition among these should drive prices at 
competitive levels, just as someone would expect from a market dominated by 
specialised institutions that compete in a healthy fashion. Second, he contends that 
consumers cannot be worse off when presented with the opportunity to purchase 
bundled services. This is because, a) the additional transaction costs incurred when 
“shopping around” should drive the price of purchasing separate products up and b) 
ignorant consumers could be overcharged in a bundled service just as much as in an 
individual service purchase. Finally, the sixth conflict of interest is related to the 
possible transfer of private information from one affiliate to another, that gives an 
unfair advantage and unique price setting power to the latter company (Saunders and 
Cornett, 2008; Walter, 1997). 
Having looked at the literature on the implications of the creation of financial 
conglomerates from both the firm and public policy perspective, the following can be 
summarised. From the firm-level perspective, it is evident that the benefits associated 
with expanding the scale and scope of companies in the financial services industry, 
outweigh the respective costs. On the other hand, there are serious public policy 
concerns regarding financial conglomerates and universal banks. From the sceptics’ 
point of view, the emergence of universal banks and financial conglomerates seems to 
be creating an economic environment that socialises risks while privatising gains. 
Nevertheless, the consensus in the literature seems to be that the competitive forces 
created by open markets and prudent monitoring, should minimize the risks that the 
financial system and the economy are being exposed to. For example, similar 
conclusions are reached in Benston (1994), who considers all the concerns related to 
universal banking and points out that universal banks can offer considerable benefits 
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and pose a few problems for the economy. The future for universal banks and 
financial conglomerates is well depicted in the work of Santomero and Eckles (2000). 
They conclude that the synergies achieved via the universal firm system should drive 
the market towards the creation of an increasing number of such companies. They 
also suggest that that niche firms will not cease to exist and that is more likely that a 
mix of specialised and universal firms will be the norm. 
3.2. THE CASE OF BANK-INSURANCE 
 
The bank-insurance phenomenon, or otherwise known as bancassurance, naturally 
falls under the wider canopy of mergers and acquisitions in the financial services 
industry and represents a central part of the wave towards the creation of financial 
conglomerates. The same market dynamics that fostered the expansion of financial 
conglomerates are also somewhat responsible for the emergence of the bancassurance 
model and its adoption by many financial services firms. Specifically, on the one 
hand, increased competition and its negative effect on interest rate margins, the threat 
of takeovers and the shareholders’ pressure for higher returns have forced banks to 
look for and secure alternative sources of income (Staikouras, 2006). In a similar 
fashion, these competitive forces have pushed down insurance profitability ratios 
through their effect on both distribution costs and product pricing (Artikis, Mutenga 
and Staikouras, 2008). In addition, changing customer behaviour, such as the 
increased preference for a one-stop-shopping environment, and growing customer 
sophistication, have added to the need for cooperation between financial service 
providers (Ryan, 2001; Voutilainen, 2005), while the continuing relaxation of 
international trade barriers, and the trend towards deregulation in several markets has 
allowed companies to enter an increasing number of new markets (Benoist, 2002). 
Finally, technological advances have helped financial institutions to reduce costs and 
created motives for the creation of one-stop-shops, while analogous effects have been 
created by changes in demographics, such as the aging world population (Ryan, 
2001). Given these changes in the financial companies’ external environment, it was 
crucial for financial institutions to reduce costs, search for alternative sources of 
revenues and strengthen their capital basis, in order to become more efficient and 
compete effectively within this highly competitive environment. 
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Given that bancassurance is part of the conglomerate movement, the primary 
motives behind its adoption embrace expectations for synergies, similar to those 
analysed in the previous section with respect to financial conglomerates. Specifically, 
the key targets are higher efficiency and profitability, geographic and revenue 
diversification and finally, shareholder value maximisation that is considered as the 
primary motive by (Berger, Demsetz and Strahan, 1999). 
The effects of the blurring boundaries between banking and insurance on firm 
value have spawned an ongoing debate in the academic literature, with a large volume 
of research focusing on the analysis of the potential synergies as well as the risks 
involved. In an effort to gauge the impact of bancassurance on firm value, the 
economy and the consumer, the majority of these studies adhere to three different 
methodological approaches. The first group of studies includes qualitative analyses 
that, unlike the majority of research, focus on the unquantifiable, yet still very 
important aspects of bancassurance. These studies, which are generally overlooked, 
are of great importance as they provide the theoretical framework, on the basis of 
which, quantitative studies are designed and developed45. The second set of studies 
compares the pre-merger and post-merger performance of financial institutions using 
accounting data. Specifically, these studies examine changes in accounting profit 
rates, cost/revenue ratios and also changes in risk-return profiles and the associated 
probability of bankruptcy of the involved institutions. As such, performance related 
studies produce a direct measure of whether bancassurance indeed adds to, or destroys 
the value of the financial institutions that embrace it46
                                                 
45 See 
. The last group of studies uses 
the event study methodology to examine the stock market reaction to bank-insurance 
mergers. Based on the efficient market hypothesis, this methodology asserts that 
investors react to new information by immediately reflecting their expectations on the 
stock prices of the merging entities. In the case of the bank-insurance interface, event 
studies usually gauge the wealth effects of specific merger announcements – like the 
Citicorp-Travelers merger – and/or the market reaction upon certain regulatory 
announcements on the stock prices of banks and insurers, or provide direct evidence 
Table B.5 in the appendix for a summary table of theoretical studies. 
46 See Table B.3 and Table B.4 in appendix for a summary table of studies that use accounting 
measures. 
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on the average equity wealth effects of a number of bancassurance deals on bidders, 
target firms and/or the combined entity47
3.2.1. QUALITATIVE STUDIES 
. 
In what follows, the arguments and conclusions of the qualitative studies are laid-
out and discussed in section 1, while section 2 sets out to thoroughly review the 
empirical findings from performance and event studies alike. 
 
Qualitative studies embark to explore the unquantifiable aspects of the 
bancassurance interface, which despite being very important, are generally overlooked 
in the literature. While some of these studies document the roots of the collaboration 
between banks and insurers and its expansion at several parts of the world, others look 
at the rationale behind its implementation. Another strand of studies focuses on the 
corporate side of bancassurance and examines the forms of entry and the available 
organisational structures. The challenges for managers and the risk-success factors 
that are pertinent to the bank-insurance interface are also examined in recent work. 
Notwithstanding the above studies, the pertinent benefits/risks and challenges for the 
consumers and regulators have also been the subjects of extensive scrutiny in studies 
on universal banks and financial conglomerates presented earlier. In what follows, this 
section builds the knowledge on bancassurance based on these qualitative studies and 
considers the various theories and conclusions drawn from this set of studies. 
The cooperation between banks and insurers is generally believed to have emerged 
around the ‘80s in France. Nevertheless, there is evidence suggesting that the first 
links between banks and insurance companies emerged during the first decade of the 
19th century at the U.S. state of Massachusetts (Johnston, 1922). Specifically, after the 
Armstrong investigation, the local legislature body made provisions for what was then 
called “savings-bank life insurance”. Through these provisions, but under specific 
requirements, savings banks in Massachusetts were able to establish insurance 
departments that used banks as the main channel for the distribution of personal and 
commercial insurance. Under this system, bancassurance was successfully operating 
under a well supervised system where insurance and savings divisions of banks were 
                                                 
47 See Table B.1 and Table B.2 in the appendix for a summary table of studies that used the event study 
approach. 
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kept financially separate48
In spite of the early attempts by financial institutions to put bank and insurance 
operations under the same corporate umbrella, regulatory intervention in the form of 
restrictions has slowed down the phenomenon, especially in the U.S. Nevertheless, 
determined bankers and insurers have consistently found ways to circumvent 
restrictions imposed on their affiliation. It is well documented in the academic 
literature that as a market becomes increasingly competitive, regulation tends to 
become stricter and regulated parties are more willing to innovate by finding 
loopholes, especially because regulatory restrictions impose opportunity costs on 
banks when narrowing the scope of their operations (
. Around the same time, attempts were made to operate the 
model in a more integrated manner, through hybrid savings-insurance products, yet 
these plans failed due to regulatory concerns for the increased risks and fears that 
bank competition would wipe out the incumbent agency system. 
Kane, 1981). In terms of the 
bank-insurance interface, the argument above is given further support in Broome and 
Markham (2000) who suggest that “the entry of banks and bank holding companies 
into insurance since the early 1990's is an example of creative lawyering and the 
acquiescence of regulators frustrated with the inability of Congress to statutorily 
expand the permissible activities of banking organisations”. The fact that banks and 
insurers are still collaborating despite continuous attempts to separate them, proves 
that the market forces that pull banks and insurers together are carrying more weight 
than the legal barriers designed to keep the two industries apart (Felgran, 1985). 
The cyclical interaction between regulation and market driven innovation is 
extremely apparent if one considers the case of the United States, where stringent 
regulatory obstacles have prevented the expansion of bancassurance. Nevertheless, 
innovation in terms of finding loopholes coupled with mega-mergers (i.e. Citicorp-
Travelers) have pushed regulatory reforms (FSMA 1999), that paved the way for the 
creation of financial conglomerates and the expansion of bancassurance. 
In Europe, the success of bancassurance is clearly evident if one considers its 
successful implementation and market penetration in major countries as well as its 
rapid growth in other European countries, where it is still in its infancy. The cases of 
the U.K. and France are adeptly analysed in Morgan, Sturdy, Daniel and Knights 
(1994). In the U.K., where banks promote bancassurance through fully owned 
                                                 
48 In particular, the assets of the savings bank and its insurance department were kept separate so that 
neither department would be liable for the obligations of the other. 
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insurance subsidiaries or act as a tied agent or independent broker in selling insurance 
products, evidence suggests that independent advice is losing market share to 
bancassurance at an incredible pace. Even more spectacular figures are observed by 
the authors in France, where bancassurance is operated by banks in a more 
straightforward manner, through de-novo entry in the insurance market, or 
acquisitions of existing insurance firms. Nevertheless these figures are constrained to 
the life insurance and pensions market as penetration in non-life insurance is still low. 
In contrast with the previous study, others claim that bancassurance in the U.K. is still 
in its infancy due to the extensive market penetration of independent insurance 
advisors there (Benoist, 2002). The latter also argues that, in addition to the U.K., the 
phenomenon has not taken-off in Germany and Italy. Others suggest that despite the 
fact that the U.K. bancassurance model did not experience a boom in 1990s, as it did 
in other European countries, it is experiencing gradual growth due to an extensive 
restructuring of the market (Falautano and Marsiglia, 2003). 
The status and practises of bancassurance in Greece has also attracted academic 
interest. What is interesting about Greece, which is considered a rather new market for 
bancassurance, is the fact that despite de jure regulatory limits on the interface of 
financial institutions, bancassurance existed there since the early 1980s in a de facto 
mode, where state owned banks operated their own insurance subsidiaries 
(Kalotychou and Staikouras, 2007)49
2003
. The potential for the growth of bancassurance in 
Greece is also evidenced in Lymperopoulos, Chaniotakis and Soureli ( ), who 
examine the extent of the opportunities of Greek banks to effectively cross-sell 
insurance products via their branches. The analysis of a questionnaire that was 
completed by 720 bank customers shows that there are significant opportunities that 
mostly arise from consumer unawareness of the offering of insurance products by 
banks, and their willingness to buy bancassurance products. 
Outside North America and Europe, bancassurance has met uneven success, 
depending on characteristics such as the degree of regulatory intervention, the 
structure of tax and pension systems, the type of the financial system or economy50
Benoist, 2002
, 
and finally the development of the insurance markets ( ). In this respect, 
the author finds that bancassurance is highly developed in Argentina and Brazil, due 
                                                 
49 The authors also point out that the subsidiary structure is still the dominant bancassurance model in 
Greece. 
50 This serves to distinguish bank-based economies, where bancassurance has been successful, from 
market based economies where bancassurance has yet to take-off. 
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to the increasing penetration of foreign players in the first case and the important role 
of banks in the financial system of the second. On the other hand, the phenomenon is 
growing in Mexico and Japan, due to pension reforms and the abolition of regulatory 
barriers, respectively. 
Another strand of qualitative research examines the market forces that pull banks 
and insurers together, the mutual benefits and costs along with the opportunities 
offered to, and the challenges faced by banks, insurers as well as regulators and 
consumers alike. 
There are several potential benefits for both banks and insurers that can be 
exploited via the joint distribution of their services. Banks for instance, specialise in 
the provision of financial transactions to their customers (Bergendahl, 1995). They 
have extensive branch networks that serve millions of customers on a daily basis, and 
vast customer bases with exclusive information about lenders and borrowers (Felgran, 
1985). In contrast to the insurers, banks experience strong brand recognition and 
customer loyalty for two main reasons. First, because they are perceived by the public 
as safe institutions due to their strong capital bases and second, because there is a 
general consensus among consumers that banks ‘give them money’ while insurers 
‘take it away’. Taking also into consideration the fact that banks are an effective ‘sales 
machine’ that serves millions of customers, it is generally believed that they could 
effectively sell insurance products as well. 
Banks make inroads into the insurance market for a number of reasons. In 
particular, they can increase their non-interest income by offering insurance products 
and thus reduce their dependence on loans as a primary source of income (Broome 
and Markham, 2000; Johnston and Madura, 2000). This represents a great opportunity 
for banking organisations, since demand for ordinary banking products may 
experience limited growth or even decline from time to time. Under these 
circumstances banks can leverage their resources in selling insurance products in 
order to rebalance their revenue streams and avoid profit downturns. In other words, 
banks enjoy diversification benefits when they choose to offer insurance products via 
their distribution channel. Moreover, by leveraging their core competencies, such as 
their reputation and their vast distribution systems, banks can easily cross-sell 
insurance products along with traditional banking products (Flur, Huston and Lowie, 
1997). This is possible because many bank and insurance services are complementary 
and can be packaged and cross-sold easily by non-specialised bank staff. For example, 
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insurance products could be offered to customers who purchase banking services and 
vice versa, as is the case when a mortgage is packaged with a life insurance policy. 
Furthermore, many customers may value a bundled provision of services from a 
single outlet more than unbundled offers of separate institutions, given the reduced 
information and transaction costs (Van den Berghe, Verweire and Carchon, 1999; 
Vander Vennet, 2002). As such, banks could offer a one-stop-shopping environment 
to their clientele in order to increase their market share and further build on customer 
loyalty. Finally, banks can boost their efficiency and profitability levels if they 
manage to achieve optimum usage of their resources and networks. The latter is in 
line with the conclusions drawn in (Bergendahl, 1995). By analysing the dynamics 
behind the profitability of bancassurance he identifies five key factors that are crucial 
for its success; the number of branches, the number of insurance specialists per 
branch, the number of customers, the cross-selling ratio and the degree of learning of 
the branch staff. 
On the other hand, insurers specialise in areas where banks fall short. Most 
insurance companies have strong underwriting and investment/risk management 
experience, and specialise in product development and hard selling. Contrary to 
banks, they do not have extensive branch networks and therefore rely on costly 
distribution channels such as brokers and agents in order to market and distribute their 
products (Flur, Huston and Lowie, 1997). Insurance companies are risky in nature and 
that represents a major disadvantage with respect to brand awareness, since in general, 
the public perceives them as unsafe institutions. Insurers may benefit from 
bancassurance since they can market their products to a new and vast customer base. 
In addition, they can minimise their reliance on traditional networks by using the vast 
channels owned by banks, where the distribution costs are significantly lower than 
through broker/agent networks (Benoist, 2002). Therefore, insurance companies can 
boost their sales and at the same time lower their distribution costs, and that has a 
direct positive impact on profit efficiency. Moreover, a momentous advantage for 
insurers that choose the bancassurance model is the ability to make use of incumbent 
banking networks in order to quickly establish market presence even in completely 
new markets. Companies that choose the bank channel are also better positioned than 
their rival companies that use traditional distribution networks, since they are able to 
offer their products at lower prices; as such, profits could be further increased due to 
higher demand, or, through increased customer satisfaction and loyalty. Last but not 
61 
 
least, insurance companies can obtain vital capital injections that will help improve 
their solvency levels and expand their business. 
Arguments against a bundled provision of banking and insurance services exist 
nonetheless. Some fear that very close ties between banks and insurers without 
integration at the operational level can create several problems, leading to expensive 
breaks of the relationships. For example, the cultural gap and the organisational 
differences51
Morgan, Sturdy, Daniel and Knights, 1994
 between banks and insurance companies can very often lead to severe 
problems that can become the basis for a subsequent failure of the relations within the 
bancassurance model ( ). Specifically, 
clashes may arise in relation to the determination of commissions, handling of 
databases and client “ownership”, management of information resources, and 
managerial roles (Benoist, 2002). Another typical danger outlined in the literature 
relates to the risk of product cannibalisation, where conventional banking products 
like deposits are substituted by insurance policies (Bergendahl, 1995). Furthermore, a 
main concern for banks when they act as distribution channels, is their exposure to 
reputation risk, since if an insurance contract sold by a bank runs into problems it is 
the bank that will face bad publicity. However, this risk can be easily diminished if 
bank managers exercise due diligence in choosing the appropriate partners for the 
bancassurance operation. On the other hand, insurance companies may face serious 
channel conflicts if they distribute one or more of their products through different 
distribution channels. There have been many cases in the past where brokers or agents 
have boycotted the bank channel resulting in the banks selling only simplified 
products. Finally, there are issues beyond those that arise from within the model. Van 
den Berghe and Verweire (2001) assess the one-stop-shopping principle and argue 
that while it may suit the needs of some customers, others may prefer to shop around. 
Notwithstanding the sources of synergies that can be achieved at the distribution 
level through bancassurance, there are significant gains that can be realised if banking 
and insurance further integrate at the operational level. This is the reason why a 
growing number of qualitative studies has delved into the different levels of 
organisational structures offered to bancassurance, and/or analysed the benefits and 
                                                 
51 According to Staikouras (2006), the cultural differences between banks and insurers stem from the 
fact that the two industries have distinctively different philosophies both at the corporate and retail 
level. He further argues that while insurance is associated with marketing innovation, hard selling 
techniques and compensation based on incentive systems, commercial banking is associated with 
building client relationships, risk control and compensation schemes that are less performance based. 
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costs of such integration from the perspectives of all participants. At this point, it is 
worth mentioning, that a large part of this literature has examined this from the 
perspective of financial conglomerates and universal banks. Nevertheless, when bank-
insurance crosses the bounds of mere distributional agreements, it enters the realm of 
financial conglomerates. Given that the broad literature on financial conglomerates 
and universal banks was analysed in the previous sections and considering that the 
arguments offered and conclusions drawn in that literature are also pertinent to 
bancassurance, the following part focuses on the qualitative research with particular 
focus on the bank-insurance interface.  
An extensive analysis of the convergence between banks and insurance firms 
ranging from the simplest distributional level to full integration is provided in Van 
den Berghe and Verweire (2001) and Van den Berghe, Verweire and Carchon (1999). 
They look at the potential benefits and costs of convergence from three different 
perspectives; the consumer, market and macro perspective. They suggest that the 
combination of banking and insurance via bancassurance is just the initial step 
towards a more integrated relationship, one that will redefine the core business of 
financial institutions from a product (technical) to a client-oriented (functional) 
approach. Similar conclusions can be found in Merton (1990), who proposes that the 
integrated/functional approach will provide a better organising perspective to banks 
that operate in an environment of rapid technological change and increasing 
interdependencies across global financial markets. Another strand of literature 
examines the available structures and the challenges that lie ahead for the successful 
implementation of bancassurance. For example, Voutilainen (2005) explores the 
various forms of bank-insurance alliances and proposes six different structure models. 
He concludes that the most successful models will be those that maximise cost and 
revenue synergies, customer relations management (CRM) efficiency, efficiency of 
sales management, product development efficiency and the effectiveness of one-stop-
shopping, eliminate conflicting earnings logics between partners and channel 
conflicts, optimise capital and, finally, increase investor power. Along the same lines, 
Benoist (2002) argues that bancassurance presents a major opportunity for financial 
institutions if the inherent risks are taken into careful consideration and minimized. 
He concludes that successful bancassurers will be those able to tailor the model to the 
context, and those who focus on product quality and innovation, technology, low costs 
and strong customer relationships. Kist (2001) develops a model for success of 
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integrated financial services companies (IFS) that revolves around customers. He 
suggests that product range, distribution and scale are essential elements for the 
success of hybrid firms, while strong asset-liability management, competent risk 
management, brand creation and efficient technology are elements that can result in a 
comparative advantage if achieved. He also argues that through the integration of 
insurance, banking and asset management, financial institutions can benefit from 
higher and less volatile earnings, more efficient use of capital and diversification. 
With respect to the bank-insurance interface, it is argued that the latter can help banks 
and insurers in hedging their naturally mismatched positions in their assets and 
liabilities52
1986
. In a similar vein, the analysis of the asset management models of banks 
and insurance companies by Szego ( ), reveals a high degree of 
complementarities. More specifically, the similarities in the structure of their cash 
flows create opportunities for interest rate swapping between them, while the rising 
demand for insurance by banks to cover for increased non-diversifiable risks and for 
risky sovereign loans is further strengthening the ties between the two sectors. He 
concludes that the growing interdependence between banks and insurance companies 
will manifest in the form of increasing competition and/or collaboration within a four 
dimensional setting. Specifically, the first two dimensions of the bank-insurance 
competitive interface are already evident as banks sell special insurance packages and 
guarantees to their stockholders, depositors and third parties respectively, while 
insurers progressively promote virtual bank services. The other two dimensions 
represent the possible avenues for cooperation between banks and insurance 
companies. Elsewhere, the market realities along with the various impediments in the 
successful integration of banking and insurance, are adeptly analysed in Staikouras 
(2006), who then suggests a three-dimensional, radar-shape approach for the 
bancassurance model. Furthermore, in identifying the risk/success factors of the 
model he elaborates on various exogenous (market based) and idiosyncratic (strategic 
and operational) drivers that are crucial for the survival of hybrid institutions. 
                                                 
52 These complementarities in banking and insurance are well represented in Crooks Gora (1997) who 
posits that “In their traditional roles, both banks and insurance companies operate as intermediaries. 
As financial intermediaries, they obtain funds by issuing claims against themselves to market 
participants, and then investing those funds. Banks invest these funds in loans. Insurance companies 
invest them in securities, mortgage loans, and mortgage-backed securities. Both try to make money 
from the spread between their assets and liabilities. Both intermediate maturities (when their 
liabilities have one maturity and their assets another). Both reduce risk for their liability holders by 
diversifying their assets. Both reduce their liability holders’ costs of gathering information about 
assets and contracting with asset holders”. 
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Specifically, economic growth, demographics, regulation and the tax environment are 
identified as exogenous risk-success factors. With respect to the firm specific 
dynamics, the business culture, corporate closeness, management initiative and 
adequate corporate governance are characterised as crucial strategic factors, whereas 
the branch environment, customer relations, range of services, financial and brand 
management are laid out as important operational factors. 
3.2.2. PERFORMANCE STUDIES 
 
The arguments of the qualitative research on the benefits and costs of financial 
conglomerates and bancassurance have motivated a growing amount of empirical 
literature that attempts to examine the issues typically raised in the former stream of 
research. The usual issues raised at the theoretical level are related to the potential 
synergies offered by convergence in the financial services industry, such as the 
potential for scale and scope economies (diseconomies), cost and profit efficiencies 
(inefficiencies) and risk reduction (risk increases). Along these lines, empirical 
research systematically tries to provide an empirical basis to these arguments and, as 
such, can be categorised accordingly. As such, performance related studies typically 
examine the phenomenon from two different angles; the first strand examines the 
effects of convergence on accounting profit rates and cost/revenue ratios (operating 
performance studies), while the other delves into changes in the risk-return profiles 
and the associated probability of bankruptcy of the institutions involved into cross-
product diversification (risk-return studies). In what follows section 1 reviews the 
literature on operating performance studies while section 2 deals with risk-return 
studies53
3.2.2.1. OPERATING PERFORMANCE STUDIES 
. 
 
Most of the early research on the scope efficiency of financial institutions comes 
from research studies on scale efficiency that used almost identical cost functions to 
examine the extent of scope economies by comparing the costs of multi-product 
institutions to those of specialised firms. The overall results from those initial cost 
                                                 
53 See Table B.3 in appendix for a summary of the efficiency, scale and scope economies studies and 
Table B.4 for a summary of the risk-return studies. 
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scope studies are almost identical to those of the early scale efficiency studies and 
generally find minimal cost savings for multi-output institutions54
For example, in one of the early studies Hunter, Timme and Yang (
. 
1990), examine 
the subadditivity of costs in 311 U.S. large banks in 1986, in the context of 
hypothetical mergers by employing a multi-product translog cost function using the 
Minflex-Laurent functional form. They find that the costs functions of large 
multiproduct banks are not subadditive, suggesting no cost complementarities in the 
case of multi-product manufacturing. In a similar vein, Chang and Lynge Jr (1994) 
examine the existence of multiproduct cost economies, and in particular, scale and 
scope economies in all U.S. savings banks (417) between 1986 and 1988. Using a 
generalised translog cost function they reveal constant overall and product specific 
returns to scale for the average savings bank. They also find that scope economies are 
present at the overall level, but results show diseconomies at the product specific 
level, complementing the above findings. On the contrary, results from studies outside 
the U.S. are more positive. Lang and Welzel (1996) measure economies of scale and 
scope, cost efficiency and the rate of technical progress for 757 German cooperative 
banks between 1989 and 1992. The employ a multi-product translog cost function 
similar to the previous studies and report moderate economies of scale for all size 
classes. They also find some evidence for economies of scope for small size classes. 
Interestingly, cost reductions are mostly due to technical progress in the institutions 
examined. 
Later studies on scope economies have focused on revenue/profit scope efficiency 
effects of diversifying mergers. This type of approach provides a direct test on 
whether customers are willing to pay more for one-stop shopping of financial 
services, or instead prefer tailor-made products as provided by specialised institutions. 
For instance, Vander Vennet (2002) uses cost and profit efficiency measures in order 
to accurately compare specialised institutions with financial conglomerates and 
universal banks in Europe during the period 1995-1996. Cost efficiency is measured 
as a function of input prices, output quantities and risk, while both the standard 
translog and the Fourier-Flexible specification are used for the functional form. Profit 
efficiency is effectively measured in the same manner as cost efficiency, the only 
                                                 
54 See Berger, Hanweck and Humphrey (1987), Chang and Lynge Jr (1994), Hunter, Timme and Yang 
(1990), Pulley and Humphrey (1993). 
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difference being that the log of profits55
2004
 is used as the dependent variable. The 
analysis on a large sample of 2,375 European banks suggests that although specialised 
institutions exhibit equal cost efficiency with financial conglomerates when non-
traditional activities are not taken into consideration, the latter are more cost efficient 
when all activities are accounted for. He also delves into the comparison of estimates 
of scale and scope economies for those three groups. Results suggest that while very 
small specialised banks exhibit large unexploited scale and scope economies, 
universal banks and financial conglomerates only have opportunities for increased 
scope economies which are linked to joint production and exhibit no scale economies. 
It is suggested that since conglomerates are more cost and revenue efficient than their 
specialised peers, further de-specialisation could lead to a more efficient banking 
system. These results seem to imply that there are significant gains that can be 
achieved through universal banking and bancassurance. Casu and Girardone ( ) 
examine cost and profit efficiency and changes in the productivity of 168 financial 
conglomerates in Italy between 1996 and 1999. They employ different 
methodological approaches and find mixed results across the parametric stochastic 
frontier approach and the non-parametric data envelopment analysis for cost 
efficiency, with the first suggesting a constant improvement over the sample period, 
and the second exhibiting irregular cost efficiency trend over the sample period. With 
regards to profit efficiency they report consistent estimates across methodologies and 
find that the former exhibits a persistent upward trend over the sample period. Finally, 
cross section regressions reveal that cost efficient conglomerates have higher capital 
ratios, superior growth rates and lower degree of problem loans. They also report a 
significant negative relationship between cost efficiency and ROA, a positive relation 
between the capital ratio, non performing loans and profit efficiency but a negative 
relation between growth rates and profit efficiency. 
In the U.S., Wheelock and Wilson (2001) also use a number of different 
methodological approaches in order to analyse estimates of scale and product mix 
economies on a sample including all U.S. commercial banks with available data in the 
years 1985, 1989 and 1994. They find that banks could achieve potential economies 
by expanding the size of their output and adjusting their output mix toward the figures 
                                                 
55 Each institution’s profits are adjusted by adding the absolute value of the minimum value of profits in 
each sample and 1 { 1ln( min ++ ππ }. This adjustment is necessary to avoid negative profit values. 
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of banks with at least $300–$500 million of assets. In terms of scale economies they 
find that the size threshold at which those are exhausted has increased between the 
mid-1980s and mid-1990s. Furthermore, Berger, Humphrey and Pulley (1996) 
analyse the synergies arising from the joint consumption of deposit and loan services 
using a measure of revenue scope economies. They assert that in order for revenue 
scope economies to exist in a competitive market, two realities must simultaneously 
hold. First, consumers must be willing to pay a premium for one-stop-shopping 
because otherwise banks would be forced to specialise and second, banks must be 
experiencing cost scope diseconomies since otherwise they would lack the basis for 
charging a higher premium for their joint services, while competition would wipe out 
any revenue synergies. Revenue scope economies are estimated as the difference 
between the percentage increase in bank revenues that is due to joint production and 
the percentage increase in revenues when each service is provided separately. Even 
after altering the standard indirect revenue function in order to incorporate market 
imperfection, the resulting function only accounts for single output banks. Provided 
that it is pragmatic to accept that such institutions do not exist, the function is 
extended so as to assimilate quasi-specialised banks. Moreover, given the problems of 
the standard translog cost function when estimating scope economies56, they employ a 
composite model that associates a quadratic composition for multiple outputs with a 
log-quadratic composition for input prices. This model also allows disintegrating 
scope economies into their fixed and complementary components. The model is 
specified so as to account for two categories of financial services produced by banks 
(first includes payment, liquidity and safekeeping services while the second includes 
intermediation and loan services) and three distinct measures of revenues (total gross 
revenue, net revenue, adjusted net revenue57
                                                 
56 According to Berger, Humphrey and Pulley (
). Three input measures are used 
(physical capital, labour and funds). The estimation of the revenue functions and 
scope economies is done by using the three revenue measures as dependent variables 
within a nonlinear least squares routine. The estimation years are 1978 and 1984, each 
with a sample of 683 banks, and 1990 with an overlapping group of 626 banks. 
1996) the translog cost function is unable to accurately 
model the effects of specialisation in that its cost economies estimates as well as its Box-Cox 
variants vary depending on how close the point of scope economy evaluation is to completely 
specialised production. 
57 Adjusted Net Revenue = Net Revenue - Core Deposit Interest Expenses. 
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Their results suggest that there are no revenue economies of scope in banking, 
given that both their fixed and complementary components appear to be 
insignificantly different from zero over 1978-1990, irrespective of the revenue 
measure employed. Berger, Humphrey and Pulley (1996) offer three possible 
explanations. First, they suggest that consumers may value one-stop-shopping but 
competition may be preventing banks from charging higher premiums. Alternatively, 
although competition may not act as a brake for higher bank premiums, consumers 
may not be willing to pay that premium for multiple services. In the worst case 
scenario, they suggest that competition may prevent banks and at the same time 
consumers may not value a one-stop-shopping environment. Interestingly, their results 
point out that synergies between loans and deposits are mostly stemming from joint 
production rather than joint consumption. Therefore, by extrapolation, the same 
conclusions may hold for combinations of banking and non-banking products, such as 
bancassurance services. 
Looking at the surveys in this area, it is suggested that consolidation can increase 
profit efficiency both in the U.S. (Berger, Demsetz and Strahan, 1999) and Europe 
(Berger, DeYoung and Udell, 2001), if consolidation barriers are removed. Finally, in 
a more recent survey of the academic literature on M&As, DeYoung, Evanoff and 
Molyneux (2009) conclude that early studies failed to provide solid results with 
respect to efficiency improvements because of difficulties in defining the cost and 
profit functions. When post-2000 studies are considered, they conclude that North 
American bank mergers are likely to result into efficiency improvement, whereas 
European mergers do bring about efficiency gains. 
3.2.2.2. RISK-RETURN STUDIES 
 
Another important issue discussed in the theoretical studies on financial 
conglomerates and bancassurance is whether financial conglomerates are better 
positioned than specialized institutions in terms of their risk-return profiles. As such, 
another stream of empirical work has set out to examine whether cross-industry 
diversification is beneficial or not for financial institutions from the perspective of 
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risk, return and the associated probability of bankruptcy. In what follows, this section 
sets out to summarise and contrast the key findings in the literature58
Despite the various methodological avenues followed in the extant literature, the 
evidence is mixed and the question still remains. This is also evident when one looks 
at the extensive surveys of the academic literature on this subject. Specifically, Kwan 
and Laderman (
. 
1999) find that securities activities, insurance broking, and insurance 
underwriting are riskier but more profitable than banking activities and provide the 
potential for diversification. Similar conclusions are drawn in Berger, Demsetz and 
Strahan (1999), where it is suggested that consolidation can increase profit efficiency 
and help diversify the portfolio risks of financial institutions. In the European front, 
Berger, DeYoung and Udell (2001) conclude that there is significant potential for 
efficiency gains through consolidation that is mainly attributable to risk 
diversification, yet most of it is offset by the existence of consolidation barriers. 
Furthermore, no consensus is reported in Saunders and Walter (1994) who review 18 
studies on whether nonbanking activities reduce bank risk and report that nine studies 
answer yes, six answer no, while three are inconclusive. 
In addition to the abovementioned surveys, there exists considerable empirical 
work on the subject. In an early study, Heggestad (1975) suggests that many nonbank 
activities are safer than banking and that there are potential diversification benefits in 
some nonbanking operations. Furthermore, Boyd and Graham (1986) find no 
significant relationship between either profitability or risk and nonbank activity. 
However, when the sample is split into two sub periods they find a strong positive 
correlation between nonbank share and risk in the first sub period. It is suggested that 
this is because BHC regulation was considerably tightened towards the end of the 
sample period. Brewer (1989) complements the previous study by finding no evidence 
of high BHC risk associated with nonbank activity, but reports a strong negative 
relation between risk and nonbank activity for the high risk BHCs. Using a similar 
framework, Brewer, Fortier and Pavel (1988) report a negative relation between the 
proportion of nonbank activity and BHC risk. Despite the considerable effort invested, 
the above studies are exposed to two considerable shortcomings. First, the nonbank 
activities are limited to those permitted during the sample period and thus it would not 
be wise to reflect the conclusions drawn from them onto nonbanking activities that 
                                                 
58 A more detailed review of the empirical findings of risk-return studies is provided in the literature 
review section of chapter 6. 
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were impermissible at the time. What is more, the risk from any particular activity 
cannot be isolated as the results from those studies only hold for aggregated 
nonbanking activities. 
In order to account for these drawbacks, a number of studies have used merger 
simulation techniques. For example, Boyd and Graham (1988) find that combinations 
between BHCs and securities firms, real estate developers and P/C insurance increase 
the volatility of returns and the risk of failure. On the other hand, they find that the 
expansion of BHCs into life insurance reduces both the volatility of returns and the 
risk of failure. In contrast, Laderman (1999) finds that either life/ insurance 
underwriting, property and casualty insurance underwriting or securities underwriting, 
reduce the probability of bankruptcy of the BHC. In the U.K. front, Genetay and 
Molyneux (1998) report mixed evidence on risk, with significantly lower probabilities 
of failure but insignificant changes in return on assets volatility for bancassurance 
combinations. At this point it is worth noting that the practice of randomly selecting 
pairs of companies without controlling for their size may inevitably lead to 
hypothetical pairs of large nonbanks and small BHCs. In this case the risk/return 
profile of the merged institution would not necessarily represent a high-quality 
combination in terms of risk and return. This setback is accounted for in Boyd, 
Graham and Hewitt (1993) and Lown, Osler, Strahan and Sufi (2000). The first find 
that mergers between BHCs and life or non-life insurance firms can be risk reducing 
when the appropriate asset portfolio weight combinations are chosen, whereas 
mergers with either securities or real estate companies are likely to increase BHC risk. 
The second conclude that mergers between bank holding companies and either 
securities firms or property and casualty firms would likely modestly raise BHC risk. 
However, they find that mergers between BHCs and life insurance companies lower 
the risk of both firms due to diversification benefits. Nevertheless, even after 
correcting for the problems identified in Brewer (1989) and Boyd and Graham (1986), 
merger simulation studies fail to account for three factors that may understate their 
results and, consequently, the conclusions drawn from them. First, they only consider 
mergers between one BHC and one nonbank firm and in this way ignore further 
possible diversification benefits from BHC combinations with more than one 
nonbanking firms. Second, the random selection of BHC-nonbank pairs does not 
necessarily reflect reality, where managers carefully select target companies based on 
their organisational and financial characteristics. Last but not least, serious biases in 
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their results and conclusions may arise from the fact that M&A costs and acquisition 
premia are disregarded, even though they can be substantial. The first issue is 
addressed in studies that use a portfolio approach. Specifically, Allen and Jagtiani 
(2000) find that nonbank activities reduce total risk but increase systematic market 
risk. Both securities and insurance activities have no significant effect on market risk 
premiums of universal banks. Moreover, while the interest rate risk premiums seem to 
be lowered by securities activities, it is not affected by insurance activities. 
Complementing their results, Estrella (2001) finds that both banking institutions and 
insurance companies can experience diversification benefits by converging. 
The emergence of bank-insurance combinations in recent years has paved the way 
for a number of studies that have produced more reliable results. For instance, 
Nurullah and Staikouras (2008) deal with the issues affecting simulation studies by 
analysing actual bank-insurance combinations. The analysis at the aggregate industry 
level reveals that life and non-life insurance underwriting are riskier than banking, 
while insurance broking has higher returns and does not affect bank creditworthiness. 
On the other hand, the results of the analysis of synthetic bank-insurance structures 
show that life and non-life insurance significantly increase bank return volatility and 
the probability of bankruptcy. They conclude that best candidate for bank expansion is 
insurance brokerage. Another strand of research examines the phenomenon by 
looking at the relation between measures of bank diversification and performance 
and/or risk. In these cases diversification is not always found to be beneficial for 
financial institutions. For example, Stiroh and Rumble (2006) find that the increased 
risk adjusted performance across financial holding companies (FHCs) due to 
diversification benefits, is offset by the increased exposure to non-interest activities. 
Their results also suggest that increasing the diversification levels within FHCs does 
not bring improvements in risk adjusted performance. Finally, they report a negative 
relation between non-interest income and risk adjusted performance. Using a similar 
framework, Stiroh (2006) finds an insignificant relation between bank mean return 
and non-interest activities. On the other hand, his results point to a positive correlation 
between non-interest income share and total, market and idiosyncratic risk. 
Complementing the above studies, Stiroh (2004) provides further evidence against 
bank diversification. The results from the analysis at the industry level show that 
while the volatility of bank revenue has dropped overtime, this decline was due to the 
reduction in the volatility of net-interest income. On the other hand, the volatility of 
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non-interest income is found to have increased during the same period, together with 
the correlation between net- and non-interest income. The author suggests that banks’ 
increasing focus on cross-selling might expose different lines of their business to the 
same shocks. Likewise, in the European front, diversification is found to be 
detrimental for small banks in Mercieca, Schaeck and Wolfe (2007), who find a 
negative relation between non-interest income and profitability and Z-scores, 
respectively. They conclude that financial institutions should rather focus on their 
core competencies. Complementing the above results, (Lepetit, Nys, Rous and Tarazi, 
2008) report a positive and significant relationship between non-interest income share 
and both accounting- and market-based measures of risk for European banks. 
Conclusions drawn from U.S. studies are somewhat in line with those in Baele, De 
Jonghe and Vander Vennet (2007), who find that non-interest revenue share is 
positively associated with systematic risk and negatively related with idiosyncratic 
and total risk. The overall consensus from the literature on risk seems to be in line 
with expectations; although there is potential for risk reduction via non-interest 
income, this is exhausted at a relatively low level, after which risk increases. In 
essence, banks that rely heavily on non-interest sources of income are more exposed 
to market movements or economy-wide shocks.  
Another important issue for financial conglomerates is whether diversification per 
se has a positive impact on the market valuations of institutions. In this respect 
Laeven and Levine (2007) find that diversification of bank based financial services 
firms is value destroying, since the market values of banks engaged in multiple 
activities are lower than the values those banks would have, if broken up into 
specialized firms. Similar conclusions are drawn in Schmid and Walter (2009) who 
report a substantial and persistent conglomerate discount in financial firms. Further 
tests by the authors verify that it is diversification that causes the discount and not that 
troubled firms choose to diversify in other areas. Interestingly, when combinations 
between banking and insurance or banking and investment banking are considered, 
they are found to offer a significant valuation premium. On the other hand Baele, De 
Jonghe and Vander Vennet (2007) find that diversified institutions are associated with 
higher return potential. 
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3.2.3. EVENT STUDY APPROACHES 
 
Bank-insurance related announcements in the financial markets have been the 
subject of extensive scrutiny as the market reactions convey information on investor 
perceptions of the bancassurance interface. Event studies on bancassurance typically 
fall under two main categories, with the first involving studies that focus on the 
response of the market to specific deal announcements or certain related regulatory 
events and the second looking into the aggregate effects of a number of diversifying 
mergers on the stock prices of the involved institutions. In what follows, this section 
sets out to summarise and contrast the key findings in this literature59
Early event studies examine the market reactions to a number of court 
rulings/regulatory events that have implications on the interface between banks and 
insurance companies. For example, Carow (
. 
2001b) finds that banks experience 
insignificant excess returns around rulings that allow the sale of annuity products by 
banks. On the other hand, he finds that insurers experience negative and significant 
abnormal returns around the same rulings. With regards to rulings that allowed banks 
to sell insurance products, his results suggest that both banks and insurance companies 
experience insignificant valuations. Along the same lines, Cowan, Howel and Power 
(2002) report similar results. First, with regards to rulings that annuities are insurance 
products and subject to the town of 5000 rule, their results show that insurance 
companies experience positive and significant excess returns, while BHCs exhibit 
negative and significant valuations. Second, insignificant reactions from both 
industries are reported for rulings giving New York state banks the right to sell 
annuity products directly to their customers, rather than through a third party. Third, 
an insignificant reaction by insurers and a positive and significant reaction by BHCs is 
reported for rulings that allow the latter to underwrite annuities. Fourth, the authors 
report insignificant excess returns from both industries around rulings permitting 
national banks to sell annuities. 
Further indirect evidence comes from studies that examine the effects of the 
Financial Services Modernization Act of 1999 (FSMA) on the stock prices of 
financial institutions. For example, Carow and Heron (2002) report that across their 
sample of firms, only insurance companies experience positive excess returns around 
                                                 
59 A more detailed review of the empirical findings of event studies is provided in the literature review 
sections of chapters 4 and 5. 
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the announcement of the Act. In line with the above study, Hendershott, Lee and 
Tompkins (2002) find that insurance companies reap most of the benefits from 
deregulation, with the stock returns of commercial banks and investment banks 
remaining largely unaffected, while Neale and Peterson, (2005) report positive and 
significant excess returns for life and property and casualty insurance firms, but 
insignificant abnormal returns for accident and health as well as other insurance 
companies. 
Another stream of empirical work delves into the impact of the Citicorp-Travelers 
merger in 1998 on the stock prices of peer institutions (Carow, 2001a; Johnston and 
Madura, 2000). The first study reports a positive and significant stock price reaction 
for life insurance companies and an insignificant reaction by the rest of the firms, 
while the second, point to positive and significant excess returns for all sectors 
considered. 
A final set of indirect studies use the event study methodology to look into the 
effects of diversifying mergers on the involved institutions but yield contradicting 
results, most likely due to the market examined, or to the methodological approach 
followed. Specifically, DeLong (2001) finds that bank mergers that focus in terms of 
geography and activity are value-increasing, whereas bank mergers that diversify 
geography, activity, or both, do not create value. Nevertheless, his results are not 
verified in Lepetit, Patry and Rous (2004) who report that banks that either diversify 
activity or focus geography exhibit positive valuations. 
The emergence of actual bank-insurance combinations in the last decades has 
resulted in studies that examine the effect that such deals have on the equity prices of 
banks and insurance companies. For example, Cybo-Ottone and Murgia (2000) find 
that the weighted abnormal return of the bidder and target firm around the 
announcement is positive and significant. Positive and significant abnormal returns 
for a sample of European M&A announcements are also reported in Beitel, Schiereck 
and Wahrenburg (2004). 
More recent studies also yield conflicting results. Chen, Li, Moshirian and Tan 
(2007) find that bancassurance deals trigger significant reactions by the markets that 
negatively affect the stock prices of acquiring firms, while insignificant returns from 
bank-insurance deals are presented in Ekkayokkaya, Holmes and Paudyal (2007). 
Furthermore, Fields, Fraser and Kolari (2007a) find positive abnormal returns for the 
bidders and targets but not for the combined entity, whereas Fields, Fraser and Kolari 
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(2007b) report positive excess returns for bank and insurance bidders, but not for the 
mixed sample. More recently, Staikouras (2009), unveils significant abnormal returns 
surrounding the announcement of bank-insurance ventures. He also finds positive and 
significant abnormal returns for bank bidders, but reports negative and significant 
figures for the insurance-bidders. He also looks into bank-insurance divestments and 
unveils either statistically significant negative returns or insignificant figures, 
depending on the window examined. 
Overall, the event-study evidence on the bancassurance phenomenon is relatively 
mixed. Specifically, while early indirect evidence on court rulings shows that insurers 
are either indifferent or react negatively to the entrance of banks into the insurance 
business, evidence on the FSMA (1999) shows quite the reverse, with insurance 
companies reaping the benefit from the removal of the barriers separating banking and 
insurance. The case becomes even more mixed when direct studies are taken into 
consideration, with some studies reporting significant excess returns – some  positive 
and others negative – while others reporting insignificant results. 
3.3. SUMMARY 
 
The extant literature on financial conglomerates and bancassurance revolves 
around theoretical contributions that look into the causes, benefits and concerns of this 
consolidation trend and, on the other hand, around empirical investigations that 
embark to provide answers to the issues raised in the former studies. 
Intense competition between financial intermediaries, the growing competition 
from capital markets, technology, deregulation and changing customer needs and 
sophistication, seem to be the main driving forces behind the creation of financial 
conglomerates and the adoption of bancassurance strategies. Proponents of this trend 
cite numerous benefits, both at the firm level and market level, such as synergies, 
increased efficiency and better diversification. In contrast, opponents call for attention 
due to serious public policy issues, such as increased systemic risk, monopoly powers 
and the access of these mega-firms to government subsidies. 
Empirical studies examine the phenomenon from three different angles, looking at 
merger related efficiencies (inefficiencies) due to scale and scope economies 
(diseconomies) and improvement (deterioration) in the risk-return profiles of the 
institutions involved. Finally, others examine this issue from the perspective of the 
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market, through event studies. Interestingly, the results in all cases are mixed, perhaps 
due to sample or methodological differences. 
The questions this study attempts to address, thereby extending the literature, are 
the following: What is the market reaction around bancassurance merger 
announcements? What are the firm and deal specific attributes that determine the 
market valuations of bidders in bancassurance deals? Do mergers and acquisitions 
between banks and insurance firms affect the total risk – and its market and 
idiosyncratic components – of the bidders? What are the firm specific factors that 
determine the risk components of acquirers and, are these relationships altered 
following the deals? Finally, do large bancassurance deals trigger risk-return spillover 
effects that affect their peer institutions, and if so, are the effects of competitive or 
contagion nature?  
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4. BANCASSURANCE DEAL ANNOUNCEMENTS: THE MARKET 
PERCEPTIONS 
4.1. INTRODUCTION 
 
During the last three decades the financial services sector has undergone a major 
restructuring in terms of the interface between financial firms. Forces like 
technological innovations, regulatory changes, reduced international trade barriers and 
the growing economic linkages across countries, are just a few of the reasons why the 
trend towards the creation of financial conglomerates has been growing both at the 
domestic and international level (Goddard, Molyneux, Wilson and Tavakoli, 2007; 
Staikouras, 2006). The banking and insurance industries, being no exception, have 
experienced similar shake-ups that dramatically changed the way they conduct their 
business both at the corporate and retail levels. More specifically, bancassurance has 
allowed banks to diversify their income streams through fee generating activities, 
while at the same time has expanded the customer reach of insurers. 
Corporate restructuring in the banking industry has been the subject of extensive 
scrutiny over the last two decades, with the majority of empirical evidence unveiling 
significant losses for bidders, as well as wealth transfers from bidders to targets 
(Amihud, DeLong and Saunders, 2002; Bhargava and Fraser, 1998; DeLong, 2001; 
Houston and Ryngaert, 1994)60
Beitel, Schiereck 
and Wahrenburg, 2004
. The bank-insurance evidence, however, is rather 
insufficient as it is either generated by a limited number of cases (
; Cybo-Ottone and Murgia, 2000), or indirectly inferred by the 
stock price reactions of banks and insurers to the announcement of major changes in 
the U.S. market (Carow, 2001a; b; Carow and Heron, 2002; Carow and Kane, 2002; 
Cowan, Howell and Power, 2002; Hendershott, Lee and Tompkins, 2002; Johnston 
and Madura, 2000; Neale and Peterson, 2005). In addition, indirect event studies that 
look into the effects of diversifying mergers on firm value yield contradictory findings 
for U.S. and European samples respectively (DeLong, 2001; Lepetit, Patry and Rous, 
2004). Not surprisingly, a limited number of studies with direct evidence on 
                                                 
60 While there are numerous studies dealing with the stock market reactions to announcements of bank 
merger and acquisitions and bank acquisitions of security firms, it is not the intention of this chapter 
to report all findings. To keep the task manageable, the results of a small fraction of these studies are 
reported. See Amel, Barnes, Panetta and Salleo (2004) and Carow and Kane (2002) for detailed 
reviews. 
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bancassurance also yield mixed results (Chen, Li, Moshirian and Tan, 2007; 
Ekkayokkaya, Holmes and Paudyal, 2007; Fields, Fraser and Kolari, 2007a; b). 
This chapter contributes to the bancassurance literature where more research is 
deemed necessary. This is because the bank-insurance literature has provided indirect 
evidence regarding the wealth effects of financial conglomerates, while only a couple 
of studies have examined the direct impact of the bank-insurance phenomenon as 
discussed above. This chapter provides new and broader findings on the stock price 
reaction to all available bank-insurance ventures. Based on a large multinational 
sample of banks and insurance companies, evidence is provided on the effect of deals 
that led to bancassurance structures between 1990 and 2006. Specifically, sub-
samples are formed to examine whether the bidder’s nature (bank or insurer) is 
essential in shaping any excess compensation for their equity holders. The chapter 
further focuses on the geographical characteristics of the sample by analyzing deals 
that took place on a domestic, regional as well as international level. Moreover, the 
deals’ size and cultural similarities between the institutions involved in the formation 
of financial conglomerates are also taken into account. Finally, all available bank-
insurance divestments are examined in order to provide further insight into whether 
the market favours such corporate restructurings. 
 In what follows, section 2 provides a review of the existing body of event-
study research on bancassurance. Section 3 introduces the data and the methodology 
employed. Section 4 presents the empirical results, while Section 5 concludes the 
chapter. 
4.2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
The current section explores the extant event-study evidence on bancassurance and 
critically discusses the empirical findings. As discussed in the introduction, the event-
study evidence associated with the blurring boundaries across financial institutions 
and specifically banks and insurance companies, falls under two main categories 
depending on the approach used. The first category involves indirect studies, which a) 
either focus on the response of the market to specific deal announcements and the 
effect on peer companies, or examine the market’s reaction to certain related 
regulatory events, or b) use an event study methodology to look into the effects of 
diversifying mergers on the involved institutions. The second category involves direct 
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studies which focus on the impact of actual bank-insurance deals on the stock prices 
of the involved institutions. This category can be further broken down into: a) studies 
that examine a very limited number of bank-insurance mergers and b) a small number 
studies that used an adequate number of bank-insurance deals. 
Early event studies examine the bancassurance phenomenon in an indirect manner, 
mainly by gauging the market responses to a number of court rulings/regulatory 
events that have implications on the interface between banks and insurance 
companies. For example, Carow (2001b) studies the effect of 3 rulings of the Office 
of the Comptroller of Currency (OCC) and 3 Supreme Court rulings allowing banks to 
sell annuities and insurance products, on the stock prices of 133 banks and insurance 
companies. His results suggest that banks experience insignificant excess returns 
around rulings that allow the sale of annuity products by banks. On the other hand, he 
finds that insurers experience a negative and significant abnormal return of -2.39% 
around the same rulings. With regards to rulings that allowed banks to sell insurance 
products, his results suggest that both banks and insurance companies experience 
insignificant valuations. In a similar vein, Cowan, Howel and Power (2002) examine 
the stock market reaction of 59 life insurance companies and 88 Bank Holding 
Companies (BHCs) to four court and regulatory decisions affecting banks' rights to 
originate and market annuity products. First, with regards to rulings holding that 
annuities are insurance products and subject to the town of 5000 rule, their results 
show that insurance companies experience a positive and significant excess return, 
while and BHCs negative and significant valuations. As suggested, this result is 
somewhat expected given that in the absence of this rule, fee revenues and profits 
would be diverted from insurance companies to banks. Second, insignificant reactions 
from both industries are reported for rulings giving New York state banks the right to 
sell annuity products directly to their customers, rather than through a third party. 
According to the authors this reaction is expected since expanded bank-insurance 
activities would be value adding for banks and not value-destroying for insurers. 
Third, an insignificant reaction by insurers and a positive and significant reaction by 
BHCs, is reported for rulings that allow the latter to underwrite annuities. Fourth, the 
authors report insignificant excess returns from both industries around rulings 
permitting national banks to sell annuities. 
Further indirect evidence comes from studies that examine the effects of the 
Financial Services Modernization Act of 1999 (FSMA) on the stock prices of 
80 
 
financial institutions. For example, Carow and Heron (2002) delve into the stock price 
reaction of a sample of U.S. financial institutions61
2002
 to 6 events leading to the passage 
of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act. His results represent the overall effect across the six 
events, and suggest that across the sample of firms, only insurance companies 
experience a positive excess return. The authors suggest that the benefits from bank 
diversification into non-banking have been already reflected on bank stock prices. In 
line with the above study, Hendershott, Lee and Tompkins ( ) examine the stock 
market reactions of 297 commercial banks, 36 investment firms and 139 insurance 
companies around the time of the announcement of the FSMA (1999)62
2002
. 
Corroborating the findings of Carow and Heron ( ), their results show that 
insurance companies reap most of the benefits from deregulation, with stock returns 
of commercial banks and investment banks remaining largely unaffected. In an 
analogous study on the effects of 10 events leading to the passage of the FSMA 
(1999) on the insurance industry63 2005, Neale and Peterson, ( ) report positive and 
significant excess returns for life and property and casualty insurance firms, and 
insignificant abnormal returns for accident and health as well as other insurance 
companies.   
Another stream of empirical work delves into the impact of Citicorp-Travelers 
merger in 1998 on the stock prices of peer institutions (Carow, 2001a; Johnston and 
Madura, 2000). The first study reports a positive and significant stock price reaction 
for life insurance companies but an insignificant reaction by the rest of the firms 
considered in the sample64
A final set of indirect studies use the event study methodology to look into the 
effects of diversifying mergers on the involved institutions but yield contradicting 
. The second study, which only considers a much smaller 
sample of 12 large banks, 26 insurance companies and 24 securities firms, points to 
positive and significant excess returns for all sectors considered. Similar to results 
from studies on the FSMA (1999), as reported above, insurance companies seem to 
reap most of the benefits from bancassurance. 
                                                 
61 Their sample includes 247 banks, 10 foreign banks, 145 thrifts, 32 finance companies, 33 Investment 
banks and 85 Insurance companies. 
62 Similar to Carow and Heron (2002) their analysis is based on 7 events leading to the announcement 
of FSMA (1999). 
63 Their sample includes 33 life Insurance companies, 13 accident and health insurance firms, 40 
property and casualty insurance companies and 51 other insurance firms. 
64 His sample includes 133 national banks, 117 state banks, 30 life insurance companies, 26 health 
insurance firms and 67 property and casualty insurance companies. 
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results, most likely due to the market examined, or to the methodological approach 
followed. Specifically, DeLong (2001) examines the wealth effects of 280 mergers 
between U.S. banks from 1988 to 1995. The author categorises mergers based on 
whether the latter focus or diversify across the dimensions of activity and geography. 
The results show that while bank mergers that focus in terms of geography and 
activity are value-increasing, bank mergers that diversify geography, activity or both, 
do not create value. Nevertheless, his results are not verified in a similar study that 
employs a European sample of 180 deals between 1991 and 2001, where banks that 
either diversify activity or focus geography exhibit positive valuations (Lepetit, Patry 
and Rous, 2004). It is important to note here that the divergence in the results of the 
above studies could also be due to the fact that the latter study employs a bivariate 
GARCH approach. 
The emergence of actual bank-insurance combinations has resulted in studies that 
examine the effect that such deals have on the equity prices of banks and insurance 
companies. For example, Cybo-Ottone and Murgia (2000) delve into the valuation 
effects of European mergers and acquisitions between 1988 and 1997. Their findings 
with regards to 10 bank-insurance mergers that are present in the sample, show that 
the weighted abnormal return of the bidder and target firm around the announcement 
is positive and significant. Positive and significant abnormal returns for a sample of 
European M&A announcements between 1985 and 2000 are also reported in Beitel, 
Schiereck and Wahrenburg (2004). Even though their sample includes 11 bank-
insurance mergers, the study only provides aggregate results for the whole sample and 
as such, direct inferences on bancassurance cannot be made. 
Furthermore, there is a limited number of more recent event studies that provide 
direct evidence on the effects of bancassurance on the stock prices of acquiring 
institutions. Nevertheless, the results remain mixed. Chen, Li, Moshirian and Tan 
(2007) focus on 42 European bancassurance mergers between 1983 and 2004. Their 
results show that bancassurance deals trigger significant reactions by the markets that 
negatively affect the stock prices of acquiring firms. On the contrary, insignificant 
returns from bank-insurance deals are presented in Ekkayokkaya, Holmes and 
Paudyal (2007), whose sample includes 36 European bancassurance mergers and 
acquisitions initiated between 1990 and 2004. Furthermore, in two more 
comprehensive studies on a global sample of bank-insurance mergers Fields, Fraser 
and Kolari (2007a; b) use the same sample of 129 deals between 1997 and 2004 and 
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examine it from two different perspectives. In the first study, they analyse the effect 
of bancassurance announcements on the stock prices of bidders, targets as well as on 
the combined entity, and find positive abnormal returns for the first and second but 
not for the third group, respectively (Fields, Fraser and Kolari, 2007a). The second 
study looks into the effect of the same set of bank-insurance merger announcements 
on the stock prices of bank bidders, insurance bidders as well as on the full sample. 
Their results show positive excess returns for bank and insurance bidders but not for 
the whole sample (Fields, Fraser and Kolari, 2007b). A significant drawback of these 
two studies is that they fail to take into account the differences in the risk-return 
profiles of banks when the latter merge with insurance companies as opposed to 
mergers with insurance agents/brokers (Boyd, Graham and Hewitt, 1993; Nurullah 
and Staikouras, 2008). In failing to differentiate between the two, the results can be 
misleading. 
Overall the empirical event study evidence on the bancassurance phenomenon is 
relatively mixed. Specifically, while early indirect evidence on court rulings shows 
that insurers are either indifferent or react negatively to the entrance of banks into the 
insurance business, evidence on the FSMA (1999) shows quite the reverse, with 
insurance companies reaping the benefit from the removal of the barriers separating 
banking and insurance. The case becomes even more mixed when direct studies are 
taken into consideration, with some studies reporting significant excess returns – 
some  positive and others negative – while others reporting insignificant results. It is 
important to note here that this might be due to the fact that the existing empirical 
evidence suffers from two considerable drawbacks. First, the majority of the findings 
come from studies that are indirectly assessing the phenomenon and therefore the 
results cannot necessarily be projected to actual bancassurance cases. Second, direct 
studies on bank-insurance deals suffer from either small sample biases, or from the 
fact that they fail to differentiate between bank acquisitions of insurance firms, and 
bank acquisitions of insurance agents/brokers. As such, the conclusions drawn from 
these studies can be unrealistic and biased. 
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4.3. DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
 
This chapter examines the impact of a wide range of bank-insurance corporate 
restructurings on the equity prices of acquirers/sellers. The bancassurance corporate 
restructurings database used here comprises of 226 deal announcements. This sample 
represents all available international bancassurance-related merger and acquisition 
(M&A) and divestiture/spin-off announcements, recorded by official wire services 
between 1990 and 2006. Specifically, information on these deals is collected by the 
Thomson One Banker deals database, while it is verified by Bloomberg’s corporate 
calendar. The current investigation considers the following types of deals: a) public 
banks’ bids for public/private insurance companies, b) public banks’ bids for 
insurance agencies, c) public insurance companies’ bids for public/private banks, and 
finally d) corporate divestments/spin-offs of previously established bank-insurance 
structures. Bank-insurance deals that involve rescue motivations are not considered in 
the current analysis. Table 4.1 represents the distribution of the sample of bidders and 
targets by country and deal type, while Table 4.2 represents the composition of the 
sample of deals by year and deal type. 
 
Table 4.1. Sample Distribution of bidders and targets by country and deal type 
 
 All Deals Bank-Insurance Assure-banking Bank-Insurance 
agency 
Sell-Offs 
Region/Count
ry 
Bidder
s 
Target
s 
Bidder
s 
Target
s 
Bidder
s 
Target
s 
Bidder
s 
Target
s 
Divestitur
es 
Spin
-offs 
           
Europe (ex. 
UK) 56 51 33 31 19 17 4 3 12 1 
United 
Kingdom 6 6 6 5 0 1 0 0 0 0 
United States 129 132 42 45 1 0 86 87 2 1 
Canada 8 5 8 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Australia 5 5 5 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Asia 5 5 5 6 0 0 0 0 0 0 
L.America 1 5 1 3 0 2 0 0 0 0 
Africa 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Total 210 210 100 100 20 20 90 90 14 2 
The table presents the distribution of the sample of bidders and targets by country and by deal type. The sample consists of 
available international data collected for 226 publicly announced deals between 1990 and 2006. Information on deals is obtained 
by Thomson One Banker and Bloomberg’s corporate calendar. The sample of bank-insurance announcements consists of 100 
deals where the bidder is a bank and the target an insurance company, while the sample of bank-insurance agency 
announcements consists of 90 deals where the bidder is a bank and the target an insurance agency. Finally, the sample of 
insurance-banking announcements consists of 20 deals where the bidder is an insurance company and the target a bank. The 
sample of divestitures and spin-offs represents corporate exits from the bancassurance framework. 
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Table 4.2. Sample Distribution by year and deal type 
       
 Mergers and acquisitions Sell-Offs 
Year/Deal 
Type 
All Deals Bank-Insurance 
Insurance-
Banking 
Bank-
Insurance 
Agency 
Divestitures Spin-offs 
       
1990 1 0 1 0 0 0 
1991 3 3 0 0 0 0 
1992 3 2 1 0 0 0 
1993 6 2 1 3 0 0 
1994 8 4 3 1 0 0 
1995 6 5 1 0 0 0 
1996 8 4 0 4 0 0 
1997 11 8 2 1 0 0 
1998 14 6 2 6 2 0 
1999 20 10 2 8 1 0 
2000 23 10 2 11 0 0 
2001 20 11 3 6 5 1 
2002 26 10 1 15 2 0 
2003 26 10 0 16 1 1 
2004 17 6 1 10 1 0 
2005 16 8 0 8 2 0 
2006 2 1 0 1 0 0 
Total 210 100 20 90 14 2 
The table presents the decomposition of the sample of deals by year of announcement and by deal type. The sample consists of 
available international data collected for 226 publicly announced deals between 1990 and 2006. Information on deals is obtained 
by Thomson One Banker and Bloomberg’s corporate calendar. The sample of bank-insurance announcements consists of 100 
deals where the bidder is a bank and the target an insurance company, while the sample of bank-insurance agency 
announcements consists of 90 deals where the bidder is a bank and the target an insurance agency. Finally, the sample of 
insurance-banking announcements consists of 20 deals where the bidder is an insurance company and the target a bank. The 
sample of divestitures and spin-offs represents corporate exits from the bancassurance framework. 
 
Looking at the distribution of the sample in Table 4.1, it is evident that the majority 
of the deals involve U.S. and European firms. It is also notable that while deals where 
banks acquire insurance companies (bank-insurance) are fairly evenly distributed 
across the U.S. and Europe, the same does not apply to deals where insurance 
companies acquire banks (assure-banking) or divestitures, where the majority of these 
are initiated within the European borders. On the contrary, the phenomenon of banks 
acquiring insurance agents/brokers is mainly observed in the U.S. with only a small 
fraction of these deals appearing in Europe, while none taking place in the rest of the 
world. Shifting the focus to the distribution of the sample per year in Table 4.2, it is 
noticeable that most of the deals are initiated within the 1997-2005 period. This is 
reasonable if one takes into account the removal of the existing regulatory barriers 
between banks and insurance companies in the U.S. by the Financial Services 
Modernization Act of 1999. On the other hand the majority of deals in the pre-1999 
period come from deals involving European companies given that the restrictions on 
the particular market were removed earlier, by the Second Banking Directive of 1989. 
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It is important to note here, that a number of deals were announced and completed in 
the U.S. prior to the FSMA 1999, but under specific regulatory approvals. Ten deals 
that fall in this category are included in the sample here and detailed information on 
these is provided in Table C.1 in appendix C. 
With regards to the data, daily acquirer stock prices are collected from Thomson 
Datastream and logarithmic stock returns are calculated for the purpose of the 
econometric estimations. All return series have been checked and adjusted for non-
trading days, public holidays and market interruptions in the sample period. All 
announcements are made on trading days except the merger between Allianz AG and 
Dresdner Bank, which is announced on a Sunday65
The methodology proposed by Brown and Warner (
. In cases where more than one 
announcement involving the same acquirer and different targets is made on the same 
day, the analysis treats these cases as one and only considers the simultaneous effect 
of both announcements on the bidder. In addition to bank-insurance partnership 
announcements a control sample is also incorporated. The control sample consists of 
50 M&A deal announcements that do not involve bancassurance structures, but cases 
where at least one of the firms, generally the bidder, is either a bank or an insurance 
company. 
This chapter aims to uncover whether bank-insurance venture announcements 
trigger trading movements that significantly affect the equity returns of acquiring 
firms, on and/or around the announcement(s) period. Specifically, the subsequent 
research questions addressed in this empirical chapter are; a) whether the market 
distinguishes bank-insurance initiatives based on the structure of the ventures (i.e. 
bank-insurance, assure-banking, bank-insurance agency), b) whether/how it reacts to 
subsequent exits from bancassurance structures via sell-offs (i.e. divestitures, spin-
offs), and finally c) whether and how the market valuates the above ventures based on 
a variety of company and deal characteristics (i.e. domestic vs. international deals, 
size of deal, geographic origin of bidder). 
1985) is an event study 
approach that suits the purpose of this analysis, given its wide application in the 
academic literature in assessing and drawing inferences about the impact of an event 
on security prices around a specific time interval(s). Specifically, the approach entails 
the identification of an equity return generating process and the use of two distinct 
                                                 
65 In this case the announcement date is brought forward by one trading day. 
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periods; the estimation period, where equity returns for at least one year prior to the 
event are used to estimate parameters of the return generating process, and the event 
study period, where the estimated parameters are used to generate forecasts over a 
pre-determined event window. In particular, the analysis here is based on an 
estimation period of 200 trading days (-241 to 41) prior to the event announcement(s) 
(t = 0), leaving an 81-day (-40, + 40) window for the event study period. As a 
robustness check, these steps have also been performed using a 121-day event study 
period (-60, +60 window) that required an estimation period of 261 to 61 days prior to 
the event announcement(s). 
The ordinary least squares (OLS) estimations are based on a univariate framework 
and, when statistically appropriate a multivariate representation is employed to model 
stock returns. The model takes the following algebraic form: 
 
ARit = Rit – E(Rit|φit) ≡ Rit – (ai + βmi Rmt + βIi It)                                    (4.1) 
CAR = ∑
−=
n
nt
tAR                                         (4.2) 
 
where Rit is the return on stock i in period t, Rmt is the return on the market portfolio or 
industry proxy (obtained from the main market index of the exchange where each 
bidder is listed, while industry returns refer to the return on the respective sector index 
i.e. bank or insurance index depending on the nature of the bidder)66
                                                 
66 The market proxies are FTSE ALL, S&P500, DAX etc., while for the sector proxies FTSE-Banks, 
S&P500-Banks etc are used. In countries where industry indices are not available the sector indices 
compiled by DataStream are employed. 
, It is the change 
on T-bill rates – used as proxy for interest rate risk and when not available the 
respective inter-bank rates are employed, E(⋅|φit) denotes expectation depending on 
the information set, and CAR stands for cumulative abnormal returns. 
Average abnormal returns (AARs) are constructed by averaging out the estimated 
ARs of individual companies in each particular sample, while cumulative average 
abnormal returns (CAARs) are obtained by aggregating the AARs over different time 
periods within the event window. Finally, CAARs represent the total effect of the 
bank-insurance events across the sample of companies and across a specified time 
interval.  
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4.4. EMPIRICAL FINDINGS 
 
This chapter seeks to assess the markets’ perception of various types of 
bancassurance partnership announcements and sell-offs by analysing the equity 
movements of the acquiring/selling firms around these events. Specifically, excess 
returns are estimated over different periods surrounding the announcement day(s). 
The different event windows aim to assess the stock markets’ reaction from five 
different angles. First, the analysis concentrates on whether possible information 
leakages lead to the appearance of abnormal returns in periods leading to the 
announcement date (day zero). As such, various intervals leading to day zero are 
explored. Second, based on the aforesaid event intervals, cumulative abnormal returns 
from symmetric windows (same number of days before and after day zero) are also 
examined to gauge the events’ general impact on the stock prices. Third, intervals 
which include a period prior to the particular event as well as one trading day after 
day zero are also examined. Fourth, post-event intervals are examined to consider the 
existence of any persistence in abnormal performance following the deals. The first 
set of empirical findings for all bank-insurance deals and the control sample is 
reported in Table 4.3. 
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Table 4.3. Cross-section analysis of all bank-insurance deals 
 
  Excess Returns via Excess Returns via Excess Returns 
Event Period Market Index Industry Index Control Sample of FI 
(-1, 0) (0, +1) 0.73% 0.62% 0.57% 0.51% -0.75% -1.24% 
  (3.52) a (2.99) a (3.17) a (2.83) a -(1.69) c -(2.79) a 
(-2, 0) (0, +2) 0.51% 0.20% 0.34% -0.03% -1.25% -1.14% 
  (2.00) b (0.78) (1.56) -(0.13) -(2.31) b -(2.11) b 
(-3, 0) (0, +3) 0.40% 0.36% 0.22% 0.03% -1.19% -0.99% 
  (1.36) (1.23) (0.88) (0.12) -(1.90) c -(1.58) 
(-4, 0) (0, +4) 0.30% 0.39% 0.18% 0.16% -1.14% -1.40% 
  (0.91) (1.19) (0.65) (0.57) -(1.62) -(2.00) b 
(-5, 0) (0, +5) 0.08% 0.18% 0.03% 0.00% -1.20% -0.92% 
  (0.22) (0.49) (0.10) -(0.01) -(1.56) -(1.20) 
(-10, 0) (0,+10) 0.04% 0.40% -0.13% 0.31% -2.09% -1.81% 
  (0.07) (0.81) -(0.31) (0.74) -(2.01) b -(1.74) c 
(-20, 0) (0,+20) 0.11% 0.31% -0.23% 0.59% -3.42% -2.63% 
  (0.16) (0.47) -(0.39) (1.02) -(2.39) a -(1.83) c 
Event Period       
(0, 0) (-1, +1) 0.67% 0.68% 0.55% 0.52% -0.63% -1.36% 
  (4.57) a (2.68) a (4.36) a (2.38) a -(2.00) b -(2.50) a 
 (-2,+1) (-2, +2) 0.46% 0.04% 0.30% -0.24% -1.86% -1.77% 
  (1.56) (0.11) (1.17) -(0.85) -(2.97) a -(2.52) a 
 (-3,+1) (-3, +3) 0.35% 0.09% 0.18% -0.30% -1.80% -1.55% 
  (1.06) (0.23) (0.62) -(0.90) -(2.57) a -(1.87) c 
 (-4,+1) (-4, +4) 0.25% 0.02% 0.14% -0.21% -1.75% -1.91% 
  (0.69) (0.04) (0.45) -(0.55) -(2.28) b -(2.03) b 
 (-5,+1) (-5, +5) 0.03% -0.41% -0.01% -0.52% -1.81% -1.49% 
  (0.07) -(0.85) -(0.04) -(1.25) -(2.18) b -(1.44) 
 (-10,+1) (-10, +10) -0.01% -0.24% -0.18% -0.37% -2.70% -3.27% 
  -(0.03) -(0.36) -(0.40) -(0.64) -(2.49) a -(2.28) b 
 (-20,+1) (-20, +20) 0.06% -0.25% -0.28% -0.19% -4.03% -5.43% 
  (0.08) -(0.27) -(0.46) -(0.23) -(2.75) a -(2.71) a 
The sample here consists of 120 bancassurance deals announced between 1990 and 2006 and excludes deals where the targets are 
insurance agencies (90 cases). After adjusting for multiple bids* the sample size drops to 113 bancassurance deals. The reported 
values are cumulative average abnormal returns for the overall international sample of bank-insurance deals excluding deals 
where the targets are insurance agencies. The control sample involves 50 deals between financial institutions (FI), at least one 
bank or insurance that does not pursue bank-insurance structures. The event windows are presented under the first two columns 
and excess returns are reported in that order under each of the subsequent three headings. Abnormal returns are calculated using 
standard event study methodology with a two-factor variant of the market model – where statistically necessary. As a proxy for 
market risk, the general market index and sector specific index are employed separately. The figures in brackets indicate t-values. 
* Multiple bids arise when institutions announce the acquisition of more than one target on a given day. To avoid multiple 
counting of the same effect we treat these cases as one when averaging out the ARs and CARs. 
a/b/c denote significant CAAR at the 0.02/0.05/0.10 level (two-tailed test) for the pertinent event period. 
 
Looking at the excess returns from the windows close to the events’ announcement 
it is clear that the acquiring institutions experience significant abnormal returns 
irrespective of the index employed as a proxy for the market. Specifically, all the 
CAARs arising from combinations of windows within the three-day [-1 +1] period, 
are positive and significant for institutions that pursue bancassurance structures, while 
negative and significant for institutions announcing deals that lead to structures other 
than bancassurance. Focusing on bank-insurance deals, although the presence of 
information leakage is implied by the positive and statistically significant CAARs in 
the event windows leading to the announcement day, the AARs one and two days 
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prior to the announcement are statistically insignificant67
The conclusions that can be drawn from the results reported above are the 
following: First, the analysis of the control sample corroborates the typical findings of 
the literature on mergers and acquisitions between financial institutions. More 
specifically, target shareholders are generally found to gain value at the expense of 
acquirer shareholders, which in turn experience negative excess returns around M&A 
announcements between banks, or those between banks and securities firms (
. The absence of any excess 
returns prior to day zero has two main implications; first, it corroborates the notion 
that the market did not anticipate these announcements, and second, it reinforces the 
strong average excess return (0.67%) witnessed on the announcement day [0 0]. 
Moving on to the symmetric windows, the positive and significant average excess 
returns dissipate outside the 3-day [-1 +1] window. A similar pattern is observed in 
the post-event windows where CAARs do not persist for a long period, fading away 
after the 3-day [0 +2] window. Given the above, it can be deduced that the market 
seems to be efficient in the way information is disseminated and absorbed by 
investors. On the other hand, when the control sample is considered, the negative and 
significant cumulative average excess returns are apparent across the majority of 
event windows examined. It is also noticeable that the reaction persists even when 
large intervals are taken into account, with the respective acquiring institutions 
shedding as much as 2.63% [0 +20] or 5.43% [-20 +20] of their value. 
Amihud, 
DeLong and Saunders, 2002; Bhargava and Fraser, 1998; DeLong, 2001; Houston and 
Ryngaert, 1994). Second, the results are consistent with the findings of limited direct 
event-study evidence on bank-insurance mergers. Specifically, (Fields, Fraser and 
Kolari, 2007a; b) report positive average excess returns for acquirers in their analysis 
of an international sample of bancassurance deals, while Cybo-Ottone and Murgia 
(2000) find positive and significant excess returns for a small European sample of 
bank-insurance cases. Nevertheless, the above results are in contrast with Chen, Li, 
Moshirian and Tan (2007) who report negative average excess returns in examining a 
sample of European bank-insurance partnership announcements. Similarly, the 
conclusions here are not in line with DeLong (2001) when her sample of diversifying 
deals is considered, as she finds that diversifying deals in terms of activity and/or 
geography do not create shareholder value. One explanation might be that her sample 
                                                 
67 The average abnormal return for day -1 is 0.06% and the respective figure for day -2 is -0.22%. Both 
figures are statistically insignificant even at the 10% level. 
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of diversifying deals does not differentiate between bank-insurance mergers and bank-
securities mergers, where the latter have been indeed found to destroy shareholder 
value. On a theoretical level, the positive reaction of the market to bancassurance 
partnership announcements is  in line with Johnston and Madura (2000) and Nurullah 
and Staikouras (2008) who argue that banks could benefit from bancassurance by 
exploiting cross-selling opportunities and increases in non-interest income. In other 
words, the positive excess returns could be associated with the fact that, by exploiting 
bancassurance, banks can reduce their dependence on loans as a primary source of 
income (Broome and Markham, 2000) and diversify their revenues (Felgran, 1985; 
Szego, 1986). 
In an attempt to assess whether stock market adjustments differ depending on the 
nature (sector) of the bidder or, in other words, the direction of the deal, the current 
section discriminates between banks and insurance firms. Staikouras (2006) discusses 
the possible dynamics underpinning these distinct corporate entities by pointing 
towards the strong bank brand value, range of services provided, reputation, multi-
branch facilities etc. which can be appealing to market investors. Based on the above, 
this section distinguishes between deals where a bank bids for an insurance company 
and deals where the insurer takes the lead. The findings provide an interesting insight 
as to how different industries react to the bank-insurance ventures. The results are 
presented in Table 4.4. 
  
  
91 
 
Table 4.4. Bank bidder vs Insurance bidder announcements 
          
  Bank Bidder Insurance Bidder 
  Excess Returns via Excess Returns via Excess Returns via Excess Returns via 
Event Period Market Index Industry Index Market Index Industry Index 
(-1, 0) (0, +1) 0.82% 0.87% 0.63% 0.68% 0.28% -0.62% 0.27% -0.35% 
  (3.76) a (3.99) a (3.17) a (3.43) a (0.56) -(1.25) (0.61) -(0.79) 
(-2, 0) (0, +2) 0.58% 0.31% 0.41% -0.02% 0.16% -0.36% 0.01% -0.07% 
  (2.17) b (1.17) (1.69) c -(0.09) (0.26) -(0.59) (0.02) -(0.13) 
(-3, 0) (0, +3) 0.46% 0.51% 0.31% 0.09% 0.12% -0.39% -0.24% -0.28% 
  (1.47) (1.66) c (1.12) (0.32) (0.16) -(0.55) -(0.38) -(0.45) 
(-4, 0) (0, +4) 0.40% 0.64% 0.30% 0.31% -0.20% -0.86% -0.37% -0.55% 
  (1.16) (1.86) c (0.94) (0.97) -(0.25) -(1.08) -(0.53) -(0.80) 
(-5, 0) (0, +5) 0.11% 0.48% 0.07% 0.20% -0.06% -1.31% -0.17% -1.02% 
  (0.28) (1.27) (0.21) (0.59) -(0.07) -(1.52) -(0.22) -(1.34) 
(-10, 0) (0,+10) 0.09% 0.52% -0.11% 0.32% -0.26% -0.23% -0.21% 0.27% 
  (0.18) (1.02) -(0.25) (0.69) -(0.22) -(0.19) -(0.21) (0.26) 
(-20, 0) (0,+20) -0.16% 0.47% -0.47% 0.53% 1.43% -0.46% 0.96% 0.90% 
  -(0.22) (0.66) -(0.73) (0.83) (0.88) -(0.28) (0.68) (0.63) 
Event Period         
(0, 0) (-1, +1) 0.82% 0.88% 0.64% 0.67% -0.05% -0.29% 0.11% -0.19% 
  (5.29) a (3.28) a (4.58) a (2.74) a -(0.15) -(0.48) (0.35) -(0.35) 
 (-2,+1) (-2, +2) 0.63% 0.08% 0.45% -0.25% -0.41% -0.16% -0.45% -0.17% 
  (2.06) b (0.22) (1.59) -(0.81) -(0.59) -(0.20) -(0.72) -(0.24) 
 (-3,+1) (-3, +3) 0.51% 0.15% 0.35% -0.24% -0.46% -0.22% -0.69% -0.62% 
  (1.48) (0.37) (1.12) -(0.64) -(0.58) -(0.24) -(1.00) -(0.76) 
 (-4,+1) (-4, +4) 0.45% 0.23% 0.33% -0.04% -0.77% -1.00% -0.82% -1.03% 
  (1.20) (0.49) (0.97) -(0.10) -(0.89) -(0.94) -(1.08) -(1.11) 
 (-5,+1) (-5, +5) 0.16% -0.23% 0.11% -0.37% -0.63% -1.32% -0.63% -1.30% 
  (0.40) -(0.45) (0.29) -(0.79) -(0.68) -(1.13) -(0.76) -(1.26) 
 (-10,+1) (-10, +10) 0.15% -0.20% -0.08% -0.44% -0.83% -0.43% -0.67% -0.05% 
  (0.28) -(0.28) -(0.16) -(0.68) -(0.67) -(0.27) -(0.62) -(0.03) 
 (-20,+1) (-20, +20) -0.10% -0.50% -0.43% -0.58% 0.85% 1.02% 0.51% 1.75% 
  -(0.14) -(0.51) -(0.66) -(0.65) (0.51) (0.45) (0.35) (0.88) 
The sample here consists of 100 cases where banks bid for insurers and 20 bank-insurance deals where the bidder is an insurance 
firm. The sample period is 1990-2006. After adjusting for multiple bids* the sample size drops to 94 bank to insurance deals and 
19 insurance to bank deals. The reported values are cumulative average abnormal returns for the international sample of these 
announcements, excluding deals where the targets are insurance agencies. The event windows are presented under the first two 
columns and excess returns are reported in that order under each of the subsequent four headings. Abnormal returns are 
calculated using standard event study methodology with a two-factor variant of the market model – where statistically necessary. 
As a proxy for market risk, the general market index and sector specific index are employed separately. The figures in brackets 
indicate t-values. 
* Multiple bids arise when institutions announce the acquisition of more than one target on a given day. To avoid multiple 
counting of the same effect we treat these cases as one when averaging out the ARs and CARs. 
a/b/c denote significant CAAR at the 0.02/0.05/0.10 level (two-tailed test) for the pertinent event period. 
 
A comparison between the cumulative average excess returns experienced by bank 
bidders versus the respective returns experienced by insurance bidders clearly shows 
that the market places more weight on the former or, in other words, on deals where 
banks take the lead. Specifically, the CAARs are much higher for bank bidders when 
compared to those of insurance bidders. The significance of the bank’s equity excess 
returns seems to dominate the five-day window [-2 +2], while using the market index 
such significance is extended up to 4 days after the announcement. Conversely, when 
insurance bidders are examined, there is no significant abnormal return prior to/on the 
announcement day, while most of the other CAARs are negative and statistically 
insignificant. It is also interesting that in many cases, the negative returns experienced 
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by insurance bidders, exhibit a much higher value than the positive returns obtained 
by bank-bidders. These results are in line with Fields, Fraser and Kolari (2007b) who 
find positive and significant excess returns for bank bidders, but insignificant returns 
for insurance bidders. In a study of the U.S. market, Carow (2001b) hints a word of 
warning, as equity values of insurance firms are plummeting as a result of court 
rulings that allow banks to sell annuities and insurance products. His work is also in 
line with conclusions drawn in Cowan, Howell and Power (2002) and Carow and 
Kane (2002). In essence, the above results provide some support for the theory of 
contestable markets (Baumol, 1982), according to which, the removal of regulatory 
hedges can reduce the long-term revenues of incumbent firms in the industry, given 
the increased competition by new entrants. This can be accompanied by the fact that 
banks may have much lower selling costs than insurers (Felgran, 1985; Todd and 
Murray, 1988).  
To sum up, the differences in the empirical findings could be attributed to a 
number of reasons – not directly testable in the present analysis. One could argue that 
bank shareholders view the bank-insurance interface as a means of increasing 
revenues through a low cost operation; or possibly aiming to extend the deposit-
security frame to annuities that closely resemble banking products such as mortgages. 
On the other hand, insurers may be concerned about the bank’s powerful low cost 
operation and vast network which could possibly take insurers out of the market. In 
essence, these fears are related to the notion that bancassurance could inject more 
competition into the insurance business and thus divert premium cash flows to banks. 
In addition, banks have always enjoyed a stronger brand name, while to a large 
extent consumers have not yet developed the “trust relationship” with the insurance 
industry. This is evident if one contrasts the cautiousness of consumers when it comes 
to insurance and sales of related products versus their more relaxed attitude when it 
comes to purchasing banking services. In sum, the above could provide support to the 
negative correlation between the banks and insurers’ stock returns at the time of the 
bank-insurance announcements. 
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4.4.1. BANK-INSURANCE AGENCY COMBINATIONS 
 
A closer look at the extant body of research on the bank-insurance interface reveals 
fundamental differences in the risk-return profiles of banks when the latter combine 
with insurance agencies/brokers (Boyd, Graham and Hewitt, 1993; Nurullah and 
Staikouras, 2008). Specifically, while the first study obtains mixed results with 
regards to the risk-return profiles of banks when they merge with agencies/brokers 
versus insurance underwriters, the second suggests that the most suitable candidate for 
the bancassurance entity is insurance brokerage, because it offers the most attractive 
risk-return profile. Within a theoretical framework, Felgran (1985) argues that 
insurance brokerage is attractive for banks since it is complementary to banking 
products, requires low investment and carries low risk as it generates fee income. On 
the other hand, he suggests insurance underwriting is not attractive to banks, because 
it has a high risk/low return profile, is capital intensive and there are few linkages 
between underwriting and banking services. Despite these dissimilarities, the existing 
body of event studies on bancassurance does not differentiate between deals where the 
bank is targeting an insurance underwriter – thus becoming exposed to underwriting 
risks – and deals where the bank is targeting an insurance broker/agent, where 
underwriting risk is not applicable. Given that the market is expected to react 
differently to combinations offering distinct risk-return structures, aggregating excess 
returns from both types of bank-insurance deals could yield conflicting, if not, 
problematic results. In order to overcome this issue, the current study isolates 
combinations of banks and insurance brokers/agents. The results are presented in 
Table 4.5. 
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Table 4.5. Bank - Insurance agencies/brokers deals 
      
  Bank Bidder - Ins Agency Target 
  Excess Returns via Excess Returns via 
Event Period Market Index Industry Index 
(-1, 0) (0, +1) -0.05% -0.39% 0.10% -0.20% 
  -(0.20) -(1.55) (0.44) -(0.85) 
(-2, 0) (0, +2) -0.08% -0.36% 0.12% -0.25% 
  -(0.25) -(1.17) (0.43) -(0.86) 
(-3, 0) (0, +3) -0.07% -0.57% 0.01% -0.47% 
  -(0.19) -(1.59) (0.02) -(1.43) 
(-4, 0) (0, +4) 0.12% -0.22% 0.32% -0.27% 
  (0.29) -(0.55) (0.87) -(0.73) 
(-5, 0) (0, +5) 0.23% -0.60% 0.43% -0.66% 
  (0.54) -(1.38) (1.06) -(1.63) 
(-10, 0) (0,+10) -0.07% -0.60% 0.36% -0.68% 
  -(0.12) -(1.02) (0.66) -(1.25) 
(-20, 0) (0,+20) -0.23% 0.04% 0.01% 0.18% 
  -(0.28) (0.05) (0.02) (0.23) 
Event Period     
(0, 0) (-1, +1) -0.23% -0.21% -0.08% -0.02% 
  -(1.28) -(0.69) -(0.49) -(0.05) 
 (-2,+1) (-2, +2) -0.24% -0.21% 0.01% -0.04% 
  -(0.68) -(0.53) (0.02) -(0.12) 
 (-3,+1) (-3, +3) -0.23% -0.41% -0.11% -0.38% 
  -(0.58) -(0.86) -(0.30) -(0.88) 
 (-4,+1) (-4, +4) -0.05% 0.12% 0.20% 0.13% 
  -(0.11) (0.23) (0.50) (0.27) 
 (-5,+1) (-5, +5) 0.07% -0.14% 0.31% -0.15% 
  (0.15) -(0.24) (0.71) -(0.28) 
 (-10,+1) (-10, +10) -0.23% -0.44% 0.24% -0.24% 
  -(0.38) -(0.54) (0.43) -(0.32) 
 (-20,+1) (-20, +20) -0.39% 0.04% -0.10% 0.27% 
  -(0.47) (0.03) -(0.13) (0.26) 
The sample here consists of 90 banks bidding for insurance agencies. The sample period is 1990-2006. After adjusting for 
multiple bids* the sample size drops to 87 bank to insurance agencies deals. The reported values are cumulative average 
abnormal returns for the international sample of these announcements. The event windows are presented under the first two 
columns and excess returns are reported in that order under each of the subsequent two headings. Abnormal returns are calculated 
using standard event study methodology with a two-factor variant of the market model – where statistically necessary. As a proxy 
for market risk, the general market index and sector specific index are employed separately. The figures in brackets indicate t-
values. 
*Multiple bids arise when institutions announce the acquisition of more than one target on a given day. To avoid double/triple 
counting the same effect we treat these cases as one when averaging out the ARs and CARs. 
a/b/c denote significant CAAR at the 0.02/0.05/0.10 level (two-tailed test) for the pertinent event period. 
 
 
The results presented in Table 4.5 clearly show that the cumulative average excess 
returns experienced by bank bidders are negative and insignificant throughout the 
event period. The positive but insignificant CAARs drawn from the model that 
incorporates industry indices are the only exception with respect to the direction of 
excess returns. Nevertheless, the latter difference may well be related to events that 
affected the market as a whole, but not the particular sector in any significant way and 
vice versa. 
The insignificance of the results in Table 4.5 points to two considerable 
conclusions. First, the analysis here verifies previous concerns with respect to the 
differences in the risk-return profiles of banks when the latter merge with insurance 
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underwriters versus agencies/brokers. This is especially apparent when one contrasts 
the results in Table 4.5 with those presented in previous tables. Second, in contrast to 
the prior literature that generally favours insurance brokerage as an addition to the 
traditional banking business, the findings for this sample of 90 deals point to the 
opposite direction. The market is found to ignore bank-insurance agency/brokerage 
combinations around the time of their announcement. In essence, banks that bid for 
insurance agencies neither create nor destroy shareholder value. This outcome might 
be related to the low risk-return nature of the insurance brokerage/agency business or, 
as Broome and Markham (2000) suggest, be associated with concerns involving a) 
customer confusion regarding insurance products, b) conflicts of interest for the bank 
who acts both as a disinterested investment counsellor and as an insurance sales outlet 
and finally c) bank coercion, if loan applicants are indirectly forced into buying 
insurance products. 
4.4.2. BANK-INSURANCE INTERFACE AND SAMPLE CHARACTERISTICS 
 
Having analysed the overall market reaction around bank-insurance 
announcements, this section sets out to explore whether various deal characteristics 
such as: a) their classification as domestic or cross-border, b) their size, c) their status 
as U.S. or non-U.S. and finally, d) the geographic location of the bidder, play a 
significant role in the subsequent valuation of the deal by the market. In other words, 
the study moves on to test for the existence and magnitude of excess returns, 
associated with the aforementioned attributes. This is accomplished by dividing the 
sample into the categories mentioned above and then calculating the respective 
average abnormal returns (AARs) and cumulative average abnormal returns 
(CAARs). 
4.4.2.1. GEOGRAPHIC OVERLAP 
 
Evidence on the effects of geographic diversification in banking is available since 
the 1990s (Berger and Humphrey, 1994; Siems, 1996), showing an increase in 
efficiency and higher returns associated with overlaps in the branch networks of 
merging banks. In terms of returns to stockholders, Beitel, Schiereck and Wahrenburg 
(2004) and DeLong (2001) find that geographically focusing mergers perform better 
than diversifying ones. In a more general framework, Deng and Elyasiani (2008) 
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show, among others, that geographic diversification is associated with a significant 
value premium and a reduction in total risk. Considering the empirical evidence in 
banking, this section sets out to explore whether the extent of geographic overlap of 
the merging entities is of significance with respect to the subsequent market reaction 
to the bank-insurance announcement(s). Table 4.6 presents the results of the split 
sample on the basis of deals being either domestic or cross-border. 
 
Table 4.6. Cross-border vs. domestic (all deals) 
  Cross Border Domestic 
  Excess Returns via Excess Returns via Excess Returns via Excess Returns via 
Event Period Market Index Industry Index Market Index Industry Index 
(-1, 0) (0, +1) 0.65% 0.61% 0.56% 0.82% 0.81% 0.65% 0.58% 0.42% 
  (1.56) (1.46) (1.50) (2.19) b (3.54) a (2.84) a (2.87) a (2.08) b 
(-2, 0) (0, +2) 0.41% 0.53% 0.02% 0.69% 0.60% 0.15% 0.43% -0.22% 
  (0.81) (1.05) (0.04) (1.50) (2.15) b (0.53) (1.74) c -(0.89) 
(-3, 0) (0, +3) 0.07% 0.57% -0.23% 0.39% 0.54% 0.34% 0.36% -0.08% 
  (0.12) (0.96) -(0.44) (0.75) (1.67) c (1.04) (1.25) -(0.28) 
(-4, 0) (0, +4) -0.03% 0.10% 0.02% 0.12% 0.44% 0.49% 0.25% 0.17% 
  -(0.04) (0.16) (0.03) (0.21) (1.21) (1.36) (0.77) (0.53) 
(-5, 0) (0, +5) -0.31% -0.69% 0.21% -0.44% 0.22% 0.42% 0.00% 0.11% 
  -(0.43) -(0.96) (0.32) -(0.69) (0.55) (1.07) (0.01) (0.30) 
(-10, 0) (0,+10) 0.11% 0.18% -0.40% 0.37% 0.09% 0.45% -0.04% 0.26% 
  (0.11) (0.19) -(0.46) (0.42) (0.16) (0.85) -(0.08) (0.54) 
(-20, 0) (0,+20) 0.33% 0.71% -0.99% 1.73% 0.19% 0.22% 0.04% 0.25% 
  (0.24) (0.53) -(0.82) (1.44) (0.26) (0.30) (0.06) (0.38) 
Event Period         
(0, 0) (-1, +1) 0.55% 0.71% 0.66% 0.71% 0.73% 0.73% 0.54% 0.47% 
  (1.87) c (1.39) (2.52) a (1.55) (4.50) a (2.61) a (3.73) a (1.89) c 
 (-2,+1) (-2, +2) 0.47% 0.40% 0.17% 0.04% 0.52% 0.02% 0.32% -0.32% 
  (0.79) (0.60) (0.33) (0.07) (1.62) (0.06) (1.12) -(1.01) 
 (-3,+1) (-3, +3) 0.13% 0.08% -0.08% -0.50% 0.46% 0.15% 0.25% -0.26% 
  (0.19) (0.11) -(0.13) -(0.72) (1.28) (0.35) (0.77) -(0.67) 
 (-4,+1) (-4, +4) 0.03% -0.48% 0.17% -0.52% 0.36% 0.20% 0.14% -0.12% 
  (0.04) -(0.54) (0.26) -(0.66) (0.90) (0.41) (0.39) -(0.27) 
 (-5,+1) (-5, +5) -0.25% -1.55% 0.36% -0.90% 0.14% -0.09% -0.11% -0.42% 
  -(0.32) -(1.59) (0.52) -(1.03) (0.33) -(0.16) -(0.28) -(0.89) 
 (-10,+1) (-10, +10) 0.16% -0.26% -0.25% -0.70% 0.01% -0.19% -0.15% -0.31% 
  (0.16) -(0.19) -(0.28) -(0.58) (0.02) -(0.25) -(0.30) -(0.47) 
 (-20,+1) (-20, +20) 0.39% 0.49% -0.84% 0.08% 0.11% -0.32% -0.07% -0.25% 
  (0.28) (0.26) -(0.68) (0.04) (0.15) -(0.31) -(0.10) -(0.27) 
The sample here consists of 24 cross border bancassurance deals and 96 domestic bancassurance deals announced between 1990 and 
2006, excluding deals where the targets are insurance agencies. After adjusting for multiple bids* the sample size drops to 23 (14 
bank bidders and 9 insurance bidders) cross border deals and 90 (80 bank bidders and 10 insurance bidders) domestic deals. The 
reported values are cumulative average abnormal returns for the international sample of these announcements. The event windows 
are presented under the first two columns and excess returns are reported in that order under each of the subsequent four headings. 
Abnormal returns are calculated using standard event study methodology with a two-factor variant of the market model – where 
statistically necessary. As a proxy for market risk, the general market index and sector specific index are employed separately. The 
figures in brackets indicate t-values. 
* Multiple bids arise when institutions announce the acquisition of more than one target on a given day. To avoid multiple counting 
of the same effect we treat these cases as one when averaging out the ARs and CARs. 
a/b/c denote significant CAAR at the 0.02/0.05/0.10 level (two-tailed test) for the pertinent event period. 
 
The results presented in Table 4.6 verify that deals where the bidder and target 
come from the same geographic background are superior (when statistically 
significant) to cross-border deals. Specifically, the excess returns of the cross-border 
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deals for the period leading to and post the announcement day(s) are positive but 
insignificant, whereas the cumulative excess returns of the domestic deals ranging 
from the [-1 0] up to the [-3 0] event windows as well as the post event [0 +1] CAAR, 
are higher and statistically significant. It is worth noting that on the announcement 
day(s) [0 0], cross border deals experience a positive and significant excess return of 
0.55%, yet this is still lower than the excess return experienced by domestic deals 
which takes a value of 0.73%.  
Given the previous finding of different market reactions according to the bidder’s 
nature of business (banking/insurance), the study delves into the market reaction of 
cross-border versus domestic deals for bank and insurance bidders respectively. The 
results are presented in Table 4.7 and Table 4.8. 
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Table 4.7. Cross-border vs. domestic deals (bank bidders) 
         
  Cross Border Domestic 
  Excess Returns via Excess Returns via Excess Returns via Excess Returns via 
Event Period Market Index Industry Index Market Index Industry Index 
(-1, 0) (0, +1) 0.20% 0.31% 0.11% 0.88% 0.93% 0.97% 0.72% 0.65% 
  (0.37) (0.57) (0.22) (1.87) c (3.99) a (4.16) a (3.36) a (3.01) a 
(-2, 0) (0, +2) 0.14% 0.07% -0.20% 0.47% 0.66% 0.36% 0.52% -0.11% 
  (0.22) (0.11) -(0.35) (0.82) (2.30) b (1.24) (1.97) b -(0.41) 
(-3, 0) (0, +3) -0.41% 0.18% -0.32% 0.35% 0.61% 0.57% 0.43% 0.05% 
  -(0.54) (0.23) -(0.48) (0.53) (1.84) c (1.73) c (1.40) (0.15) 
(-4, 0) (0, +4) -0.50% -0.34% -0.03% 0.17% 0.56% 0.81% 0.35% 0.33% 
  -(0.58) -(0.39) -(0.04) (0.23) (1.51) (2.21) b (1.04) (0.97) 
(-5, 0) (0, +5) -0.88% -0.85% 0.04% -0.04% 0.28% 0.71% 0.08% 0.25% 
  -(0.95) -(0.91) (0.04) -(0.05) (0.69) (1.77) c (0.21) (0.66) 
(-10, 0) (0,+10) -0.31% -0.29% -0.55% 0.65% 0.16% 0.66% -0.04% 0.26% 
  -(0.24) -(0.23) -(0.50) (0.59) (0.30) (1.21) -(0.08) (0.52) 
(-20, 0) (0,+20) -1.19% -0.21% -1.40% 1.50% 0.02% 0.59% -0.31% 0.36% 
  -(0.68) -(0.12) -(0.92) (0.98) (0.03) (0.78) -(0.44) (0.52) 
Event Period         
(0, 0) (-1, +1) 0.36% 0.15% 0.54% 0.45% 0.90% 1.00% 0.66% 0.70% 
  (0.93) (0.23) (1.61) (0.78) (5.44) a (3.52) a (4.37) a (2.68) a 
 (-2,+1) (-2, +2) 0.10% -0.14% 0.14% -0.27% 0.73% 0.11% 0.50% -0.25% 
  (0.13) -(0.16) (0.21) -(0.36) (2.21) b (0.31) (1.65) c -(0.74) 
 (-3,+1) (-3, +3) -0.46% -0.59% 0.02% -0.51% 0.68% 0.28% 0.41% -0.19% 
  -(0.54) -(0.58) (0.03) -(0.57) (1.85) c (0.65) (1.21) -(0.48) 
 (-4,+1) (-4, +4) -0.55% -1.19% 0.31% -0.40% 0.63% 0.47% 0.34% 0.02% 
  -(0.58) -(1.04) (0.38) -(0.40) (1.56) (0.96) (0.91) (0.04) 
 (-5,+1) (-5, +5) -0.93% -2.09% 0.38% -0.54% 0.35% 0.10% 0.06% -0.34% 
  -(0.92) -(1.65) c (0.43) -(0.49) (0.81) (0.18) (0.15) -(0.67) 
 (-10,+1) (-10, +10) -0.35% -0.95% -0.20% -0.43% 0.24% -0.07% -0.06% -0.44% 
  -(0.27) -(0.54) -(0.18) -(0.28) (0.42) -(0.09) -(0.10) -(0.63) 
 (-20,+1) (-20, +20) -1.24% -1.76% -1.06% -0.45% 0.10% -0.28% -0.32% -0.61% 
  -(0.69) -(0.72) -(0.68) -(0.21) (0.12) -(0.27) -(0.46) -(0.62) 
The sample here consists of 15 cross border bancassurance deals and 85 domestic bancassurance deals where the bidder is a bank and 
the target an insurance firm, excluding deals where the targets are insurance agencies. The sample period is 1990-2006. After 
adjusting for multiple bids* the sample size drops to 14 cross border deals and 80 domestic deals. The reported values are cumulative 
average abnormal returns for the international sample of these announcements. The event windows are presented under the first two 
columns and excess returns are reported in that order under each of the subsequent four headings. Abnormal returns are calculated 
using standard event study methodology with a two-factor variant of the market model – where statistically necessary. As a proxy for 
market risk, the general market index and sector specific index are employed separately. The figures in brackets indicate t-values. 
*Multiple bids arise when institutions announce the acquisition of more than one target on a given day. To avoid double/triple 
counting the same effect we treat these cases as one when averaging out the ARs and CARs. 
a/b/c denote significant CAAR at the 0.02/0.05/0.10 level (two-tailed test) for the pertinent event period. 
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Table 4.8. Cross-border vs. domestic deals (insurance bidders) 
Insurance Bidders         
  Cross Border Domestic 
  Excess Returns via Excess Returns via Excess Returns via Excess Returns via 
Event Period Market Index Industry Index Market Index Industry Index 
(-1, 0) (0, +1) 0.56% 0.77% 1.13% 0.78% 0.03% -1.87% -0.51% -1.36% 
  (1.00) (1.37) (1.84) c (1.27) (0.04) -(2.38) a -(0.84) -(2.22) b 
(-2, 0) (0, +2) 0.04% 0.94% 0.28% 1.12% 0.26% -1.54% -0.23% -1.14% 
  (0.06) (1.37) (0.37) (1.49) (0.27) -(1.59) -(0.31) -(1.52) 
(-3, 0) (0, +3) 0.04% 1.00% -0.32% 0.62% 0.19% -1.65% -0.16% -1.09% 
  (0.05) (1.27) -(0.36) (0.72) (0.17) -(1.47) -(0.19) -(1.26) 
(-4, 0) (0, +4) -0.05% 0.48% -0.12% 0.06% -0.33% -2.06% -0.59% -1.11% 
  -(0.05) (0.55) -(0.12) (0.06) -(0.27) -(1.65) c -(0.61) -(1.14) 
(-5, 0) (0, +5) -0.05% -0.59% 0.29% -1.03% -0.07% -1.96% -0.58% -1.00% 
  -(0.06) -(0.61) (0.27) -(0.97) -(0.05) -(1.44) -(0.55) -(0.95) 
(-10, 0) (0,+10) -0.17% 1.21% -0.43% 0.31% -0.33% -1.52% -0.02% 0.24% 
  -(0.13) (0.93) -(0.30) (0.21) -(0.18) -(0.82) -(0.01) (0.17) 
(-20, 0) (0,+20) 0.63% 2.43% -1.12% 2.66% 2.15% -3.06% 2.84% -0.68% 
  (0.35) (1.34) -(0.56) (1.33) (0.84) -(1.20) (1.43) -(0.35) 
Event Period         
(0, 0) (-1, +1) 0.39% 0.93% 0.76% 1.15% -0.45% -1.39% -0.47% -1.40% 
  (0.99) (1.37) (1.74) c (1.53) -(0.80) -(1.44) -(1.09) -(1.86) c 
 (-2,+1) (-2, +2) 0.42% 0.59% 0.30% 0.64% -1.17% -0.83% -1.12% -0.90% 
  (0.53) (0.67) (0.34) (0.66) -(1.05) -(0.66) -(1.29) -(0.93) 
 (-3,+1) (-3, +3) 0.41% 0.65% -0.29% -0.45% -1.24% -1.01% -1.05% -0.78% 
  (0.47) (0.62) -(0.30) -(0.39) -(0.99) -(0.68) -(1.08) -(0.68) 
 (-4,+1) (-4, +4) 0.33% 0.05% -0.10% -0.82% -1.76% -1.95% -1.47% -1.22% 
  (0.34) (0.04) -(0.09) -(0.63) -(1.29) -(1.16) -(1.39) -(0.94) 
 (-5,+1) (-5, +5) 0.32% -1.03% 0.31% -1.50% -1.50% -1.59% -1.47% -1.11% 
  (0.31) -(0.79) (0.27) -(1.04) -(1.01) -(0.86) -(1.28) -(0.78) 
 (-10,+1) (-10, +10) 0.21% 0.66% -0.41% -0.88% -1.76% -1.41% -0.90% 0.70% 
  (0.15) (0.36) -(0.27) -(0.44) -(0.91) -(0.55) -(0.60) (0.35) 
 (-20,+1) (-20, +20) 1.00% 2.66% -1.10% 0.78% 0.72% -0.47% 1.95% 2.63% 
  (0.54) (1.05) -(0.54) (0.28) (0.27) -(0.13) (0.96) (0.95) 
The sample here consists of 9 cross border bancassurance deals and 11 non-cross border bancassurance deals, where the bidders are 
insurance companies and the targets banks. The sample period is 1990-2006. After adjusting for multiple bids* the sample size drops 
to 9 cross border deals and 10 non-cross border deals. The reported values are cumulative average abnormal returns. The event 
windows are presented under the first two columns and excess returns are reported in that order under each of the subsequent four 
headings. Abnormal returns are calculated using standard event study methodology with a two-factor variant of the market model – 
where statistically necessary. As a proxy for market risk, the general market index and sector specific index are employed separately. 
The figures in brackets indicate t-values. 
*Multiple bids arise when institutions announce the acquisition of more than one target on a given day. To avoid double/triple 
counting the same effect we treat these cases as one when averaging out the ARs and CARs. 
a/b/c denote significant CAAR at the 0.02/0.05/0.10 level (two-tailed test) for the pertinent event period. 
 
 
When the decomposition of bank bids for insurance companies into domestic 
versus cross-border is compared with the respective decomposition for the whole 
sample, the price adjustment is comparable, but at the same time stronger. 
Nevertheless, when the focus is shifted to the analogous excess returns experienced by 
the insurance bidders, these are in the opposite direction. In contrast with previous 
results, cross border deals where the bidder is an insurance company, generally 
experience positive excess returns, with the [0 +1] and [-1 +1] CAARs being 1.13% 
and 0.76% as well as statistically significant. On the other hand, analogous domestic 
deals where the insurance companies take the lead, exhibit negative excess returns 
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throughout the event period. Comparing the results in Table 4.8 with the results 
presented in Table 4.4 we conclude that the negative reaction of the market towards 
insure-banking deal announcements is mainly due to the domestic part of this sample. 
However, due to the small sample of assurebanking deals, one should be cautious 
before making any generalisations. 
In summary, the results with regards to the effects of geographic overlap in 
bancassurance deals are generally consistent with the event study literature in banking 
and financial institutions (Cybo-Ottone and Murgia, 2000; DeLong, 2001). It seems 
that the market attaches value to the synergies-efficiencies derived from larger market 
overlap and/or increases in market share and concentration. Furthermore, domestic 
deals may be easier to implement than cross border deals, which often suffer from 
difficulties created by the different legal and tax systems, language barriers and 
organizational cultures of the two entities. On the other hand, the above results are in 
contrast with event studies on bancassurance, where domestic deals are found to be 
associated with lower excess returns (Fields, Fraser and Kolari, 2007a; b) or with 
negative excess returns (Chen, Li, Moshirian and Tan, 2007). Two possible 
explanations for the divergence between the results reported here and the results 
reported in these studies could be sample differences and/or the fact that the above 
studies do not distinguish between bank bids for insurance underwriters and bank bids 
for insurance agencies. 
4.4.2.2. DEAL SIZE 
 
In addition to the geographic location, another factor that could play an important 
role in the market valuations of bancassurance deals could be the size of the deal. 
Large deals often receive higher publicity and are followed by many analysts due to 
their impact on investment banks’ portfolios as well as on the financial sector and the 
wider economy. The size of the deal could also act as an indicator of the higher 
synergies via scale economies that are likely to be achieved via the combination of the 
two institutions. The results are presented in Table 4.9. 
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Table 4.9. Large deals vs small deals 
  Large Deals Small Deals 
  Excess Returns via Excess Returns via Excess Returns via Excess Returns via 
Event Period Market Index Industry Index Market Index Industry Index 
(-1, 0) (0, +1) 1.79% 1.55% 1.28% 1.23% 0.91% 0.35% 0.82% 0.34% 
  (5.26) a (4.55) a (4.49) a (4.31) a (2.12) b (0.82) (2.14) b (0.90) 
(-2, 0) (0, +2) 1.85% 1.04% 1.23% 0.70% 0.94% -0.74% 0.85% -1.05% 
  (4.44) a (2.50) a (3.53) a (2.00) b (1.78) c -(1.41) (1.83) c -(2.26) b 
(-3, 0) (0, +3) 1.36% 1.35% 0.85% 0.76% 1.11% -0.91% 1.04% -1.09% 
  (2.82) a (2.80) a (2.11) b (1.87) c (1.84) c -(1.50) (1.93) c -(2.03) b 
(-4, 0) (0, +4) 1.01% 1.04% 0.70% 0.64% 1.04% -0.88% 0.89% -0.94% 
  (1.87) c (1.94) c (1.55) (1.42) (1.53) -(1.29) (1.47) -(1.56) 
(-5, 0) (0, +5) 0.92% 1.11% 0.84% 0.90% 0.54% -1.08% 0.41% -0.99% 
  (1.56) (1.89) c (1.71) c (1.82) c (0.73) -(1.46) (0.63) -(1.50) 
(-10, 0) (0,+10) 1.04% 1.22% 0.38% 1.39% 0.41% -1.13% 0.44% -0.88% 
  (1.30) (1.53) (0.57) (2.08) b (0.41) -(1.12) (0.50) -(0.98) 
(-20, 0) (0,+20) 1.87% 0.58% 0.51% 0.97% 0.97% -0.70% 0.71% 0.14% 
  (1.69) c (0.53) (0.55) (1.05) (0.69) -(0.51) (0.58) (0.12) 
Event Period         
(0, 0) (-1, +1) 1.49% 1.85% 1.17% 1.34% 0.63% 0.63% 0.57% 0.59% 
  (6.18) a (4.44) a (5.80) a (3.83) a (2.08) b (1.19) (2.11) b (1.26) 
 (-2,+1) (-2, +2) 1.91% 1.40% 1.29% 0.76% 0.65% -0.43% 0.62% -0.77% 
  (3.97) a (2.61) a (3.21) a (1.70) c (1.08) -(0.64) (1.16) -(1.28) 
 (-3,+1) (-3, +3) 1.42% 1.22% 0.91% 0.44% 0.83% -0.43% 0.81% -0.63% 
  (2.63) a (1.91) c (2.02) b (0.82) (1.23) -(0.53) (1.34) -(0.88) 
 (-4,+1) (-4, +4) 1.07% 0.56% 0.76% 0.17% 0.76% -0.47% 0.66% -0.62% 
  (1.81) c (0.78) (1.54) (0.28) (1.02) -(0.52) (1.00) -(0.77) 
 (-5,+1) (-5, +5) 0.98% 0.54% 0.90% 0.58% 0.26% -1.17% 0.19% -1.14% 
  (1.54) (0.68) (1.69) c (0.86) (0.33) -(1.17) (0.26) -(1.28) 
 (-10,+1) (-10, +10) 1.10% 0.77% 0.44% 0.61% 0.13% -1.35% 0.22% -1.00% 
  (1.32) (0.70) (0.63) (0.66) (0.12) -(0.97) (0.23) -(0.81) 
 (-20,+1) (-20, +20) 1.93% 0.96% 0.57% 0.31% 0.68% -0.37% 0.49% 0.29% 
  (1.71) c (0.62) (0.60) (0.24) (0.48) -(0.19) (0.39) (0.17) 
The sample here consists of 35 large bancassurance deals ($ value > 203.20 mil*.), and 35 small bancassurance deals ($ value < 
203.20 mil*.), excluding deals where the targets are insurance agencies and deals where the terms (including deal $size) were not 
disclosed. The sample period is 1990-2006. The reported values are cumulative average abnormal returns for the international sample 
of these announcements. The event windows are presented under the first two columns and excess returns are reported in that order 
under each of the subsequent four headings. Abnormal returns are calculated using standard event study methodology with a two-
factor variant of the market model – where statistically necessary. As a proxy for market risk, the general market index and sector 
specific index are employed separately. The figures in brackets indicate t-values. 
* This is the median $ value of this sample. 
a/b/c denote significant CAAR at the 0.02/0.05/0.10 level (two-tailed test) for the pertinent event period. 
 
 
The decomposition of the sample of deals based on their median size confirms the 
importance of this factor in the subsequent bidder valuation by the market. Looking at 
large deals, the positive and significant excess returns dominate most combinations 
within the 11-day [-5 +5] window, with the only exception being the 9-day and 11-
day symmetric windows. Moreover, the AAR on the announcement day(s) is 1.49% 
and significant. On the other hand, small deals exhibit a positive but smaller price 
adjustment that is confined to the pre-event period and extends from the 2-day [-1 0] 
window up to the 4-day [-3 0] window. Even though there is a positive and significant 
excess return of 0.63% on the announcement day(s), the CAARs on the subsequent 
days dissipate, becoming negative but insignificant. Furthermore, the study delves 
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into the market reaction of large versus small deals for bank and insurance bidders 
respectively. The results are presented in Table 4.10 and Table 4.11. 
 
Table 4.10. Large deals vs small deals (bank bidders) 
Bank bidders         
  Large Deals Small Deals 
  Excess Returns via Excess Returns via Excess Returns via Excess Returns via 
Event Period Market Index Industry Index Market Index Industry Index 
(-1, 0) (0, +1) 2.14% 2.31% 1.41% 1.64% 1.31% 0.66% 1.22% 0.60% 
  (5.40) a (5.82) a (4.31) a (5.03) a (2.86) a (1.44) (2.82) a (1.39) 
(-2, 0) (0, +2) 2.10% 1.69% 1.28% 1.11% 1.27% -0.89% 1.19% -1.36% 
  (4.32) a (3.47) a (3.19) a (2.78) a (2.26) b -(1.59) (2.25) b -(2.57) a 
(-3, 0) (0, +3) 1.47% 1.99% 0.92% 1.23% 1.54% -0.98% 1.38% -1.36% 
  (2.62) a (3.55) a (2.00) b (2.67) a (2.38) a -(1.51) (2.26) b -(2.23) b 
(-4, 0) (0, +4) 1.02% 1.74% 0.67% 1.10% 1.61% -0.88% 1.31% -1.16% 
  (1.63) (2.77) a (1.30) (2.13) b (2.22) b -(1.22) (1.91) c -(1.69) c 
(-5, 0) (0, +5) 0.90% 1.83% 0.82% 1.37% 0.88% -1.07% 0.69% -1.11% 
  (1.31) (2.66) a (1.44) (2.42) a (1.11) -(1.35) (0.93) -(1.48) 
(-10, 0) (0,+10) 0.89% 1.44% 0.27% 1.34% 0.83% -1.01% 0.59% -1.01% 
  (0.96) (1.54) (0.35) (1.75) c (0.77) -(0.94) (0.58) -(1.00) 
(-20, 0) (0,+20) 1.44% 0.12% 0.23% 0.35% 0.87% 0.40% 0.22% 0.68% 
  (1.12) (0.10) (0.22) (0.33) (0.59) (0.27) (0.16) (0.49) 
Event Period         
(0, 0) (-1, +1) 1.85% 2.60% 1.26% 1.79% 0.94% 1.02% 0.88% 0.94% 
  (6.60) a (5.36) a (5.46) a (4.48) a (2.91) a (1.82) c (2.87) a (1.78) c 
 (-2,+1) (-2, +2) 2.56% 1.93% 1.66% 1.13% 0.98% -0.57% 0.91% -1.05% 
  (4.56) a (3.08) a  (3.60) a (2.19) b (1.52) -(0.79) (1.49) -(1.53) 
 (-3,+1) (-3, +3) 1.93% 1.61% 1.31% 0.89% 1.25% -0.38% 1.11% -0.86% 
  (3.07) a (2.16) b (2.53) a (1.46) (1.73) c -(0.45) (1.62) -(1.06) 
 (-4,+1) (-4, +4) 1.48% 0.90% 1.06% 0.51% 1.32% -0.22% 1.03% -0.73% 
  (2.15) b (1.07) (1.86) c (0.74) (1.67) c -(0.22) (1.38) -(0.79) 
 (-5,+1) (-5, +5) 1.36% 0.88% 1.20% 0.92% 0.60% -1.13% 0.42% -1.29% 
  (1.83) c (0.94) (1.97) b (1.21) (0.70) -(1.05) (0.52) -(1.28) 
 (-10,+1) (-10, +10) 1.35% 0.47% 0.65% 0.35% 0.55% -1.12% 0.31% -1.31% 
  (1.39) (0.37) (0.82) (0.33) (0.49) -(0.75) (0.29) -(0.93) 
 (-20,+1) (-20, +20) 1.90% -0.29% 0.61% -0.68% 0.58% 0.33% -0.05% 0.03% 
  (1.44) -(0.16) (0.56) -(0.46) (0.38) (0.16) -(0.04) (0.01) 
The sample here consists of 27 large bancassurance deals ($ value > 195.00 mil*.), and 27 small bancassurance deals ($ value < 
195.00 mil*.) where the bidder is a bank and the target an insurance company, excluding deals where the targets are insurance 
agencies and deals where the terms (including deal $size) were not disclosed. The sample period is 1990-2006. The reported values 
are cumulative average abnormal returns for the international sample of these announcements. The event windows are presented 
under the first two columns and excess returns are reported in that order under each of the subsequent four headings. Abnormal 
returns are calculated using standard event study methodology with a two-factor variant of the market model – where statistically 
necessary. As a proxy for market risk, the general market index and sector specific index are employed separately. The figures in 
brackets indicate t-values. 
* This is the median $ value of this sample. 
a/b/c denote significant CAAR at the 0.02/0.05/0.10 level (two-tailed test) for the pertinent event period. 
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Table 4.11. Large deals vs small deals (insurance bidders) 
Insurance bidders          
  Large Deals Small Deals 
  Excess Returns via Excess Returns via Excess Returns via Excess Returns via 
Event Period Market Index Industry Index Market Index Industry Index 
(-1, 0) (0, +1) 0.55% -1.26% 0.58% -0.82% -0.67% -1.57% -0.67% -1.01% 
  (0.88) -(2.00) b (1.03) -(1.45) -(0.67) -(1.57) -(0.83) -(1.25) 
(-2, 0) (0, +2) 0.52% -1.26% 0.51% -1.29% -0.17% -0.98% -0.33% -0.42% 
  (0.68) -(1.64) (0.74) -(1.86) c -(0.14) -(0.80) -(0.33) -(0.42) 
(-3, 0) (0, +3) 0.22% -1.13% -0.21% -1.61% -0.38% -1.08% -0.22% -0.27% 
  (0.25) -(1.27) -(0.26) -(2.01) b -(0.27) -(0.76) -(0.19) -(0.23) 
(-4, 0) (0, +4) 0.28% -1.45% 0.01% -1.44% -1.04% -1.08% -0.59% -0.21% 
  (0.28) -(1.46) (0.01) -(1.61) -(0.66) -(0.68) -(0.46) -(0.16) 
(-5, 0) (0, +5) 0.52% -1.54% 0.25% -1.27% -0.91% -1.46% -0.56% -0.70% 
  (0.48) -(1.42) (0.25) -(1.29) -(0.52) -(0.84) -(0.40) -(0.50) 
(-10, 0) (0,+10) 1.47% -0.07% 0.33% 0.54% -1.59% -1.86% -0.10% -0.40% 
  (1.00) -(0.05) (0.25) (0.40) -(0.68) -(0.79) -(0.05) -(0.21) 
(-20, 0) (0,+20) 1.45% 0.05% -0.16% 1.46% 1.79% -3.59% 3.17% -1.35% 
  (0.71) (0.02) -(0.09) (0.80) (0.55) -(1.10) (1.21) -(0.51) 
Event Period         
(0, 0) (-1, +1) 0.14% -0.85% 0.55% -0.78% -0.47% -1.77% -0.35% -1.33% 
  (0.31) -(1.10) (1.37) -(1.13) -(0.66) -(1.44) -(0.61) -(1.34) 
 (-2,+1) (-2, +2) -0.88% -0.88% -0.85% -1.32% -1.27% -0.68% -0.99% -0.40% 
  -(0.98) -(0.88) -(1.07) -(1.48) -(0.90) -(0.43) -(0.86) -(0.31) 
 (-3,+1) (-3, +3) -1.18% -1.05% -1.58% -2.37% -1.48% -0.99% -0.88% -0.13% 
  -(1.18) -(0.89) -(1.76) c -(2.24) b -(0.93) -(0.53) -(0.69) -(0.09) 
 (-4,+1) (-4, +4) -1.12% -1.32% -1.36% -1.97% -2.15% -1.66% -1.25% -0.45% 
  -(1.03) -(0.98) -(1.38) -(1.64) -(1.24) -(0.78) -(0.89) -(0.26) 
 (-5,+1) (-5, +5) -0.88% -1.16% -1.12% -1.57% -2.02% -1.91% -1.22% -0.91% 
  -(0.74) -(0.79) -(1.05) -(1.18) -(1.07) -(0.81) -(0.81) -(0.48) 
 (-10,+1) (-10, +10) 0.07% 1.26% -1.03% 0.32% -2.70% -2.99% -0.76% -0.15% 
  (0.05) (0.62) -(0.75) (0.17) -(1.10) -(0.92) -(0.38) -(0.06) 
 (-20,+1) (-20, +20) 0.05% 1.36% -1.53% 0.75% 0.68% -1.34% 2.51% 2.17% 
  (0.02) (0.48) -(0.81) (0.29) (0.20) -(0.29) (0.94) (0.59) 
The sample here consists of 8 large bancassurance deals ($ value > 304.10 mil*.), and 8 small bancassurance deals ($ value < 304.10 
mil*.) where the bidders are insurance companies and the targets banks, excluding deals where the terms (including deal $size) were 
not disclosed. The sample period is 1990-2006. The reported values are cumulative average abnormal returns for the international 
sample of these announcements. The event windows are presented under the first two columns and excess returns are reported in that 
order under each of the subsequent four headings. Abnormal returns are calculated using standard event study methodology with a 
two-factor variant of the market model – where statistically necessary. As a proxy for market risk, the general market index and sector 
specific index are employed separately. The figures in brackets indicate t-values. 
* This is the median $ value of this sample. 
a/b/c denote significant CAAR at the 0.02/0.05/0.10 level (two-tailed test) for the pertinent event period. 
 
 
When bank bidders are considered (Table 4.10), the results are analogous to those 
reported for the whole sample (Table 4.9), yet even stronger. On the contrary, when 
insurance bidders are examined, the results are reversed, with negative excess returns 
found across most of the event windows for large and small deals alike. A closer look 
reveals insignificant returns for the small deals in this sample. On the contrary, 
insurers that take the lead in large assurebanking partnerships experience a negative 
and significant excess return of -1.26% on the 2-day [0 +1] window. 
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The results clearly show that large deals are superior to small deals, and this 
reflects that the market possibly anticipates that large deals will lead to greater post-
merger gains. Overall, the results are consistent with Fields, Fraser and Kolari (2007a; 
b), who find a positive relation between a proxy for scale economies (ratio of target 
size to bidder size) and excess returns. The latter are also in line with Chen, Li, 
Moshirian and Tan (2007) who find a positive relation between relative deal size and 
abnormal returns, while not in line with Cybo-Ottone and Murgia (2000) who fail to 
verify a relationship between excess returns and target size. 
4.4.2.3. GEOGRAPHIC LOCATION 
 
The sample is further divided to explore any variation in the market valuation of 
bank-insurance deals that stems from the geographic location of the bidder. Looking 
at the bancassurance trend across the world, it is a market reality that European 
financial institutions have a lead against those located in other continents (Artikis, 
Mutenga and Staikouras, 2008; Nurullah and Staikouras, 2008; Staikouras, 2006). At 
the same time, the demise of the U.S. regulatory restrictions between banks and 
insurers, following the Financial Services Modernization Act (FSMA, 1999), provides 
a fertile terrain for cross-continent analysis. The sample is split into four major groups 
namely the U.S., Australasian, European and Canadian bidders. The results are 
presented in Table 4.12. Looking at Australasian bidders it is clear that the market 
does not attach any value to deals initiated by these institutions. One explanation for 
this could be that the market for bancassurance in Asia and Australia is still in its 
infancy, when compared to the respective market penetration and its witnessed 
success in the western economies. Shifting the focus to the other three groups, U.S., 
European and Canadian bidders are found to exhibit positive excess returns upon the 
announcement day(s), yet the latter are only significant for the U.S. bidders (1.05%) 
and European bidders (0.56%). A closer look at the post-event excess returns reveals 
an interesting variation in the results. Specifically, Canadian bidders exhibit positive 
and significant post-event stock price adjustments, which persist even in extended 
windows – using the industry index. On the contrary, European bidders receive 
negative but insignificant valuations following  
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Table 4.12. Regional analysis 
                  
  United States Australasia Europe Canada 
  Excess Returns Excess Returns Excess Returns Excess Returns Excess Returns Excess Returns Excess Returns Excess Returns 
Event Period MI II MI II MI II MI II 
(-1, 0) (0, +1) 1.16% 0.97% 0.87% 0.65% -0.84% -0.48% -0.99% -0.78% 0.80% 0.52% 0.63% 0.48% 0.38% 1.01% 0.75% 1.78% 
  (3.01) a (2.54) a (2.44) a (1.82) c -(0.96) -(0.55) -(1.23) -(0.97) (2.80) a (1.80) c (2.57) a (1.97) b (0.69) (1.82) c (1.89) c (4.51) a 
(-2, 0) (0, +2) 0.42% 0.97% 0.27% 0.51% -0.51% -0.73% -0.53% -1.60% 0.77% -0.34% 0.47% -0.42% 0.55% 1.26% 0.89% 2.25% 
  (0.89) (2.07) b (0.62) (1.18) -(0.48) -(0.68) -(0.54) -(1.61) (2.19) b -(0.98) (1.58) -(1.42) (0.81) (1.85) c (1.84) c (4.64) a 
(-3, 0) (0, +3) 0.29% 1.31% 0.15% 0.79% -0.26% 0.60% -0.36% -0.67% 0.62% -0.38% 0.28% -0.59% 0.02% 0.18% 0.66% 1.47% 
  (0.53) (2.42) a (0.30) (1.57) -(0.21) (0.48) -(0.31) -(0.58) (1.53) -(0.94)  (0.80) -(1.70) c (0.02) (0.23) (1.18) (2.63) a 
(-4, 0) (0, +4) 0.45% 1.71% 0.23% 1.20% -0.04% 0.66% -0.26% -0.28% 0.32% -0.60% 0.16% -0.76% -0.32% -0.24% 0.66% 1.60% 
  (0.73) (2.82) a (0.41) (2.15) b -(0.03) (0.48) -(0.21) -(0.22) (0.71) -(1.32) (0.41) -(1.98) b -(0.37) -(0.28) (1.06) (2.55) a 
(-5, 0) (0, +5) 0.09% 1.12% 0.05% 0.63% 0.36% 0.97% -0.50% -0.10% 0.14% -0.74% 0.05% -0.78% -0.83% 0.40% 0.45% 2.00% 
  (0.13) (1.69) c (0.08) (1.03) (0.24) (0.64) -(0.36) -(0.07) (0.28) -(1.50) (0.11) -(1.85) c -(0.87) (0.42) (0.66) (2.92) a 
(-10, 0) (0,+10) -0.07% 1.66% -0.27% 1.32% -0.95% -0.46% -1.82% -2.07% 0.34% -0.57% 0.15% -0.22% -0.23% 1.31% 0.52% 1.77% 
  -(0.07) (1.85) c -(0.32) (1.58) -(0.46) -(0.22) -(0.96) -(1.09) (0.50) -(0.84) (0.26) -(0.39) -(0.18) (1.01) (0.56) (1.91) c 
(-20, 0) (0,+20) -0.15% 1.40% -0.62% 0.96% -2.31% -1.60% -2.68% -1.31% 0.72% -0.23% 0.29% 0.49% 0.92% 1.61% 1.11% 2.39% 
  -(0.12) (1.13) -(0.54) (0.84) -(0.82) -(0.56) -(1.02) -(0.50) (0.77) -(0.24) (0.36) (0.62) (0.51) (0.90) (0.87) (1.86) c 
Event Period                 
(0, 0) (-1, +1) 1.05% 1.07% 0.78% 0.72% -0.13% -1.18% -0.51% -1.26% 0.56%  0.76% 0.53% 0.58% 0.57% 0.83% 1.01% 1.52% 
  (3.86) a (2.32) b (3.13) a (1.70) c -(0.22) -(1.10) -(0.90) -(1.27) (2.77) a (2.16) b (3.06) a (1.94) c (1.45) (1.22) (3.60) a (3.14) a 
 (-2,+1) (-2, +2) 0.34% 0.31% 0.13% -0.03% -0.86% -1.10% -0.80% -1.62% 0.72% -0.14% 0.42% -0.48% 0.99% 1.24% 1.67% 2.13% 
  (0.63) (0.52) (0.27) -(0.05) -(0.69) -(0.80) -(0.70) -(1.26) (1.78) c -(0.30) (1.23) -(1.24) (1.26) (1.41) (2.98) a (3.41) a 
 (-3,+1) (-3, +3) 0.22% 0.52% 0.01% 0.13% -0.60% 0.47% -0.63% -0.52% 0.57% -0.32% 0.23% -0.84% 0.46% -0.37% 1.44% 1.13% 
  (0.36) (0.74) (0.02) (0.20) -(0.44) (0.29) -(0.49) -(0.34) (1.26) -(0.60) (0.59) -(1.84) c (0.52) -(0.36) (2.30) b (1.52) 
 (-4,+1) (-4, +4) 0.37% 1.09% 0.09% 0.64% -0.38% 0.76% -0.53% -0.03% 0.28% -0.84% 0.11% -1.13% 0.12% -1.14% 1.44% 1.26% 
  (0.56) (1.37) (0.15) (0.87) -(0.25) (0.41) -(0.38) -(0.02) (0.56) -(1.37) (0.26) -(2.19) b (0.12) -(0.97) (2.10) b (1.50) 
 (-5,+1) (-5, +5) 0.02% 0.15% -0.09% -0.11% 0.02% 1.47% -0.77% -0.08% 0.09% -1.17% 0.00% -1.27% -0.39% -1.00% 1.23% 1.45% 
  (0.02) (0.17) -(0.13) -(0.13) (0.01) (0.72) -(0.51) -(0.04) (0.17) -(1.74) c (0.00) -(2.21) b -(0.38) -(0.77) (1.66) c (1.56) 
 (-10,+1) (-10, +10) -0.14% 0.47% -0.40% 0.19% -1.30% -1.28% -2.09% -3.38% 0.29% -0.79% 0.10% -0.61% 0.21% 0.52% 1.30% 1.28% 
  -(0.15) (0.38) -(0.46) (0.17) -(0.61) -(0.45) -(1.05) -(1.29) (0.41) -(0.85) (0.17) -(0.77) (0.16) (0.29) (1.34) (1.00) 
 (-20,+1) (-20, +20) -0.22% 0.22% -0.76% -0.41% -2.66% -3.78% -2.95% -3.47% 0.67% -0.07% 0.24% 0.25% 1.36% 1.96% 1.89% 2.49% 
  -(0.18) (0.13) -(0.65) -(0.26) -(0.92) -(0.95) -(1.10) -(0.95) (0.71) -(0.05) (0.29) (0.23) (0.74) (0.78) (1.44) (1.39) 
The sample here consists of 43 bancassurance deals involving U.S. bidders, 8 deals involving Canadian bidders, 62 deals involving EU bidders and 10 bancassurance deals involving Australasian bidders, excluding 
deals where the targets are insurance agencies. After adjusting for multiple bids the sample size drops to 40 US bidders, 8 deals involving Canadian bidders, 54 deals involving EU bidders and 10 Australasian bidders. 
The reported values are cumulative average abnormal returns.  The event windows are presented under the first two columns and excess returns are reported in that order under each of the subsequent four headings.  
Abnormal returns are calculated using standard event study methodology with a two-factor variant of the market model – where statistically necessary.  As a proxy for market risk, the general market index and sector 
specific index are employed separately.  The figures in brackets indicate t-values. 
MI and II stand for Market Index and Industry Index respectively. 
a/b/c denote significant CAAR at the 0.02/0.05/0.10 level (two-tailed test) for the pertinent event period. 
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the 2-day (0 +1) window, which subsequently become negative and significant 
when the industry index is employed. Finally, U.S. bidders seem to reap the benefits 
from bancassurance announcements, if one considers the higher excess return they 
experience upon the announcement day and the persistence of post-event CAARs 
using the wider market index. In general, the U.S. market is found to provide a 
stronger support for bancassurance combinations, most likely due to the recent 
removal of the regulatory restrictions imposed on bank affiliations with insurance 
companies. 
4.4.2.4. BANCASSURANCE SELL-OFFS 
 
Since its inception, bancassurance has been used by banks and insurance 
companies as a means of achieving synergies. These can appear in the form of cost 
and revenue economies of scale and scope and/or risk diversification. The expected 
benefits from the combination of banks and insurers at both the retail and corporate 
level, have spawned an unprecedented wave of mergers and acquisitions between the 
two, with the magnitude of success being noticeably diverse across countries and 
continents. In many cases bank-insurance marriages have spawned balance sheet 
problems that few expected. What is more, the global economic slowdown during the 
early years of the millennium did not do much either to sustain the viability of a 
number of these structures. Valuation ratios in the insurance market hit an eight-year 
low in 2002, while stocks markets continued to fall for the third straight year. 
Insurers, which meet claims through vast equity investments, saw the value of their 
reserves evaporating, and many firms turned to their shareholders for additional 
funds. As for real world examples, Credit Suisse and Citigroup experienced decreases 
in their financial performance due to earnings’ volatility of their insurance arms. As a 
result, the first divested both its insurance arms, namely Winterthur International in 
2001 and Churchill Insurance later in 2003, while Citigroup spun-off its Travelers 
property and casualty division in 2001 and subsequently managed a full exit from 
bancassurance by divesting its Travelers life and annuity business in 2005. Other 
bancassurance companies followed suit. It is therefore interesting, both from an 
academic and practical perspective, to investigate these divestments and compare the 
findings with the previous table(s). Table 4.13 shows the effect that these sell-offs had 
on the equity prices of the companies exiting bancassurance. 
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Table 4.13. Cross-section analysis of bank-insurance sell-offs 
  Excess Returns via Excess Returns via 
Event Period Market Index Industry Index 
(-1, 0) (0, +1) 0.30% 0.30% 0.56% 0.59% 
  (0.45) (0.44) (0.84) (0.89) 
(-2, 0) (0, +2) 0.52% 0.03% 0.77% 0.23% 
  (0.63) (0.03) (0.94) (0.28) 
(-3, 0) (0, +3) 0.96% -0.61% 1.06% -0.63% 
  (1.00) -(0.64) (1.13) -(0.66) 
(-4, 0) (0, +4) 1.42% -0.74% 1.55% -0.48% 
  (1.33) -(0.69) (1.47) -(0.45) 
(-5, 0) (0, +5) 1.75% -0.63% 1.81% -0.06% 
  (1.49) -(0.53) (1.56) -(0.05) 
(-10, 0) (0,+10) 0.01% -0.50% 0.74% 0.14% 
  (0.01) -(0.32) (0.47) (0.09) 
(-20, 0) (0,+20) -3.00% 1.08% -1.12% 1.21% 
  -(1.36) (0.49) -(0.52) (0.56) 
Event Period     
(0, 0) (-1, +1) 0.74% -0.14% 1.02% 0.14% 
  (1.54) -(0.16) (2.16)b (0.17) 
(-2,+1) (-2, +2) 0.08% -0.19% 0.34% -0.02% 
  (0.08) -(0.18) (0.36) -(0.02) 
(-3,+1) (-3, +3) 0.52% -0.39% 0.64% -0.58% 
  (0.49) -(0.30) (0.61) -(0.46) 
(-4,+1) (-4, +4) 0.98% -0.06% 1.13% 0.05% 
  (0.84) -(0.04) (0.97) (0.04) 
(-5,+1) (-5, +5) 1.31% 0.39% 1.39% 0.73% 
  (1.03) (0.24) (1.11) (0.47) 
(-10,+1) (-10, +10) -0.43% -1.23% 0.31% -0.14% 
  -(0.26) -(0.56) (0.19) -(0.07) 
(-20,+1) (-20, +20) -3.44% -2.66% -1.54% -0.93% 
  -(1.53) -(0.86) -(0.69) -(0.31) 
The sample here consists of 16 sell-offs, where banks exit bancassurance by the divestiture or spin-off of the 
insurance business, announced between 1990 and 2006. The reported values are cumulative average abnormal 
returns. The event windows are presented under the first two columns and excess returns are reported in that order 
under each of the subsequent three headings. Abnormal returns are calculated using standard event study 
methodology with a two-factor variant of the market model – where statistically necessary. As a proxy for market 
risk, the general market index and sector specific index are employed separately. The figures in brackets indicate t-
values. 
* Multiple bids arise when institutions announce the acquisition of more than one target on a given day. To avoid 
multiple counting of the same effect we treat these cases as one when averaging out the ARs and CARs. 
a/b/c denote significant CAAR at the 0.02/0.05/0.10 level (two-tailed test) for the pertinent event period. 
 
The findings are not as clear as those reported in the previous sections. Looking at 
the excess returns on the announcement day, it is observed that they are positive 
irrespective of the market proxy used, yet statistical significance depends on the index 
employed. Specifically, using the industry proxy, there is a positive and significant 
stock market reaction of 1.02%, while this is not the case for the figure obtained using 
the wider market index, which is still positive but insignificant. Shifting the focus to 
the CAARs on the windows before the announcement, the majority of the reported 
figures are positive but insignificant. On the other hand the excess returns for the 
symmetric and post-event windows, turn negative but still remain insignificant. The 
overall picture is that exits from bank-insurance structures produce insignificant 
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excess returns, yet when the industry index is employed the results are somewhat 
mixed. 
This is also verified when individual cases are considered separately. For instance, 
Citigroup’s exit from the insurance business generated a strong market reaction.  
Citigroup’s stock price enjoyed a positive and significant AR of 3.04% when the 
former announced its intention to spin-off its Travelers P/C division in 2001, but a 
positive and insignificant abnormal return when it announced its plans to sell its 
Travelers Life & Annuity operations to MetLife Inc. in 2005. However, the 
circumstances leading to Citigroup’s decision to withdraw from the Travelers P/C 
business are somewhat special and can provide a subtle justification for the positive 
market reactions. Analysts at the time held that the volatility and unpredictability in 
the earnings distribution of the P/C operation were hurting Citigroup’s stock price. In 
2001 Travelers P/C suffered $500 million losses, mostly attributed to claims linked 
with the World Trade Center (WTC) terrorist attacks. It is also true that Travelers P/C 
had a massive exposure to asbestos liabilities. Citigroup’s exits from the insurance 
business provide some support to Felgran’s (1985) suggestion that banks would not 
extract much gain from providing insurance underwriting services because of the high 
risk(s) involved. In addition, the two Citigroup cases and the subsequent reactions 
corroborate the findings of the literature where property and casualty insurance is 
found to be a less favourable complement to banking than life insurance. 
4.5. CONCLUSION 
 
This chapter examines the excess returns experienced by acquiring firms around 
the announcement of bancassurance partnerships. The model employed is an event 
study methodology using a two factor variant of the market model, where statistically 
necessary. The sample consists of 226 bancassurance M&A announcements. 
Specifically, 100 cases correspond to deals where banks bid for insurance companies, 
20 cases involve insurance companies’ bids for banks, 90 cases incorporate banks’ 
bids for insurance agencies, and finally 16 cases of bank sell-offs of their insurance 
arms. 
The analysis points to some interesting conclusions. On average, companies that 
pursue a bancassurance strategy experience positive and significant excess returns on 
and around the announcement day(s). Thus, on average, bancassurance creates value 
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for the stockholders of acquiring firms. The decomposition of the sample of deals 
based on the nature of business (sector) of the acquirer yields some very interesting 
results. Specifically, banks increase shareholder value in bids for insurance firms. On 
the announcement day(s) of diversification into the insurance business, they 
experience a positive and significant AAR of 0.82%, which is followed by positive 
and significant CAARs. On the contrary, insurance companies do not add value for 
their shareholders in analogous bids for banks, as they experience negative but 
insignificant excess returns throughout the event period. 
When the sample is decomposed based on sample characteristics, the results 
indicate that, as in banking mergers, investors seem to anticipate more synergies to be 
realised through domestic bancassurance deals. Moreover, large deals are found to be 
superior to small deals in terms of their valuation by the market. At the regional level, 
U.S. bidders experience higher price adjustments than bidders from other geographic 
regions. Finally, while European and Canadian bidders experience positive AARs on 
and around the time of the announcement day(s), Australasian acquirers receive 
negative but insignificant valuations. 
Further analysis of the announcement of bancassurance divestitures and spin-offs 
yields mostly insignificant results. Nevertheless, the latter are mixed when the 
industry proxy is employed. 
To sum up, it is clear that bancassurance mergers are supported by the market, 
possibly due to expectations of higher synergies for the combined entity. The negative 
valuation of insurance companies’ bids for banks could be interpreted as a precaution 
by the market, given investor claims that bancassurance is a mere bank driven 
phenomenon that only benefits banks. This is consistent with the market-disruption 
hypothesis of Cowan, Howell and Power (2002) under which potential profits from 
insurance activities are simply rerouted to banks. 
This chapter addressed the question of whether bancassurance deal announcements 
trigger trading movements that significantly affect the stock prices of acquiring 
institutions. The answer is an emphatic yes which is also accompanied by further 
evidence of variations in abnormal returns based on a set of deal or bidder 
characteristics. An important question that still remains unanswered is whether 
investors “blindly” value such deals, or if they do so by considering a set of firm 
financials and deal specific information that can form the basis of a more accurate 
forecast of future performance. As such, the next chapter delves into the determinants 
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of the variation in abnormal returns while simultaneously controlling for a number of 
factors. This analysis is performed within a multivariate setup, where the dependent 
variables are the estimated CARs and the independent variables are various 
accounting and deal specific characteristics that are expected to determine market 
expectations and, as a result, bidder excess returns. 
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5. WHAT DRIVES BIDDER EXCESS RETURNS IN BANCASSURANCE 
MERGERS? 
5.1. INTRODUCTION 
 
After years of cyclical interactions between regulatory restrictions, company 
innovations, re-regulation and/or deregulation (Kane, 1981; 1988), financial 
institutions are now able to functionally diversify their operations68
2006
. This allowed for 
the formation of financial conglomerates, universal banks and the emergence of 
bancassurance. As Staikouras ( ) points out, the underlying motive behind 
consolidation is the hunt for new business opportunities and further profit sources 
through hybrid corporate structures. 
Despite the increasing use of bancassurance as a mechanism for revenue 
diversification, evidenced by its widespread adoption by companies around the world, 
there is not much empirical evidence on the determinants of the markets’ reaction 
around bank-insurance partnership announcements. In addition, the limited previous 
literature yields somewhat conflicting results69
                                                 
68 The cornerstone for the liberalisation of the European financial services industry was introduced in 
1989 when the Second Banking Directive was adopted by the EU Council of Ministers. However, 
the directive was only implemented by all 15 member states between 1991 and 1994. See Chen 
(
. In the previous chapter it has been 
found that bank-insurance partnership announcements cause significant trading 
movements that affect the equity prices of acquiring institutions. Furthermore, the 
disaggregation of the sample of deals into various groups depending on various 
characteristics, such as the nature of the bidder (bank vs. insurer), the nature of the 
target (insurance underwriter vs. insurance agency), the geographic origin of the 
bidder, the size of the deal and the nature of the deal (domestic vs. cross-border), has 
shown that such factors can affect market expectations and therefore produce 
variations in abnormal returns. Nevertheless, some or all of the factors examined, may 
have a simultaneous effect on abnormal returns. A univariate analysis can shed light 
on the aggregate effect of these factors on abnormal returns, but not on the individual 
effect of each factor, while controlling for the rest. It is therefore of paramount 
2007) for further details. The financial services industry in the United States remained fragmented 
until 1999, when the Financial Services Modernization Act removed the remaining barriers imposed 
by the National Banking Act (1864), the Banking Act (1933), and the Bank Holding Company Act 
(1956). 
69 A significant drawback of previous studies is the fact that they fail to differentiate between bank bids 
for insurance companies and bank bids for insurance agencies. As discussed in the previous chapter, 
banks exhibit different risk-return profiles when they acquire insurance underwriters, as opposed to 
acquiring insurance brokers. As such, aggregating the results from these types of deals can lead to 
conflicting conclusions. 
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importance to examine the effect of each determinant of cumulative abnormal returns 
(CARs, thereof) while controlling for other factors. Such an analysis can be 
performed in a multivariate setup, where the dependent variables are the estimated 
CARs and the independent variables are various accounting and deal specific 
characteristics that are expected to determine market expectations and as a result, 
bidder excess returns. 
This chapter aims to unveil the drivers of heterogeneity in CARs around the 
announcement of a bancassurance deals. To the best of our knowledge, this study uses 
the most comprehensive sample of bancassurance deals, which spans from 1990 to 
2006 and involves 210 corporate events. In addition, previous studies fail to 
differentiate between deals where the targets are insurance companies and deals 
where the targets are insurance agencies. Given the distinct risk-return profiles offered 
by these two sets of combinations, the results of these studies might be biased. This 
study accounts for the above issue by decomposing the sample into bank deals with 
insurance firms and bank deals with insurance agencies, and examining the 
determinants of excess returns separately. A multivariate cross sectional framework is 
employed, where various accounting measures and deal specific characteristics are 
considered as potential factors driving abnormal returns. 
The analysis points to a number of interesting conclusions. Bidders which are 
already reliant on significant amounts of non-interest income experience negative 
valuations around the announcement of bancassurance deals. In addition, the market 
favours deals with greater potential for scale economies, and deals where the 
acquiring institution is U.S. based. What is more, there is some evidence against the 
conclusions drawn in the previous chapter. More specifically, controlling for other 
factors simultaneously, bank bidders are found to lose value. Domestic deals do not 
trigger higher bidder excess returns. Furthermore, the decomposition of the sample 
into deals before and after the Financial Services modernization Act of 1999 (FSMA, 
thereof), reveals a shift in the relative importance of the factors affecting bidder 
abnormal performance. Deals before the FSMA, are valued by investors based on 
estimates of bidder growth opportunities, the potential for scale economies and 
whether the deal was initiated by a U.S. financial institution, while deals announced 
following the passage of FSMA are valued based on estimates of the bidders’ capacity 
for further functional diversification and profitability levels. Last but not least, the 
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market does not consider any company or deal characteristics when valuing bank 
acquisitions of insurance agents/brokers.  
In what follows, section 2 reviews the existing body of related research and 
discusses the empirical findings, while section 3 presents the sample and 
methodological framework employed. The empirical findings are presented in section 
4, while the implications for bancassurance are adeptly analysed in section 5. Finally, 
section 6 concludes this chapter. 
5.2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
The exploration of the determinants of excess returns associated with the blurring 
boundaries between financial intermediaries and specifically banks and insurance 
companies has been an integral part of the majority of event studies in this area. These 
studies generally examine the phenomenon either directly or indirectly. On the one 
hand, indirect studies focus on the response of the market to specific deal 
announcements and the effect on peer companies, or examine the market’s reaction to 
certain regulatory events. On the other hand, direct evidence focuses on the impact of 
a number of bank-insurance partnership announcements on the stock prices of the 
involved institutions. Nevertheless, only limited research on the direct impact of 
bancassurance mergers exists. Given that the determinants of excess returns from 
bancassurance mergers are examined by the same strand of research, limited 
conclusions can be drawn with regards to the factors taken into account by investors 
when valuing these partnerships. 
Early event studies have approached the phenomenon through examining the 
response of the market to various court rulings/regulatory events that had implications 
for the interface between banks and other financials and consequently bancassurance. 
In what follows, the findings of these studies with respect to the determinants of the 
abnormal returns experienced by the cross section of the companies are discussed. 
Carow and Lee (1997) use an event study methodology to examine the stock price 
reactions of 271 banks to 50 interstate banking laws passed by 49 states and the 
District of Columbia. The cross-sectional analysis shows that smaller banks, located 
in less concentrated states with faster growth exhibited the highest excess returns, 
something consistent with takeover opportunities. Similar results are reported in 
Carow and Heron (1998) who investigate the effects of the passage of the Interstate 
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Banking and Branching Efficiency Act of 1998 (IBBEA) on the stock prices of  180 
bank holding companies (BHCs). The sample is comprised of 90 BHC with existing 
interstate presence and 90 without interstate presence. The analysis of the 
determinants of excess returns produces insignificant results in relation to whether 
banks that were previously more restricted would experience greater wealth effects. 
They suggest that most of the benefits stemming from the relaxation of restrictions 
were realised through the passage of state-level interstate banking laws. They also 
report a significant inverse relationship between return on assets and BHC returns. It 
is suggested that poorly performing firms are more likely to become takeover targets, 
and as a consequence, there is an increased probability of receiving bids in the post-
IBBEA period. Results also show that companies with lower capital ratios experience 
higher abnormal returns. Others delve into the excess returns experienced by increases 
in securities powers granted to banks by the Federal Reserve and the respective 
factors being responsible for the variation in abnormal returns. More specifically, Ely 
and Robinson (1998) examine the determinants of excess returns for 24 banks with a 
security subsidiary, 41 banks with no security subsidiary and 20 investment banks. 
They find a positive relation between the profit margin and excess returns and suggest 
that greater profitability is likely to attract merger partners, yet this is not in line with 
the insignificant coefficient for return on equity (ROE). On the other hand, they report 
a negative relation between company size and excess returns that is most likely 
caused by the difficulty in getting a merger regulatory approval given the revenue 
limit. In a similar study, Ely and Robinson (1999) find a negative relation between 
ROE and excess returns, but report an insignificant coefficient for size for 26 banks 
already engaged in securities activities. It is important to note however, that the 
reported adjusted R2 values are very low, ranging from 1% to 4% depending on the 
model specification. 
Another set of early studies focuses on the market response to court rulings 
allowing or prohibiting banks to sell insurance products. For example, Carow (2001b) 
studies the effect of 3 rulings of the Office of the Comptroller of Currency (OCC)70
                                                 
70 “The Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) charters, regulates, and supervises all national 
banks. It also supervises the federal branches and agencies of foreign banks. Headquartered in 
Washington, D.C., the OCC has four district offices plus an office in London to supervise the 
international activities of national banks” source: http://www.occ.treas.gov/aboutocc.htm 
 
and 3 Supreme Court rulings allowing banks to sell annuities and insurance products, 
on the stock prices of 133 banks and insurance companies. The cross section analysis 
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focuses on the determinants of CARs from the annuities rulings, the insurance rulings 
and across all rulings. With regards to the annuities rulings, he finds that the charter of 
the bank and the presence of an insurance subsidiary are not taken into account by the 
market. On the contrary, insurers that use brokerage as one of their distribution 
systems benefit from the rulings, while insurance agencies and life and health insurers 
lose value. This is because as banks enter insurance brokerage, competition for direct 
writers and agents will increase substantially. What is more, the author points out that 
the negative and significant coefficient for health insurers indicates that banks are 
expected to compete more heavily in the life and health market. Moving to the rulings 
affecting the bank sale of insurance products, banks with an existing insurance 
subsidiary benefit the most, while national banks and health insurers lose value. The 
results for the determinants of CARs across all events verify the previous conclusions, 
while further regressions show a positive relation between insurance companies’ size 
and CARs. As suggested, large insurers are more immune in terms of bank 
competition, because of their reputation and their potential for scale economies in 
case they become takeover targets. Likewise, Cowan, Howell and Power (2002) 
examine the stock market reaction to four court and regulatory decisions regarding 
banks' rights to originate and market annuity products. The cross sectional analysis 
involves the regression of CARs from these rulings on firm characteristics of insurers 
and bank holding companies. They find that on average small, financially weaker 
insurers that are more concentrated in the annuity business and those using 
independent agents lose value from the expansion of bank rights to sell annuities, 
something consistent with Carow (2001b). On the other hand, their results suggest 
that large, risky bank holding companies with geographically concentrated deposits 
that are more reliant on non lending activities or consumer business gain value. 
The primary evidence from actual bank-insurance mergers comes from studies that 
delve into the effect of Citicorp-Travelers merger in 1998 on the stock prices of peer 
institutions (Carow, 2001a; Johnston and Madura, 2000). The cross sectional analysis 
of the first study reports that large banks and life insurance companies have 
significantly higher abnormal returns than small banks, national banks and P/C 
insurance companies, while the second, finds a significant relation between size and 
CARs for commercial banks and brokerage firms, but an insignificant relation 
between size and excess returns for insurers. The difference in the results of the two 
studies might be related to sample differences. In particular, while the cross section 
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analysis in Carow (2001a) involves a sample of 373 companies, Johnston and Madura 
(2000) do not report the sample for their cross section analysis71
Another strand of research examines the phenomenon by looking at the effects of 
the Financial Services Modernization Act of 1999 on the stock prices of financial 
institutions and the respective determinants of excess returns. More specifically, 
Carow and Heron (
.  
2002) study the stock price reaction of financial institutions to 6 
events leading to the passage of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act. Consistent with 
previous findings, their cross section findings for 170 financial institutions shows that 
that large investment banks and large insurance companies benefited from the Act, 
whereas thrifts, finance companies and foreign banks lost value. The authors conclude 
that national banks did not experience positive results because the stock prices of 
banks already reflected gains related to product-line diversification. They also 
conclude that the gains experienced by investment banks and insurance companies 
can be attributed to expectations that they will become targets of banks, as well as to 
the fact that the FSMA limits the extent of the Federal Reserve’s authority on non-
banks, giving more power to the SEC and insurance regulators, who are more likely to 
promote sectoral interests. In a similar fashion, Hendershott, Lee and Tompkins 
(2002) examine the determinants of excess returns related to the FSMA for 297 
commercial banks 36 investment banks and 139 insurance companies. The results 
point to a positive relation between size and commercial bank, investement bank and 
insurance company abnormal returns. In addition, more profitable banks, as measured 
by their return on assets (ROA), experience more positive valuations around the 
announcement of the Act. The authors suggest that larger and more profitable 
institutions are better positioned to expand into new areas. 
The availability of actual bank-insurance combinations in recent years has paved 
the way for studies that look into the direct effect of such deals on the stock prices of 
the involved institutions. One way to enter the bank-insurance business is by forming 
strategic alliances. In a study on the market’s reaction to the formation of strategic 
alliances Chan, Kensinger, Keown and Martin (1997) reveal a negative relation 
between company size and excess returns. Somewhat consistent with previous studies 
in support of the bank-insurance phenomenon, alliances between companies in related 
                                                 
71 Although their event-study sample includes 62 companies, the final sample for the cross-section 
analysis is not reported. Although it could be the same, it is usually expected that the unavailability 
of some accounting and/or qualitative data will make the cross-section sample smaller. 
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industries (horizontal alliances) are found to be better than alliances between 
companies that operate in unrelated industries (non-horizontal alliances). It is also 
revealed that the market is in favour of horizontal alliances that involve 
complementarities in knowledge and skills. Nevertheless, this study does not consider 
strategic alliances between banks and insurance companies, and therefore the 
implications of the results for the bancassurance phenomenon are relatively limited. 
On the contrary, some initial conclusions can be drawn by the early study of Cybo-
Ottone and Murgia (2000). Ten bancassurance mergers are present in their sample of 
European mergers and acquisitions. Their cross sectional analysis focuses on the 
factors driving excess returns. In particular, the regressions involve 46 deals for size 
and deal characteristics and then a cross section analysis of 54 bidders and 72 targets 
for country effects. The results suggest no relation between CARs and target size. In 
addition, there is a positive relation between domestic deals and CARs and no 
relationship between either small deals or deals between commercial banks and 
CARs, while there is limited evidence for country effects. Despite the appearance of 
10 bank-insurance mergers in the event study sample, the authors do not report 
whether these deals appear in the reduced sample of their cross section analysis. 
Chen, Li, Moshirian and Tan (2007) focus on 42 European bancassurance mergers. 
Their cross section results suggest a positive relation between the ratio of the target’s 
market value to the bidder’s market value and CARs as well as a positive relation 
between the change in systematic risk before and after the merger and the market 
valuation. What is more, the market is found to ignore cross border deals. 
In a more comprehensive study on a global sample of bank-insurance mergers 
Fields, Fraser and Kolari (2007a) examine the determinants of the variation in CARs 
experienced around the announcements of such partnerships. The cross section 
regressions for 36 deals show that the market favours deals where synergies through 
profitability, scale and scope economies are more likely to arise. Furthermore and 
contrary to earlier findings, they find that cross-border deals are associated with 
positive abnormal returns and, in contrast with Chen, Li, Moshirian and Tan (2007), 
they report a negative relation between change in systematic risk before and after the 
merger and CARs. Using the same sample of deals, Fields, Fraser and Kolari (2007b) 
expand their previous analysis of the determinants of the excess returns associated 
with bancassurance mergers by using different model specifications and by 
introducing models that include corporate governance variables. In the first set of 
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regressions they find a positive relation between bidder return on assets and CARs. 
They suggest that if the bidder has been able to produce high profits in the past it will 
manage to do so after the acquisition as well. Similar to their previous study, cross 
border bancassurance deals are found to be superior to domestic ones, an indication 
that the benefits from geographic diversification outweigh the difficulties that arise 
from cross border mergers; the latter being demographic and cultural differences 
together with language and regulation barriers. One significant drawback of the two 
aforementioned studies is that they fail to take into account the differences in the risk-
return profiles of banks when the latter merge with insurance companies as opposed 
to mergers with insurance agents/brokers (Boyd, Graham and Hewitt, 1993; Nurullah 
and Staikouras, 2008). In failing to differentiate between the two, the results can be 
misleading72
5.3. DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
.  
The consensus of the studies points to a positive relationship between company 
size and excess returns associated with the blurring boundaries between banks and 
insurance companies. It is suggested that the markets value the potential for scale 
economies. Relatively stable conclusions are also drawn on the effect of profitability, 
as investors have higher expectations for profitable institutions. On the other hand, 
mixed results are reported with regards to the effect of geographic diversification and 
the effect of changes in systematic risk of the institutions. However, the extant 
empirical evidence suffers from two considerable drawbacks. At first, the majority of 
the findings come from studies that are indirectly assessing the phenomenon. Second, 
direct studies on bank-insurance deals suffer from either small sample biases, or from 
the fact that they fail to differentiate between bank acquisitions of insurance firms, 
and banks acquisitions of insurance agents/brokers. As such, the conclusions drawn 
from these studies can be unrealistic and biased. 
 
The data selection incorporates the sample of deals that was used in the event study 
analysis in chapter 4. As such, 210 international bancassurance partnership events 
between 1990 and 2006 are considered. The events include 120 major restructuring 
events with 100 cases where banks bid for insurers and 20 cases where insurers bid 
for banks. In addition, 90 events where banks bid for insurance agencies are 
                                                 
72 For further elaboration on this matter see footnote no. 69 pp. 111. 
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examined. The current framework utilizes accounting data for all acquiring 
institutions that are present in the current sample as well as deal specific variables. 
Excess returns and cumulative excess returns, as estimated in the previous chapter, are 
also employed in the current framework. 
Individual acquirer excess returns (CARs) from various time frames relative to the 
announcement of each deal are obtained from the event study database constructed for 
the purposes of the previous chapter. The Thomson One Banker database and/or 
Datastream are then used to retrieve year end accounting data for each acquirer in the 
sample, from 1989 to 2006. Once obtained, the data is matched to the respective 
CARs in such a way so that each company’s abnormal performance on a given date 
corresponds to the last reported year end accounting data of that particular institution, 
before the announcement is made public. Finally, deal specific information and data 
are obtained from Thomson One Banker’s deal tear sheets. 
The analysis of the determinants of bidder abnormal performance involves a 
multivariate regression of the abnormal returns on a set of accounting and deal 
specific variables using ordinary least squares. The mathematical expression for the 
model is the following: 
 
,t i i tAR Fα β ε= + +∑                  (5.1) 
 
where AR is the excess return or cumulative excess return (CAR) over different time 
frames t, α is the constant, β are the sensitivities of AR to each factor F, and ε is the 
error term with the usual properties. The accounting exogenous variables (F) 
considered in the model are the following: First, the relative deal size (RDS) as the 
ratio of value of the deal to the market value of bidder. This ratio represents a measure 
of potential scale economies, since the larger the deal size relative to the bidder’s 
market value, the greater the potential synergies (Chen, Li, Moshirian and Tan, 2007). 
Second, the ratio of the bidders’ non-interest income to total operating income 
(NII/TOI). This ratio is used as a functional diversification measure given that the 
higher the proportion of non-interest income, the more diversified the institution is, in 
terms of income generated through nonbanking activities (Baele, De Jonghe and 
Vander Vennet, 2007). In effect, specialized commercial banks will have a lower ratio 
of non-interest income to total operating income, while this ratio is expected to be 
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higher in universal banks and financial conglomerates. Finally, the operating leverage 
expressed as the ratio of total assets to common equity73, the market to book value 
and profitability, expressed as either ROE or ROA are employed. The deal specific 
independent variables used in this setup are the following: First, a domestic deal 
dummy which is equal to one if the headquarters of the involved institutions are in the 
same country and zero otherwise. Second, two dummy variables to account for the 
nature of the bidder and target companies. More specifically, the first indicator 
variable is equal to one if the bidder is a bank and zero if the bidder is an insurance 
company, whereas the second indicator variable takes the value of one if the target is 
an insurance agent/broker and zero if the target is an insurance firm74
5.4. EMPIRICAL FINDINGS 
. Finally, two 
more dummy variables are used, one that accounts for deals where the bidder is a U.S. 
institution; set to one if the acquirer is U.S. based and zero otherwise, and a regulation 
interaction dummy equal to one for deals announced after the FSMA 1999 and zero 
otherwise, and vice versa. 
 
The current section presents the findings from the analysis of determinants of 
excess returns from bancassurance partnership announcements. First, the results from 
all bancassurance cases excluding cases where the targets are insurance 
agencies/brokers are considered75
                                                 
73 Bank leverage is calculated as: (Total Assets - Customer Liabilities on Acceptances) * 100 / Common 
Equity, where customer liabilities on acceptances are only subtracted when included in total assets. 
For insurance companies, leverage is calculated as: Total Assets * 100 / (Common Equity + 
Policyholders' Equity). 
. Second, the determinants of excess returns of cases 
where the bidder is a bank and the target an insurance firm are examined to assess 
whether there are any variations in the factors that affect investor decisions and 
therefore abnormal returns, depending on the nature of the bidder (bank vs. insurance 
firm). Finally, the determinants of cases where the target is an insurance 
agency/broker are isolated and results presented. This is because a closer look at the 
literature on the interface between bank and insurance companies reveals differences 
74 Empirical evidence shows that there are differences in the risk-return profiles of banks when they 
combine with insurance agencies/brokers as opposed to combinations with insurance firms (Boyd, 
Graham and Hewitt, 1993; Nurullah and Staikouras, 2008) 
75 Insurance agents and brokers act as intermediaries between the insurance companies and their clients. 
Insurance agents can be either tied to an insurance company or work for many different insurance 
companies; whereas, insurance brokers are usually large institutions that are fully independent. 
Adding a different perspective, insurance agents could be considered as acting for the company(ies) 
they are tied to, while brokers are acting on behalf of their client(s).  
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in the risk return profiles of banks when they combine with insurance 
agencies/brokers, as opposed to combining with insurance firms (Boyd, Graham and 
Hewitt, 1993; Nurullah and Staikouras, 2008). Despite these variations, the existing 
body of research does not differentiate between deals where the target is an insurance 
underwriter –exposed to underwriting risks – and deals where the target is and 
insurance agent/broker, where underwriting risk is not present. As such, not only the 
market is expected to react differently to combinations offering distinct risk-return 
profiles, but also the factors that are taken into account when valuing these deals are 
expected to be vary. Taking the above issues into consideration, analysing the 
determinants for both types of deals under the same framework could yield conflicting 
results. 
Table 5.1 presents the results of the exploration of the determinants of bidder 
excess returns from bancassurance deal announcements, excluding deals where the 
targets are insurance agencies. Following the general-to-specific approach76, the 
results from three models are presented under each column of the table. In addition, 
two sets of regressions are estimated, the first with the dependent variable being the 2 
day [-1 0] cumulative abnormal return and the second with the dependent variable 
being the 3 day [-1 +1] CAR77
                                                 
76 The general-to-specific methodology involves starting with a large and statistically adequate model. 
This model is then restricted and reorganized until the most parsimonious formulation is reached. 
See Gilbert (
. 
1986) for a detailed discussion of this approach. 
77 An additional six CARs coming from different windows relative to the announcement have been used 
as dependent variables for each model. To conserve space, these results are presented in Table D.1 in 
the appendix. 
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Table 5.1. Determinants of bancassurance deal excess returns (all deals) 
,t i i tCAR Fα β ε= + +∑  
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
 (-1,0) (-1,+1) (-1,0) (-1,+1) (-1,0) (-1,+1) 
       
Intercept -0.031 0.059 -0.039 0.069 -0.013 0.091 
 -(0.48) (0.94) -(1.55) (1.39) (-0.89) (2.08)b 
Market to book 0.001 -0.001     
 (0.30) -(0.21)     
Leverage 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.000   
 (1.20) (0.68) (1.30) (0.74)   
NII pct TOI -0.070 -0.089 -0.070 -0.091 -0.077 -0.099 
 (-1.72)c -(2.22)b -(1.95)c -(2.46)b -(2.26)b -(2.81)a 
Relative Deal 
size 0.049 0.052 0.051 0.053 0.056 0.054 
 (2.68)a (2.86)a (3.01)a (3.11)a (3.44)a (3.35)a 
Return on 
equity 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001   
 (0.94) (1.12) (0.79) (1.17)   
DBB* -0.020 -0.094  -0.096  -0.094 
 -(0.45) -(2.16)b  -(2.35)b  -(2.43)b 
DDOM* 0.007 0.006     
 (0.42) (0.36)     
DUS* 0.056 0.037 0.054 0.038 0.046 0.036 
 (3.26)a (2.23)b (3.47)a (2.51)b (3.34)a (2.68)a 
DFSMA* -0.003 0.003     
 (-0.22) (0.24)     
       
N 47 47 47 47 49 49 
F-value 2.91 2.92 5.58 4.67 8.79 6.88 
Adjusted R2 0.27 0.27 0.33 0.32 0.33 0.33 
AIC -3.45 -3.49 -3.61 -3.61 -3.68 -3.69 
The sample here consists of 120 bancassurance deals announced between 1990 and 2006, excluding 
deals where the targets are insurance agencies. The unavailability of accounting or deal specific data 
for some companies/deals produces a final sample of 47 to 49 deals depending on the selected model. 
The abnormal returns are taken from the market model, where market risk is represented by the 
pertinent wide market index. The figures represent coefficient estimates, while those in brackets 
indicate t-values (White errors). 
CAR stands for the bidder cumulative abnormal returns, α is the constant, F represents the exogenous 
factors listed in the first column of the table. 
* DBB is the dummy taking into account the fact that the bidder is a bank, DDOM is the dummy taking 
into account domestic deals, DUS is the dummy taking into account U.S. bidders and DFSMA is the 
dummy variable taking into account deals that were announced after the passage of the Financial 
Services Modernization Act (1999). 
a/b/c denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level. 
 
Looking at the cross section regression output for the determinants of cumulative 
abnormal returns, it is evident that three to four variables are important in determining 
the market reaction to the bancassurance partnership announcements, depending on 
the choice of the model. At first, a negative and significant relation is observed 
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between the ratio of non-interest income to total operating income of the acquiring 
banks and the exhibited CARs. This variable remains negative and significant across 
all models and windows examined. One interpretation of the above result is that the 
market attaches less value to deals where the acquiring institution is already 
generating fee income, as opposed to institutions where non-interest income is 
comparatively low before the deal announcement. Proceeding with the analysis, there 
is a positive relation between the relative size of the deals and CARs, which is 
significant at 1% level across all models and windows. In essence, the greater the size 
of the target company compared to the market value of the acquirer, the higher the 
valuation that the market attaches to the acquiring company. Further examination of 
the models reveals that the U.S. dummy is positive and significant across all models. 
The latter finding corroborates the results of univariate analysis reported in the 
previous chapter, which show that deals where the acquiring institution is U.S. based, 
are superior to their counterparts, in terms of the excess return experienced around the 
time of their announcement. In effect, U.S. bidders are found to experience more 
favourable valuations even after controlling for the effect of other factors. Last but not 
least, a closer look at the models for the 3-day [-1 +1] window, reveals a very 
interesting result. The coefficient of the dummy variable taking into account deals 
where the bidder is a bank is negative and significant. As such, bancassurance deal 
announcements where the bank takes the lead, experience negative market valuations. 
This is in contrast to the results reported in the previous chapter, where bank driven 
bancassurance deals were found to experience higher excess returns than assure-
banking partnership announcements. One interpretation for this discrepancy might be 
that the higher average excess return of bank driven deals observed in the univariate 
analysis is caused by another factor which is present in U.S. deals, yet unaccounted 
for. This could in fact be any of the contributing factors that are employed in the 
current multivariate approach. On the other hand, it is interesting to note that variables 
such as the bidders’ market to book value, leverage and profitability, as expressed by 
return on equity, do not play in significant role in determining excess returns. What is 
more, when the geographic focus of the deals or their status as post-FSMA are 
considered simultaneously with other variables, the analysis produces no significant 
coefficients for them in any of the windows or models considered. 
Despite the impact that the Financial Services Modernization Act (FSMA 1999) 
had on the structure of the U.S. financial services industry and consequently on the 
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interface between banks and insurance companies, the results so far suggest that there 
is no difference in the excess returns experienced by the bidders between deals that 
were announced before and after the Act. What might have changed however, are the 
factors that are taken into account by investors when valuing bancassurance 
partnerships. This has a practical as well as academic intuition if one considers the 
following: First, the enthusiastic reaction of the stock market to the Citicorp-Travelers 
mega merger in 1998 in conjunction with the varied responses among sectors of the 
financial services industry and/or between companies of the same sector depending on 
their characteristics (Carow, 2001a; Johnston and Madura, 2000). Second, the varied 
responses by financial firms to passage of the FSMA, combined with the documented 
evidence for a positive relation between company size and the exhibited excess 
returns (Carow and Heron, 2002; Hendershott, Lee and Tompkins, 2002; Lown, 
Osler, Strahan and Sufi, 2000; Neale and Peterson, 2005). In what follows, Table 5.2 
presents the results for the shifts in the relative importance of determinants of excess 
returns from bancassurance announcements. This is accomplished by employing an 
interaction dummy variable that captures the possible shifts in the importance of 
factors determining CARs before and after the FSMA78 Table 5.1. Following , two 
windows are examined under each of the two columns, while the pre- and post-FSMA 
determinants are examined for each window, respectively. 
 
                                                 
78 Similar to the regressions in the previous table, the general to specific approach is also applied here. 
In order to conserve space, only the final (most parsimonious) model specification is presented in 
this table. 
 125 
Table 5.2. Shifts in determinants of bancassurance deal excess returns before and 
after the Financial Services Modernization Act (1999) 
,t B i A i tCAR D F D Fα β β ε= + × + × +∑  
Variable (-1,0) (-1,+1) 
 Before After Before After 
     
Intercept -0.029 -0.029 0.069 0.069 
 -(0.71) -(0.71) (1.57) (1.57) 
Market to book -0.025 0.001 -0.023 0.001 
 -(3.10)a (0.40) -(2.65)a (0.42) 
NII pct TOI 1 -0.010 -0.119 -0.066 -0.097 
 -(0.21) -(2.43)b -(1.29) -(1.84)c 
Relative Deal size 0.056 0.023 0.057 0.032 
 (2.74)a (1.14) (2.59)a (1.50) 
Return on equity 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.003 
 (1.18) (2.27)b (0.84) (2.70)a 
DBB* 0.021 0.015 -0.059 -0.103 
 (0.55) (0.31) -(1.48) -(1.98)c 
DUS* 0.097 0.018 0.054 0.026 
 (5.08)a (1.20) (2.62)a (1.63) 
     
N 49 49 
F-value 5.86 4.43 
Adjusted R2 0.55 0.46 
AIC -3.93 -3.79 
The sample here consists of 120 bancassurance deals announced between 1990 and 2006, excluding 
deals where the targets are insurance agencies. The unavailability of accounting or deal specific data 
for some companies/deals produces a final sample of 49 deals. The cumulative abnormal returns are 
taken from the market model, where market risk is represented by the pertinent wide market index. The 
figures represent coefficient estimates, while those in brackets indicate t-values (White errors). 
CAR stands for the bidder cumulative abnormal returns, α is the constant, DB and DA is an interaction 
dummy variable used to assess the relative importance of the determinants F before and after the 
FSMA respectively, while F represents the exogenous factors listed in the first column of the table. 
* DBB is the dummy taking into account the fact that the bidder is a bank and DUS is the dummy 
taking into account U.S. bidders. 
1 NII pct TOI represents the ratio of non interest income to total operating income. 
a/b/c denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level. 
 
Looking at the first column of the table that reports the results of the 2-day [-1 0] 
CARs, it is evident that there are changes in the contributing factors of CARs between 
deals announced before and after the FSMA. The results show that bancassurance 
partnerships announced before the Act are being valued by investors based on 
estimates of the bidders’ market to book ratio, relative deal size and location. More 
specifically, the coefficient of the ratio of market to book value is negative and 
significant at 1%, indicating that overvalued bidders are inferior to undervalued 
bidders in terms of the excess returns they exhibit. Results also suggest a positive 
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relation between the relative size of the deal and bidder abnormal returns. In effect, 
the greater the value paid to acquire the target compared to the market value of the 
acquiring institution, the more positive the market valuation of the latter. In addition, 
the findings show that before the FSMA, investors value more favourably deals where 
the acquiring institution is U.S. based. Nevertheless, the importance of these 
characteristics fades away after the Act, with measures of functional diversification 
and profitability taking over. In particular, the coefficient of the ratio of non-interest 
income to total operating income is negative and significant at 5%, showing that 
bidders that are more specialized before the deal announcement experience higher 
excess returns. As for profitability, results show a positive and significant relation 
between ROE and CARs, indicating that more profitable bidders experience greater 
market valuations around the time of bancassurance partnership announcements. 
Shifting our focus to the 3-day [-1 +1] CARs, the results are almost identical. The 
only notable difference arises in the results for the post-FSMA deals, where the 
dummy variable responsible for bank bidders takes a negative coefficient, which is 
significant at the 10% level. This is in contrast to the results of chapter 4 that show 
bank bidders to be experiencing greater excess returns. However, this difference can 
be due to the fact that other deal or firm specific characteristics can have a significant 
impact on the cumulative average abnormal returns. Due to the nature of event study 
analysis, their individual effects can be difficult to quantify. The cross-sectional 
framework addresses this issue and allows for the impact of individual factors to be 
assessed. 
Given that banks and insurance companies have distinct asset-liability structures, 
the determinants of bidder returns in bancassurance deals might differ depending on 
the nature of the bidder. In what follows, Table 5.3 and Table 5.4 isolate bank driven 
deals79
Table D.2
 and present the results for the determinants of bank acquirers’ CARs and the 
shifts in the determinants before and after the FSMA respectively. Both tables follow 
the same structure as the previous tables, while results from additional windows are 
presented in  in the appendix. 
 
                                                 
79 Due to the small number of insurance company driven deals (20) and the unavailability of insurance 
company data that would further reduce this sample; the study does not consider the determinants of 
insurance bidder excess returns. 
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Table 5.3. Determinants of bank-insurance deal excess returns (bank bidders) 
,t i i tCAR Fα β ε= + +∑  
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
 (-1,0) (-1,+1) (-1,0) (-1,+1) (-1,0) (-1,+1) 
       
Intercept -0.051 -0.035 -0.024 -0.027 -0.012 -0.003 
 -(1.29) -(0.91) -(1.19) -(1.09) -(0.77) -(0.23) 
Market to 
book 0.001 -0.001     
 (0.30) -(0.21)     
Leverage 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.000   
 (1.20) (0.68) (1.06) (0.74)   
NII pct TOI -0.070 -0.089 -0.081 -0.091 -0.085 -0.099 
 -(1.72)c -(2.22)b -(2.21)b -(2.46)b -(2.36)b -(2.81)a 
Relative Deal 
size 0.049 0.052 0.051 0.053 0.056 0.054 
 (2.68)a (2.86)a (2.97)a (3.11)a (3.39)a (3.35)a 
Return on 
equity 0.001 0.001  0.001   
 (0.94) (1.12)  (1.17)   
DDOM* 0.007 0.006     
 (0.42) (0.36)     
DUS* 0.056 0.037 0.054 0.038 0.046 0.036 
 (3.26)a (2.23)b (3.45)a (2.51)b (3.34)a (2.68)a 
DFSMA* -0.003 0.003     
 -(0.21) (0.24)     
       
N 46 46 46 46 48 48 
F-value 3.28 2.97 6.81 5.05 8.85 8.20 
Adjusted R2 0.29 0.26 0.34 0.31 0.33 0.32 
AIC -3.46 -3.50 -3.61 -3.62 -3.67 -3.71 
The sample here consists of 100 bancassurance deals announced between 1990 and 2006, excluding 
deals where the targets are insurance agencies. The unavailability of accounting or deal specific data 
for some companies/deals produces a final sample of 46 to 48 deals depending on the selected model.  
The cumulative abnormal returns are taken from the market model, where market risk is represented by 
the pertinent wide market index. The figures represent coefficient estimates, while those in brackets 
indicate t-values (White errors). 
CAR stands for the bidder cumulative abnormal returns, α is the constant, F represents the exogenous 
factors listed in the first column of the table. 
* DDOM is the dummy taking into account domestic deals, DUS is the dummy taking into account 
U.S. bidders and DFSMA is the dummy variable taking into account deals that were announced after 
the passage of the Financial Services Modernization Act (1999). 
a/b/c denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level. 
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Table 5.4. Shifts in determinants of bank-insurance deal excess returns before and 
after the Financial Services Modernization Act (1999) 
,t B i A i tCAR D F D Fα β β ε= + × + × +∑  
Variable (-1,0) (-1,+1) 
 Before After Before After 
     
Intercept -0.010 -0.010 -0.009 -0.009 
 -(0.62) -(0.62) -(0.47) -(0.47) 
Market to book -0.025 0.001 -0.021 0.000 
 -(3.17)a (0.38) -(2.44)b (0.15) 
NII pct TOI 1 -0.009 -0.122 -0.059 -0.121 
 -(0.20) -(2.74)a -(1.17) -(2.49)b 
Relative Deal size 0.058 0.021 0.068 0.021 
 (3.11)a (1.20) (3.33)a (1.10) 
Return on equity 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.002 
 (1.26) (2.45)b (1.12) (2.41)b 
DUS* 0.098 0.017 0.056 0.021 
 (5.17)a (1.22) (2.68)a (1.38) 
     
N 48 48 
F-value 7.22 4.76 
Adjusted R2 0.57 0.44 
AIC -3.98 -3.80 
The sample here consists of 100 bancassurance deals announced between 1990 and 2006 where the 
bidder is a banking firm, excluding deals where the targets are insurance agencies. The unavailability 
of accounting or deal specific data for some companies/deals produces a final sample of 48 deals. The 
cumulative abnormal returns are taken from the market model, where market risk is represented by the 
pertinent wide market index. The figures represent coefficient estimates, while those in brackets 
indicate t-values (White errors). 
CAR stands for the bidder cumulative abnormal returns, α is the constant, DB and DA is an interaction 
dummy variable used to assess the relative importance of the determinants F before and after the 
FSMA respectively, while F represents the exogenous factors listed in the first column of the table. 
* DUS is the dummy taking into account U.S. bidders. 
1 NII pct TOI represents the ratio of non interest income to total operating income. 
a/b/c denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level. 
 
The results for bank bidders are almost identical to the results from the whole 
sample (Table 5.1), verifying the previous findings. In addition, the results on the 
shifts in the determinants before and after the FSMA, as presented in Table 5.4, are in 
line with the results for the pre- and post-FSMA determinants of the whole sample 
presented in Table 5.280
The extant literature on the bank-insurance interface suggests fundamental 
differences in the risk-return profiles of banks when the latter combine with insurance 
. 
                                                 
80 It is important to note here that the similarities in the determinants of the whole sample versus the 
bank-insurance sample might be caused by the fact that the two underlying samples are 
predominantly consisted from the same companies. This could be caused by unavailable accounting 
data for insurance companies. 
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brokers/agents81
Table 5.5
. Following the empirical analysis of chapter 4, the determinants of 
CARs from these cases are examined separately and the respective results are 
presented in  below. 
 
Table 5.5. Determinants of bank-insurance agency deal excess returns 
,t i i tCAR Fα β ε= + +∑  
Variable Model 1 
 (-1,0) (-1,+1) 
   
Intercept -0.020 -0.025 
 -(0.41) -(0.45) 
Market to book 0.009 0.014 
 (1.18) (1.68)c 
Leverage 0.001 0.001 
 (0.98) (0.52) 
NII pct TOI -0.017 -0.002 
 -(0.51) -(0.07) 
Return on equity 0.000 -0.001 
 -(0.75) -(0.96) 
DDOM* 0.010 -0.003 
 (0.23) -(0.07) 
DUS* -0.002 0.014 
 -(0.07) (0.53) 
DFSMA* 0.002 0.007 
 (0.38) (1.05) 
   
N 86 86 
F-value 0.84 0.63 
Adjusted R2 -0.01 -0.03 
AIC -4.80 -4.56 
The sample here consists of 90 bancassurance deals announced between 1990 and 2006 where the 
targets are insurance agencies. The unavailability of accounting or deal specific data for some 
companies/deals produces a final sample of 86 deals The cumulative abnormal returns are taken from 
the market model, where market risk is represented by the pertinent wide market index. The figures 
represent coefficient estimates, while those in brackets indicate t-values (White errors). 
CAR stands for the bidder cumulative abnormal returns, α is the constant, F represents the exogenous 
factors listed in the first column of the table. 
* DDOM is the dummy taking into account domestic deals, DUS is the dummy taking into account 
U.S. bidders and DFSMA is the dummy variable taking into account deals that were announced after 
the passage of the Financial Services Modernization Act (1999). 
a/b/c denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level. 
 
It is a notable fact that the all the coefficients of the determinants of excess returns 
around bancassurance deals where the targets are insurance agencies are insignificant. 
The market does not seem to differentiate its reaction around this type of deals 
                                                 
81 See the results section of chapter 4 pp. 88 to 89 for further elaboration on this matter. 
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depending on the characteristics of the bidder and/or other deal characteristics. One 
interpretation for this result could be that the market does not value such 
combinations, something that is consistent with the results of the event study analysis 
in chapter 4, where bidders in bank-insurance agency/brokerage partnership 
announcements exhibited insignificant excess returns. The decomposition of the 
determinants of this type of deal into pre- and post-FSMA does not yield any 
significant results either82
5.5. EMPIRICAL FINDINGS: DISCUSSION AND IMPLICATIONS 
. In particular, Looking at the determinants of the 2-day [-1 
0] CARs all the coefficients are insignificant except for the market to book ratio 
which becomes marginally significant following the FSMA. However, this ratio does 
not remain important for the 3-day [-1 +1] CARs, where only the return on equity is 
marginally significant for deals that take place after the Act.  
 
The results of the analysis are of significant importance for bank and insurance 
company managers, investors and regulators alike. The first notable finding is the 
importance of non-interest income generated by bidders before the announcement. 
The ratio of non-interest income to total operating income is an important 
performance measurement for a banking company. It indicates the contribution that 
fees are making to total revenue. The last decade has witnessed a rapid growth in the 
relative importance of fees in banking revenue as the lines between financial firms are 
blurring. The analysis of the determinants of both the whole sample and the bank-
bidder sample, points to a negative relation between this ratio and excess returns. This 
is expected for two main reasons. First, the more diversified in terms of off-balance 
sheet income an institution is prior to the announcement, the lower the impact of the 
newly announced deal on the firms’ income structure and, consequently, the lower the 
market reaction. Second, the market might be penalizing institutions that are already 
generating a steady flow of non-interest income for over-diversifying or, in other 
words, over-relying on fee-generating activities. The latter argument is in line with 
Stiroh (2006) who finds that the degree of bank non-interest income share is 
associated with higher market betas and risk, while it is not associated with stock 
returns. In essence, he finds no benefit stemming from the risk-return trade-off from 
non-interest activities and suggests that U.S. banks may have become overexposed to 
                                                 
82 The results are not presented here but are available upon request. 
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off-balance sheet income. The above result is also consistent with Stiroh and Rumble 
(2006) and Mercieca, Schaeck and Wolfe (2007) who report that increased reliance on 
non-interest income is associated with reduced risk adjusted performance. On the 
other hand, Baele, De Jonghe and Vander Vennet (2007) report a positive relation 
between non-interest income share and a market based measure of potential returns as 
well as market beta of banks, and a negative relation between non-interest income 
share and bank total and idiosyncratic risk. However, the relationship between non-
interest income and total or idiosyncratic risk is found to be non-linear, where after a 
specific point, it becomes positive. The initial difference in their results might well be 
related to the scope of their sample which is constrained to European banks, which 
have a longer track record in these activities, and/or to the fact that they do not use a 
risk-adjusted measure of returns. More specifically, if they used a risk-adjusted 
measure of returns, the positive relation between total risk and non-interest income 
share that appears after a specific point, could trigger a negative impact on the 
relationship between risk-adjusted returns and non-interest income share.  
The second main finding is the importance of the relative deal size or, in other 
words, the ratio of the value of the deal to the market value of the bidder. A strong 
positive relation is revealed between this variable and excess returns. Taking into 
consideration the fact that this ratio is a measure of scale economies that can be 
achieved via the combination of the two entities, the results show that the market 
anticipates more financial benefits from mergers or acquisitions of larger scale. This 
is somewhat consistent with Fields, Fraser and Kolari (2007a) who examine the 
determinants of bidder excess returns from 36 bancassurance mergers between 1997 
and 2004. Among other control variables, they find a positive and significant 
relationship between excess returns and economies of scale, as measured by the ratio 
of target total assets to bidder total assets83
2007
. In addition, the results are in line with 
Chen, Li, Moshirian and Tan ( ) who report a positive relation between the 
relative size of deals and bidder excess returns around the announcement of 42 
European bancassurance deals84
                                                 
83 The authors also use the ratio of target market value to bidder market value as an alternative measure 
of scale economies but find insignificant results. 
84 These 42 deals represent the sample examined in their event study analysis. Cross sectional analyses 
where accounting data and deal characteristics variables are involved, are often susceptible to 
reductions in the initial sample, due to the unavailability of such data for some companies. 
Nevertheless, the authors do not report the sample used in the cross sectional regressions. 
. They conclude that the market anticipates more 
synergy to be created from large scale bank-insurance deals. Another study by Cybo-
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Ottone and Murgia (2000) examines the determinants of excess returns for 46 mergers 
and acquisitions and find no relation between CARs and target firm size. 
Nevertheless, their event study sample included only 10 bank-insurance deals, while 
at the same time it is not reported if and how many of these cases are present in the 
cross sectional analysis. Furthermore, their measure of size is different to the one used 
in this empirical analysis as it does not take into account the size of the target in 
relation to the size of the bidder, and therefore it cannot be interpreted as a scale 
economies measure. 
Another interesting outcome is the positive coefficient attached to the dummy that 
takes into account deals where the bidder is U.S. based. This corroborates the results 
from the event study analysis in chapter 4, where U.S. bidders were found to 
experience higher abnormal returns when compared to their counterparts from the rest 
of the world. In addition, this finding further enhances the validity of the previous 
results, given that the positive and significant relationship found here is above and 
beyond the possible effects from other factors that are considered simultaneously. In 
effect, the market is found to provide stronger support for deals lead by U.S. financial 
institutions, most likely due to the recent demise of the regulatory restrictions 
imposed on the interface between banks and insurance companies by the Glass-
Steagall Act of 1933 and the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956. Nevertheless, this 
is in contrast with the results in the cross section analysis in Fields, Fraser and Kolari 
(2007a) who report an insignificant dummy variable for U.S. bidders.  
Finally, another variable that is important in determining CARs is the dummy 
variable that takes into account deals that are driven by banks, or otherwise known as 
bank-insurance deals, as opposed to assure-banking initiatives. Despite earlier support 
for this type of deals, as suggested by the results in chapter 4, the coefficient of this 
variable in the multivariate framework is negative and statistically significant at 5% 
level. This in turn suggests that, controlling for other factors, the market does not 
favour bancassurance deals where banks take the lead. In particular, a bank driven 
bancassurance partnership announcement is associated with a negative 3-day 
cumulative abnormal return of 9.4%, holding other factors constant. This is not in line 
with the negative but insignificant bank bidder dummy variable coefficient reported in 
Fields, Fraser and Kolari (2007a). 
Shifting our focus to the analysis of the determinants of pre- and post-FSMA deals, 
some interesting findings arise. It is evident that there is a considerable shift in 
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investor perceptions of bancassurance deals after the demise of the regulatory barriers 
between banks and insurance companies. Before the Act, deals are being valued based 
on estimates of bidder growth opportunities, the potential for scale economies and 
whether the deal was initiated by a U.S. financial institution. The importance of these 
variables might be related to the continuous efforts of companies and investors alike 
to lobby regulators for the repeal of the Glass Steagall Act and the Bank Holding 
Company Act. Therefore, at the time, large and/or U.S. bank-insurance deals 
reinforced the position of those in favour of financial deregulation, and hence, were 
welcomed by the market. Someone might at this point question the validity of the 
shift in the importance of the U.S. bidder dummy on the grounds of non-existence of 
bank-insurance combinations before the FSMA. Nevertheless, in reality the U.S. 
market was familiar with such deals before 1999, with the greatest example being the 
Citicorp-Travelers mega-merger in 199885
2000
. Further analysis for this is provided in 
Broome and Markham ( ) who suggest that despite the regulatory restrictions, 
banks and insurers have always found ways to combine their operations. Following 
the passage of the Act, the relative importance of the aforementioned attributes fades 
away and estimates of the bidders’ capacity for further functional diversification and 
profitability levels take the lead. The cause of this change can be reasonably justified. 
Once the regulatory barriers are removed, bancassurance deals are valued based on 
the acquiring institutions expected potential for synergies, as measured by their 
capacity in generating more fee income and their profitability. A number of studies 
have focused on the market reaction of financial institutions to the FSMA and the 
respective determinants of excess returns. Carow and Heron (2002) find that large 
investment banks and large insurance companies benefited from FSMA, whereas 
thrifts, finance companies and foreign banks lost value. Using a similar framework for 
insurance companies Neale and Peterson (2005) verify the positive effect of size. 
Similar results are also reported by Hendershott, Lee and Tompkins (2002). Their 
cross section results suggest that larger and better performing institutions benefit the 
most from the Act, because of their better position to achieve synergies by exploiting 
the newly available opportunities, allowed by the legislation. In summary, studies on 
the capital market reactions to the FSMA suggest that large and profitable companies 
should benefit from the legislation. Nevertheless, the results of these studies apply and 
                                                 
85 A list of a number of these deals that are also present in the sample of the deals analysed here can be 
found in Table C.1 in the appendix. 
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are limited to the general market expectations from the removal of regulatory 
restrictions. It should be noted that individual deals are judged by the market based on 
the expected performance of the combined entity. To the best of our knowledge, this 
is the first time that the shift in the determinants of bancassurance deals before and 
after the FSMA is examined. As such, the results here are of significant importance 
with regards to bank-insurance combinations. 
Moving on to the determinants of excess returns associated with bank-insurance 
agency/brokerage deals, the insignificance of the regression coefficients in all 
windows examined, reinforces the earlier univariate results in the previous chapter. 
The markets’ unresponsiveness to these deals is also verified by the fact that none of 
the factors examined makes any difference in terms of the bidders’ valuation around 
the announcement. In addition, the decomposition of the analysis of determinants into 
pre- and post-FSMA does not yield any significant results. One of the most discussed 
issues in the literature on financial conglomerates is that of the risk-return trade-off 
associated with the incursion of banks into non-banking activities. One of the 
activities frequently examined is insurance broking. Nevertheless, empirical evidence 
is rather mixed, with some studies reporting that bank combinations with insurance 
agents/brokers are more risky than combinations with life or property and casualty 
insurers (Boyd, Graham and Hewitt, 1993) and others reporting a favourable risk-
return trade-off for mergers between banks and insurance agents/brokers (Boyd and 
Graham, 1988; Heggestad, 1975; Nurullah and Staikouras, 2008). The results here are 
not in line with either side of the existing evidence. Not only does the market ignore 
such deals but also disregards accounting measures and deal characteristics that could, 
as witnessed in other cases, steer expectations and consequently abnormal returns.  
5.6. CONCLUSION 
 
This chapter examines the determinants of excess returns experienced by acquiring 
firms around the announcement of bancassurance mergers. A cross section regression 
framework is employed, where the dependent variables are the cumulative abnormal 
returns experienced by the bidders in various time windows around the deals’ 
announcements. The sample of deals consists of 210 bancassurance transactions, 
where 100 correspond to cases where banks bid for insurance companies, 20 cases 
where insurance companies bid for banks and 90 cases where banks bid for insurance 
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agencies. The results show a significant inverse relationship between non-interest 
income and bidder excess returns around bancassurance announcements, indicating 
that the market is penalizing institutions that are already more reliant on non-interest 
income before the deal’s announcement. What is more, the greater the potential for 
scale economies for the combined entity, the more positive the excess return 
experienced by acquiring institutions. It is also found that deals where the acquiring 
institution is U.S. based are valued more favourably. In contrast to the results from the 
previous chapter, evidence from the multivariate analysis shows that controlling for 
other factors simultaneously, bank bidders lose value. 
The decomposition of the sample into pre- and post-FSMA deals indicates a shift 
in the relative importance of the determinants of bidder abnormal performance. 
Investors value deals before the FSMA based on estimates of bidder growth 
opportunities, the potential for scale economies and whether the acquirer is a U.S. 
financial institution, possibly due to the continuous efforts of market participants to 
lobby regulators to remove the existing barriers between banks and insurance 
companies. In contrast, following the passage of FSMA, investors value bank-
insurance partnership announcements based on estimates of the bidders’ capacity for 
further functional diversification and their profitability levels. This indicates that with 
the regulatory barriers removed, bancassurance deals are valued based on true 
investor estimates of synergies through bank-insurance partnerships. Finally, 
consistent with the results of the previous empirical chapter, it is found that the 
market ignores bank combinations with insurance agents/brokers, as none of the 
factors capturing company and deal characteristics is significant. 
 So far, attention has been paid to the market reaction to bancassurance deals and 
further analysis has been carried out to gauge the impact of company and deal specific 
factors on bidder valuations. The results so far assert that bancassurance deals trigger 
significant trading movements, that affect the stock prices of acquiring institutions, 
and that the direction of these movements is based on careful investor evaluation of 
the potential of bancassurance strategies. A very important dimension of the 
phenomenon that is reflected in bidder returns – but not directly captured so far – is 
that of the risk element. As such, the next chapter looks into the changes in risk before 
and after bancassurance announcements by decomposing the latter into its total, 
market, interest rate and idiosyncratic components. 
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6. BANCASSURANCE DEALS: AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF THE EFFECTS 
ON RISK AND ITS DETERMINANTS 
6.1. INTRODUCTION 
 
The last two decades have witnessed a burgeoning of mergers and acquisitions in 
the financial services sector, most of which emphasized on product diversification. In 
contrast to the European financial services industry, that was liberalised in 1989 when 
the Second Banking Directive was implemented by all member states, the industry in 
the United States remained fragmented until 1999, due to concerns for increased risk 
from combining banking and non-banking activities. Specifically, regulation dating 
back to the 19th century constrained the geographical expansion of banks into other 
states as well as their ability to affiliate with investment banks, securities firms, and 
insurance companies. Due to these legal barriers86, U.S. banks were unable to benefit 
from synergies through consolidation. The Second Banking Directive of 1989 in the 
European Union, followed by the Financial Services Modernisation Act of 1999 in the 
United States, have both allowed financial institutions to functionally diversify their 
operations by offering a broad range of financial services87
In the previous chapters, the reaction of the markets to bancassurance deals has 
been examined, with results pointing to significant bidder excess returns. Analysing 
the risk effects, in addition to the return effects of these mergers, is especially 
important, because there should be a trade-off between risk and return. Therefore, 
looking at the return effects in isolation would only provide a partial picture. To be 
more specific, it is possible that the bidder firm returns rise in response to the merger 
 under the same corporate 
umbrella. One of the main targets of regulators and policymakers is to maintain 
competitiveness within the financial services industry, while minimizing the risks of a 
systemic failure. However, investors are interested in high returns and low risk, while 
depositors, policyholders, and bondholders are more interested in minimizing firm-
specific risk. As a result, the effect of bancassurance partnerships on the risk of 
financial institutions is an issue of paramount importance for all stakeholders. Despite 
this, the empirical literature on this subject is limited and offers mixed conclusions. 
                                                 
86 The majority of the barriers between financial institutions in the U.S. were imposed by the National 
Banking Act (1864), the Banking Act (1933), and the Bank Holding Company Act (1956). 
87 These include commercial banking, investment banking, insurance and other financial services. 
 137 
announcement (as shown in chapter 4), but the firm trades off this higher return for a 
higher level of risk. Furthermore, the disaggregation of the sample of deals into those 
where the bidder is a bank versus those where the bidder is an insurance company, 
produced variations in abnormal returns. Similar variations were found when deals 
between banks and insurance agencies were considered. Further tests were carried out 
to capture the firm and deal specific factors that drive abnormal returns, with the 
degree of diversification prior to the merger announcement being one of the most 
important factors. In effect, one question remains unanswered. Do bancassurance 
deals affect the risk of acquiring institutions? 
This chapter attempts to contribute to the literature on financial conglomerates, and 
more specifically, on the risk effects of bank-insurance combinations, which so far 
has been constrained by data limitations and methodological issues88
The results show that bank-insurance partnerships do not significantly affect the 
total and idiosyncratic risk of bidders, but systematic risk is increasing following the 
deal announcement, or completion. Consistent with the results of the previous 
chapters, when the sample is split based on the nature of the bidder (bank vs. 
insurance company), or target (insurance company vs. insurance agency), some 
interesting results arise. For example, insurance bidders exhibit greater exposures to 
total and market risk than bank bidders. What is more, when banks combine with 
insurance agencies, their equity becomes exposed to considerably higher systematic 
risk, than in cases of bank acquisitions of insurance underwriters, and vice versa. 
Furthermore, the risk decomposition reveals that banks are much more exposed to 
firm-specific risk than to market risk, while insurance companies are relatively 
equally exposed to both types of risk. Surprisingly, the firm-specific component of 
. The research 
questions that are addressed here are the following: Do bancassurance deals affect the 
total, market and idiosyncratic risk of acquiring institutions, and if yes, to what 
direction? What kind of factors determine the risk attributes of firms that enter into 
bancassurance deals, and do these relationships change following the deals? In this 
respect, a risk decomposition methodology is employed to assess the impact of 
bancassurance partnerships on total risk and its systematic and idiosyncratic 
components, while cross section regressions shed light on the factors affecting the risk 
components. 
                                                 
88 A further analysis of the methodological issues being present in previous studies is provided section 
2. 
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banks that bid for insurance agencies accounts for around 80% of their total risk. The 
analysis of the determinants of risk suggests that it is not diversification into insurance 
activities that drives market betas up, rather it is the increased scale of the institutions 
due to the merger/acquisition that has an impact on betas. What is more, bank 
acquisitions of insurance agencies are superior to bank acquisitions of insurance 
underwriters, given that the negative and significant relationship between non-interest 
income share and unsystematic risk fades away following bank acquisitions of 
insurance companies, yet remains significant after bank acquisitions of insurance 
agencies. 
In what follows, section 2 reviews the extant literature on the risk issues related to 
financial conglomerates and discusses the empirical findings. Section 3 presents the 
sample and the employed methodological framework. The empirical findings are 
presented and analysed in section 4. Finally, section 5 concludes this chapter. 
6.2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
The question of whether financial conglomerates outperform their more specialized 
counterparts in terms of their risk-return attributes is an issue of ongoing academic 
research. Generally, proponents of diversification (Benston, 1994; Saunders, 1994)89
1970
 
claim the existence of synergies through cost and revenue economies of scope 
coupled with reduced bankruptcy risk due to the imperfect correlations of revenue 
streams from different functions. On the other hand, several arguments against 
diversification exist, with the most prominent one considering diversification at the 
company level as redundant, given that investors can diversify away company specific 
risk by constructing efficient portfolios at a lower cost. Consistent with that notion, 
Levy and Sarnat ( ) employ portfolio theory to prove that in the absence of 
synergistic gains and capital cost economies90
                                                 
89 A detailed analysis of the arguments for and against diversification and financial conglomerates can 
be found in chapter 3. 
90 The term capital cost economies is used by the authors in order to describe cost savings that stem 
from better access to capital markets and reduced lender’s risk following diversifying mergers. 
, the diversification benefits that are 
stemming from such mergers cannot produce economic gains in a perfect capital 
market. Moreover, critics of diversifying M&As also emphasize on the risk of driving 
a company and its management outside their core competency.  
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Despite the various methodological avenues followed in the extant literature, the 
evidence is mixed and the question still remains. This is also evident when one looks 
at the surveys of the academic literature on this subject. Specifically, Kwan and 
Laderman (1999) review the literature on the effects of combining banking and 
nonbank financial activities on bank risk and return, and find that securities activities, 
insurance broking, and insurance underwriting are riskier but more profitable than 
banking activities and provide the potential for diversification. Similar conclusions 
are drawn in the survey of Berger, Demsetz and Strahan (1999), where it is suggested 
that consolidation can increase profit efficiency and help diversify the portfolio risks 
of financial institutions. In the European front, Berger, DeYoung and Udell (2001) 
review the literature on the effects of consolidation on the efficiency of the financial 
services industry. They conclude that there is significant potential for efficiency gains 
through consolidation that is mainly attributable to risk diversification, yet most of it 
is offset by the existence of consolidation barriers91
1994
. Furthermore, no consensus is 
reported in the review of the literature provided in Saunders and Walter ( ). They 
review 18 studies on whether nonbanking activities reduce bank risk and report that 
nine studies answer yes, six answer no, while three are inconclusive. 
In addition to the abovementioned surveys, there exists some empirical work on 
the subject, yet the findings are limited due to problems such as data unavailability, or 
methodological issues92 1975. In an early study, Heggestad ( ) employs 
variance/covariance analysis in order to evaluate the risk-return characteristics of 
banks and nonbanks and the correlations among them, in an attempt to shed light on 
the risk effects of combining banks with nonbanks. The analysis is conducted at the 
industry level between 1953 and 1967. His findings suggest that many nonbank 
activities are safer than banking and that there are potential diversification benefits in 
some nonbanking operations. Nevertheless, considerable care must be exercised in 
extrapolating the above conclusions to individual firms as the analysis is performed at 
the aggregate industry level. In contrast to the variance/covariance analysis, others 
have employed a combination of accounting and market data in order to examine the 
relation between BHC risk and diversification into nonbanking. For example, Boyd 
and Graham (1986) use accounting data and multiple regression analysis, where risk 
                                                 
91 The main consolidation barriers identified are distance, language, culture and implicit rules against 
foreign institutions. 
92 A more detailed analysis of these issues is provided in the following paragraphs. 
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and return are used as dependent variables, to examine the relationship between the 
former and measures of nonbank activity. They find no significant relationship 
between either profitability or risk and nonbank activity. However, when the sample 
is split into two sub periods (1971-1977 and 1978-1983) they find a strong positive 
correlation between nonbank share and risk in the first sub period. It is suggested that 
this is because BHC regulation was considerably tightened towards the end of the 
sample period. Using the same methodological approach, Brewer (1989) 
complements Boyd and Graham’s (1986) study by employing market data in addition 
to accounting data, on a sample of 106 BHCs between 1978 and 1986. He finds no 
evidence of high BHC risk associated with nonbank activity, but reports a strong 
negative relation between risk and nonbank activity for the high risk BHCs. Using a 
similar framework on a sample of 40 BHCs between 1979 and 1983, Brewer, Fortier 
and Pavel (1988) employ OLS regressions of variance of stock returns and return on 
assets on the proportion of assets devoted to nonbank activity, as well as variance 
analysis and hypothetical mergers. They report a negative relation between the 
proportion of nonbank activity and BHC risk. 
Despite the considerable effort invested, all the above studies are exposed to two 
shortcomings. First, the nonbank activities are limited to those permitted during the 
sample period and thus it would not be wise to reflect the conclusions drawn from 
them onto nonbanking activities that were impermissible at the time. Second, the risk 
from any particular activity cannot be isolated as the results from those studies only 
hold for aggregated nonbanking activities. 
In order to account for these drawbacks, a number of studies have used merger 
simulation techniques. For example, Boyd and Graham (1988) use accounting and 
market data in order to analyse the impact of a hypothetical expansion of BHCs into 
nonbanking on BHC risk, between 1971 and 198493
                                                 
93 Their sample involves 146 BHCs, 30 life insurance companies, 15 P/C insurance companies, 5 
insurance brokers/agents, 11 securities firms, 31 real estate development firms and 11 other real 
estate firms. 
. In terms of the methodological 
approach, they employ merger simulations and compare the results with unmerged 
firms. Their results suggest that combinations between BHCs and securities firms, 
real estate developers and property and casualty (P/C) insurance increase the volatility 
of returns and the risk of failure. On the other hand, they find that the expansion of 
BHCs into life insurance reduces both the volatility of returns and the risk of failure. 
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In contrast, Laderman (1999) also generates hypothetical mergers between a large 
sample of BHCs and various nonbanking firms in the period 1979-1997, and finds 
that either life/ insurance underwriting, P/C insurance underwriting or securities 
underwriting, reduce the probability of bankruptcy of the BHC. In the U.K. front, 
Genetay and Molyneux (1998) analyse the impact of an expansion of banks into 
mutual and proprietary life insurance on bank risk, between 1988 and 1992. Merger 
simulations reveal mixed evidence on risk, with significantly lower probabilities of 
failure but insignificant changes in return on assets volatility for bancassurance 
combinations. At this point, it is worth noting that the practice of randomly selecting 
pairs of companies without controlling for their size may inevitably lead to 
hypothetical pairs of large nonbanks and small BHCs. In this case the risk/return 
profile of the merged institution would not necessarily represent a high-quality 
combination in terms of risk and return. This setback is accounted for in Boyd, 
Graham and Hewitt (1993) and Lown, Osler, Strahan and Sufi (2000). The first, 
expand the previous study (Boyd and Graham, 1988) by substantially increasing the 
sample period and the number of companies analysed94
2000
. Not only that, they address 
the issue of the possibility of inappropriate pair selection by accounting for various 
different portfolio combinations for each bank-nonbank pair. One of the major 
advantages of this approach is that it facilitates the evaluation of the risk minimising 
bank-nonbank asset combinations. The results suggest that mergers between BHCs 
and life or non-life insurance firms can be risk reducing when the appropriate 
portfolio weight combinations are chosen, whereas mergers with either securities or 
real estate companies are likely to increase BHC risk. In a similar framework, Lown, 
Osler, Strahan and Sufi ( ), simulate mergers between pre-selected pairs95
                                                 
94 The sample period is 1971-1987 and the data sample includes 141 BHCs, 30 life insurance 
companies, 16 P/C insurance companies, 20 insurance brokers/agents, 27 securities firms, 69 real 
estate development firms and 67 other real estate firms. 
 of the 
10 largest BHCs and the 10 largest companies in the insurance and securities 
business, using financial data from 1984-1998. They conclude that mergers between 
bank holding companies and either securities firms or property and casualty firms 
would likely modestly raise BHC risk. However, they find that mergers between 
BHCs and life insurance companies lower the risk of both firms due to diversification 
benefits. Nevertheless, even after correcting for the problems identified in Brewer 
95 This practice represents a different way of alleviating the random pair problem identified in Boyd and 
Graham (1988). 
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(1989) and Boyd and Graham (1986), merger simulation studies fail to account for 
three factors that may understate their results and, consequently, the conclusions 
drawn from them. First, they only consider mergers between one BHC and one 
nonbank firm and in this way ignore further possible diversification benefits from 
BHC combinations with more than one nonbanking firm. Second, the random 
selection of BHC-nonbank pairs does not necessarily reflect reality, where managers 
carefully select target companies based on their organisational and financial 
characteristics. Last but not least, serious biases in their results and conclusions may 
arise from the fact that M&A costs and acquisition premia are disregarded, even 
though they can be substantial. The first issue is addressed in studies that used a 
portfolio approach. In this respect, Allen and Jagtiani (2000) create synthetic 
universal banks96 in order to discern the impact of securities and insurance activities 
on bank total and systematic risk as well as on bank risk premiums between 1986 and 
1994. Using market data, they construct universal bank portfolios that consist of one 
bank, one securities firm and one insurance company, by value-weighting their 
respective monthly returns. The sample consists of 9 representative97
2001
 companies from 
each industry, which are combined to generate 729 universal banks. They find that 
nonbank activities reduce total risk but increase systematic market risk. Both 
securities and insurance activities have no significant effect on market risk premiums 
of universal banks. Moreover, while the interest rate risk premiums seem to be 
lowered by securities activities, they are not affected by insurance activities. 
Complementing their results, Estrella ( ), employs an option pricing approach in 
order to discern the potential diversification gains from BHC combinations with 
nonbanks. The sample incorporates the 10 largest and 10 smallest BHCs as well as the 
10 largest life and P/C insurance firms, security brokers and non-financial firms 
during the period 1989-1998. Using both accounting and market data he finds that 
both banking institutions and insurance companies can experience diversification 
benefits by converging. 
Despite the considerable effort that has been invested in the above studies, the 
unavailability of actual bank-insurance combinations and the indirect manner of 
                                                 
96 The term synthetic here is used by the authors to describe universal banks that do not exist, but are 
rather created for the purposes of their study. A “synthetic universal bank” is effectively a portfolio 
consisting of one depository institution, one securities firm, and one insurance company. 
97 The nine largest companies from each industry are selected. However, this has many implications on 
the reflection of the results on other possible size combinations. 
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analyzing the phenomenon, leaves one question. How applicable are the results from 
simulation studies to actual bank-insurance combinations? The emergence of bank-
insurance combinations and financial conglomerates in recent years, has paved the 
way for a number of studies that have produced more reliable results, based on actual 
deals or hybrid companies. 
For instance, Nurullah and Staikouras (2008) deal with the issues affecting 
simulation studies by analysing actual bank-insurance combinations during the period 
1990 to 1999. Specifically, they construct measures of profitability, risk and 
creditworthiness at the firm and industry level. Using these measures they examine 
the pre- and post-merger risk-return effects of European banks’ diversification into 
life and non-life insurance underwriting, as well as into insurance broking 
businesses98. The analysis at the aggregate industry level reveals that life and non-life 
insurance underwriting are riskier than banking, while insurance broking has higher 
returns and does not affect bank creditworthiness. On the other hand, the results of the 
analysis of synthetic bank-insurance structures show that life and non-life insurance 
significantly increase bank return volatility and the probability of bankruptcy. They 
conclude that best candidate for bank expansion is insurance brokerage. Another 
strand of research examines the phenomenon by looking at the relation between 
measures of bank diversification and performance and/or risk99
2006
. In these cases 
diversification is not always found to be beneficial for financial institutions. For 
example, Stiroh and Rumble ( ) consider the impact of diversification on the 
performance of 1816 U.S. Financial Holding Companies (FHCs) in the period 1997 to 
2002. By employing cross section and panel regressions they find that the increased 
risk adjusted performance across FHCs due to diversification benefits is offset by the 
increased exposure to non-interest activities. The results also suggest that increasing 
the diversification levels within FHCs does not bring improvements in risk adjusted 
performance. Finally, they report a negative relation between non-interest income and 
risk adjusted performance100
                                                 
98 Their sample consists of 45 banks, 40 life insurance firms, 12 non-life insurance firms and 11 
insurance brokers. 
99 It is worth noting that these studies are a re-invention of early studies that used the same 
methodology. The recent studies however, do not suffer from the two drawbacks that affected the 
early works. See paragraph 2 in page 135 for further details. 
. Using a similar framework and market data for 635 U.S. 
100 The paper also examines the impact of diversification on regular performance measures such as 
ROE, ROA and the respective standard deviations of these ratios. A significant relation is only 
revealed when standard deviations are used as dependent variables. Two possible issues/biases are 
identified by the authors. First, the measure of diversification (DIV) and the share of net operating 
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BHCs between 1997 and 2004, Stiroh (2006) examines the relationship between non-
interest income and equity market measures of BHC return and risk. Specifically, he 
uses pooled cross-section OLS regressions of stock returns, total and idiosyncratic 
risk and bank betas on proxies for non-interest share, size and the equity to assets ratio 
He finds an insignificant relation between bank mean return and non-interest 
activities. On the other hand, his results point to a positive correlation between non-
interest income share and total, market and idiosyncratic risk. An interesting feature 
of his results is the non-linear relationship between non-interest share and total and 
idiosyncratic risk. In effect, it is found that total risk can be minimized when non-
interest share is between 18% and 27%, while idiosyncratic risk is minimized as long 
as this share remains under 16%. Nonetheless, the author concludes that U.S. 
institutions are already intensively diversified and cannot benefit at the above levels. 
Complementing the above studies, Stiroh (2004) provides further evidence against 
diversification by analysing the U.S. banking industry in the period 1984 to 2001. His 
methodological approach involves two steps. The first consists of an analysis of the 
fluctuation in non-interest income and net interest income over time and the 
examination of the volatility of net operating revenue growth. The second involves a 
correlation analysis between net interest income and non-interest income across time 
and sample of banks. Finally, OLS regressions of bank net income growth and ROE 
on non-interest share proxy and other variables are used to discern the impact of 
diversification on profitability. The results from the analysis at the industry level 
show that while the volatility of bank revenue has dropped overtime, this decline was 
due to the reduction in the volatility of net-interest income. On the other hand, the 
volatility of non-interest income is found to have increased during the same period, 
together with the correlation between net and non-interest income. The author 
suggests that banks’ increasing focus on cross-selling might expose different lines of 
their business to the same shocks. Likewise, in the European front, diversification is 
found to be detrimental for small banks in Mercieca, Schaeck and Wolfe (2007), who 
conclude that these institutions should rather focus on their core competencies. They 
use OLS regressions to gauge the relationship between measures of profitability and 
risk and the degree of diversification for 755 small European banks between 1997 and 
                                                                                                                                            
revenue from non-interest sources (SHnon) are simultaneously used as independent variables in the 
regressions. The problem lies in the fact that DIV is a function of SHnon. Second, similar issues arise 
through the use of non-interest income and net income. 
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2003. This study differs from others in that diversification measures are constructed 
using a Herfindahl Hirschmann Index (HHI) that accounts for the spread between 
non-interest income and net-interest income. In addition, another two sets of HHI 
indexes are constructed to account for diversification across the components of the 
two sources of income101. The results point to a negative relation between non-interest 
income and profitability and Z-scores102
2008
, respectively. Complementing the above 
results, Lepetit, Nys, Rous and Tarazi ( ) examine the degree of diversification of 
734 banks established in 14 European countries between 1996 and 2002. They 
employ OLS regressions of both accounting- and market-based measures of risk on a 
set of variables capturing the degree of bank income diversification. Their results 
reveal a significant relationship between the degree of income diversification and both 
accounting- and market-based measures of risk. Further tests reveal that this 
relationship is stronger for smaller banks and that in all cases risk is more positively 
correlated with fee-based activities than with trading activities. 
Conclusions drawn from U.S. studies are somewhat in line with those in Baele, De 
Jonghe and Vander Vennet (2007). Their study focuses on 255 banks from 17 
European countries. They look at the relationship between bank risk – which is 
decomposed into its market and idiosyncratic components – and non-interest revenue 
share103
2006
, between 1989 and 2004. This is accomplished by decomposing risk into its 
systematic and idiosyncratic parts and then employing OLS regressions of bank 
Tobin's Q, betas, total and idiosyncratic risk on measures of asset and revenue 
diversification. They find that non-interest revenue share is positively associated with 
systematic risk, but contrary to Stiroh ( ), non-interest revenue share is found to 
be negatively related to idiosyncratic and total risk. Further scrutiny however, reveals 
that the latter relationship is non-linear with a shift in its direction occurring when 
non-interest revenue share exceeds 22% and 36% for total and idiosyncratic risk, 
respectively. The overall consensus from the literature on risk seems to be in line with 
expectations; although there is potential for risk reduction via non-interest income, 
                                                 
101 Diversification within non-interest income is measured as an HHI index of the spread between 
commission revenue, trading income and other operating income, whereas diversification within net-
interest income is measured as an HHI index of the spread between income from mortgages, hire 
purchase and leases, loans to group companies, associates, governments, municipalities and 
corporations and other loans. 
102 Z-scores are used in the literature as a measure of insolvency risk. Higher Z-scores indicate 
improved insolvency risk. 
103 Non-interest revenue share is defined as the ratio of non-interest income to total operating income. 
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this is exhausted at a relatively low level, after which risk increases. In essence, banks 
that rely heavily on non-interest sources of income are more exposed to market 
movements or economy-wide shocks.  
Another important question on financial conglomeration is whether diversification 
per se has a positive impact on the market valuations of institutions. One study that 
tries to address the above question is Laeven and Levine (2007). They use Tobin’s Q 
of 836 banks from 43 countries over the period 1998-2002, and benchmark it against 
the Tobin’s Q the same banks would have if they were broken into their component 
firms, each one being a separate, specialized institution. What is more, they employ 
regressions of excess value and Tobin’s Q estimates on diversification proxies and 
other control variables. Their results suggest that diversification of bank based 
financial services firms is value destroying, since the market values of banks engaged 
in multiple activities are lower than the values those banks would have, if broken up 
into specialized firms. They also report a negative relation between diversity measures 
and excess and Q values. Using a similar methodological approach, Schmid and 
Walter (2009) extend the above study by analysing 664 U.S. financial firms between 
1985 to 2004. Their results are consistent with Laeven and Levine (2007), in that they 
also show a substantial and persistent conglomerate discount in financial firms. 
Further tests by the authors verify that it is diversification that causes the discount and 
not that troubled firms choose to diversify in other areas. Interestingly, when 
combinations between banking and insurance or banking and investment banking are 
considered, they are found to offer a significant valuation premium. On the contrary, 
different conclusions are drawn in a similar analysis conducted in Baele, De Jonghe 
and Vander Vennet (2007), who consider a European bank sample. Their results 
suggest that diversified institutions are associated with higher return potential. At this 
point it is worth noting that similar discrepancies were observed in the results of U.S. 
and European studies with regards to risk. As the authors suggest, this could be due to 
the fact that diversified European banks have been around for a longer period of time 
and have committed a considerable amount of resources in making diversification 
work. 
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6.3. DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
 
This chapter considers the effect of bank-insurance partnerships on the risk of 
acquiring institutions. In order to get further insight into these risk effects, total risk is 
decomposed into its systematic and unsystematic components. The presence of risk 
shifts is examined for the periods pre- and post-announcement, or the completion of 
the deals, respectively. Finally, a cross section analysis is employed, where the 
contribution of a selection of accounting variables104
The empirical tests in this chapter are carried out in two steps. First, a 
decomposition of the bidding firms’ total risk into systematic and unsystematic risk 
components is employed, in order to examine the possible changes in each of these 
risk categories between pre- and post-announcement/completion periods. A 
methodological framework that suits the purpose of this chapter, and therefore is 
adopted here, is the decomposition approach used in Aharony, Saunders and Swary 
(
 on total, systematic and 
idiosyncratic risk, is analysed. Given the nature of this empirical investigation, the 
sample of deals employed in the previous chapters is reconsidered in the current 
framework. In particular, 210 bancassurance deals announced between 1990 and 2006 
are used, where 100 cases represent bank bids for insurance companies, 20 cases 
correspond to insurance firms targeting banks and finally 90 cases represent banks 
targeting insurance agents/brokers. 
Individual daily stock prices for each acquiring institution and daily prices for the 
index where each bidder is traded are collected from Thomson Datastream, for a 
period of 251 trading days before and 250 trading days after, relative to each 
announcement/deal completion. Logarithmic returns are then calculated for each stock 
and index. Finally, accounting variables for the second-step cross section analysis are 
obtained from the Thomson Financial database and consist of year-end financial 
statement data for the periods before and after the announcement – completion of the 
deals, respectively. 
1988) and Yourougou (1990). Such a framework is used to express the equities’ total 
risk as the sum of systematic and unsystematic components. The mathematical 
formulation of the equities’ decomposition of total risk takes the following form: 
 
                                                 
104 These variables are designed to capture the effects of diversification, risk, profitability and size, 
before and after the bancassurance announcements and deal completions. 
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where 2
iR
σ  is total risk, 2 2
i mM R
β σ is the market component of total risk and 2
iε
σ  is the 
idiosyncratic risk component for each firm in the sample. For each sample subset105 
and relevant period, total risk is defined as the average variance of all stock returns, 
while market risk is defined as the average of the individual market risk components. 
The market risk beta coefficients and the idiosyncratic risk components for each firm 
are obtained by employing equation (6.2) for each company in the selected sample 
subset. The betas are then squared and plugged in equation (6.1), while the average 
residual variance is used as a measure of idiosyncratic risk106
,, ,
,
i i ti t M M i t
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. 
 
                                                                                           (6.2) 
 
where, ,i tR  is the return of stock i at time t, α is the intercept, iM the market 
coefficient, 
,i tM
R  the return of market index i at time t and ,i t  the error term with the 
usual properties. The above equations are estimated for the pre-announcement period 
(day -250, day -1) and the post-announcement period (day +1, day +250) separately. 
As a robustness check measure, the estimations are also employed using the pre- and 
post-deal completion periods. 
The second stage of the empirical analysis assesses the determinants of bidder risk 
before and after the announcement/completion of bank-insurance mergers using 
cross-sectional data107
                                                 
105 The sample of deals is separated into four main subsets. The subset containing all deals excluding 
those between banks and insurance agencies (All deals), the subset containing bank bids for 
insurance companies (Bank-Insurance), the subset containing Insurance company bids for banks 
(Insure-Banking), and finally the subset comprising of bank bids for insurance agencies (Bank-
Insurance agency). 
106 Given that 
. Specifically, this involves an OLS regression of the total, 
systematic and unsystematic risk estimates on accounting variables. The analytical 
specification of the model is of the following general form: 
 
,i tM
R  and ,i t  in equation (6.2) are orthogonal by construction, equation (6.1) is derived 
by taking the respective variances in equation (6.2). The derivation of this can be found in appendix 
E. 
107 It is important to note here that due to the unavailability of insurance company data on Thomson 
Financial, the sample of insurance companies that bid for banks is not included in the cross section 
analysis. 
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Y X                                                                                                                 (6.3) 
 
where, Y represents the endogenous variables of the models which can be total risk (
2
iR
σ ), market beta (β) and unsystematic risk ( 2
iε
σ ); X is a vector of predetermined 
exogenous factors; β is a vector of parameters to be estimated; and ε is the error term 
with the usual properties. 
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first time a risk decomposition framework 
is employed in order to assess possible changes in total risk and its market and 
idiosyncratic components, caused by bancassurance deal announcements. In addition, 
this is also the first time a cross sectional framework is employed – within the context 
of bank-insurance mergers – with the aim of examining the relationship between risk 
components and a number of accounting proxies as well as possible shifts in the 
former relationships, before and after the deals’ announcement and completion. 
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6.4. EMPIRICAL FINDINGS 
6.4.1. RISK DECOMPOSITION 
 
This section attempts to gauge the impact of bancassurance merger announcements 
on the risk profiles of acquiring institutions. In particular, the presence of shifts in 
total, market and unsystematic risk before and after the deal announcements and 
completions is evaluated. First, the results from all bank-insurance deal 
announcements are presented and analysed. Second, bank-driven deals and insurance-
driven deals are isolated and examined independently in order to assess any possible 
variations in risk adjustments before and after these events, respectively. Finally, the 
results from deals where the target is an insurance agent/broker are assessed. The 
distinction between deals where the target is an insurance company vs. those where 
the target is an insurance agent/broker follows the structure of the previous empirical 
chapters108
Boyd, Graham and Hewitt, 1993
. In particular, the literature on the interface between bank and insurance 
companies points to significant differences in the risk-return profiles of banks when 
they combine with insurance agencies/brokers, as opposed to combining with 
insurance firms ( ; Nurullah and Staikouras, 2008). 
Failing to differentiate between deals where the target is an insurance underwriter – 
exposed to underwriting risks – and deals where the target is and insurance 
agent/broker – where underwriting risk is not present – could lead to unrealistic or 
biased results. Given that the market measures of risk are expected to vary across 
combinations offering distinct risk-return profiles, bank bids for insurance companies 
and those for insurance agencies are separated, while the results are presented in 
isolation, respectively. 
Table 6.1 contains the results of the risk decomposition for all acquiring 
institutions in bancassurance deal announcements. Panel A presents the 
decomposition of total return risk of acquiring firms in the period before the deal 
announcement, while panel B deals with the risk decomposition for the period 
following the deals’ announcement. The post-announcement changes in the risk and 
other variables are presented in panel C. The variables/statistics are presented in the 
first column, while each of the subsequent columns deals with the results from the 
different sample subsets, as analysed above. 
                                                 
108 See section 4 in chapter 5. 
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Table 6.1. Decomposition of total return risk of acquiring institutions (announcement) 
 All Deals Bank-insurance deals 
Insure-banking 
deals 
Bank-insurance 
agency deals 
Panel A: period before announcement (day -250 to day -1) 
σ2Ri 4.007 3.985 4.130 3.852 
 (100%) (100%) (100%) (100%) 
2 2
Rmβ σ  1.427 1.316 2.052 0.646 
 (35.62%) (33.04%) (49.68%) (16.78%) 
2
iεσ  2.580 2.668 2.078 3.206 
 (64.38%) (66.96%) (50.32%) (83.22%) 
  0.819 0.802 0.911 0.589 
  0.423 0.417 0.459 0.386 
iR  0.041% 0.041% 0.041% 0.042% 
mR  0.015% 0.014% 0.017% 0.008% 
2
Rmσ  1.646 1.613 1.832 1.536 
Panel B: period after announcement (day +1 to day +250) 
σ2Ri 4.080 3.834 5.470 3.729 
 (100%) (100%) (100%) (100%) 
2 2
Rmβ σ  1.506 1.239 3.012 0.743 
 (36.91%) (32.32%) (55.05%) (19.93%) 
2
iεσ  2.574 2.595 2.459 2.986 
 (63.09%) (67.68%) (44.95%) (80.07%) 
  0.857 0.846 0.922 0.704 
  0.386 0.369 0.480 0.491 
iR  0.033% 0.036% 0.019% 0.039% 
mR  0.025% 0.026% 0.017% 0.028% 
2
Rmσ  1.721 1.669 2.015 1.375 
Panel C: Changes in risk pre- and post-announcement1 
Δσ2Ri 0.073 -0.151 1.340 -0.123 
% change 1.83% -3.79% 32.45% -3.19% 
2 2
Rmβ σ∆  0.079 -0.077 0.959 0.097 
% change 5.51% -5.87% 46.76% 15.03% 
2
iεσ∆  -0.005 -0.074 0.381 -0.220 
% change -0.21% -2.77% 18.32% -6.86% 
  0.038 0.043 0.010 0.115a 
% change 4.69% 5.41% 1.14% 19.60% 
iR  -0.008% -0.005% -0.022% -0.003% 
% change -19.15% -13.19% -53.57% -6.67% 
2
Rmσ∆  0.075 0.056 0.184 -0.161 
% change 4.58% 3.49% 10.02% -10.46% 
The table presents the shift in relative importance of risk factors composing total bank bidder return risk before and after bank-
insurance partnership announcements. The total sample consists of 210 bancassurance deal announcements between 1990 and 
2006. The first column presents the risk measures and statistics while each of the subsequent columns contain the results from the 
different samples analysed. Specifically, the sample of all deals includes 120 bancassurance deals, excluding deals where the 
targets are insurance agencies. The sample of bank-insurance deals includes 100 cases where banks bid for insurance companies, 
whereas the sample of insure-banking deals contains 20 cases of insurance company bids for banks. Finally, the sample of bank-
insurance agency deals consists of 90 cases where banks bid for insurance agencies/brokers. Panel A presents the results from the 
pre-announcement period, while panel B presents the corresponding results from the post-announcement period. Finally, panel C 
presents the differences in the risk measures before and after the announcements. All the risk measures have been calculated 
using the models in equations 3.1 and 3.2. The variance terms have been multiplied by 104. 
σ2Ri is total risk, β2σ2Rm is the systematic risk component, σ2εi is the idiosyncratic risk component. All risk measures are averaged 
across firms. β is the average beta, while σβ the standard deviation of betas. Ri is the average company return, Rm the average 
market return and σ2Rm is the average variance of market returns. Δs in panel C represent changes in the respective variables. 
1 Negative values indicate reduction in the risk or other measures, while positive values indicate a respective increase. a/b/c 
denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Looking at the second column that presents the results for all bancassurance deals 
excluding those where the targets are insurance agencies, some interesting statistics 
are observed. Starting with the mean portfolio return ( iR ) for all bidders, the pre-
announcement figure is 0.041% and drops to 0.033% in the post-announcement 
period. The mean market return ( mR ) on the other hand, increases from 0.015% to 
0.025% in the period following the announcements, while its variance increases 0.075 
from 1.646 to 1.721, or by 4.58% (panel C). In both cases, the difference in the mean 
and variance of returns before and after the events is statistically insignificant. The 
results in relation to the variance are consistent with Fields, Fraser and Kolari (2007b) 
who do not find any significant changes in the risk measures of all acquirers before 
and after bancassurance deals. Furthermore, although the mean market beta ( ) 
across the sample of companies increased from 0.819 to 0.857, or by 4.69% (panel C), 
its standard deviation has dropped from 0.423 to 0.386. Even though the difference in 
the means and variance of betas before and after the announcements is insignificant, 
the fact that the average market beta increases, is in line with expectations; as markets 
become more and more concentrated through mergers and acquisitions (M&A) and 
the creation of financial conglomerates, the latters’ equities will tend to approach the 
total market basket, and therefore their betas will be closer to one. In addition, it is 
well documented in the academic literature that banks that rely more on non-interest 
sources of income, have systematically higher market betas and therefore bear higher 
systematic risk (Allen and Jagtiani, 2000; Baele, De Jonghe and Vander Vennet, 
2007; Stiroh, 2006). Consistent with that notion, the newly formed entities will also 
exhibit higher systematic risk exposures, following bancassurance partnerships. 
Shifting the focus to total risk and its components, it is evident that bidder total return 
risk (σ2Ri) in the period before the announcements (panel A) is 4.007. The systematic 
risk component for this period accounts for 35.62% of the bank total portfolio risk, 
while the firm specific risk component accounts for 64.38%. Post-announcement 
(panel B), the total risk figure slightly increases to 4.080, or by 1.83% (panel C), 
triggered by the slight increase in the market risk component ( 2 2Rmβ σ ) from 1.427 to 
1.506 (panels A, B, respectively), or by 5.51% (panel C). Looking at the unsystematic 
risk component ( 2iεσ ), the figure marginally decreases after the announcement, from 
2.580 to 2.574 (panels A, B, respectively), or by 0.21% (panel C). Both changes in 
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market risk and idiosyncratic risk are statistically insignificant. Finally, there is no 
significant shift in the relative importance of market and idiosyncratic components 
(percentages in brackets, panels A and B). Specifically, after the deal announcements, 
market risk accounts for 36.91% of total risk, an increase of about 1.30%, whereas 
firm specific risk accounts for 63.09%, which amounts to a marginal decrease of 
about 1.30%, both with respect to the relevant figures from the pre-announcement 
period (panel A). The results from the risk decomposition of the sample involving all 
bank-insurance partnerships are largely inconclusive. One explanation might be that 
these partnership announcements do not significantly alter the risk profiles of these 
institutions, as reflected by market data. 
An alternative possibility might be that the risk effects from bank driven deals and 
insurance driven deals are diametrically different and, in effect, cancel out each other 
when a mixed sample is considered. Staikouras (2006) uses a theoretical framework 
to explore the distinct dynamics affecting banks and insurance companies, and 
suggests that banks are bigger, financially stronger and experience stronger brand 
recognition than insurers. He also points out a number of cultural differences between 
the two, both at the corporate and retail level. Such differences can affect investor 
expectations, particularly with respect to the institution that takes the lead in 
bancassurance partnerships. For example, investors might expect that the aggressive 
(non-aggressive) behaviour of insurers (bankers) with respect to sales, will affect the 
new entity in a negative (positive) manner in terms of their return and risk. From the 
perspective of returns, the above argument is supported in chapter four, where results 
show that the market clearly places more weight on bank driven deals as opposed to 
insurance led partnerships109
Table 6.1
. It is therefore possible that there are differences in the 
risk responses of acquirers, depending on the nature of their operations. As such, the 
sample of bank bidders and insurance bidders is separated in order to test whether 
there are such variations in the risk responses following bancassurance partnership 
announcements. The results are presented under columns three and four of . 
A first look at the returns of the two sets of acquirers reveals that their mean returns 
are very close110
                                                 
109 When insurers take the lead in a bank-insurance partnership, this is known as an Assurebank 
operation, where the insurer underwrites the products which are then marketed by the bank. 
110 The mean returns of the two sets of acquirers appear to be equal on the table due to rounding up. In 
reality they are not equal but are very close. Further information is available upon request. 
 during the pre-announcement period (panel A), yet the two diverge 
in the period following the announcements (panel B). Specifically, the mean portfolio 
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return of bank bidders drops slightly from 0.041% to 0.036%, while the respective 
return of insurance bidders drops considerably to 0.019%. In line with expectations, 
the average betas of both portfolios increase slightly post announcement, but the 
changes are statistically insignificant. In addition, while the variance of the betas 
decreases post announcement for bank driven deals, the opposite is observed for 
insurance driven deals, yet both changes are statistically insignificant. The results on 
market betas are consistent with Fields, Fraser and Kolari (2007b) who do not find 
any significant changes in the risk measures of insurance bidders pre- and post-
merger. 
Moving to the risk decomposition part of the analysis, some very interesting results 
are observed. It is evident that total return risk decreases from 3.985 (panel A) to 
3.834 (panel B) for bank bidders, and substantially increases from 4.130 (panel A) to 
5.470 (panel B) for insurance bidders. The former represents a 3.79% fall in total risk 
for bank acquirers, and a 32.45% rise in the respective figure for insurance acquirers 
(panel C). Nevertheless, both changes are statistically insignificant. Shifting the focus 
to the systematic risk components, the figure for bank acquirers drops from 1.316 to 
1.239, (panels A, B, respectively), or by 5.87% (panel C). On the contrary, the same 
figure for insurance bidders rises by 46.76% (panel C) from 2.052 to 3.012. However, 
once more both changes of the systematic risk components of bank and insurance 
bidders are statistically insignificant. Finally, while the idiosyncratic risk component 
of bank bidders drops from 2.668 to 2.595 (panels A, B, respectively), the equivalent 
figure for insurance bidders increases from 2.078 to 2.459, or by 18.32%, yet changes 
are statistically insignificant. 
A closer look at bank bidders reveals that the contribution of the systematic 
component to total risk drops about one percentage point, while the contribution of 
the idiosyncratic component increases by almost 1%. Similar observations can be 
made for the insurance bidders, where the contribution of the idiosyncratic component 
decreases by about 5%, at the expense of the contribution of the systematic 
component, which increases by about the same amount. Although banks and 
insurance firms both operate as financial intermediaries, their respective risk-return 
profiles are distinct, given that the latter largely depend upon the structure of their 
assets and liabilities. Generally, insurance companies’ focus their asset reserves at the 
longer end of the maturity spectrum in order to match their long-term liabilities, while 
banks generally hold short-term liabilities and long-term assets. The latter mismatch 
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causes the so-called negative gap in the banks’ asset-liability structure, as their short-
term liabilities are greater than their short-term assets. The above argument is verified 
when the decomposition results of bank and insurance bidders are put into 
comparison. Irrespective of the risk shifts before and after the announcements, it is 
clear that insurance companies are generally riskier than banks (higher total risk 
figures) and at the same time are more exposed to market risk than banks. 
Specifically, before the announcements, their systematic risk component accounts for 
49.68% of total risk, whereas the respective figure for banks stands at 33.04%. On the 
other hand, banks bear higher firm-specific risk than insurance companies, with the 
figures being 66.96% and 50.32%, respectively. Similar conclusions can be drawn 
from the figures of the post-announcement phase, where the contribution of 
unsystematic risk stands at 67.68% for banks and 44.95% for insurance companies. 
The recent, 2007-2009 financial crisis provides further support for the above figures, 
with more banks than insurance companies facing financial distress and receiving 
capital injections. What is more, the fact that banks exhibit higher idiosyncratic risk 
may provide further evidence on why insurance-driven bancassurance deals expose 
insurers to higher risk after the announcements; the market might be taking into 
account the addition to the firm-specific risk factor that will be caused by integrating 
with a bank. 
The differences in the risk-return profiles of banks integrating with insurance 
companies as opposed to combining with insurance agencies have been adeptly 
analysed in the previous chapters111
Table 6.1
. Following the same notion, the results from deals 
where the targets are insurance agencies are separately presented in column four of 
. The results show an insignificant decrease in the mean return from 0.042% 
to 0.039% and a large increase in their beta coefficient from 0.589 to 0.704 (panels A, 
B, respectively) or by 19.6% (panel C), which is statistically significant at 1%. 
On the other hand, the decomposition of risks reveals some interesting results. 
Unlike banks that bid for insurance companies, the contribution of the systematic risk 
component of banks that bid for insurance agencies is at unusually low levels 
(16.78%), as opposed to the contribution of the idiosyncratic factor which is very high 
(83.22%). Even though there is a marginal shift in the contributions of each factor to 
total risk following the announcements, it seems that these banks bear very high 
                                                 
111 See chapter 4 or chapter 5. 
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exposures to firm-specific risk. One explanation for this outcome might be the size of 
these banks, which tend to be small in terms of capitalization and assets; while 
another justification for this might be that riskier banks tend to bid for insurance 
agencies. It is well documented in the academic literature that, when it comes to risk, 
insurance agents/brokers are the best candidates for bank expansion, since they do not 
affect it (Heggestad, 1975; Nurullah and Staikouras, 2008). Shifting the focus on the 
changes in the risk attributes before and after the announcements as evidenced on 
panel C, it seems that bank deals with insurance agencies lead to a marginal reduction 
in total risk (3.19%) and idiosyncratic risk (6.86%), and a considerable increase in the 
systematic risk component (15.03%). Nevertheless, all changes are statistically 
insignificant. 
At this stage, one might argue that an analysis based on the merger announcement 
cannot fully reflect the risk of the merging institutions before and after the actual 
merger. In order to further investigate that, and as a robustness check, the risk 
decomposition has also been carried out on the basis of the deal completion. The 
results are presented in Table 6.2. Following the structure of Table 6.1, panel A 
presents the decomposition of total return risk of acquiring firms in the period before 
the deal completion, while panel B deals with the risk decomposition for the period 
following the deals’ completion. The post-completion changes in the risk and other 
variables are presented in panel C. The variables/statistics are presented in the first 
column, while each of the subsequent columns presents the results from the four 
different sample subsets. 
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Table 6.2. Decomposition of total return risk of acquiring institutions (completion) 
 All Deals Bank-insurance deals 
Insure-banking 
deals 
Bank-insurance 
agency deals 
Panel A: period before merger (day -250 to day -1) 
σ2Ri 3.887 3.766 4.559 3.796 
 (100%) (100%) (100%) (100%) 
2 2
Rmβ σ  1.341 1.162 2.341 0.632 
 (34.50%) (30.86%) (51.35%) (16.65%) 
2
iεσ  2.546 2.604 2.218 3.164 
 (65.50%) (69.14%) (48.65%) (83.35%) 
  0.811 0.786 0.947 0.598 
  0.419 0.409 0.462 0.398 
iR  0.043% 0.045% 0.032% 0.039% 
mR  0.018% 0.016% 0.028% 0.009% 
2
Rmσ  1.594 1.555 1.812 1.537 
Panel B: period after merger (day +1 to day +250) 
σ2Ri 4.087 3.804 5.668 3.647 
 (100%) (100%) (100%) (100%) 
2 2
Rmβ σ  1.624 1.285 3.521 0.758 
 (39.74%) (33.78%) (62.12%) (20.78%) 
2
iεσ  2.463 2.519 2.147 2.889 
 (60.26%) (66.22%) (37.38%) (79.22%) 
  0.864 0.853 0.927 0.730 
  0.413 0.382 0.565 0.490 
iR  0.033% 0.037% 0.006% 0.040% 
mR  0.023% 0.024% 0.015% 0.027% 
2
Rmσ  1.726 1.651 2.146 1.336 
Panel C: Changes in risk pre- and post-merger1 
Δσ2Ri 0.200 0.038 1.109 -0.149 
% change 5.15% 1.01% 24.33% -3.93% 
2 2
Rmβ σ∆  0.283
c 0.123 1.180 0.126c 
% change 21.10% 10.59% 50.41% 19.94% 
2
iεσ∆  -0.083 -0.085 -0.071 -0.275 
% change -3.26% -3.26% -3.20% -8.69% 
  0.053c 0.067b -0.020 0.132a 
% change 6.54% 8.52% -2.11% 22.09% 
iR  -0.010% -0.008% -0.026% 0.001% 
% change -23.26% -17.78% -81.25% 2.56% 
2
Rmσ∆  0.132 0.096 0.334 -0.201 
% change 8.28% 6.17% 18.43% -13.08% 
The table presents the shift in relative importance of risk factors composing total bank bidder return risk before and after the 
completion of bank-insurance partnerships. The total sample consists of 210 bancassurance deal announcements between 1990 
and 2006. The first column presents the risk measures and statistics while each of the subsequent columns contain the results 
from the different samples analysed. Specifically, the sample of all deals includes 120 bancassurance deals, excluding deals 
where the targets are insurance agencies. The sample of bank-insurance deals includes 100 cases where banks bid for insurance 
companies, whereas the sample of insure-banking deals contains 20 cases of insurance company bids for banks. Finally, the 
sample of bank-insurance agency deals consists of 90 cases where banks bid for insurance agencies/brokers. Panel A presents the 
results from the pre-completion period, while panel B presents the corresponding results from the post-completion period. 
Finally, panel C presents the differences in the risk measures before and after the completion of the deals. All the risk measures 
have been calculated using the models in equations 3.1 and 3.2. The variance terms have been multiplied by 104. 
σ2Ri is total risk, β2σ2Rm is the systematic risk component, σ2εi is the idiosyncratic risk component. All risk measures are averaged 
across firms. β is the average beta, while σβ the standard deviation of betas. Ri is the average company return, Rm the average 
market return and σ2Rm is the average variance of market returns. Δs in panel C represent changes in the respective variables. 
1 Negative values indicate reduction in the risk or other measures, while positive values indicate a respective increase. a/b/c 
denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Similar to the previous analysis, the mean portfolio return ( iR ) for all bidders 
drops from 0.043% to 0.033%, while the market return ( mR ) rises from 0.018% to 
0.023%, between the pre- and post-merger periods. The variance of the market return 
( 2Rmσ ) on the other hand, increases by 8.28% (panel C), from 1.594 to 1.726 (panels A, 
B, respectively). Further statistical tests however, indicate that all the above changes 
are insignificant. Looking at the betas of acquirers in bancassurance partnerships, it is 
once more evident that the beta increases following the merger or acquisition. This 
represents a 6.24% rise (panel C), which is statistically significant at the 10% level. 
This is consistent with the results from the announcements-based risk decomposition, 
and gives further support to the previous argument that mergers and acquisitions in 
the financial services industry, the creation of financial conglomerates and increased 
diversification leads to higher exposures of the firms involved to changes in market 
sentiment, or economy wide shocks (Baele, De Jonghe and Vander Vennet, 2007). 
Looking at panel C, the decomposition results reveal a 5.15% rise in total risk (σ2Ri), a 
21.10% rise in the systematic risk component ( 2 2Rmβ σ ) and finally a 3.26% reduction 
in the idiosyncratic risk component ( 2iεσ ). Although the shifts in the risk figures are in 
this case similar to those reported in Table 6.1, the rise in systematic risk here is 
statistically significant at 10%, and enhances the validity of the above argument. 
Furthermore, the results with respect to the contribution of each factor to total risk 
remain relatively similar to those reported in Table 6.1. 
When bank driven deals are separated from insurance driven deals, the results 
indicate relative increases of 1.01% and 10.59% in total and systematic risk, 
respectively, and a decrease of 3.26% in idiosyncratic risk for banks merging with 
insurance companies (panel C, column 3). Although the change in the first two risk 
elements has a different direction than the one reported in the decomposition based on 
announcements (Table 6.1, panel C, column 3), the changes here are statistically 
insignificant as well. An interesting difference emerges when the beta is considered, 
where figures indicate a statistically significant rise of 8.52%, following the merger. 
For insurance companies merging with, or acquiring banks, the results are relatively 
similar to those reported in Table 6.1. The only notable divergence comes from the 
idiosyncratic risk figure which exhibits an increase of 18.32%, yet statistical tests 
indicate that the changes are insignificant. 
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Finally, when bank-insurance agency deals are considered (column 5), acquiring 
banks exhibit a statistically insignificant reduction of 3.93% in total risk, a 19.94% 
increase in systematic risk, which is statistically significant at the 10% level, and an 
insignificant reduction of 8.69% in unsystematic risk. In line with expectations as well 
as with results presented in Table 6.1, the beta of banks merging with, or acquiring 
insurance agencies, shoots up 22.09%, a shift that is statistically significant at the 1% 
level. 
In summary, the overall results indicate that bancassurance deals do not 
significantly affect the total and idiosyncratic risk of acquiring institutions, per se. 
Nonetheless, the results provide evidence that the exposure of banks to system wide 
shocks is increasing following bancassurance partnerships. This is evident when one 
considers the rises in betas and in the systematic risk components, especially after the 
actual mergers or acquisitions. In addition, the comparison of banks and insurance 
companies shows that the two have distinct exposures to systematic and idiosyncratic 
risks and this divergence is linked to the distinct asset-liability structures in their 
balance sheets. What is more, banks that bid for insurance agencies are found to be 
highly exposed to firm-specific risk and scantily exposed to systematic risk. 
One possible explanation for the above is that bancassurance offers institutions an 
opportunity to rebalance their risk exposures. Specifically, bancassurance seems to be 
used as a mechanism to diversify away firm specific risk at the expense of a higher 
systematic risk exposure. This is evident in both tables where the contribution of 
unsystematic risk to total risk is in most cases declining following the 
announcement/completion, and is followed by an analogous rise in the contribution of 
systematic risk components. Finally, the fact that banks that bid for insurance 
agencies exhibit far greater exposures on firm-specific risk can be related to either the 
size of these banks, which tend to be small in terms of capitalization and assets, or to 
the possibility that riskier banks tend to bid for insurance agencies in an attempt to 
diversify.  
6.4.2. DETERMINANTS OF RISK 
 
This section builds upon the risk decomposition results by attempting to identify 
the factors that are related to the market based risk estimates as well as assessing the 
effect of the bank-insurance mergers on the aforementioned relationships. More 
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specifically, all measures of risk (total, market and idiosyncratic) are regressed on a 
variety of accounting variables in an attempt to gauge the relationship between the 
former and proxies of diversification, risk, profitability, leverage and size, as reflected 
on their equity returns. Not only that, possible shifts in those relationships before and 
after the bancassurance partnerships are examined by using this technique on a pre-
and post-announcement/completion basis. In order to examine the relationship 
between the aforementioned proxies and risk, as well as possible changes in that 
relationship following the deals, the following model is estimated: 
 
, 1 , 2 , 3 4 5j i k i h i i i i iY DIV LL ROA LEV Size                                            (6.4) 
 
where, ,j iY  is each of the market based measures of bank risk (systematic risk, 
measured by the market beta, β, idiosyncratic risk, 2iεσ , or total risk, σ
2Ri); DIV is each 
of the two proxies for diversification (the percentage of non-interest income to total 
operating income or the percentage of loans to total assets); LL is each of the three 
proxies for loan related risk (percentage of non-performing loans to total assets, 
percentage of provision for loan losses to total assets, or percentage of loan losses to 
total assets); ROA, LEV and Size are control variables that capture firm profitability 
(return on assets), leverage (ratio of total assets to common equity), and size (natural 
logarithm of total assets); and finally, i , is the error term with the usual properties. It 
is important to note that equation (6.4) is employed on a pre- and post-announcement, 
as well as on a pre-and post-completion basis. 
Table 6.3 presents the results of market beta regressions before and after the 
announcements of bank-insurance deals. Panel A presents the results from the pre-
announcement regressions while panel B presents the respective results for the post-
announcement period. The variables are presented in column one, while each of the 
subsequent columns (numbered 1 to 6) contain the results from each of the different 
model specifications. In particular, columns 1 to 3 present the regressions where non-
interest income share is used as a proxy for revenue diversification, while columns 4 
to 6 present the regressions where the ratio of loans to total assets is used as a proxy 
for revenue diversification. Within the two subsets, the risk measures vary, producing 
an additional three sets of regressions. 
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Table 6.3. Market beta regressions of bank-insurance deals 
       
Panel A: Period before announcement 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Constant 0.394 0.398 0.472 0.403 0.501 0.740 
 (4.64)a (4.62)a (2.93)a (2.38)b (2.32)b (2.70)a 
Non-interest income share 0.790 0.773 1.057    
 (4.72)a (4.40)a (3.48)a    
Loans to total assets    0.226 0.205 -0.030 
    (0.96) (0.84) -(0.10) 
Non-performing loans to total 
assets   -4.074   -4.486 
   -(0.65)   -(0.74) 
Provision for loan losses to total 
assets -2.679   -1.324   
 -(0.28)   -(0.13)   
Loan losses to total assets  -0.013   0.031  
  -(0.44)   (0.63)  
ROA -0.069 -0.077 -0.098 -0.070 -0.064 -0.114 
 -(1.16) -(1.12) -(1.01) -(1.16) -(1.37) -(1.12) 
Leverage 0.013 0.013 0.013 0.014 0.014 0.014 
 (3.87)a (3.87)a (3.41)a (4.02)a (4.05)a (3.37)a 
Firm size 0.157 0.157 0.149 0.160 0.159 0.166 
 (8.52)a (8.52)a (6.06)a (9.34)a (9.24)a (7.78)a 
N 85 85 66 85 85 66 
Adjusted R-squared 0.49 0.46 0.45 0.46 0.46 0.45 
F-statistic 15.10 15.14 11.61 15.31 15.41 11.68 
Panel B: Period after announcement 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Constant 0.877 0.869 0.913 0.733 0.777 0.667 
 (5.27)a (5.79)a (5.00)a (2.84)a (3.29)a (2.74)a 
Non-interest income share 0.262 0.294 0.704    
 (0.99) (1.12) (1.69)c    
Loans to total assets    0.192 0.167 0.212 
    (0.68) (0.59) (0.66) 
Non-performing loans to total 
assets   -17.606   -16.206 
   -(3.28)a   -(2.96)a 
Provision for loan losses to total 
assets -8.413   8.732   
 -(0.77)   (0.75)   
Loan losses to total assets  -0.054   0.046  
  -(0.95)   (0.77)  
ROA -0.095 -0.093 -0.124 -0.082 -0.083 -0.113 
 -(1.83)c -(1.87)c -(1.14) -(1.53) -(1.56) -(0.96) 
Leverage 0.002 0.002 -0.002 0.003 0.003 0.000 
 (0.72) (0.76) -(0.28) (1.01) (1.00) (0.02) 
Firm size 0.112 0.114 0.115 0.115 0.114 0.126 
 (4.53)a (4.58)a (4.22)a (4.71)a (4.80)a (4.66)a 
N 73 73 55 73 73 55 
Adjusted R-squared 0.17 0.17 0.22 0.17 0.17 0.23 
F-statistic 3.90 3.94 4.11 3.99 3.99 4.14 
The table presents OLS regressions of bank market beta, β, on measures of revenue and asset diversification, risk proxies, 
profitability and size variables, before and after the announcement of bank-insurance deals. Panel A presents the results from the 
pre-announcement regressions while Panel B presents the results from the post-announcement regressions. The sample consists 
of 100 bancassurance deal announcements between 1990 and 2006. The independent variables are presented in the first column, 
while columns 1 to 6 contain the results from different regressions. In particular, columns 1 to 3 present the regressions where 
non-interest income share is used as a proxy for revenue diversification, while columns 4 to 6 present the regressions where the 
ratio of loans to total assets is used as a proxy for revenue diversification. Within the two subsets, the risk measures vary, 
producing three sets of regressions. In all models a number of bank-specific characteristics are employed as control variables 
(ROA, leverage, firm size). In cases where independent variables are correlated with one another, auxiliary regressions are 
employed in order to make them orthogonal. Non-interest income share is the ratio of non-interest income to total operating 
income, ROA is the ratio of net income to total assets, Leverage is the ratio of total assets to common equity, and Firm size is the 
natural logarithm of total assets. The rest of the variables are self explanatory. All balance sheet and income statement variables 
for the pre- and post-announcement regressions are obtained at the year end prior to and after the announcement, respectively. 
The figures in brackets indicate t-values (White errors), while a/b/c denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10%, 
respectively. 
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Looking at the pre-announcement period (panel A) it is evident that there is a 
strong positive relationship between the ratio of non-interest income to total operating 
income and the beta of the firms (models 1 to 3). In effect, banks which are more 
reliant on non-interest sources of income have higher exposures in market wide 
shocks and consequently higher market betas. This is consistent with Baele, De 
Jonghe and Vander Vennet (2007), who report similar results in the context of bank 
diversification, but not within the context of bank-insurance mergers as well as in line 
with Allen and Jagtiani (2000) who find that nonbank activities increase bank 
systematic risk. It is notable that none of the proxies for loan risk demonstrate any sort 
of explanatory power with respect to bank market betas, prior to the deal 
announcement. Among the control variables, leverage shows a positive association 
with betas. The economic intuition behind this result is that riskier firms (high 
leverage) tend to have systematically higher betas than unlevered firms. In addition, 
firm size shows a strong positive relationship with betas. This is in line with 
expectations, given that, as discussed earlier, larger firms tend to capture a greater 
share in the total market basket, and hence, have systematically higher betas. Finally, 
looking at models 4 to 6, the results show that there is no relationship between the 
alternative proxy for diversification (loans to total assets) and betas. Shifting the focus 
to the post-announcement period (panel B), some interesting results can be observed. 
First, the relationship between non-interest income share and betas becomes 
insignificant, with the exception of model 3, where it is marginally significant. One 
plausible explanation for this might be that insurance activities bring about the desired 
diversification effects. Specifically, it is possible that the additional non-interest 
income that comes from insurance activities helps lower the systematic risk of banks 
and this is reflected in the insignificant relationship of non-interest income share and 
betas following the deal announcements. This outcome also sheds additional light on 
the results in the previous section, where betas are found to increase post 
announcement. The increase in betas is not related to the increase in non-interest 
income share coming from insurance activities per se, but is related to other factors, 
such as increased size. Second, the relationship between the ratio of non-performing 
loans to total assets and betas becomes negative and significant following the 
announcements (model 3). The economic rationale for this negative relationship is 
that this ratio can be interpreted as an ex-post measure of the actual losses from 
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lending activities (Berger, Hasan and Zhou, 2010). In effect, this ratio represents a 
firm specific measure of risk, and firms with a higher (lower) ratio of non-performing 
loans will inevitably bear greater (lower) exposure to idiosyncratic risk. As a result, 
the stocks of these firms are less (more) exposed to market wide shocks, hence the 
negative relation of this ratio with betas. Third, there is a negative relation between 
ROA and bank market betas following the merger announcement, which is significant 
at 10% (models 1, 2). One explanation for this outcome might come from the relation 
between ROA and leverage. Holding ROE constant, the higher the leverage, the lower 
the ROA and vice versa. Therefore, a negative relationship between the ROA and 
market betas can be explained if lower ROA stemming from higher leverage leads to 
higher risk exposure, and as previously discussed, higher systematic risk. Finally in 
order to check the robustness of the results, the beta regressions are also estimated 
using the pre- and post- deal completion dates as a benchmark. The results remain 
quantitatively similar and are presented in Table E.3 in the appendix. 
Table 6.4 presents the corresponding results of idiosyncratic risk regressions before 
and after the announcements for bank-insurance deals, and follows the same structure 
as in Table 6.3. 
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Table 6.4. Ιdiosyncratic risk regressions of bank-insurance deals 
All betas have been multiplied by 104 
Panel A: Period before announcement 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Constant 3.950 4.060 4.660 4.880 4.750 3.800 
 (5.36)a (5.38)a (3.66)a (3.87)a (3.88)a (2.49)b 
Non-interest income share -3.730 -3.690 -6.160    
 -(2.15)b -(2.08)b -(1.93)c    
Loans to total assets    -2.490 -2.620 -1.090 
    -(1.33) -(1.47) -(0.48) 
Non-performing loans to total 
assets   -27.660   -25.310 
   -(0.99)   -(0.97) 
Provision for loan losses to total 
assets 63.580   49.190   
 (0.82)   (0.60)   
Loan losses to total assets  0.165   -0.078  
  (0.73)   -(0.26)  
ROA 0.166 0.204 0.220 0.228 0.283 0.383 
 (0.54) (0.62) (0.48) (0.82) (1.36) (1.02) 
Leverage -0.032 -0.033 -0.034 -0.036 -0.037 -0.030 
 -(1.36) -(1.38) -(0.96) -(1.61) -(1.60) -(0.92) 
Firm size -0.443 -0.434 -0.227 -0.514 -0.498 -0.430 
 -(3.19)a -(3.14)a -(1.43) -(3.76)a -(3.63)a -(3.07)a 
N 85 85 66 85 85 66 
Adjusted R-squared 0.13 0.13 0.11 0.14 0.14 0.08 
F-statistic 3.52 3.43 2.64 3.73 3.70 2.19 
Panel B: Period after announcement 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Constant 0.905 1.420 1.310 4.860 5.890 7.000 
 (0.88) (1.51) (0.89) (1.74) (2.51) (2.92) 
Non-interest income share -0.223 -1.140 -0.849    
 -(0.12) -(0.55) -(0.24)    
Loans to total assets    -4.970 -5.520 -7.020 
    -(1.69)c -(1.99)b -(2.20)b 
Non-performing loans to total 
assets   70.800   40.530 
   (1.89)c   (1.24) 
Provision for loan losses to total 
assets 290.480   184.020   
 (1.60)   (1.00)   
Loan losses to total assets  1.470   0.725  
  (1.83)c   (0.87)  
ROA 0.770 0.670 0.899 0.547 0.492 0.926 
 (1.72)c (1.47) (0.93) (1.18) (1.07) (1.05) 
Leverage -0.012 -0.017 0.039 -0.025 -0.028 0.012 
 -(0.54) -(0.78) (0.69) -(0.99) -(1.13) (0.27) 
Firm size -0.518 -0.553 -0.536 -0.569 -0.596 -0.698 
 -(2.00)b -(2.11)b -(1.80)c -(2.33)b -(2.49)b -(2.57)a 
N 73 73 55 73 73 55 
Adjusted R-squared 0.16 0.15 0.10 0.21 0.19 0.26 
F-statistic 3.67 3.48 2.26 4.81 4.37 4.70 
The table presents OLS regressions of bank idiosyncratic risk, 2 , on measures of revenue and asset diversification, risk proxies, 
profitability and size variables, before and after the announcement of bank-insurance deals. Panel A presents the results from the 
pre-announcement regressions while Panel B presents the results from the post-announcement regressions. The sample consists 
of 100 bancassurance deal announcements between 1990 and 2006. The independent variables are presented in the first column, 
while columns 1 to 6 contain the results from different regressions. In particular, columns 1 to 3 present the regressions where 
non-interest income share is used as a proxy for revenue diversification, while columns 4 to 6 present the regressions where the 
ratio of loans to total assets is used as a proxy for revenue diversification. Within the two subsets, the risk measures vary, 
producing three sets of regressions. In all models a number of bank-specific characteristics are employed as control variables 
(ROA, leverage, firm size). In cases where independent variables are correlated with one another auxiliary regressions are 
employed in order to make them orthogonal. Non-interest income share is the ratio of non-interest income to total operating 
income, ROA is the ratio of net income to total assets, Leverage is the ratio of total assets to common equity, and Firm size is the 
natural logarithm of total assets. The rest of the variables are self explanatory. All balance sheet and income statement variables 
for the pre- and post-announcement regressions are obtained at the year end prior to and after the announcement, respectively. 
The figures in brackets indicate t-values (White errors), while a/b/c denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10%, 
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respectively. 
 
Looking at the results for the pre-announcement period (panel A), the coefficient 
on the non-interest income share reveals a negative and significant relationship 
between the former and idiosyncratic risk. Following the deal announcements (panel 
B), the coefficient becomes statistically insignificant. This is consistent with the 
literature, in that, although diversification in non-interest income sources is expected 
to reduce idiosyncratic risk, overreliance on non-interest income can have the 
opposite effects (Baele, De Jonghe and Vander Vennet, 2007; Stiroh, 2006). In the 
context of bank-insurance deals, results indicate that the additional non-interest 
income coming from insurance does not provide any additional benefit to the 
acquiring banks, in terms of further reducing their idiosyncratic risk exposure. 
Nevertheless, the coefficient on size is negative and significant in all model 
specifications, indicating that size-related diversification benefits are still present, 
something consistent with expectations for too-big-to-fail guarantees, and/or scale 
related synergies. Another explanation might come from Wilson and Williams (2000), 
which show that smaller E.U. banks experience more variable growth than larger 
banks. They suggest that large banks are able to exploit diversification advantages 
through off-balance sheet activities, which can smooth fluctuations in growth. This 
might explain the size sign here, given that, banks that exhibit less volatile growth 
patterns, should bear less idiosyncratic risk. Looking at panel B, some more 
interesting results are evident. In the first model, the coefficient on ROA is positive 
and significant, showing that more profitable companies bear higher idiosyncratic 
exposures after the deal announcement. The economic intuition of this result might be 
that more profitable banks might be relying on more risky sources of income, such as 
risky loans, and especially within the context of bank-insurance deals, insurance 
underwriting. This is verified in academic research, where insurance underwriting is 
found to increase bank risk when actual bank-insurance combinations are considered 
(Nurullah and Staikouras, 2008). In models 2 and 3 the coefficients of the proxies for 
loan risk (ratio of loan losses to total assets and ratio of non-performing loans to total 
assets) exhibit a positive and significant relationship with idiosyncratic risk, 
something in line with expectations. A notable shift in market perceptions, following 
the deal announcements, is observed in models 4 to 6 (panel B). The market measure 
of idiosyncratic risk exhibits a negative relationship with the ratio of loans to total 
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assets. In effect, the additional risk element which might stem from increasing this 
ratio is not priced by the market, perhaps due to the fact that investors expect that the 
latter risk is offset by diversification into the insurance business. This result is 
partially in contrast with Barros, Ferreira and Williams (2007), who report that bigger 
and more diversified E.U. commercial banks are less likely to perform well and more 
likely to perform poorly, as opposed to small and loan-intensive banks. To bring this 
argument to the context of the analysis here, large and diversified banks should 
exhibit inferior performance that would be reflected in a higher idiosyncratic risk 
exposure. Nevertheless, in the sample examined herein, bigger and more diversified 
banks (following the deal) are found to bear lower unsystematic risk. This could be 
due to better performance, the pure effect of diversification, or a combination of both, 
something not directly testable in the present analysis. Looking at Table E.4 in the 
appendix, which corresponds to idiosyncratic risk regressions before and after the 
deals’ completion, the results are relatively similar. The only exceptions are the 
coefficient on leverage before the merger, which is significant (panel A, models 4 and 
5) and the coefficients on ROA and loan losses to total assets after the merger, which 
are insignificant (panel B, models 1 and 2, respectively). If anything, this adds to the 
importance of bancassurance as a diversification tool for banks. 
Moving forward, the results for total risk are presented in Table E.1112
2007
. Total bank 
risk can be decomposed into systematic and unsystematic risk as shown in the 
previous section. As such, the results for total bank risk are driven by both underlying 
components. As anticipated, the coefficients on non-interest income share are 
insignificant for both pre- and post-merger periods. This is expected, given the 
positive relationship between the latter and beta and the corresponding negative 
relationship of the ratio with idiosyncratic risk. In effect, these inverse relationships 
cancel out each other when total risk is considered. This is partially in line with Baele, 
De Jonghe and Vander Vennet ( ), who report an insignificant relationship 
between total risk and non-interest revenue share. Nevertheless, when they allow for 
non-linearity, the relationship becomes negative and significant up to a certain 
threshold (proportion of non-interest income to total operating income), after which, it 
turns to positive113 2006. The results here are in contrast with Stiroh ( ), who reports a 
                                                 
112 In order to conserve space this table is presented in the appendix. 
113 Further tests have been carried out in this chapter to test for non-linearity in the relationship between 
non-interest income share and all risk measures, yet the results were insignificant. 
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strong positive relation between total risk and non-interest income share. The 
coefficients of proxies for loan risk are, as in previous models, positive and 
significant, indicating that the higher the exposure to loan risk, the higher the bank 
total risk. What is more, the alternative proxy for diversification (loans to total assets), 
exhibits a negative relationship with total risk that becomes stronger post 
announcement, perhaps due to the expected diversification benefits from 
bancassurance. Finally, the corresponding results of total risk regressions before and 
after the completion of bank-insurance deals are presented in Table E.5 in the 
appendix, and are consistent with the above results. 
Given the already discussed differences in the risk-return profiles of banks when 
they merge with insurance companies as opposed to combining with insurance 
agencies, this section moves on to analyse the determinants of bank risk before and 
after the announcements of bank acquisitions of insurance agencies. Table 6.5 and 
Table 6.6 present the results of market beta and idiosyncratic risk regressions before 
and after the announcements of bank-insurance agency deals, respectively. Finally 
Table E.2, which is reported in the appendix, contains the results of the total risk 
regressions. 
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Table 6.5. Market beta regressions of bank-insurance agency deals 
       
Panel A: Period before announcement 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Constant 0.000 0.096 0.018 -0.114 -0.130 -0.024 
 (0.00) (0.82) (0.14) -(0.49) -(0.57) -(0.11) 
Non-interest income share 1.716 1.853 1.858    
 (4.85)a (5.28)a (5.18)a    
Loans to total assets    0.682 0.695 0.678 
    (1.90)c (2.06)b (1.98)b 
Non-performing loans to total 
assets   22.117   17.638 
   (1.57)   (1.20) 
Provision for loan losses to total 
assets 48.735   58.406   
 (2.68)a   (3.10)a   
Loan losses to total assets  0.264   0.398  
  (2.23)b   (3.56)a  
ROA 0.188 0.194 0.184 0.229 0.239 0.228 
 (2.62)a (2.64)a (2.47)b (3.49)a (3.64)a (3.49)a 
Leverage 0.012 0.012 0.011 0.009 0.009 0.008 
 (1.72)c (1.60) (1.72)c (1.12) (1.07) (1.07) 
Firm size 0.084 0.087 0.085 0.119 0.118 0.117 
 (2.94)a (3.07)a (3.05)a (6.27)a (6.23)a (6.45)a 
N 79 79 79 79 79 79 
Adjusted R-squared 0.28 0.26 0.29 0.29 0.29 0.30 
F-statistic 7.14 7.03 7.45 7.34 7.35 7.63 
Panel B: Period after announcement 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Constant 0.587 0.597 0.464 -0.166 -0.053 -0.465 
 (3.54)a (3.63)a (1.68)c -(0.49) -(0.16) -(1.08) 
Non-interest income share 0.455 0.429 0.458    
 (1.17) (1.09) (1.16)    
Loans to total assets    1.208 1.092 1.224 
    (2.18)b (2.12)b (2.29)b 
Non-performing loans to total 
assets   31.642   27.473 
   (1.03)   (0.93) 
Provision for loan losses to total 
assets 28.583   26.213   
 (0.73)   (0.66)   
Loan losses to total assets  -0.052   0.261  
  -(0.23)   (1.28)  
ROA 0.111 0.125 0.219 0.154 0.162 (0.20) 
 (0.86) (0.99) (1.66)c (1.18) (1.29) (1.53) 
Leverage 0.002 0.001 0.002 0.004 0.005 0.007 
 (0.32) (0.23) (0.17) (0.76) (0.94) (0.57) 
Firm size 0.103 0.103 0.104 0.105 0.099 0.105 
 (4.12)a (4.07)a (4.33)a (4.55)a (4.30)a (4.72)a 
N 74 74 73 74 74 73 
Adjusted R-squared 0.07 0.07 0.10 0.14 0.15 0.16 
F-statistic 2.12 2.12 2.52 3.47 3.52 3.69 
The table presents OLS regressions of bank market beta, β, on measures of revenue and asset diversification, risk proxies, 
profitability and size variables, before and after the announcement of bank-insurance agency deals. Panel A presents the results 
from the pre-announcement regressions while Panel B presents the results from the post-announcement regressions. The sample 
consists of 90 bancassurance deal announcements between 1990 and 2006. The independent variables are presented in the first 
column, while columns 1 to 6 contain the results from different regressions. In particular, columns 1 to 3 present the regressions 
where non-interest income share is used as a proxy for revenue diversification, while columns 4 to 6 present the regressions 
where the ratio of loans to total assets is used as a proxy for revenue diversification. Within the two subsets, the risk measures 
vary, producing three sets of regressions. In all models a number of bank-specific characteristics are employed as control 
variables (ROA, leverage, firm size). In cases where independent variables are correlated with one another auxiliary regressions 
are employed in order to make them orthogonal. Non-interest income share is the ratio of non-interest income to total operating 
income, ROA is the ratio of net income to total assets, Leverage is the ratio of total assets to common equity, and Firm size is the 
natural logarithm of total assets. The rest of the variables are self explanatory. All balance sheet and income statement variables 
for the pre- and post-announcement regressions are obtained at the year end prior to and after the announcement, respectively. 
The figures in brackets indicate t-values (White errors), while a/b/c denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10%, 
respectively. 
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Table 6.6. Ιdiosyncratic risk regressions of bank-insurance agency deals 
All betas have been multiplied by 104 
Panel A: Period before announcement 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Constant 6.330 5.960 5.610 2.040 2.100 0.857 
 (4.11)a (4.90)a (3.51)a (1.16) (1.13) (0.48) 
Non-interest income share -11.600 -12.090 -12.250    
 -(2.57)a -(2.52)b -(2.58)a    
Loans to total assets    3.670 3.630 3.490 
    (1.47) (1.49) (1.43) 
Non-performing loans to total 
assets   103.640   110.700 
   (0.56)   (0.60) 
Provision for loan losses to total 
assets -185.690   -348.640   
 -(0.71)   -(1.22)   
Loan losses to total assets  -1.520   -2.350  
  -(0.95)   -(1.32)  
ROA 0.421 0.364 0.493 -0.103 -0.164 -0.028 
 (0.47) (0.42) (0.55) -(0.13) -(0.21) -(0.04) 
Leverage -0.044 -0.043 -0.044 -0.017 -0.015 -0.012 
 -(1.11) -(1.03) -(1.17) -(0.38) -(0.32) -(0.30) 
Firm size -0.632 -0.608 -0.654 -0.742 -0.740 -0.774 
 -(1.70)c -(1.63) -(1.75)c -(2.17)b -(2.14)b -(2.22)b 
N 79 79 79 79 79 79 
Adjusted R-squared 0.03 0.03 0.04 -0.03 0.03 0.04 
F-statistic 1.54 1.54 1.58 1.55 1.55 1.60 
Panel B: Period after announcement 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Constant 4.610 4.640 3.520 1.740 1.130 0.957 
 (5.05)a (5.19)a (1.87)c (0.75) (0.51) (0.24) 
Non-interest income share -5.660 -5.830 -5.570    
 -(1.78)c -(1.83)c -(1.78)c    
Loans to total assets    2.190 3.140 2.700 
    (0.79) (1.11) (0.89) 
Non-performing loans to total 
assets   -52.970   -104.420 
   -(0.31)   -(0.55) 
Provision for loan losses to total 
assets 222.490   13.410   
 (0.92)   (0.07)   
Loan losses to total assets  1.930   0.147  
  (1.28)   (0.16)  
ROA -0.514 -0.415 -0.530 -0.636 -0.610 -0.583 
 -(0.57) -(0.44) -(0.47) -(0.70) -(0.68) -(0.63) 
Leverage -0.010 -0.010 0.096 0.006 0.010 0.122 
 -(0.20) -(0.21) (0.76) (0.12) (0.17) (0.93) 
Firm size -0.550 -0.511 -0.497 -0.605 -0.593 -0.548 
 -(2.74)a -(2.41)b -(2.33)b -(3.53)a -(3.50)a -(3.04)a 
N 74 74 73 74 74 73 
Adjusted R-squared 0.11 0.11 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 
F-statistic 2.83 2.81 2.54 2.60 2.55 2.59 
The table presents OLS regressions of bank idiosyncratic risk, 2 , on measures of revenue and asset diversification, risk proxies, 
profitability and size variables, before and after the announcement of bank-insurance agency deals. Panel A presents the results 
from the pre-announcement regressions while Panel B presents the results from the post-announcement regressions. The sample 
consists of 90 bancassurance deal announcements between 1990 and 2006. The independent variables are presented in the first 
column, while columns 1 to 6 contain the results from different regressions. In particular, columns 1 to 3 present the regressions 
where non-interest income share is used as a proxy for revenue diversification, while columns 4 to 6 present the regressions 
where the ratio of loans to total assets is used as a proxy for revenue diversification. Within the two subsets, the risk measures 
vary, producing three sets of regressions. In all models a number of bank-specific characteristics are employed as control 
variables (ROA, leverage, firm size). In cases where independent variables are correlated with one another auxiliary regressions 
are employed in order to make them orthogonal. Non-interest income share is the ratio of non-interest income to total operating 
income, ROA is the ratio of net income to total assets, Leverage is the ratio of total assets to common equity, and Firm size is the 
natural logarithm of total assets. The rest of the variables are self explanatory. All balance sheet and income statement variables 
for the pre- and post-announcement regressions are obtained at the year end prior to and after the announcement, respectively. 
The figures in brackets indicate t-values (White errors), while a/b/c denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10%, 
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respectively. 
 
Looking at Table 6.5, the results are similar to those reported for banks bidding for 
insurance companies (Table 6.3). In particular, the coefficient on non-interest income 
share is positive and significant before the announcement (panel A) and becomes 
insignificant following the announcement (panel B), indicating that the additional 
income stemming from insurance brokerage activities lowers the systematic risk of 
banks. In addition, all proxies for loan risk apart from non-performing loans to total 
assets have a positive and significant relation with betas pre-announcement (panel A), 
but become insignificant following the announcement (panel B). A similar pattern is 
observed for the first two control variables (ROA, leverage). Both are positive and 
significant in the pre-announcement period, yet become insignificant post-
announcement, with the exception of ROA, which is marginally significant in model 
3. Overall, it seems that the expected diversification benefits have a strong effect on 
the capacity of the banks to assume loan risk. Nonetheless, this is not verified by the 
coefficient on the alternative diversification proxy (loans to total assets) which is 
positive and significant in both periods. Shifting the focus to size, its positive 
coefficient is in line with the results in Table 6.3 and indicates, as discussed earlier, 
that larger firms tend to have systematically higher betas. Further support for the 
above argument is provided by the larger coefficient for size in the post-
announcement regressions. 
Shifting the focus to the idiosyncratic risk regressions in Table 6.6, it is evident 
that bank-insurance agency deals are more beneficial than bank-insurance deals in 
terms of diversification. Specifically, the relationship between non-interest income 
share and idiosyncratic risk remains negative and significant even after the deal 
announcement. This is in contrast with bank bids for insurance companies, where the 
additional non-interest income generated via insurance underwriting does not provide 
any additional benefit to the acquiring banks in terms of further reducing their 
idiosyncratic risk exposure. On the other hand, the results here verify that the 
additional income generated via insurance brokerage plays an important role in 
reducing idiosyncratic risk. This result is in line with Nurullah and Staikouras (2008), 
whose findings suggest that insurance brokerage does not significantly affect the risk 
of banking firms. Furthermore, the negative and significant size coefficient verifies 
the presence of size-related decreases in idiosyncratic risk. The latter result is 
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corroborated by the findings of Baele, De Jonghe and Vander Vennet (2007) for 
European banks and Stiroh (2006) for U.S. bank holding companies. 
Finally the corresponding results of the total risk regressions for bank-insurance 
agency deal announcements (appendix, Table E.2), show a negative and significant 
relationship between non-interest revenue share and total risk (panel A), that becomes 
insignificant following the deal announcement. In effect, fee income from insurance 
brokerage does not help reduce the total risk of banks. The only remaining significant 
variable in the models (both panels) is size, which exhibits a negative relationship 
with total risk. Taking into account the relationship between total risk and its two 
components (systematic, unsystematic), the result on size here can be explained by 
looking at the equivalent coefficient estimates in the previous tables. While size is 
positively related with market betas, it also exhibits a negative relation with 
unsystematic risk. Given that the overall effect of size on total risk is negative, we 
conclude that the effect of size on idiosyncratic risk dominates the relationship 
between size and beta. The latter finding is in line with Stiroh (2006), but in contrast 
with Baele, De Jonghe and Vander Vennet (2007). Finally, the results from the beta, 
idiosyncratic and total risk regressions before and after the completion of the bank-
insurance agency deals, presented in Table E.6, Table E.7 and Table E.8 in the 
appendix, are consistent with the above results. 
6.5. CONCLUSION 
 
Banks and insurance companies have been allowed to combine their operations for 
some time now. Despite this, one important question that arises is whether the 
benefits of bancassurance outweigh the costs. Two primary advantages claimed by 
managers of the two institutions are that there are diversification gains, and cross-
selling opportunities that can maximize profits. One problem with intensive cross-
selling is that, while it may open new revenue streams for both banks and insurance 
companies, the latter might become exposed to the same types of shocks and thus 
increase their risk. However, in reality, the stakeholders of bank and insurance 
companies are not collectively interested in the same type of risks. For example, 
diversified investors are mainly interested in systematic risk, given their ability to 
diversify away idiosyncratic risks by constructing efficient portfolios. In contrast, 
customers, depositors/policyholders and large shareholders, are predominantly 
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concerned with idiosyncratic risks, since a failure of the bank would have detrimental 
effects on their holdings, deposits/policies. Finally, regulators and supervisory 
authorities are interested in both components of total risk, as the stability of the 
financial sector can be affected by both. 
The academic literature so far has been inconclusive with regards to the risks 
associated with financial conglomeration and consequently the risks related to 
bancassurance. This chapter addresses this, in that for the first time, a risk 
decomposition technique is used to assess the direct effects of bancassurance mergers 
on total, market and firm-specific risk of acquiring institutions. What is more, this 
chapter offers novel results in the academic literature with respect to the relationship 
between the aforementioned market measures of risk and accounting measures of 
functional diversification, risk, profitability and size. The possibility of shifts in these 
relationships after the bancassurance events is also examined, in order to stress 
whether this type of diversification offers a comparative advantage in terms of risk. 
Using a large and global sample of bank-insurance deals between 1990 and 2006, this 
chapter gives a new insight on the phenomenon, with results that can be used by all 
stakeholders in evaluating such deals. 
Overall, the results show that bancassurance deals do not significantly affect the 
total and idiosyncratic risk of acquiring institutions, per se. Nonetheless, the results 
provide evidence that the exposure of banks to system wide shocks is increasing 
following bancassurance partnerships. At this point, due care must be taken, as factors 
such as the nature of the bidder and target can have dissimilar effects on the 
respective risks. For example, investors and regulators should be careful when banks 
combine with insurance agencies as this will expose them to considerably higher 
systematic risk than in cases of bank acquisitions of insurance underwriters or vice 
versa. Another interesting result arises when the risk components of banks and 
insurance companies are compared. It seems that banks are much more exposed to 
firm-specific risk than to market risk, while insurance companies are relatively 
equally exposed to both types of risk. One possible advantage of the above, in the 
context of the analysis here, is that bancassurance offers institutions opportunities to 
rebalance their risk exposures, that is, shield themselves from unsystematic exposures, 
yet at the expense of bearing greater systematic exposure. The issue becomes even 
more apparent when banks that bid for agencies are examined, with their firm-specific 
component accounting for around 80% of their total portfolio risk. This might be due 
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to the fact that these banks are small and/or that risky banks bid for insurance 
agencies in an attempt to reduce their unsystematic risk. Indeed, the contribution of 
the idiosyncratic risk component to total risk marginally decreases following the 
announcements. 
The analysis of determinants of risk yields some very interesting conclusions with 
respect to diversification through bancassurance. The additional non-interest income 
coming from bancassurance operations is no longer positively correlated with market 
betas following the mergers, suggesting that it is not diversification into insurance 
activities per se, that drives market betas up, but rather the increased scale of the 
institutions. On the other hand, when idiosyncratic risk is considered, bank 
acquisitions of insurance agencies are superior to bank acquisitions of insurance 
underwriters. The negative and significant relationship between non-interest income 
share and unsystematic risk fades away following bank acquisitions of insurance 
companies, but remains significant after bank acquisitions of insurance agencies. 
This chapter provides further evidence that investors should welcome 
bancassurance deals. Although the latter seem to increase the systematic exposures of 
institutions, further tests reveal that the increase is not related to the additional income 
coming from insurance, but is rather related to size, something that is affected by any 
type of deal. On the other hand, depositors/policyholders and large shareholders 
should prefer deals between banks and insurance agencies, as the latter are superior to 
bank deals with insurance underwriters with respect to the diversification of firm-
specific risk. 
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7. RISK-RETURN AND SPILLOVER EFFECTS OF BANK-INSURANCE 
MERGERS: A SPECIAL GARCH APPLICATION 
 
7.1. INTRODUCTION 
 
During the financial crisis of 2007-2009, global financial markets have suffered 
catastrophic losses. What started as a mere banking crisis – triggered by the threat of 
massive subprime borrowers’ defaults – quickly spread within and across sectors, 
industries and international markets. The consequences of the crisis serve as a 
reminder to investors, managers and regulators alike, of how interconnected modern 
financial institutions and markets are, and how easily idiosyncratic shocks can 
manifest into systemic crises. The latter realisation has refuelled the longstanding 
debate on financial conglomerates, product diversification, contagion and regulation. 
With respect to financial conglomerates, a main concern among regulators, 
shareholders and bank managers is whether the risk inherent in their operations, under 
financial crises, will have a greater potential to spill over from banking to the 
insurance industry and vice versa, and to spread from these industries to the real 
economy, bringing about more dramatic consequences (Parsons and Mutenga, 2009). 
Furthermore, questions have been raised as to whether the global financial 
intermediation process is at stake, with some arguing that re-regulation is a virtual 
certainty (Walter, 2009). However, history is there to remind all stakeholders that 
entering a new series of cyclical interactions between regulation, regulatory avoidance 
and re-regulation, or deregulation, as depicted in Kane (1981), does not represent an 
optimal solution to the problem. Neither will constraining the degree of diversification 
of financial institutions, minimize the risk of future systemic crises, as implied in 
Wagner (2010). An important issue that must be clarified by policymakers is what 
types of diversification are welfare enhancing and what types are welfare reducing, 
thereby increasing systemic risks. In this context, it is important to examine how 
mergers and acquisitions (M&As) between banks and insurance companies, within 
and across national borders, affect the risk and returns of the acquiring firms as well 
as those of the other financial institutions operating in the same market place, and 
what factors determine the magnitude of such effects. 
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The previous empirical chapters shed light on the effects of bank-insurance deals 
on the risk-return profiles of acquiring firms. Considering the above issues, this 
chapter extends the literature on financial conglomerates and specifically the bank-
insurance enterprise, by analysing the wealth and risk spillover effects of 
bancassurance partnerships across the financial services sector. Not only that, it 
measures the effects of an international sample of deals on the risk-return profiles of 
acquiring firms. What is different here is the fact that a Generalized Auto-Regressive 
Conditionally Heteroskedastic (GARCH) framework is employed for the first time in 
this context. This specification accounts for the cluster patterns commonly observed 
in financial time series and allows for shock persistence to be measured. 
The contributions of this chapter are the following: First, the excess returns of the 
acquiring firms as well as those of peer bank and insurers are examined. The above 
analysis facilitates a) the assessment of the bidder equity response around 
bancassurance deals, b) the determination of the existence of spillover effects to the 
industry, and c) the evaluation of the nature of these effects as contagion or 
competitive. Second, the determinants of the bidder excess returns are analysed. This 
analysis sheds light on the effect of a selection of company and deal specific variables 
on the subsequent market valuations of the bidder banks. Third, the risk of bank 
bidders as well as the risk of bank and insurance peers is decomposed into its 
systematic and idiosyncratic components, while the results are contrasted between the 
pre- and post-announcement periods. The risk decomposition analysis helps determine 
a) whether bancassurance operations alter the risk of acquiring firms, b) the presence 
of intra and inter-industry risk-spillover effects and c) the nature of these effects as 
contagion versus competitive. 
The results indicate that bank acquisitions of insurance firms lead to positive 
bidder stock valuations and reduce the risk of the acquiring firms. In addition, the 
presence of contagion effects from these deals is verified, with the reaction of 
insurance peers being stronger and slower to compete. The cross section analysis 
indicates that the market takes into account factors such as the bidders’ leverage, the 
size of the deal, the medium of payment, bidder growth opportunities and whether the 
acquirer is located in the U.S., when evaluating bank-insurance deals. Finally, the risk 
decomposition results indicate that bancassurance deals bring about reductions in the 
total, market and idiosyncratic risk of acquiring firms. The risk reduction spills over 
to bank/insurer peers, who also seem to benefit from these mergers. 
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The chapter is organised as follows: Section 2 reviews the literature, while section 
3 presents the sample and methodological framework employed. Section 4 reports and 
discusses the empirical findings, while section 5 concludes this chapter. 
7.2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
The question of whether financial conglomerates outperform their more specialized 
counterparts in terms of their risk-return attributes has fuelled an ongoing debate in 
the academic literature. 
A number of studies have investigated bank product diversification through merger 
within the banking industry. In an early study, Martin and Keown (1981) examine the 
extent to which the formation of bank holding companies (BHCs) affects the risk-
return attributes of the involved banks' common stock. Their sample consists of 25 
BHCs formed in the United States between 1968 and 1974. Their analysis suggests 
that the formation of one-bank holding companies does not have an impact on the 
banks’ risk-return generating mechanism. Houston and Ryngaert (1994) use data on 
153 bank mergers between 1985 and 1991 to examine the consequent gains/losses. 
Their findings suggest that targets realize gains while bidders suffer losses as a result 
of these deals, suggesting that mergers result in transfer, rather than creation, of 
additional wealth. The above conclusions are corroborated in Siems (1996) who 
examines the value effects of  24 banking mega-mergers in 1995 as well as whether 
higher office overlap and increased market concentration resulting from those mergers 
led to positive or negative valuations. According to the results, acquiring banks 
experience negative abnormal returns while targets positive, something consistent 
with the wealth transfer hypothesis. However, bidders with the highest market overlap 
exhibit positive valuations and, in general, mergers with the highest market overlaps 
and market concentration levels have higher valuations than a) mergers with fewer 
office overlaps and b) those resulting in the smallest increases in market 
concentration. Furthermore, Houston, James and Ryngaert (2001) analyze a sample of 
64 large bank mergers between 1985 and 1996. They find that mergers result in an 
increase in the value of the combined entities (bidders and targets) with most of 
revaluation originating from cost savings, rather than revenue enhancements.  
On the contrary, Zhang (1995) performs an event study analysis of 107 U.S. bank 
takeovers between 1980 and 1990 and finds that on average mergers create, rather 
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than transfer value. However, his result might be due to the fact that the estimates are 
based on the size-adjusted combined returns of bidder and target firms. DeLong 
(2001) divides bank mergers between BHCs into diversifying and focusing mergers 
along geographic or activity lines. While focusing mergers are found to create value, 
diversifying mergers do not.  
DeYoung and Roland (2001) employ data on 472 banks over 1988-1995 to 
investigate the association between profitability, volatility, and revenue sources. Their 
findings indicate that increased diversification into fee-based activities are associated 
with higher, rather than lower, volatility of bank revenues. Similarly, Stiroh (2004) 
investigates diversification benefits from banks’ expansion into non-traditional 
activities producing fees and service charges, fiduciary income and trading revenues. 
He uncovers two main results. First, at the aggregate level, although the volatility of 
banks’ net operating income declines, the lower volatility is not due to diversification 
benefits but because of reduced volatility of net interest income. Second, at the micro 
level, increased reliance on non-interest income is accompanied by higher risk and 
lower risk-adjusted profits. The overall conclusion is that product diversification into 
non-interest income activities need not be stabilizing. As a way of explanation, Stiroh 
(2004) points out that convergence across financial institutions has led to higher 
correlations among product lines, reducing diversification gains as a result. For 
example, increased cross-selling and the use of similar models of risk measurement 
and risk management tend to expose different segments of a conglomerate firm to the 
same economic and financial shocks. In the international context, Acharya, Hasan and 
Saunders (2006) use micro level data on 105 Italian banks over 1993-1999 to 
investigate the effect of diversification within traditional banking activities on risk 
and returns. They find that diversification of bank loans across sectors and industries 
within those sectors, does neither necessarily improve return nor reduce risk. They 
conclude that these results are consistent with the view that effectiveness of 
monitoring and information gathering by banks declines when they diversify into 
newer industries and operate at higher levels of risk.  
Of more recent interest has been the expansion of banks into non-banking 
activities, especially the bank-insurance enterprise. The growth of this phenomenon in 
the industrialized world has led to an increasing volume of related research. The 
studies in this area can be divided into several strands of literature. One strand 
concentrates on the shareholder value effects of bank expansion into non-banking 
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activities and produces mixed findings114. Another strand looks into the risk-return 
effects of bank diversification into non-banking and produces mixed results as well115
Another important question raised in the literature is whether diversification per se 
has a positive (premium) or negative (discount) impact on the market valuations of 
conglomerates. The above question has given rise to another stream of contributions. 
These studies typically focus on the comparison of the valuations of diversified firms 
with the respective valuations the same firms would have if they were broken into 
their component units. For example, Schmid and Walter (
. 
2009) use a sample of 664 
U.S. financial firms between 1985 and 2004 and compare the excess values116
1995
 and 
measures of diversification of diversified firms versus those of focused firms. They 
also regress excess value measures on different diversification proxies and other 
control variables. Their results point to a substantial and persistent conglomerate 
discount in financial firms and to the fact that it is diversification that causes the 
discount and not that troubled firms choose to diversify in other areas. Interestingly, 
when combinations between banking and insurance or banking and investment 
banking are considered, they are found to offer a significant valuation premium. 
Using similar approaches Berger and Ofek ( ) and Servaes (1996) report a 
diversification discount for U.S. firms117
2004a
. The first study also reports that this discount 
is smaller for companies that diversify into related industries. Nevertheless, the 
findings of studies on corporate diversification are questioned in Villalonga ( ) 
who documents that the diversification discount is an artifact of Compustat segment 
data. Using a database that incorporates a more consistent business unit breakdown 
she reveals a diversification premium for all economic sectors between 1989 and 
1996. Somewhat comparable conclusions are also drawn in Villalonga (2004b) where 
it is found that diversification does not destroy value. The issue of a conglomerate 
discount however, re-appears for financial firms. Specifically, Laeven and Levine 
                                                 
114 The results of these event studies have been extensively analysed and discussed in previous chapters. 
See chapter 4 for an extensive review or alternatively see section 3.2.3. in chapter 3 for a summary of 
these studies. 
115 The results of these risk-return studies have been extensively analysed and discussed in previous 
chapters. See chapter 6 for an extensive review or alternatively see section 3.2.2.2. in the chapter 3 
for a summary of these studies. 
116 Excess value is calculated as the log of the ratio of a firm’s value to its imputed value. The imputed 
value of the firm is calculated as the sum of the imputed segment values, whereas, the imputed value 
for each segment is calculated by multiplying the segment’s sales (assets) by the median ratio of the 
market value to sales (assets) for single segment firms in the same industry. 
117 The first use a sample of 3,659 firms between 1986 and 1991, while the second employ a sample 
ranging from 266 to 518 firms, for the 1961-1976 period. 
 179 
(2007) use an international sample and even after accounting for the issues raised in 
Villalonga (2004a), find that diversification of bank based financial services firms is 
value destroying. On the contrary, Elsas, Hackethal and Holzhäuser (2010) find no 
evidence on discount for financial conglomerates when they diversify into fee-based 
services, trading, and underwriting insurance contracts, based on data of nine 
industrialized countries over 1996-2003. Indeed, they find that revenue diversification 
is associated with higher bank profitability and greater market valuation. 
A final strand of literature attempts to shed light on the risk-return spillover effects 
within and across sectors of the financial services industry. For example  Elyasiani, 
Mansur and Pagano (2007) examine the risk-return linkages across U.S. commercial 
banks, securities firms and life insurance companies between 1991 and 2001. 
Specifically, they investigate the transmission of changes in the level and volatility of 
stock returns across these firms using a multivariate GARCH model. Their results 
verify the presence of wealth spillover effects across smaller financial institutions 
(FIs, hereof) and the presence of strong volatility spillover effects across large 
institutions. In a similar vein, Elyasiani and Mansur (2003) use a sample of  47, 85, 
and 7 large banking institutions for the United States, Japan, and Germany, 
respectively. Their results suggest strong interest-rate and idiosyncratic volatility 
spillover effects in the equity prices of banks across these countries. Another issue of 
particular interest that has been examined in the academic literature is that of spillover 
effects caused by banking/insurance failures or distress announcements. For example 
Aharony and Swary (1983) use a sample of the 3 largest bank failures in the 1970s to 
examine the presence of spillover effects. They fail to find any contagion effects for 
the two cases where the failure was caused by firm specific factors, but report strong 
contagion effects for one of the cases examined where the failure was induced by 
external factors. In a similar fashion, Brewer and Jackson (2002) look into the inter-
industry spillover effects of three distress related announcements across 134 banks 
and 61 life insurance companies. Although they find evidence of strong inter-industry 
contagion, the results suggest that the effects are not purely contagious in nature but 
directly linked to factors such as geographic proximity, asset portfolio composition, 
liability portfolio composition, and regulatory expectations. These results give rise to 
the issue of the so called ‘pure panic’ versus ‘information based contagion’ discussed 
in Aharony and Swary (1996).  
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7.3. DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
 
This chapter draws on a GARCH framework to consider the impact of large bank-
insurance deals on the risk-return profiles of acquiring banks and peer banks and 
insurance firms. The analysis allows the impact of these deals on the risk-return 
attributes of banks to be determined, while at the same time facilitates the 
examination of the existence of risk-return spillover effects across the financial 
services sector, induced by the bancassurance deals. Finally, a cross section analysis 
is also employed that assesses the contribution of the bidders’ characteristics and deal-
specific factors on the abnormal returns of the acquiring banks. 
Information on announcements of completed deals between banks and insurance 
companies is collected using the mergers and acquisitions database of Thomson One 
Banker. The selection process draws deals from the U.S., Europe and other countries 
available, allowing an international sample of mergers and acquisitions (see Table 
7.1). In particular, the selection process admits to the following criteria: The bidder is 
a public banking institution, the target is a public or private insurance company, the 
value of the deal is disclosed and the deal does not entail rescue motivations. The 
search based on the above criteria yields a final sample of 50 cross-product merger 
and acquisitions between banks and insurance firms. 
At this point it is worth mentioning that the sample selection process focuses on 
large bancassurance mergers because they represent a model landscape for the nature 
of the investigation applied here. First, large mergers and acquisitions are closely 
monitored by investors, analysts and the press, thus a wider degree of information 
involving these cases is disseminated in the markets. As a result, it is expected that 
large deals will trigger greater impacts on investor and policy maker decisions and 
consequently on the stock prices of the involved institutions. Not only that, large deals 
tend to have a greater impact on the structure of the financial services sectors, either 
by inducing greater competition or by creating further opportunities for synergies 
among sector participants. The second argument supporting the selection of large 
deals is rather methodological. In particular, GARCH models behave in a more stable 
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manner with returns of large companies that are regularly traded on the markets, than 
with returns of thinly traded stocks118
Table 7.1. Sample characteristics and number of deals per country and year 
. 
 
Country Bidders Targets     Year No of Deals % 
Argentina 0 2        
Australia 3 2        
Belgium 1 0        
Brazil 1 1     1991 2 3.64% 
Canada 6 3     1992 1 1.82% 
Cyprus 1 1     1993 1 1.82% 
Denmark 4 4     1994 3 5.45% 
Finland 1 1     1995 2 3.64% 
Germany 2 2     1996 4 7.27% 
Hong Kong 1 2     1997 3 5.45% 
Ireland 1 2     1998 3 5.45% 
Italy 6 6     1999 6 10.91% 
Netherlands 0 1     2000 7 12.73% 
Norway 1 1     2001 3 5.45% 
Philippines 1 1     2002 5 9.09% 
Portugal 1 2     2003 4 7.27% 
South Korea 1 1     2004 3 5.45% 
Spain 3 1     2005 2 3.64% 
Sweden 2 2     2006 1 1.82% 
Switzerland 1 1        
United Kingdom 4 3        
United States 9 11        
Sum 50 50     Total 50 100% 
 
Furthermore, the analysis also considers the peer banks and peer insurance 
companies of the bidders in the sample. Having collected information on the bank-
insurance deals, the Thomson One Banker individual deal tear sheets are used to 
construct the sample of the peer groups. In particular, the each tear sheet is used to 
obtain the name of the acquirer, the deal’s announcement date and information on the 
index where the bank is traded. Once the above information is collected, Bloomberg 
and/or Thomson Datastream are used to track the historical constituent lists of the 
market where each bidder is traded119
Individual daily stock prices for acquiring banks and their peer institutions as well 
as daily prices for the index where each bidder is traded are collected from Thomson 
. Finally, the company classification systems of 
Bloomberg and/or Datastream are employed in order to construct two peer portfolios 
for each of the 50 bidders, namely, bank peers and insurance company peers. 
                                                 
118 Tests using a GARCH approach have been carried out on the returns of a number of small banks 
involved in bancassurance mergers (sample drawn from previous chapters). Almost all of the models 
exhibited problems with convergence. 
119 In cases where historical constituent lists are not available on either Bloomberg or Thomson 
Datastream, the lists are obtained by contacting the local exchanges. 
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Datastream, for a period of 251 trading days before and 250 trading days after, 
relative to each announcement/deal completion. Logarithmic returns are then 
calculated for each of the 50 bank bidders and respective peers as well as for each 
index, respectively. For each deal (bidder) in the sample, peer bank and insurance 
company returns are then used to form two equally weighted portfolios consisting of 
bank peers and insurance peers. The final sample of peers consists of 40 bank and 33 
insurance portfolios, respectively120
The empirical investigation in this chapter is carried out in four phases. The first 
phase sets out to examine the impact of bank-insurance mergers on the stock prices of 
acquiring institutions, while the second phase deals with return-spillover effects on 
peer banks and insurance companies. An event study approach suits the purposes of 
the above analysis. In particular, bidder and peer portfolio excess returns are 
calculated as the difference between the observed returns and those predicted by the 
single index model. Coefficient estimates are obtained using an estimation period of 
210 days (-250 to -41 days prior to the announcement date i.e. day 0). These are 
subsequently used to calculate excess returns during the 81 trading days of the event 
period (-40 to +40 days) surrounding the deals’ announcement. Unlike previous 
studies, a GARCH framework is employed here in order to assess the impact of bank-
insurance mergers on the stock prices of acquirers and peer bank and insurer 
portfolios
. Finally, accounting variables for the second-step 
cross section analysis are obtained from the Thomson Financial database and consist 
of year-end financial statement data for the period before the announcement, whereas 
deal specific characteristics are collected via the Thomson One Banker’s deal tear 
sheets. 
121
Bollerslev, 
. This framework takes into account the behavioural patterns of both the 
first and the second moments of the return distribution, accounts for conditional 
heteroskedasticity in the errors, and allows for persistence in shocks to be measured. 
This property is important given that, if time dependence in returns is not properly 
modelled, the estimates are inefficient and test statistics are inconsistent (
                                                 
120 The lower number of observations in the peer portfolios is due to the non-availability of constituent 
lists and/or equity prices during a particular period – different for each country where the bidder is 
located. 
121 For comparison purposes, the estimation has also been carried out without modelling the variance 
and by employing a traditional event study methodology, as above. Although the results do not differ 
quantitatively (similar excess returns), the t-statistics appear to be larger for bidders and bank peers, 
while lower for insurance peers, when the variance is assumed to be constant. The results are 
available in Table F.1 and Table F.2 in the appendix. 
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1986; 1987; Engle, 1982). During the event period the excess returns and conditional 
variances are forecasted sequentially on a daily basis. The GARCH specification used 
can be represented as follows: 
   
Rt = c + β Rmt + ut  ut ~ N(0, h)                                                                (7.1) 
ht = µ + θ (L)  + δ (L) ht                                                                                       (7.2) 
 
where, Rt is the return on a bank stock/peer portfolio; c, β, µ,θ and δ denote the 
parameters to be estimated; Rm is the market return measured by the daily changes on 
the pertinent market index where the bidder is located; θ (L) and δ (L) are lag 
polynomials of orders p and q, respectively, and L is the backward shift operator. 
Non-negativity of ht implies the identification conditions that µ > 0 and (θ, δ) ≥ 0, 
while variance stationarity is met by θ + δ < 1. The event’s impact on the wealth of 
acquiring banks and peers is measured by the magnitude of the abnormal return (AR), 
which is algebraically expressed as: 
 
ARt = Rt – (c + β Rmt)                                                   (7.3) 
The average abnormal return (AAR) and the cumulative average abnormal return 
(CAAR) are calculated using the conventional formulas as follows: 
AAR = NAR
N
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Following Savickas (2003) the cross-sectional test statistic for testing the significance 
of the GARCH-based  excess returns (AR) can be formulated as: 
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The third phase of the empirical analysis attempts to shed light on the determinants 
of acquirer excess returns using a cross-sectional framework. In particular, the 
estimated excess returns from various windows surrounding the announcements are 
used as endogenous variables and are regressed against a selection of accounting and 
deal specific variables. The mathematical formulation of the model is the following: 
 
ARt = X β + εt                                                                                                           (7.7) 
 
where, ARt is the estimated excess return from the chosen event window,  X denotes a 
vector of predetermined exogenous factors, β is the vector of parameters to be 
estimated and εt is the error term with the usual properties. 
The fourth and final phase of the analysis entails the decomposition of the 
acquiring banks’ and peer institutions’ total risk into its systematic and idiosyncratic 
components and the examination of possible shifts in each of these risk categories 
between pre- and post-deal periods. Given that stock returns are characterised by 
volatility clustering, as discussed earlier, a GARCH framework is applied to estimate 
the systematic and idiosyncratic conditional variances of bank bidders and of their 
respective peer portfolios (equations 7.1 and 7.2). In effect, total risk is defined as the 
sum of systematic and idiosyncratic risk components, as follows: 
 
TR = β 2 × Hm + Hu                                                   (7.8) 
 
The following steps are followed in order to obtain equation (7.8): First, a single 
index GARCH model is estimated for each bidder/peer portfolio. Second, the beta 
coefficient is squared. Third, each bidder’s/peer portfolio’s conditional variance is 
averaged. Fourth, the market indices are used as dependent variables in GARCH (1,1) 
models in order to compute each market’s average conditional variance. Fifth, each 
bidder’s/peer portfolio’s risk is calculated as the product of its squared beta 
coefficient and the corresponding market index variance. Finally, the average 
systematic risk component (β2 × Hm) and the average idiosyncratic risk component 
(Hu) across the sample of bidders/peer portfolios is calculated. The above calculations 
are performed both for the pre- (-250 to -1) and post-announcement period (+1 to 
+250), respectively. 
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7.4. EMPIRICAL FINDINGS 
7.4.1. WEALTH EFFECTS ON BIDDERS 
 
This section attempts to gauge the impact of bank-insurance deal announcements 
on the stock prices of acquiring banks using a GARCH approach. This analysis 
contributes to the event-study evidence on the effects of bank-insurance mergers in 
the following ways: First, although there is some empirical evidence on the wealth 
effects of bancassurance mergers, existing research is rather indirect, in that it focuses 
on either individual deals, such as the Citicorp-Travelers megamerger (Carow, 2001a; 
Johnston and Madura, 2000), or on various regulatory events affecting the bank-
insurance interface (Carow, 2001b; Carow and Heron, 2002; Cowan, Howell and 
Power, 2002; Hendershott, Lee and Tompkins, 2002; Neale and Peterson, 2005). 
Others, delve into the effects of diversifying mergers on the involved institutions but 
yield contradicting results (DeLong, 2001; Lepetit, Patry and Rous, 2004). In contrast 
with the above studies, this chapter incorporates an actual sample that contains the 50 
largest bank-insurance deals announced between 1990 and 2006. Second, more recent 
studies that look into the aggregate effects of actual bank-insurance mergers on 
bidders, targets or the combined entity, involve somewhat small samples (Beitel, 
Schiereck and Wahrenburg, 2004; Cybo-Ottone and Murgia, 2000), or yield 
contradicting results depending on the region/sample examined (Chen, Li, Moshirian 
and Tan, 2007; Ekkayokkaya, Holmes and Paudyal, 2007; Fields, Fraser and Kolari, 
2007a; b; Staikouras, 2009). A rather considerable shortcoming in these studies is that 
they fail to account for the time-varying nature of the variance of stock returns and 
this could lead to inefficient estimates and problems with the test statistics. The 
current investigation differs from the aforementioned research in that it accounts for 
heteroskedasticity in stock returns. 
GARCH models are estimated for each firm in the sample and the corresponding 
excess returns and conditional variances are forecasted sequentially, as described in 
the previous section. Wealth effects and standard errors are then averaged, cumulative 
average returns calculated over different time windows, while the cross-section test-
statistics are estimated by employing equation (7.6). The time windows encompass all 
combinations within a 9-day [-4  +4], relative to the deals’ announcement day [0  0]. 
The results are presented in Table 7.2. 
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 Table 7.2. Bidders’ excess returns due to bank-insurance mergers:  A GARCH model 
     
 1 2 3 4 
 Event windows for up to 
 3 days 5 days 7 days 9 days 
     
1 
Pre-event  window [-1  0] [-2  0] [-3  0] [-4  0] 
CAAR 1.58% 1.43% 1.27% 1.28% 
t-test (2.62) a (2.44) b (1.96) b (1.77) c 
     
2 
Post-event  window [0  +1] [0  +2] [0  +3] [0  +4] 
CAAR 1.64% 0.39% 0.45% 0.31% 
t-test (2.92) a (0.96) (1.05) (0.66) 
     
3 
Event  window [0  0]  [-2 +1]  [-3 +1]  [-4 +1] 
CAAR 1.47% 1.60% 1.45% 1.45% 
t-test (2.53) b (2.82) a (2.37) b (2.18) b 
     
4 
Event  window [-1  +1] [-2  +2] [-3  +3] [-4  +4] 
CAAR 1.75% 0.36% 0.26% 0.12% 
t-test (2.99) a (1.06) (0.85) (0.41) 
     
    
5 Mean ARCH coefficient 0.120   t-test (3.82)   
6 Mean GARCH coefficient 0.730   t-test (11.66)   
7 Mean volatility persistence 0.850   
     
The sample used consists of 50 bancassurance deals announced between 1990 and 2006. The reported values are 
cumulative average abnormal returns (CAAR). Abnormal returns are calculated using the market model via a 
GARCH estimation process. ARCH and GARCH coefficients represent the average of all firms, while the average 
standard errors are calculated using the following specification due to: 2
1
1 ˆ. . . . ( )
n
i
i
s e s e b
n =
= ∑ , where . .s e  is the 
average standard error and ( )ˆ. . is e b is the firm-specific ARCH and GARCH standard errors. 
a/b/c denote significant CAAR at the 0.01/0.05/0.10 level (two-tailed test) for the pertinent event period. 
  
The results presented under column one clearly show that the cumulative average 
excess returns (CAARs) experienced by the bidders are positive and significant, while 
sustain themselves when any combination up to a maximum of three days is 
considered. Nevertheless, both the magnitude and the significance of excess returns 
dissipate as the windows widen further. This upholds market efficiency, in that news 
are quickly absorbed by the stock markets. The comparison of the results for the pre- 
and post-event windows (rows 1 and 2), provides further evidence towards market 
efficiency as all pre-event CAARs are significant – yet become weaker as the 
windows widen – whereas post-event windows produce significant results only when 
the 2-day [0  +1] window is considered. Results presented in rows 3 and 4 show the 
announcement effects over windows combining the pre- and post-event time horizons. 
Extending the pre-event period up to four days prior to the merger announcement 
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seems to generate statistically significant excess returns, but this does not seem to be 
the case when the post-event period is extended (row 4) apart from the [-1  +1] 
window. The significant excess returns prior to the announcement indicate the 
presence of information leaks. The significance of such abnormal retrains, however, 
did not last beyond the post-announcement date, which in turn could provide some 
support towards market efficiency. 
The positive and significant excess returns experienced by bank bidders point to 
positive investor expectations for the bank-insurance interface and provide further 
support for the passage of FSMA (1999) or similar legislation, which allowed bank 
and insurers to combine at the operational level. In general, the announcement effects 
occurred before and at the time of the merger. 
The results above are indirectly comparable122
Carow, 2001b
 with studies examining the reaction 
of bank and insurance companies to court rulings allowing banks to enter insurance 
brokerage and/or underwriting ( ; Cowan, Howell and Power, 2002), the 
passage of the Financial Modernization Act (FSMA, 1999) (Carow and Heron, 2002; 
Hendershott, Lee and Tompkins, 2002), and the Citicorp-Travelers merger 
announcement (Carow, 2001a; Johnston and Madura, 2000). At this point, it is 
interesting to contrast the results of the GARCH approach applied here with the 
corresponding results of studies that focus on actual bank-insurance deals, yet do not 
take into account the time-varying nature of volatility in stock returns. The GARCH 
approach corroborate studies that find positive excess returns for bidders and/or the 
combined entity (Beitel, Schiereck and Wahrenburg, 2004; Cybo-Ottone and Murgia, 
2000; Fields, Fraser and Kolari, 2007a; b; Staikouras, 2009). Nevertheless the results 
here are in contrast with studies that find negative (Chen, Li, Moshirian and Tan, 
2007), or insignificant excess returns (Ekkayokkaya, Holmes and Paudyal, 2007) for 
acquiring firms, respectively. 
7.4.2. WEALTH SPILLOVER EFFECTS ON PEER INSTITUTIONS 
 
As discussed in the previous section, a number of studies focus on the effects of 
individual mergers or specific regulatory events on the interface between banks and 
                                                 
122 Although these studies examine the bancassurance market, they focus on the impact of isolated 
events. The current research examines a large cross-section of international bancassurance deals, 
hence the term ‘indirectly comparable’. 
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insurance companies. These studies123
Aharony and Swary, 1983
 typically examine the impact of these 
announcements on the equity prices of peer institutions in the financial sector. 
Another strand of research delves into spillover effects across financial intermediaries 
and banking in particular ( ; 1996; Brewer and Jackson, 
2002; Elyasiani, Mansur and Pagano, 2007; Kaufman, 1994), but not in the context of 
bancassurance deals. This section attempts to gauge the impact of bank-insurance deal 
announcements on the stock prices of bank and insurance peers using a GARCH 
approach. It thereby extends the literature in two ways. First, by providing direct 
evidence – from actual bank-insurance deals – on the issues of intra- and inter-
industry spillover effects, and second, by determining the nature of the former effects 
as competitive versus contagion. The distinction between contagion and competitive 
intra- or inter-industry effects is rather straightforward. Contagion effects are 
supported when the positive (negative) bidder stock price adjustments spillover to 
industry, resulting in positive (negative) valuations in the stock of peer banks or 
insurance companies. On the contrary, competitive effects are supported when the 
stocks of peer institutions exhibit valuations in the opposite direction to those of the 
bank bidders. In case spillover effects are present, it is expected that on average bank 
peers will exhibit competitive effects given the competitive advantage bancassurance 
can bring to their competitors. On the other hand, insurers are expected to experience 
contagion effects given that investors might anticipate that they will become future 
targets of large banks. Lang and Stulz (1992) argue that spillover effects from one or 
more firms to others can be manifested as a combination of contagion and competitive 
effects124 Table 7.3.  displays the estimation results for this analysis. The results for 
bank peers are presented under column A while the respective results for insurance 
peers are presented under panel B. 
                                                 
123 (Carow, 2001a; b; Carow and Heron, 2002; Cowan, Howell and Power, 2002; Hendershott, Lee and 
Tompkins, 2002; Johnston and Madura, 2000; Neale and Peterson, 2005). 
124 This also applies in the current analysis. That is, it is likely that some peer institutions will exhibit 
competitive effects, while others will exhibit contagion effects, around the announcement date. 
Given that the current framework reveals the net spillover effect; that is, if contagion effects 
dominate competitive effects, the net spillover effect will be of contagion nature and vice versa. 
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 Table 7.3. Spillover effects to bank and insurance peers based on GARCH models 
     
 1 2 3 4 
Panel A: Bank Peers Event windows for up to 
 3 days 5 days 7 days 9 days 
     
1 
Pre-event  window [-1  0] [-2  0] [-3  0] [-4  0] 
CAAR 0.34% 0.55% 0.48% 0.56% 
t-test (0.57) (0.69) (0.35) (0.54) 
2 
Post-event  window [0  +1] [0  +2] [0  +3] [0  +4] 
CAAR 0.45% 0.74% 1.04% 0.81% 
t-test (1.81) c (0.67) (0.93) (0.56) 
3 
Event  window [0  0]  [-2 +1]  [-3 +1]  [-4 +1] 
CAAR 0.38% 0.62% 0.54% 0.62% 
t-test (1.63) (1.02) (0.69) (0.79) 
4 
Event  window [-1  +1] [-2  +2] [-3  +3] [-4  +4] 
CAAR 0.40% 0.91% 1.13% 0.99% 
t-test (0.94) (0.47) (0.56) (0.40) 
      
     
5 Mean ARCH coefficient 0.140   t-test (3.83)   
6 Mean GARCH coefficient 0.570   t-test (7.34)   
7 Mean volatility persistence 0.710   
     
  
Panel B: Insurance Peers Event windows for up to 
 3 days 5 days 7 days 9 days 
     
1 
Pre-event  window [-1  0] [-2  0] [-3  0] [-4  0] 
CAAR 0.48% 0.77% 0.62% 0.43% 
t-test (1.91) c (2.48) b (1.81) c (1.09) 
2 
Post-event  window [0  +1] [0  +2] [0  +3] [0  +4] 
CAAR 0.50% 0.39% 0.80% 1.49% 
t-test (2.15) b (1.75) c (2.27) b (2.06) b 
3 
Event  window [0  0]  [-2 +1]  [-3 +1]  [-4 +1] 
CAAR 0.31% 0.96% 0.80% 0.61% 
t-test (1.86) c (2.70) a (2.15) b (1.50) 
4 
Event  window [-1  +1] [-2  +2] [-3  +3] [-4  +4] 
CAAR 0.66% 0.85% 1.11% 1.60% 
t-test (2.22) b (2.32) b (2.32) b (1.80) c 
      
     
5 Mean ARCH coefficient 0.130   t-test (3.13)   
6 Mean G ARCH coefficient 0.640   t-test (9.65)   
7 Mean volatility persistence 0.770   
    
The sample consists of 40 bank and 33 insurance peer portfolios pertinent to the bank-insurance announcements. The reported 
values are cumulative average abnormal returns. Abnormal returns are calculated using the market model via a GARCH 
estimation process. CAAR stands for cumulative average abnormal returns. ARCH and GARCH coefficients represent the 
average of all peer portfolios (bank/insurance), while the average standard errors are calculated using the following specification: 
2
1
1 ˆ. . . . ( )
n
i
i
s e s e b
n =
= ∑ , where . .s e  is the average standard error and ( )ˆ. . is e b the individual portfolio ARCH and GARCH standard 
errors.  
a/b/c denote significant CAAR at the 0.01/0.05/0.10 level (two-tailed test) for the pertinent event period. 
 
Looking at the panel A that presents the results for bank peers it is evident that on 
the announcement day [0  0] bank peers exhibit a positive reaction with an abnormal 
return of 0.38% (column 1, row 3). The corresponding excess return for insurance 
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peers (panel B, column 1, row 3) is of similar magnitude (0.31%), yet significant at 
the 10% level, indicating the presence of contagion effects. These effects are 
becoming more evident when the analysis focuses on the post-event windows. The 
excess return for bank peers becomes greater in magnitude (0.45%) and significant at 
the 10% level (panel A, column 1, row 2), while the analogous figure for insurance 
peers is 0.50% and significant at the 5% level (panel B, column 1, row 2). 
Looking at the rest of the time intervals an interesting divergence arises between 
the results of the bank peers and insurance peers. All remaining pre-event, post-event 
and symmetric windows for bank peers show positive but insignificant valuations 
(panel A). The contagion effects on bank peers seem to dissipate quickly, indicating 
that the banking peers quickly absorb any shocks stemming from the bancassurance 
announcements. On the contrary, the transmission of the shocks to the insurance 
industry is stronger and takes longer to complete. This is evident when the abnormal 
returns for the remaining windows are examined (panel B). All excess returns are 
positive and most of them significant at the 5% level, while their significance is 
sustained up to nine days around the events. In particular, the effects over the post-
event period (row 2) exhibit a growing trend as the windows are extended, reaching a 
maximum figure of 1.49% for the 5-day [0  +4] window, while a similar pattern is 
observed for the symmetric windows (row 4). The effects over the pre-event windows 
are positive and significant, up to the 4-day [-3  0] window. It is important to note that 
the magnitude of the insurance peers’ excess returns is greater than that of bank peers 
for the majority of windows surrounding the event period. 
In summary, the results indicate that shocks from bank-insurance deals spillover to 
the financial sector. Furthermore, the spillover effects are of contagion nature in that 
both bank peers and insurance peers exhibit excess returns that are in the same 
direction as those experienced by the acquiring banks. Nevertheless, the effects on 
insurance peers are stronger and sustain themselves over a longer period of time 
surrounding the events’ announcement. Given that excess returns reflect investor 
expectations, a rational explanation for the above results can be the following: The 
market might be anticipating that the peer insurance companies might become future 
targets of banking institutions. On the contrary, peer banks do not have the same 
chances of being acquired – within the bancassurance context – given that 
assurebanking partnerships are less frequent and less likely to produce similar gains. 
The poor reaction of bank peers might also indicate that investors anticipate that the 
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bancassurance partnerships will place bank peers at a competitive disadvantage to the 
acquiring banks operating within the same industry/market. 
The above results are somewhat comparable to those reported in Johnston and 
Madura (2000) and Carow (2001a). Both papers report a positive reaction by large 
banks, brokerage firms and insurers to the Citicorp-Travelers merger. One should be 
careful, however, in making direct comparisons because a) the current framework 
considers the average spillover effects of a large cross-section of domestic and 
international bank-insurance mergers, while the former studies measure the 
contagion-competitive effects of a specific announcement, and b) the Citicorp-
Travelers merger was a distinct case challenging the then existing U.S. regulatory 
barriers on product diversification. Moreover, it is notable that at Citigroup, the much 
talked about cross-selling synergies took place on the corporate and not on the retail 
banking side and, as such, we have to exercise due care in generalizing the findings 
from these studies. In addition, the fact that insurance peers experience positive 
results – possibly due to investor anticipation that they will become future targets of 
banks – is also consistent with the literature on banking, which shows the target firms 
gain as a result of M&As (Amel, Barnes, Panetta and Salleo, 2004). Finally, the above 
results are also somewhat similar with studies on contagion, which report strong 
return-related spillover effects across small financial intermediaries (Elyasiani, 
Mansur and Pagano, 2007), or contagion effects from banking failures or distress 
announcements (Aharony and Swary, 1983; 1996; Brewer and Jackson, 2002), 
respectively. 
7.4.3. DETERMINANTS OF BIDDER EXCESS RETURNS 
 
This section aims to assess the determinants of bidder abnormal performance using 
a cross sectional framework. In particular, the estimated excess returns are regressed 
on a selection of accounting data, deal specific variables and geographical 
characteristics. A general to specific methodology is employed that uses a dynamic 
model specification to identify the factors that are statistically significant across 
different time windows. Equation (7.9) represents the initial model specification, 
while the final model (equation 7.10) is presented in Table 7.4. Previous studies have 
explored the determinants of abnormal returns from bank-insurance deal 
 192 
announcements in a similar fashion (Chen, Li, Moshirian and Tan, 2007; Cybo-Ottone 
and Murgia, 2000; Fields, Fraser and Kolari, 2007a; b). 
 
ARit = α + β1(OBSAi) + β2(LEVi) + β3(ROEi) + β4(RDSi) + β5(M/Bi)  
          + β6(DV-DOMi) + β7(DV-U.S.i) + β8(DV-OFFi)             (7.9) 
          + β9(DV-SOUGHTi) + β10(DIST) + εit  
 
ARit = c + γ1(LEVi) + γ2(DV-OFFi) + γ3(RDSi) + γ4(DV-U.S.i) + uit          (7.10) 
 
where, ARit is the estimated excess return of bidder i at time (event-window) t. The 
accounting variables employed are the ratio of non-interest income to total operating 
income (as a measure of off-balance sheet activities and functional diversification, 
OBSA), leverage (equity multiplier measured as assets over equity, LEV), the relative 
size of the deal (ratio of deal-value/market-value of bidder, RDS), two profitability 
measures: return on equity (ROE) or return on assets (ROA) used interchangeably, 
and the market to book value (M/B) ratio as a measure of growth opportunities.  
The deal-specific factors include variables that account for domestic versus foreign 
deals (dummy equal to 1 if deal is domestic and 0 otherwise, DV-DOM), a variable 
that accounts for U.S. versus non-U.S. bidders (dummy equal to 1 if bidders is based 
in the U.S. and 0 otherwise, DV-U.S.), the consideration offered, which is the medium 
of payment used by the bidder (dummy equal to 1 if cash and 0 otherwise, DV-
OFFER) - Thomson One Banker reports cash and stock offers; the consideration 
sought, which is what the bidder buys from the target (dummy equal to 1 for stock 
and 0 otherwise, DV-SOUGHT) - this is provided as stock versus assets by Thomson 
One Banker; and finally, the distance – expressed in thousands of miles125
Table 7.4
 – between 
acquirer and target (DIST), which is employed as a measure of geographic 
diversification. 
 presents the results of the cross section analysis. In particular, columns 
numbered 1 to 4 contain the results from the regressions using different time 
windows, while rows numbered 1 to 5 contain the variables used across all models. 
                                                 
125 The distance between acquirer and target is measured as the distance between their respective 
headquarters, using the standard Euclidean approach.  The latter is also known as “as the crow flies” 
measure, and it is a uniform standard, offering more certainty than a measure based on road miles, 
which will continually fluctuate as new and different routes are constructed. 
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 Table 7.4. Multiple regression analysis of bank-insurance deals 
 
ARit = c + γ1 (LEVi) + γ2 (DV-OFFERi) + γ3 (RDSi) + γ4 (DV-U.S.i) + uit 
 
 1 2 3 4 
  Event  window  
 [-1  0] [0  0] [0  +1] [-1  +1] 
     
1 C (Constant) 0.040 0.038 0.035 0.036 
 (1.75) c (1.96) b (1.80) c (1.55) 
2 LEV (Leverage) 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.001 
 (2.18) b (1.90) c (1.63) (1.89) c 
3 DV-OFFER (Payment Method) 
-0.074 -0.062 -0.050 -0.062 
 (-3.92) a (-3.85) a (-3.13) a (-3.18) a 
4 RDS (Relative deal size) 0.002 0.005 0.004 0.001 
 (0.92) (2.38) b (1.79) c (0.39) 
5 DV-U.S. (U.S. Bidder) 0.052 0.057 0.041 0.036 
 (2.95) a (3.81) a (2.77) a (1.98) b 
     
The sample consists of 50 bancassurance deals announced between 1990 and 2006. After adjusting for companies 
with unavailable accounting data, the sample size drops to 40 deals. Abnormal returns are calculated using the 
market model via a GARCH estimation process. The multivariate analysis is performed using ordinary least 
squares.  
AR stands for the abnormal returns, while C is the constant; LEV is the dummy taking into account the bidder’s 
leverage (equity multiplier); DV-OFFER is the dummy variable taking into account the type of consideration 
offered by the bidder (cash or stock); RDS is the relative size of the deal to the bidder’s market value; DV-U.S. is 
the dummy taking into account the U.S. acquirers. The figures in brackets indicate t-values. 
a/b/c denote significant CAAR at the 0.01/0.05/0.10 level (two-tailed test) for the pertinent event period. 
 
The results presented in Table 7.4, point to some interesting conclusions. There is a 
positive and significant relationship between leverage (row 2) and excess returns in all 
time intervals, apart from the [0  +1] window (column 3), where the coefficient 
becomes marginally insignificant. The economic explanation for this result can be 
based on the relationship between profitability and leverage. Specifically, higher 
leverage increases the return on equity (ROE) for a given return on assets (ROA)126
                                                 
126 Note that ROE is the product of the ROA and equity multiplier (assets/equity), hence the impact of 
leverage on profitability measures. Financial analysts are familiar with the practical interaction 
between leverage and profitability. 
. 
This in turn, increases the appeal of levered firms to investors and triggers further 
trading activity and higher stock prices. Abnormal returns can be associated with the 
asset-liability structures of financial institutions because profitability catches the 
attention of market participants even if this is associated with increased risk – in this 
case measured by leverage. Surprisingly, the results do not reveal any significant 
relationship between the rest of the accounting variables (see equation 7.9) and excess 
returns. In particular, accounting measures such as the institutions’ market to book 
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value (M/B), profitability (ROE or ROA), or the non-interest income share (OBSA), 
do not play any significant role in the market valuations around the deal 
announcements. The results on geographic diversification corroborate the results 
reported in Stiroh (2004), but in contrast with Baele, De Jonghe and Vander Vennet 
(2007).  
Shifting the focus to the deal specific attributes leads to a number of interesting 
conclusions. First, the results indicate a significant relationship between the medium 
of payment and the subsequent excess returns experienced by acquiring banks. 
Specifically, the coefficient on the indicator (dummy) variable taking into account 
stock offers as opposed to cash offers is negative and significant, which implies that 
banks bidding for insurance companies via cash offers experience smaller excess 
returns than those offering stock as a method of payment. In comparison with extant 
studies these findings are quite interesting as well as intuitive127
Amel, Barnes, Panetta and Salleo, 2004
. In general, the 
literature on financial institutions has documented negative and/or insignificant results 
for the bidders ( ). This stands in contrast with 
the positive excess returns observed here for the bancassurance mergers. The 
explanation may be that since bancassurance deals provide positive benefits to the 
shareholders, markets may manifest these benefits in their preference for the medium 
of payment offered. To elaborate, since equity financing by bidders provides for 
sharing of future wealth (or future misery) with the shareholders of the acquired firms, 
depending on the market’s perception of the particular deal, stock consideration for 
the profitable bancassurance deals will and cash consideration will not mirror the 
investors’ preferences. As a consequence, cash consideration would be perceived 
negatively and would produce either a lower positive or even negative excess returns 
compared to the alternative of stock financing. 
                                                 
127 The literature on methods of payment suggests that the choice of the medium offered conveys 
information about the bidder’s assessment of either its own value or the value of the target (Franks, 
Harris and Titman, 1991). More specifically, Loughran and Anand (1997) and Raghavendra Rau and 
Vermaelen (1998) suggest that managers who believe that their stock is overvalued (undervalued) 
will pay with stock (cash). Empirical evidence points to lower or negative bidder abnormal returns 
for stock financed acquisitions, while higher or positive for cash-financed acquisitions (Alan, 1997; 
Franks, Harris and Titman, 1991; Raghavendra Rau and Vermaelen, 1998). Similar findings are 
reported in Travlos (1987) who examines the relation between the medium of payment and bidder 
abnormal returns around corporate takeover announcements. He also suggests that this happens 
because the market participants interpret a cash offer as good news and a common stock exchange 
offer as bad news about the bidding firm’s true value. On the other hand, Alan (1997) reports 
negative and significant abnormal returns related with cash offers when the CAPM model is used to 
extract excess returns. Fields, Fraser and Kolari (2007a) find insignificant results, while Chang 
(1998) finds insignificant bidder excess return for cash offers and positive and significant bidder 
excess return for stock offers. 
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 Second, the results point to a positive and significant relationship between the 
relative size of the deal (ratio of deal value to the market value of bidder, RDS) and 
bidder excess returns. This implies that the market considers scale economies and 
synergies in the joint production of bank-insurance products, gains through larger 
internal markets, or other indirect benefits such as “too big to fail” guarantees, when 
valuing bank-insurance deals. The latter is in line with Chen, Li, Moshirian and Tan 
(2007) who report similar findings for this ratio. Third, the results point to a 
significant relationship between the geographic origin of the bidder and excess 
returns. In particular, the coefficient on the dummy variable taking into account U.S. 
bidders is positive and significant, implying that U.S. bidders exhibit higher 
valuations than their non-U.S. counterparts. A plausible explanation might be that the 
recent abolishment of the regulatory hedges in the U.S. financial services industry 
(FSMA, 1999), has paved the way for synergistic gains via the creation of financial 
conglomerates. On the other hand, it could be that case that the mere size of the U.S. 
market is an important contributing factor. Finally, the distance between the bidder 
and target (DIST) and the status of the deal as domestic versus cross border (DV-
DOM) do not play any significant role in the valuations of the bidders. Distinction 
between domestic versus cross-border deals (DV-DOM), and the distance between the 
acquirer and target (DIST) are found to play insignificant valuation roles. The 
growing degree of market integration across national borders and the notion that 
geographic distance plays a lesser and lesser role in production and marketing of 
intermediation services (Berger and DeYoung, 2006) are in line with the results here. 
On the other hand, recent evidence tends to support the idea of greater synergies when 
the language barriers fall, namely when mergers are domestic (Buch and DeLong, 
2004). Nevertheless, the above results do not support this notion. 
7.4.4. RISK DECOMPOSITION 
 
Having looked at the effects of bank-insurance mergers on the stock prices of 
acquirers and their peers this section shifts the attention to the risk element. In spite of 
the wealth effects, the effects on risk, if any, are of great importance to investors, 
regulators and customers alike. This is due to the relationship between risk and return 
and more specifically the possibility of risk-return trade-offs. In particular, it is likely 
that as the bidder/peer returns rise in response to the deal announcements, these 
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institutions trade off the higher returns for a higher level of risk. Although such a 
trade-off is not necessary, its presence could cast a shadow of doubt on any return-
related gains from bank-insurance. Therefore, analysing the risk effects at this stage is 
considered essential, given the fact that looking at the return effects in isolation would 
only provide a partial picture. 
Furthermore, the analysis here is considered important as it adds further evidence 
to the stream of academic research focusing on the risk effects of bancassurance, 
which has produced rather mixed results (Allen and Jagtiani, 2000; Boyd and 
Graham, 1986; 1988; Boyd, Graham and Hewitt, 1993; Genetay and Molyneux, 1998; 
Lown, Osler, Strahan and Sufi, 2000; Nurullah and Staikouras, 2008). 
Following the previous sections a GARCH framework is also applied here as it is 
considered more suitable for analysing equity movements. The methodological 
approach used here, allows the decomposition of total risk into its systematic and 
idiosyncratic components, for the pre- and post-announcement periods. Such an 
approach, within a GARCH framework, is applied for the first time to analyse the 
risk-effects of mergers and acquisitions and specifically those between banks and 
insurance companies. 
In particular, capital market data and a single index model (equation 7.1) are used 
to decompose the total equity risk of each bidder bank into its systematic and 
unsystematic components (equation 7.8). Once the analysis has been carried out for 
both the pre- and post-announcement periods, the figures are compared. The final 
results are presented in Table 7.5. Panel A presents the decomposition of total return 
risk of acquiring firms in the period before the announcement, while panel B deals 
with the risk decomposition for the period following the announcement. The changes 
in the risk components and other variables are presented in panel C. 
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Table 7.5. Risk decomposition of bidder banks’ stock returns 
 
Panel A.   Pre-announcement  Day -250 to Day -1 
 TR = β 2 × Hm + Hu 
      
 4.583 = 1.644 + 2.939 
 100% = 35.9% + 64.1% 
    
Mean  R 0.066% Standard deviation of  R 0.0029 
Mean  Rm 0.021% Standard deviation of  Rm 0.0015 
Mean  β 0.920 Standard deviation of  β 0.3988 
Mean  β 2 1.001 Standard deviation of  β 2 0.7680 
Mean  Hm 1.672   
    
Panel B.   Post-announcement  Day +1 to Day +250 
 TR = β 2 × Hm + Hu 
      
 3.989 = 1.460 + 2.529 
 100% = 36.6% + 63.4% 
    
Mean  R 0.048% Standard deviation of  R 0.0031 
Mean  Rm 0.013% Standard deviation of  Rm 0.0020 
Mean  β 0.862 Standard deviation of  β 0.3935 
Mean  β 2 0.894 Standard deviation of  β 2 0.6615 
Mean  Hm 1.735   
    
Panel C.   Changes in risk pre- and post-announcement 1 
 ∆ (TR) = ∆ (β 2 × Hm) + ∆ (Hu) 
      
 -0.594 = -0.184 + -0.410 
% change -13.0%  -11.2%  -13.9% 
    
∆ (Mean  R) -0.018% ∆ (Standard deviation of  R) 0.0002 
∆ (Mean  Rm) -0.008% ∆ (Standard deviation of  Rm) 0.0005 
∆ (Mean  β) -0.058 ∆ (Standard deviation of  β) -0.0053 
∆ (Mean  β 2) -0.107 ∆ (Standard deviation of  β 2) -0.1065 
∆ (Mean  Hm) 0.063   
    
The table presents the shift in relative importance of risk factors composing total bank bidder return risk before 
and after bank-insurance partnership announcements. The sample consists of 50 bank-insurance deals announced 
between 1990 and 2006. All the risk measures have been calculated using the models described in equation (7.8).  
The conditional variance terms are multiplied by 104. 
R = return on the portfolio, Rm = return on the market 
TR = total risk,  β = hedge ratio, Hm = conditional variance, Hu = residual conditional variance. 
1 Negative values indicate reduction in the risk or other measures, while positive values indicate an increase. 
 
Looking at the figures reported in Table 7.5, it is evident that the overall risk (TR) 
of the acquiring firms decreases between the pre- and post-announcement periods. 
Specifically, the figure drops from 4.583 (panel A) to 3.989 (panel B), demonstrating 
a decline of 0.594, or otherwise 13% (panel C). A closer look at the components of 
total risk reveals that the larger part of this decrease is due to the decline in the 
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residual (or sector-specific, Hu) risk, which diminishes from 2.939 to 2.529 (panels 
A/B, respectively), or a relative decline of 13.95% (panel C). Similarly, the market 
risk component (β2 × Hm) drops from 1.644 to 1.460 (panels A/B, respectively) or by 
11.20% (panel C). Overall, the results suggest a reduction in total risk (TR) in the 
post-announcement phase. However, a closer look at the contributions of the market 
and residual risk components on total risk reveals some interesting results. The latter 
figures remain almost unchanged. In particular, the relative importance of market risk, 
which was 35.9% in the pre-deal period, increases to 36.6% in the post-deal period, 
while the relative importance of the idiosyncratic risk component falls from 64.1% to 
63.4%, or an equivalent decline of 70 basis points, in the post-announcement phase. 
A number of interesting conclusions can be drawn from the analysis above. First, it 
seems that the diversification into bancassurance increases the share of the acquiring 
institutions in the total market basket, or brings them closer to the large firms in the 
index and, thus, increases their market risk exposure. Conversely, the decline in the 
unsystematic risk of these firms reflects the smaller share of the idiosyncratic factors 
in the financial services industry. One reasonable explanation might be that 
bancassurance is expected to increase the quality of their financial management and 
strategic policy. An alternative justification might be that that the additional non-
interest income coming from bancassurance operations is expected to produce the 
much desired diversification benefits, thus decreasing bank idiosyncratic risk. At the 
same time, the increased scale of the combined entity might trigger investor 
expectations for implicit access to the government’s safety net through too-big-to-fail 
guarantees and greater internal markets. On the other hand, increased co-movement 
between these companies and the overall market, implied by the higher systematic 
component, raises concerns about systemic risk. This is demonstrated by the impact 
that large financial intermediaries have on the economic system and subsequently on 
the society. A vivid example is the recent credit crisis. 
Figure 7.1 below presents the conditional variances of the acquiring bank-
insurance firms in the sample in the pre- and post-announcement periods. According 
to the statistics reported in Figure 7.1, the mean conditional variance in the post-deal 
period is somewhat smaller (0.00025 compared to 0.00029) and the associated 
standard deviation is slightly larger (0.00030 compared to 0.00027). Overall, the 
figure illustrates some reduction in the conditional variance of the bank bidders’ 
equity returns in the post-deal period. 
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Figure 7.1. Conditional variance of bidder equity returns during the pre- and post-
deal phase 
 
 
An impulse response function (IRF) analysis has also been carried out. This shows 
how banks’ variance measures react to a one standard deviation shock in the 
conditional variance of the stocks in the pre- and post-announcement periods. Figure 
7.2 shows that after the exogenous shock takes place, the expected post-deal corporate 
structure absorbs it more quickly, than the firm prior to the announcement. As can be 
seen in Figure 7.2, although the initial reaction to the shock is higher in the post-deal 
phase, compared to the pre-deal phase, it takes six days for the post-deal variance to 
fall below the pre-deal variance. Overall, it can be argued that there is a slight decline 
in risk due to the higher market expectations related to the establishment of the bank-
insurance structures. This benefit strengthens the observed excess returns surrounding 
the announcement date of the deal, on the acquiring banks, as discussed earlier. 
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Figure 7.2. Impulse response analysis on the conditional variance of equity returns 
 
7.4.5. RISK SPILLOVER EFFECTS ON PEER INSTITUTIONS 
 
The current global economic system is characterised by strong interdependencies 
both within and between economies/sectors. With spillover effects being the norm 
rather than the exception, if an economy experiences a major shock it is very difficult 
to contain the damage from spreading within and across economies/sectors. The 
recent banking crisis caused the S&P500 index to shed more than 45% of its value 
between June 2007 and November 2008, while the effects rapidly spilled over to the 
rest of the world and developed into a global economic shock, resulting in 
plummeting stock markets and wide-spread bank failures. As such, it is not a 
coincidence that the unprecedented trend towards convergence in the financial 
services industry – as witnessed by mega-mergers and the creation of financial 
conglomerates – raises considerable concerns regarding the effects on the stability of 
the financial system (Herring and Santomero, 1990). One of the most important issues 
attracting scrutiny from both academics and regulators alike is the effects of 
convergence on systemic risk. In fact, the concerns regarding convergence are based 
on the notion that, as Carey and Stulz (2005) propose, risk may spillover more easily 
across financial institutions (FIs) if the latter are highly interconnected, something that 
may lead to system-wide problems. Indeed, several studies on the equity returns of 
FIs reveal strong linkages caused by information flows across these (Flannery, 1998). 
Specifically, they verify the existence of wealth-spillover effects across FIs 
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(Elyasiani, Mansur and Pagano, 2007) and in particular those caused by 
banking/insurance failures or distress announcements (Aharony and Swary, 1983; 
1996; Brewer and Jackson, 2002; Kaufman, 1994). The risk-spillover effects, 
however, have received attention only recently, with Elyasiani, Mansur and Pagano 
(2007) reporting strong volatility-spillover effects across FIs and Elyasiani and 
Mansur (2003) pointing to strong interest-rate and idiosyncratic volatility spillover 
effects in the equity prices of banks across the U.S., Japan and Germany. Focusing on 
bank-insurance mergers, an issue of great importance to stakeholders and regulators is 
whether these deals have a negative impact on the systemic risk (increase of) of the 
financial sector. If this is true, regulators should apply the necessary steps/policies to 
minimize that risk. On the other hand, if bank-insurance deals have a positive impact 
on systemic risk (decrease of), then incentives for the creation of such hybrid 
structures should be strengthened. Considering the importance of these issues, this 
section proceeds to assess the existence of risk spillover effects emanating from bank-
insurance deals to the financial services industry, and more specifically to the banking 
and insurance sectors. This is the first time the risk spillover effects from bank-
insurance deals are examined. Table 7.6 and Table 7.7 present the risk decomposition 
analysis for bank and insurance peers, respectively. 
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Table 7.6. Risk decomposition of bank peer portfolio returns 
 
Panel A.   Pre-announcement  Day -250 to Day -1 
 TR = β 2 × Hm + Hu 
      
 2.486 = 1.367 + 1.119 
 100% = 55.0% + 45.0% 
    
Mean  R 0.048% Standard deviation of  R 0.0025 
Mean  Rm 0.021% Standard deviation of  Rm 0.0022 
Mean  β 0.817 Standard deviation of  β 0.2670 
Mean  β 2 0.738 Standard deviation of  β 2 0.4075 
Mean  Hm 1.939   
    
Panel B.   Post-announcement  Day +1 to Day +250 
 TR = β 2 × Hm + Hu 
      
 2.194 = 1.263 + 0.931 
 100% = 57.6% + 42.4% 
    
Mean  R 0.019% Standard deviation of  R 0.0025 
Mean  Rm 0.005% Standard deviation of  Rm 0.0022 
Mean  β 0.824 Standard deviation of  β 0.2290 
Mean  β 2 0.730 Standard deviation of  β 2 0.3652 
Mean  Hm 1.847   
    
Panel C.   Changes in risk pre- and post-announcement 1 
 ∆ (TR) = ∆ (β 2 × Hm) + ∆ (Hu) 
      
 -0.292 = -0.104 + -0.188 
% change -11.7%  -7.6%  -16.8% 
    
∆ (Mean  R) -0.029% ∆ (Standard deviation of  R) 0.0000 
∆ (Mean  Rm) -0.016% ∆ (Standard deviation of  Rm) 0.0000 
∆ (Mean  β) 0.007 ∆ (Standard deviation of  β) -0.0380 
∆ (Mean  β 2) -0.008 ∆ (Standard deviation of  β 2) -0.0423 
∆ (Mean  Hm) -0.092   
    
The table presents the shift in relative importance of risk factors composing total return risk of bank peer portfolios 
before and after bank-insurance partnership announcements. The sample consists of 40 bank peer portfolios.  All 
the risk measures have been calculated using the models described in equation (7.8). The conditional variance 
terms are multiplied by 104. 
R = return on the portfolio, Rm = return on the market 
TR = total risk,  β = hedge ratio, Hm = conditional variance, Hu = residual conditional variance. 
1 Negative values indicate reduction in the risk or other measures, while positive values indicate an increase. 
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Table 7.7. Risk decomposition of insurance peer portfolio returns 
 
Panel A.   Pre-announcement  Day -250 to Day -1 
 TR = β 2 × Hm + Hu 
      
 3.060 = 1.197 + 1.863 
 100% = 39.1% + 60.9% 
    
Mean  R 0.044% Standard deviation of  R 0.0028 
Mean  Rm 0.021% Standard deviation of  Rm 0.0022 
Mean  β 0.778 Standard deviation of  β 0.2454 
Mean  β 2 0.664 Standard deviation of  β 2 0.3437 
Mean  Hm 1.678   
    
Panel B.   Post-announcement  Day +1 to Day +250 
 TR = β 2 × Hm + Hu 
      
 2.301 = 1.029 + 1.272 
 100% = 44.7% + 55.3% 
    
Mean  R 0.042% Standard deviation of  R 0.0027 
Mean  Rm 0.031% Standard deviation of  Rm 0.0020 
Mean  β 0.803 Standard deviation of  β 0.2269 
Mean  β 2 0.695 Standard deviation of  β 2 0.3195 
Mean  Hm 1.484   
    
Panel C.   Changes in risk pre- and post-announcement 1 
 ∆ (TR) = ∆ (β 2 × Hm) + ∆ (Hu) 
      
 -0.759 = -0.168 + -0.591 
% change -24.8%  -14.0%  -31.7% 
    
∆ (Mean  R) -0.002% ∆ (Standard deviation of  R) -0.0001 
∆ (Mean  Rm) 0.0100% ∆ (Standard deviation of  Rm) -0.0002 
∆ (Mean  β) 0.025 ∆ (Standard deviation of  β) -0.0185 
∆ (Mean  β 2) 0.031 ∆ (Standard deviation of  β 2) -0.0242 
∆ (Mean  Hm) -0.194   
    
The table presents the shift in relative importance of risk factors composing total return risk of insurance peer 
portfolios before and after bank-insurance partnership announcements. The sample consists of 33 insurance peer 
portfolios. All the risk measures have been calculated using the models described in equation (7.8). The 
conditional variance terms are multiplied by 104. 
R = return on the portfolio, Rm = return on the market 
TR = total risk,  β = hedge ratio, Hm = conditional variance, Hu = residual conditional variance. 
1 Negative values indicate reduction in the risk or other measures, while positive values indicate a respective 
increase 
 
Based on the figures reported in Table 7.6 and Table 7.7 (panels A/B, column 1, 
row 1), the overall risk (TR) of bank and insurance peers decreases in the post-
announcement periods. Interestingly, the risk reduction is greater for insurance peers 
(24.8%) than for bank peers (11.7%) as shown in panels C, column 1, row 2, in both 
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tables. Furthermore, looking at the changes in the components of total risk for bank 
and insurance peers, it is evident that the reduction is mostly attributable to the 
reduction in the firm-specific components of risk (Hu). Similar to the findings for 
total risk, the reduction in the idiosyncratic component is greater for the insurance 
peers (31.7%; Table 7.7) than for bank peers (16.8%; Table 7.6). Looking at the 
changes in the market risk components (β2 × Hm) of peer institutions it is evident that 
bank-insurance deals have an impact on the market risk component of peer 
institutions, yet this is limited to a 7.6% reduction for bank peers and to a 14.0% 
reduction for insurance peers, as shown in Table 7.6 and Table 7.7 under panels C. 
Figure 7.3 and Figure 7.4 below present the conditional variances of the bank peer 
and insurance peer equity returns, respectively, during the pre- and post-
announcement periods. According to the statistics reported in the figures, the mean 
conditional variance of bank peers is reduced in the post-deal period (from 0.00011 to 
0.00009) and the associated standard deviation remains constant (0.00002). The mean 
conditional variance of insurance peers shows a greater reduction in the post-deal 
period (from 0.00019 to 0.00013), verifying the results in table Table 7.7. 
Nevertheless, the associated standard deviation in this case exhibits a small increase. 
Overall, the figures illustrate a reduction in the conditional variances of the peers’ 
equity returns in the post-deal period. 
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Figure 7.3. Conditional variance of bank peer equity returns during the pre- and post-
deal phase 
 
 
Figure 7.4. Conditional variance of insurance peer equity returns during the pre- and 
post-deal phase 
 
 
In general, the results point to the following conclusions. First, risk spillover 
effects caused by bank-insurance deals not only exist but are also of contagion nature, 
given that peer institution risk changes are in the same direction as risk changes 
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experienced by acquiring firms. This should eliminate the concerns discussed above, 
given that the risk spillover effects caused by bank-insurance partnerships lead to a 
wider risk reduction across peer FIs. Second, it is clear that insurance peers react more 
positively to bank-insurance deal announcements, exhibiting greater reductions in 
risk, post-announcement. Similar to the discussion in section 4.4.2, an explanation for 
this might be the existence of dissimilar investors’ expectations about the future of 
banks and insurers. 
The overall findings are to some extent comparable to Elyasiani, Mansur and 
Pagano (2007) and Elyasiani and Mansur (2003) who report strong volatility spillover 
effects across banks using an international sample and across commercial and 
investment banks and insurers, respectively. Their results in essence suggest that 
adverse (benign) risk shocks from one sector can be transferred easily to another 
sector or to the same sector in different parts of the world. Our findings support this 
notion, in that, the risk reduction in the equity prices of bank bidders following bank-
insurance deal announcements, spills over to peer banks and insurance companies. 
The fact that the relation is positive – peers exhibiting risk reductions as well – is in 
favour of the bank-insurance framework, as the latter not only reduces all risk 
components of acquiring firms, but also acts as a mechanism to reduce the overall risk 
of FIs. 
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7.5. CONCLUSION 
 
This chapter employs and event study methodology and risk decomposition 
approach, within a GARCH framework, in order to investigate a) the effects of bank 
acquisitions of insurance companies on the returns and risk of the acquiring banks, b) 
whether these effects spillover to the banking and insurance peers, and c) whether the 
spillover effects are of contagion or competitive nature. The GARCH framework is 
preferred as it accounts for the clustering pattern of errors and persistence of shocks to 
the system. Finally the determinants of the magnitudes of excess returns for the 
acquiring banks are also examined. This is the first time an event study and risk 
decomposition approach are used within a GARCH framework in order to assess the 
impact of actual bank-insurance mergers on the risk-return profiles of acquiring 
institutions. What is more, the risk-return spillover effects have not been examined in 
the context of actual bank-insurance deals. 
The event study analysis reveals that acquiring banks and their peer banks and 
insurers experience positive abnormal returns in response to the announcement of the 
mergers. The effect on the acquiring banks dissipates within one day after the 
announcement, consistent with the notion of efficient markets. The analysis of the 
reaction of peers reveals the presence of spillover effects that are of contagion nature. 
Specifically bank peers react positively to the announcements but the effects dissipate 
quickly (within one day following the announcements), while the effect on insurance 
peers is not only stronger, but is also sustained for a longer period of time following 
the announcements (up to nine days). The cross-section analysis reveals a positive 
relationship between bank leverage, relative deal size and whether the bidder is a U.S. 
bank and excess returns. On the other hand, there is a negative relationship between 
cash financed deals and excess returns. When risk is considered, the bank-insurance 
deal announcements are found to bring about a slight decline in risk for the bidding 
firms that spills over to the peer institutions. The fact that the relation is positive – 
peers exhibiting risk reductions as well – is in favour of the bank-insurance 
framework, as the latter not only reduces all risk components of acquiring firms, but 
also acts as a mechanism to reduce the overall risk of FIs. The results provide some 
support for the combination of banking activities with insurance services and for the 
passage of the European Directive (1989) in the E.U. and the Financial Services 
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Modernization Act (1999) in the U.S. The implication for regulators is to allow and 
perhaps encourage such hybrid enterprises. Similarly, financial firm managers seeking 
to improve their performance in terms of profitability and risk should consider deals 
that bring together these two types of financial service providers. Investors in the 
market place may also find the stocks of financial firms combining the banking and 
insurance enterprises a more suitable vehicle to invest than those operating purely in 
banking or insurance sectors. 
 209 
8. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
In recent years market forces have facilitated the creation of new capital markets 
products that closely resemble the services offered by financial intermediaries. These 
innovations coupled with the increasing popularity of capital markets have resulted in 
a disintermediation process, where traditional intermediaries have witnessed plunging 
market shares and revenues. These forces have pushed towards a structural evolution 
in the traditionally fragmented functions of financial intermediaries. After a series of 
lagged responses between regulation, circumvention and deregulation, the 
consolidation and the creation of very large, multi-product firms with global reach 
and power is currently the norm rather than the exception. One of the considerable 
transformations in the financial services industry has been the collaboration between 
banks and insurance companies through bancassurance. 
The increasing popularity of hybrid structures such as universal banks, financial 
conglomerates, bank-securities partnerships and bancassurance has triggered a long-
lasting debate among scholars and policymakers. The debate in the academic 
literature extends from theoretical contributions with regards to the benefits and 
concerns related to this trend, to empirical investigations that attempt to shed light on 
the effects of this phenomenon on the financial industry and its participants. In 
addition, the effects of the recent financial crisis have led to renewed attention on the 
level of interconnectedness of modern financial institutions and the inability of the 
current regulatory and supervisory system to prevent the systemic consequences of 
what started as a mere banking crisis. The above have facilitated the appearance of 
claims for re-regulation, including proposals for ‘narrow banking’ through the 
introduction of firewalls such as those imposed by the Glass-Steagall Act. In effect, a 
growing number of policymakers have suggested that the size and permissible 
activities of financial institutions should be re-constricted due to increased systemic 
risk. Therefore, an important issue that must be a priori clarified by policymakers, is 
the distinction between types of bank diversification that add value for shareholders 
without adding to systemic risk, and those that might pose a threat to financial 
stability, irrespective of the possible benefit to the individual firms’ shareholders. The 
conflicting results of the contributions on the debate on the risk-return effects of 
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financial conglomerates, coupled with the limited and/or mixed results on bank-
insurance specifically, have been the motivation for this thesis. 
This thesis delves into the effects of mergers and acquisitions between banks and 
insurance companies on the risk-return attributes of acquiring firms and those of the 
banking and insurance sectors. In this respect, the current thesis contributes in a 
substantial way to the extant research, thereby extending the literature, in the 
following ways. 
First, it employs the most comprehensive sample of international bank-insurance 
deals, covering the period from 1990 to 2006. This period represents the most active 
period in terms of bank-insurance partnerships and, as such, incorporates the largest 
and most important deals of this type. Second, it distinguishes deals between banks 
and insurance companies from those between banks and insurance agencies/brokers. 
This is to allow for differences in the risk-return profiles of banks when they merge 
with insurance underwriters, as opposed to merging with insurance agents/brokers. As 
such, it deviates from a large volume of event studies in the extant literature that do 
not make this important distinction. Third, for the first time in the literature, the 
wealth effects of all available bank-insurance divestitures and spin-offs are evaluated. 
Fourth, it applies for the first time in the literature a risk decomposition approach in 
order to examine the effect of bancassurance partnerships on the risk components of 
acquiring firms before and after the deals’ announcement / completion. Fifth, it 
provides original evidence on the determinants of total, market and systematic risk on 
a pre- and post-merger basis. Sixth, it applies a GARCH methodology within an event 
study and decomposition framework in order to examine the wealth and risk effects of 
bank-insurance mergers on acquiring banks. From the perspective of event studies, 
this is the first time such a framework is being applied to examine the wealth effects 
of bancassurance deals. From the risk perspective, this thesis offers a new 
methodological framework for the decomposition of total return risk into its 
systematic and idiosyncratic components. Finally, the current research offers novel 
results with respect to the existence of risk-return spillover effects from bank bidders 
– in bancassurance mergers – to their bank and insurance peers. 
The event study results suggest that bidders experience positive and significant 
excess returns on and around the announcement day(s) of bancassurance deals. As 
such, the overall conclusion is that bancassurance creates value for the stockholders of 
acquiring firms. On the one hand however, banks increase shareholder value in bids 
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for insurance firms, while on the other hand insurance companies do not add value in 
analogous bids for banks. Insignificant stock price reactions are also observed for 
bank acquisitions of insurance agencies. Results also show that investors expect more 
synergies to be realised through domestic bancassurance deals, whereas large deals 
are found to be superior to small deals. Furthermore, U.S. bidders experience higher 
price adjustments than bidders from other geographic regions. European and 
Canadian bidders experience positive and significant valuations while Australasian 
acquirers exhibit negative but insignificant excess returns. Finally, the examination of 
bancassurance divestitures and spin-offs suggests that the market is indifferent with 
respect to exits from the bancassurance model. 
The analysis of the determinants of excess returns reveals a significant negative 
relationship between non-interest income and bidder excess returns, indicating that 
the market is penalizing institutions that are already more reliant on non-interest 
income before the deal’s announcement. What is more, it is found that the market 
values the potential for scale economies in bancassurance deals and also views more 
favourably deals where the acquiring institution is U.S. based. Surprisingly, evidence 
from the multivariate analysis shows that controlling for other factors simultaneously, 
bank bidders lose value. The results also point to a shift in the relative importance of 
the determinants of bidder abnormal performance following the FSMA. Prior to the 
FSMA, investors value opportunities for growth, the potential for scale economies 
and whether the acquirer is a U.S. financial institution. In contrast, after the passage of 
the FSMA investors are interested in the acquirers’ capacity for further functional 
diversification and their profitability potential. 
The results of the risk decomposition analysis show that bancassurance deals do 
not significantly affect the total and idiosyncratic risk of acquiring institutions. 
However, evidence is provided that supports the notion that bank exposure to system 
wide shocks increases following the bank-insurance partnerships. Banks combinations 
with insurance agencies expose bidders to considerably higher systematic risk than 
bank acquisitions of insurance underwriters. Furthermore, the findings suggest that 
banks are more exposed to firm-specific risk than to market risk, while insurance 
companies are relatively equally exposed to both types of risk and, as such, 
bancassurance offers institutions opportunities to rebalance their risk exposures. The 
analysis of the determinants of risk shows that the additional non-interest income 
achieved through bancassurance operations is no longer positively correlated with 
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market betas following the mergers. Therefore, it is not diversification into insurance 
activities per se, that drives market betas up, but rather the increased scale of the 
institutions. In addition, results show that the negative and significant relationship 
between non-interest income share and unsystematic risk prior to the deals fades away 
following bank acquisitions of insurance companies, but remains significant after 
bank acquisitions of insurance agencies. Therefore, bank acquisitions of insurance 
agencies are superior to bank acquisitions of insurance underwriters, when 
idiosyncratic risk is considered. 
Finally, the application of a special GARCH approach reveals that acquiring banks 
and their peers experience positive and significant stock price reactions around the 
announcement of the deals. As such, the reaction of peers reveals the presence of 
wealth spillover effects that are of contagion nature. The cross-section analysis 
reveals a positive relationship between bank leverage, relative deal size and whether 
the bidder is a U.S. bank and excess returns. On the other hand, there is a negative 
relationship between cash financed deals and excess returns. The bank-insurance deal 
announcements are found to trigger declines in the risk attributes of the bidding firms 
and their bank and insurer peers. The decline in the risk attributes of peers points to 
the existence of risk spillover effects that are of contagion nature. As such, the 
bancassurance model seems to be beneficial for the financial services industry as it 
not only reduces all risk components of acquiring firms, but also acts as a mechanism 
to reduce the overall risk of peer institutions. 
The results of this thesis not only add to the existing body of research but also have 
practical application in the financial services industry. The latter can be used by 
managers, stockholders, bondholders, regulators and policymakers both at the firm 
level and the public policy level. Most of the above stakeholders can benefit from 
bancassurance given that it allows for synergies between banks and insurance firms. 
These are reflected in the positive excess returns following the bank-insurance 
mergers. Bancassurance can also be used as a mechanism to rebalance risk exposure 
of institutions. Specifically, institutions can shield themselves against unsystematic 
exposures, yet at the expense of a higher systematic exposure. Nevertheless, the 
evidence suggests that the higher systematic exposure stems from the increased scale 
of the combined entity following the mergers and not from bancassurance activities 
per se. On the other hand, regulators should provide incentives for this type of 
diversification given that the financial services industry benefits from bancassurance 
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both in terms of risk and return. A notable implication of the above findings is that 
bank diversification into insurance creates synergies without introducing implications 
for the stability of the financial system as a whole. This is in contrast to the existing 
evidence on bank diversification into the securities business. As such, possible 
regulatory changes should focus on containing the risks arising from the combination 
of banks with securities firms. Finally, this research provides a platform for the ex-
ante evaluation of bancassurance deals in terms of risk and return effects on acquiring 
firms. 
At this stage it is important to note that there are a number of additional issues, not 
examined in the academic literature that this thesis has not focused on. One of the 
limitations of the thesis is the fact that it does not consider the determinants of wealth 
effects and risk for insurance bidders. This is due to the limited availability of 
financial data for international insurance companies. In addition, the current study 
does not consider the lines of insurance operated by insurance targets prior to the 
deals. This is also due to the unavailability of a comprehensive database with data on 
insurance premiums for different lines of insurance business. A final issue that is not 
considered in this study is the long-term risk-return performance of institutions 
entering bancassurance.  
Nonetheless, these areas represent a fertile ground for future research. For 
example, the long-term risk-return effects of bancassurance on the basis of the lines of 
insurance operated, can be investigated within a panel structure, provided that a 
comprehensive database becomes available. Another interesting area for future 
investigation is the examination of the risk-return effects of geographic and product 
diversification of financial intermediaries and specifically the analysis of the return 
and volatility spillover effects across financial conglomerates and markets. The 
important questions in this case can be the following: Does convergence in the 
financial services industry affect the correlations among the risk-return attributes of 
institutions and markets? If yes, does convergence and the creation of financial 
conglomerates socialise risks, while privatizing gains (Walter, 2009)? 
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A) APPENDIX A 
 
Table A.1. Number and Value of M&As in the Financial Services Industry 
Period/Region 
World US and Canada Europe 
Value $mil 
% of 
Total 
Number Value $mil 
% of 
Total 
Number Value $mil 
% of 
Total 
Number 
1987 - 1991 148,605.5 5.22% 1,437 61,208.0 4.33% 992 41,961.5 5.26% 307 
1992 - 1996 324,832.2 11.41% 2,627 175,594.3 12.42% 1,827 86,423.5 10.83% 492 
1997 - 2001 1,659,498.1 58.28% 3,743 794,379.8 56.19% 2,102 494,438.1 61.98% 776 
2002 - 2006 714,755.2 25.10% 2,448 382,483.0 27.06% 1,267 174,894.6 21.92% 469 
Total 2,847,691.0 100.00% 10,255 1,413,665.1 100.00% 6,188 797,717.7 100.00% 2,044 
  Africa/Middle East Central Asia/Asia Pacific Japan 
Period/Region Value $mil 
% of 
Total 
Number Value $mil 
% of 
Total 
Number Value $mil 
% of 
Total 
Number 
1987 - 1991 540.80 5.19% 4 2,765.90 3.35% 54 31,109.30 10.29% 4 
1992 - 1996 739.80 7.10% 23 6,860.80 8.30% 117 36,749.80 12.15% 6 
1997 - 2001 6,503.20 62.44% 81 37,827.30 45.76% 303 170,290.20 56.32% 68 
2002 - 2006 2,631.60 25.27% 38 35,211.90 42.60% 422 64,220.50 21.24% 84 
Total 10,415.40 100.00% 146 82,665.90 100.00% 896 302,369.80 100.00% 162 
  South America             
Period/Region Value $mil 
% of 
Total 
Number 
Search Criteria: 
Completed deals (excluding divestitures) that 
took place between 1987 and 2006 where at 
least one company was publicly traded and 
the percentage of shares owned by the 
acquiring company after the transaction was 
above 50%. At least acquirer or target must 
be a public company. 
1987 - 1991 0.00 0.00% 0 
1992 - 1996 2,342.60 18.35% 27 
1997 - 2001 6,189.90 48.48% 71 
2002 - 2006 4,234.40 33.17% 19 
Total 12,766.90 100.00% 117 Source: Thomson Financial 
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Table A.2. Number and Value of M&As in the Banking Sector 
Period/Region 
World US and Canada Europe 
Value $mil 
% of 
Total 
Number 
Value 
$mil 
% of 
Total 
Number Value $mil 
% of 
Total 
Number 
1987 - 1991 96,218.0 6.17% 777 42,929.7 5.15% 673 17,350.7 4.88% 72 
1992 - 1996 199,137.1 12.77% 1453 129,289.3 15.52% 1,229 20,912.6 5.88% 154 
1997 - 2001 817,894.5 52.45% 1313 405,900.4 48.73% 925 199,071.2 56.00% 215 
2002 - 2006 445,995.4 28.60% 637 254,854.9 30.60% 443 118,130.4 33.23% 114 
Total 1,559,245.0 100.00% 4,180 832,974.3 100.00% 3,270 355,464.9 100.00% 555 
  Africa/Middle East Central Asia/Asia Pacific Japan 
Period/Region Value $mil 
% of 
Total 
Number 
Value 
$mil 
% of 
Total 
Number Value $mil 
% of 
Total 
Number 
1987 - 1991 540.80 14.92% 1 635.60 1.97% 11 31,109.30 11.77% 4 
1992 - 1996 438.30 12.09% 5 5,000.50 15.50% 13 35,788.00 13.53% 3 
1997 - 2001 1,749.70 48.28% 11 18,958.80 58.77% 47 152,769.80 57.78% 21 
2002 - 2006 895.40 24.71% 12 7,663.40 23.76% 29 44,748.00 16.92% 10 
Total 3,624.20 100.00% 29 32,258.30 100.00% 100 264,415.10 100.00% 38 
  South America             
Period/Region Value $mil 
% of 
Total 
Number 
Search Criteria: 
Completed deals (excluding divestitures) that 
took place between 1987 and 2006 where at 
least one company was publicly traded and 
the percentage of shares owned by the 
acquiring company after the transaction was 
above 50%. At least acquirer or target must 
be a public company. 
1987 - 1991 0.00 0.00% 0 
1992 - 1996 2,204.70 28.46% 18 
1997 - 2001 3,817.60 49.28% 31 
2002 - 2006 
1,723.70 22.25% 6 
Total 7,746.00 100.00% 55 Source: Thomson Financial 
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Table A.3. Number and Value of M&As in the Insurance Sector 
Period/Region 
World US and Canada Europe 
Value 
$mil 
% of 
Total 
Number 
Value 
$mil 
% of 
Total 
Number 
Value 
$mil 
% of 
Total 
Number 
1987 - 1991 10,693.6 2.79% 204 1,972.2 1.31% 108 4,363.7 2.84% 67 
1992 - 1996 42,533.7 11.12% 314 20,033.3 13.34% 189 20,007.0 13.00% 84 
1997 - 2001 279,810.3 73.13% 614 99,987.3 66.59% 351 115,411.9 74.99% 133 
2002 - 2006 49,585.2 12.96% 375 28,165.8 18.76% 233 14,112.3 9.17% 73 
Total 382,622.8 100.00% 1507 150,158.6 100.00% 881 153,894.9 100.00% 357 
  Africa/Middle East Central Asia/Asia Pacific Japan 
Period/Region 
Value 
$mil 
% of 
Total 
Number 
Value 
$mil 
% of 
Total 
Number 
Value 
$mil 
% of 
Total 
Number 
1987 - 1991 0.00 0.00% 0 170.70 3.89% 4 0.00 0.00% 0 
1992 - 1996 54.90 11.99% 1 0.00 0.00% 0 0.00 0.00% 0 
1997 - 2001 304.20 66.46% 7 3,868.00 88.15% 19 9,620.30 74.18% 6 
2002 - 2006 98.60 21.54% 2 349.30 7.96% 31 3,349.40 25.82% 4 
Total 457.70 100.00% 10 4,388.00 100.00% 54 12,969.70 100.00% 10 
  South America             
Period/Region 
Value 
$mil 
% of 
Total 
Number 
Search Criteria: 
Completed deals (excluding divestitures) 
that took place between 1987 and 2006 
where at least one company was publicly 
traded and the percentage of shares owned 
by the acquiring company after the 
transaction was above 50%. At least 
acquirer or target must be a public 
company. 
1987 - 1991 0.00 0.00% 0 
1992 - 1996 0.00 0.00% 2 
1997 - 2001 0.00 0.00% 2 
2002 - 2006 
10.00 100.00% 2 
Total 10.00 100.00% 6 Source: Thomson Financial 
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Table A.4. Number and Value of Bancassurance M&As 
Period/Region 
World US and Canada Europe 
Value 
$mil 
% of 
Total 
Number 
Value 
$mil 
% of 
Total 
Number 
Value 
$mil 
% of 
Total 
Number 
1987 - 1991 12,756.8 8.39% 22 428.4 0.56% 9 12,218.3 17.2% 12 
1992 - 1996 4,043.9 2.66% 47 161.2 0.21% 20 3,583.4 5.1% 21 
1997 - 2001 131,160.9 86.29% 131 75,370.7 98.87% 66 52,657.3 74.2% 53 
2002 - 2006 4,035.2 2.65% 110 275.2 0.36% 88 2,489.5 3.5% 15 
Total 151,996.8 100.00% 310 76,235.5 100.00% 183 70,948.5 100.00% 101 
  Africa/Middle East Central Asia/Asia Pacific Japan 
Period/Region 
Value 
$mil 
% of 
Total 
Number 
Value 
$mil 
% of 
Total 
Number 
Value 
$mil 
% of 
Total 
Number 
1987 - 1991 0.00 0.00% 0 0.00 0.00% 0 0.00 0.00% 0 
1992 - 1996 0.00 0.00% 0 69.40 2.55% 4 0.00 0.00% 0 
1997 - 2001 0.00 0.00% 0 1,381.80 50.77% 4 0.00 0.00% 1 
2002 - 2006 0.00 0.00% 0 1,270.40 46.68% 6 0.00 0.00% 1 
Total 0.00 0.00% 0 2,721.60 100.00% 14 0.00 0.00% 2 
  South America             
Period/Region 
Value 
$mil 
% of 
Total 
Number 
Search Criteria: 
Completed deals (excluding divestitures) 
that took place between 1987 and 2006 
where at least one company was publicly 
traded and the percentage of shares owned 
by the acquiring company after the 
transaction was above 50%. At least 
acquirer or target must be a public 
company. 
1987 - 1991 0.00 0.00% 0 
1992 - 1996 0.00 0.00% 1 
1997 - 2001 0.00 0.00% 1 
2002 - 2006 
0.00 0.00% 0 
Total 0.00 0.00% 2 Source: Thomson Financial 
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Figure A.1. Time Series of deals in the Financial Services Industry 
Global Financial Services Industry Completed M&A Deals 1987-2006 
% shares owned after deal = 50% and above
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B) APPENDIX B 
 
Table B.1. Event Studies 
 
Study Methodology AARs/CAARs Sample Characteristics/Size Sample Period Event Window (Days) % Pos. AAR 
Objective / 
Notes 
Amihud, DeLong and 
Saunders (2002) 
Market model (three 
indices) -1.00% 
Mergers 
announcements 
between commercial 
banks and foreign 
banks 
214 1985-1998 (-10,+1) - 
They study the effect of 
cross border bank 
merger announcements 
on the stock prices of 
bidders and relate them 
to the experienced 
changes in risk. 
Beitel, Schiereck and 
Wahrenburg (2004) 
Market Model 
(Combined Effect) 
2.01%* 
1.46%* 
1.20%* 
0.91%* 
1.40%* 
1.35%* 
1.29%* 
EU bank M&A 
announcements 
(including bank-
insurance deals) 
98 
(11) 1985-2000 
(-20,0) 
(-10,0) 
(-1,0) 
(0,0) 
(-1,+1) 
(-10,+10) 
(-20,+20) 
- 
They study the effect of 
European bank M&A 
announcements on the 
stock prices of involved 
parties.  11 bank-
insurance 
announcements that are 
present in the sample 
are also examined, 
however not separately. 
Cross sectional analysis 
is also employed for 
determinants of CARs. 
Carow (2001a) 
Market model with IR1 
using MVRM2 SUE3 
approach 
+0.10% N. banks 
+0.27% St. banks 
+1.02%* Life Ins. 
-0.68% H. Ins. 
+0.19% P/C Ins. 
U.S. banks and 
insurance companies 
133 Nat. banks 
117 state banks 
30 Life Ins. 
26 Health Ins.    
67 P/C Ins. 
1998 (0,0) 
47 
57 
67 
42 
55 
Objective is similar to 
Johnston and Madura 
(2000). The study also 
reports two-day (-1,0) 
CAARs and conducts 
cross sectional analysis 
for determinants of 
AARs. 
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Study Methodology AARs/CAARs Sample Characteristics/Size Sample Period Event Window (Days) % Pos. AAR 
Objective / 
Notes 
Carow (2001b) 
Market model with IR 
using MVRM2 SUE3 
approach 
Annuities rulings 
-0.33% banks 
-2.39%* insurers 
Insurance rulings
U.S. banks and 
insurance companies  
-0.25% banks 
-1.25% insurers 
89 banks 
44 Insurers 1984-1996 (0,+1) 
Annuities 
46 
32 
Insurance
They study the effect 
on the stock prices of 
banks and insurance 
companies of 3 OCC 
and 3 Supreme Court 
rulings allowing banks 
to sell annuities and 
insurance products 
respectively. Results 
represent the 
summation of CAARs 
over the 2 groups of 
events. Cross sectional 
analysis is also 
conducted for firm 
specific determinants of 
AARs. 
 
40 
43 
Carow and Heron 
(2002) 
Market model with IR 
using MVRM1 SUE2 
approach 
+0.06% banks 
-6.33% f. banks 
-1.68% thrifts 
-5.72% fin. firms 
+4.05 Inv. banks 
+5.15%* Ins. comp. 
U.S.  Banks, foreign 
banks, thrifts, finance 
companies, investment 
banks and insurance 
companies 
247 banks 
10 f. banks 
145 thrifts 
32 fin. firms 
33 Inv. banks 
85 Ins. comp. 
1998-1999 (0,+1) 
52 
20 
44 
25 
67 
68 
They study the capital 
market reactions to 6 
events leading to the 
passage of the Gramm-
Leach-Bliley Act 
(FSMA 1999). CAARs 
are summed across six 
events. Cross sectional 
analysis is also 
conducted for firm 
specific determinants of 
AARs. 
Chan, Kensinger, 
Keown and Martin 
(1997) 
Market Model +0.64%* U.S. Strategic Alliances 345 1983-1992 (0,0) 55 
They study the effects 
of strategic alliance 
announcements on the 
stock prices of the 
involved parties. Value 
weighted portfolios are 
constructed for 114 
announcements that 
involve multiple 
partners. 
Chen, Li, Moshirian 
and Tan (2007) 
Market Model 
(Three index 
representation with two 
indices and interest 
rate) 
Negative AARs and 
CAARs for domestic 
and cross border deals 
European 
bancassurance deals 
with the exception of 2 
targets outside Europe 
42 deals 1983-2004 
AARs 
days -10 to +10 
CAARs
- 
 
(-10,2) 
(-1,+2) 
(0,+1) 
(0,+2) 
(0,+3) 
They examine the 
wealth and risk effects 
of European bank-
insurance deals. Cross 
section regressions are 
also employed for 
determinants of 
abnormal returns. 
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Study Methodology AARs/CAARs Sample Characteristics/Size Sample Period Event Window (Days) % Pos. AAR 
Objective / 
Notes 
Chiou and White 
(2005) Market Model 
Whole sample 
2.93%* 
Domestic 
1.93%* 
Domestic Small 
3.13%* 
Domestic Large 
1.23% 
Foreign
Japanese Strategic 
Alliances 
 
2.65%* 
109 1997-1999 (0,0) (-1,0) 
Whole Sample 
68 
Domestic 
They study the effect of 
strategic alliances on 
the stock prices of 
partnering financial 
institutions. Cross 
sectional analysis is 
also conducted for 
alliance and firm 
specific determinants of 
AARs. 
39 
Cowan, Howel and 
Power (2002) 
Market model using 
MVRM2 approach 
PCCM4  tests  
Annuities are Ins. 
+0.21%* Life Ins. 
-0.14% BHCs 
NY Banks can sell 
annuities. 
+0.16% Life Ins. 
-0.01% BHCs 
Banks underwrite 
annuities 
+0.03% Life Ins. 
+0.22%* BHCs 
Nat. Banks can sell 
annuities 
U.S. Life Insurance and 
Bank Holding 
Companies 
-0.09% Life Ins. 
-0.07% BHCs 
59 Life Ins 
88 BHCs 1993-1995 (0,0) - 
They Study the effect 
on the stock prices of 
Life insurance firms 
and BHCs of four 
Court and Regulatory 
decisions regarding 
banks' rights to 
originate and market 
annuity products. 3-day 
CAARs also estimated 
and follow same 
pattern. Cross sectional 
analysis is also 
conducted for firm 
specific determinants of 
AARs. 
Cybo-Ottone and 
Murgia (2000) 
Market Model 
(Combined Effect) +7.03%* 
E.U. Bank-Insurance 
M&As 10 1988-1997 (-10,0) 60 
They study the effect of 
M&As on the stock 
prices of involved 
parties. 2 deals were 
not completed. 
Negative bidder 
CAARs. Negative 
bidder AARs. 
DeLong (2001) Market Model (Combined Effect) -0.91%* 
U.S. Banks diversifying 
activity 168 1988-1995 (-10,1) 44.1 
They study the effect of 
various types of 
mergers on the stock 
prices of the involved 
parties. Cluster analysis 
used to distinguish 
between focusing and 
diversifying mergers. 
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Study Methodology AARs/CAARs Sample Characteristics/Size Sample Period Event Window (Days) % Pos. AAR 
Objective / 
Notes 
Ekkayokkaya, Holmes 
and Paudral (2007) Market Adjusted Model 
0.31%* 
(Pre-EMU period) 
EU bank M&A 
announcements 
(including bank-
insurance deals) 
963 
(36) 1990-2004 (-1,+1) - 
They study the effect of 
European bank M&A 
announcements on the 
stock prices of bidders 
during the period of the 
EMU introduction.  36 
bank-insurance 
announcements that are 
present in the sample 
are also examined with 
no significant excess 
return reported. Cross 
sectional analysis is 
also employed for 
determinants of CARs. 
Fields, Fraser and 
Kolari (2007a) 
Market Model 
(Comparison period 
approach) 
Bidders 
1.06% 
0.42% 
0.66%* 
1.07%* 
Targets 
7.25% 
-0.32% 
3.44%* 
2.98%* 
Combined 
Merger announcements 
between US and EU 
banks and insurance 
companies 
0.83% 
0.38% 
1.50% 
1.89% 
129 1997-2002 
(-51,-2) 
(-1,-1) 
(0,0) 
(-1,0) 
Bidders 
61 
59 
57 
59 
Targets 
66 
45 
55 
59 
Combined 
They study the effect of 
bank-insurance merger 
announcements on the 
stock prices of bidders, 
targets as well as on the 
combined stock price of 
bidders and targets. 
Cross sectional analysis 
is also conducted for 
firm specific 
determinants of AARs. 
68 
64 
68 
68 
Fields, Fraser and 
Kolari (2007b) 
Market Model 
(Comparison period 
approach) 
Full Sample 
0.14% 
0.28% 
0.42% 
Bank Bidders 
0.08% 
0.29%* 
0.37%* 
Insurance Bidders 
Merger announcements 
between US and EU 
banks and insurance 
companies 
0.38%* 
0.25% 
0.63% 
129 
105 bank bidders 
24 insurance bidders 
1997-2002 
(-1,-1) 
(0,0) 
(-1,0) 
Full Sample 
63 
65 
66 
Bank Bidders 
48 
55 
56 
Insurance Bidders 
They study the effect of 
bank-insurance merger 
announcements on the 
stock prices of bank 
bidders, insurance 
bidders as well as on 
the full sample. Cross 
sectional analysis is 
also conducted for 
corporate governance 
specific determinants of 
AARs. 
15 
10 
10 
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Study Methodology AARs/CAARs Sample Characteristics/Size Sample Period Event Window (Days) % Pos. AAR 
Objective / 
Notes 
Hendershott, Lee and 
Tompkins (2002) 
Market Model using 
MVRM2 SUE3 
approach 
+0.24% c. banks 
+2.21% Inv. banks 
+1.33%* Ins. comp 
U.S. commercial banks, 
Investment banks and 
insurance companies 
297 banks 
36 Inv. banks 
139 Ins. comp. 
1999 (-1,0) - 
Objective similar to 
Carow and Heron 
(2002) only they 
examine 7 events 
leading to FSMA 1999. 
Only one event 
(compromise 
agreement between 
White House and 
congress to pass the 
bill) produced a 
significant reaction 
(reported left).  Cross 
sectional analysis is 
also conducted for firm 
specific determinants of 
AARs. 
Johnston and Madura 
(2000) 
Market model with IR1 
using MVRM2 SUE3 
approach 
+2.03%* Banks 
+1.02%* Ins. 
+3.66%* Secur. 
U.S. banks, insurance 
companies and 
securities firms 
12 large banks 
26 insurers 
24 securities 
1998 (0,0) - 
They study the effect of 
the Citicorp-Travelers 
merger on the stock 
prices of peer 
institutions. 
Lepetit, Patry and Rous 
(2004) 
Bivariate GARCH 
Model 
Positive CAAR for 
target banks and 
bidders banks that 
diversify activity or 
focus geography. 
European bank M&As 
focusing or diversifying 
activity and geography 
180 deals 1991-2001 (-7,+7) (-15,+15) - 
They examine the stock 
market reactions upon 
announcement of bank 
M&As. Sample is split 
into deals focusing or 
diversifying activity 
and geography.  Probit 
analysis is also 
employed to examine 
the probability of 
excess returns. 
Martin and Keown 
(1981) Market Model 
Slight graphical 
evidence of rising 
CAARs around 
announcement(s) 
Announcements of 
formation of BHCs 25 1968-1974 
(-35,+35) 
monthly - 
They examine the 
effect of the formation 
of Bank Holding 
companies on the stock 
returns of these 
institutions. They also 
examine shifts in betas 
before and after the 
announcements for 
each BHC individually. 
(see risk-return table) 
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Study Methodology AARs/CAARs Sample Characteristics/Size Sample Period Event Window (Days) % Pos. AAR 
Objective / 
Notes 
Martin and Keown 
(1987) 
Market Model inflated 
with return on index of 
BHCs 
No significant changes 
in means of residuals 
but significant changes 
in variance in all cases 
examined. 
Announcements of 
formation of BHCs 23 1968-1974 
(-155,+156) 
weekly - 
They examine the 
effect of the formation 
of Bank Holding 
companies on the stock 
returns of these 
institutions. T-tests and 
F-tests on means and 
variances of residual 
returms before and after 
announcement are 
employed. Sample is 
also split into BHCs 
formed before and after 
the 1970 Bank Holding 
Company act 
amendment with 
similar tests employed. 
They also examine 
shifts in betas before 
and after the 
announcements for 
each BHC individually. 
(see risk-return table) 
Neale and Peterson 
(2005) 
Market model portfolio 
approach allowing for 
market risk changes. 
+2.50%* Life Ins. 
+2.10% A&H Ins. 
+2.32%* P/C Ins. 
+1.50% Other Ins. 
U.S. Life, Accident & 
Health, Property & 
Casualty and Other 
Insurance companies 
33 Life Ins. 
13 A&H Ins. 
40 P/C Ins. 
51 Other Ins. 
1997-2000 (-1,+1) - 
They examine the 
wealth and market risk 
effects of 10 events 
leading to the FSMA 
1999 on each of the 
four sectors of the 
insurance industry. 
Results on the left 
represent abnormal 
returns associated with 
the effective date of 
FSMA 1999. 
* Following AARs represents significance at 5% or better 
1 Interest Rate 
2 Multivariate Regression Model using Dummy Variables 
3 Seemingly Unrelated Equations 
4 Portfolio Constant Correlation Model 
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Table B.2. Cross Section Results 
 
Study Findings Methodology Sample Characteristics/Size Sample Period 
Carow (2001a) 
Around the announcement of Citicorp 
Travelers merger, large banks and life 
insurance companies have 
significantly higher abnormal returns 
than small banks, national banks and 
P/C insurance companies.  
Cross sectional regression of SUR 
abnormal returns on various indicator 
and accounting variables 
National banks 
State banks 
Life Insurance 
Health insurance   
P/C Insurance 
373 1998 
Carow (2001b) 
Insurance brokerage firms have 
positive and significant abnormal 
returns upon rulings that allow banks 
to sell annuities and insurance, 
whereas insurance agencies and life 
insurance companies experience 
negative and significant abnormal 
returns 
Cross sectional regression of SUR 
abnormal returns on various indicator 
variables 
Banks 
Insurance 133 1984-1996 
Carow and Heron (1998) 
Negative relation between Interstate 
presence of BHC and excess returns. 
Also negative relation between BHC 
profitability/capitalisation ratios and 
abnormal returns experienced upon 
the passage of IBBEA. 
Cross sectional regression of CARs 
from passage of IBBEA on legislative 
and accounting variables 
BHCs Model 1 - 180 Models 2 to 4 - 170 1994 
Carow and Heron (2002) 
Large investment banks and large 
insurance companies benefited from 
FSMA, whereas thrifts, finance 
companies and foreign banks lost 
value 
Cross sectional regression of CARs 
from passage of FSMA on firm 
characteristics and size variables 
Banks 
F. banks 
Thrifts 
Fin. firms 
Inv. banks 
Ins. comp. 
Not reported for cross section 
analysis. See event studies table 1998-1999 
Carow and Lee (1997) 
Banks located in passage states have 
significantly higher CARs than 
reciprocal banks. Negative relation 
between size and CARs, while 
positive relation with profitability and 
CARs. Finally, banks in states with 
faster growth and lower bank 
concentrations have higher returns. 
Cross sectional regression of CARs 
from state passage of legislation 
reducing interstate banking 
restrictions on legislative factors, 
bank characteristics and economic 
factors 
Banks 
All Banks (3817, 2462) 
Reciprocal State Banks (3612, 2327) 
Passage State Banks (205, 135) 
1982-1993 
Cybo-Ottone and Murgia (2000) 
No relation between CARs and target 
size. Domestic deals are better off 
than small deals and deals between 
commercial banks. Some evidence for 
country effects. 
Cross sectional regression of value 
weighted CARs on target size, 
dummy variables related to deal 
characteristics and country dummies 
EU Bank mergers 
46 deals for size and deal 
characteristics and then 54 and 72 for 
country dummies for bidders and 
targets respectively 
1988-1997 
Fields, Fraser and Kolari (2007a) 
Positive and significant relation 
between possible synergies and 
CARs. Cross-border deals are found 
to be associated with positive 
abnormal returns. 
Cross sectional regression of ARs on 
accounting, risk and deal 
characteristics variables.  Cross 
border dummy is also employed 
Bank-Insurance deals 36 for models 1, 2 and 4 32 for model 3 1997-2002 
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Study Findings Methodology Sample Characteristics/Size Sample Period 
Fields, Fraser and Kolari (2007b) 
Positive and significant relation 
between bidder profitability and 
CARs. Cross-border deals are found 
to be associated with positive 
abnormal returns. Positive relation 
between CEO ownership levels and 
CARs 
Cross sectional regression of ARs on 
accounting, risk and deal 
characteristics variables. Extension of 
2007a paper by addition of cross 
section analysis for corporate 
governance variables 
Bank-Insurance deals 
116 
Drops to 66 for cross sections with 
corporate governance variables 
1997-2002 
Johnston and Madura (2000) 
Significant relation between size and 
ARs for commercial banks and 
brokerage firms 
Cross sectional regression of ARs on 
size 
Banks 
Insurance 
Brokerage firms 
Not reported for cross section 
analysis. See event studies table 1998 
Chan, Kensinger, Keown and Martin 
(1997) 
Negative relation between size and 
ARs. Horizontal alliances are better 
of than non-horizontal ones. 
Horizontal alliances that entail 
complementarities in knowledge and 
skills are positively related to ARs 
Cross sectional regression of ARs on 
accounting variables and deal 
characteristics 
Strategic Alliances 
Not reported for cross section 
analysis using accounting variables. 
See event studies table. 
30 and 17 for horizontal alliances and 
90 and 79 for non-horizontal 
1983-1992 
Hendershott, Lee and Tompkins 
(2002) 
Positive relation between size and 
ARs for all firms. Profitability is 
positively related to ARs only for 
commercial banks 
Cross sectional regression of ARs 
from passage of FSMA on accounting 
variables 
Commercial Banks 
Investment Banks 
Insurance 
297 
36 
139 
1999 
Amihud, DeLong and Saunders 
(2002) 
Insignificant relation between 
systematic risk and CARs. Weak 
positive relation between total risk 
(relative to home bank index) and 
CARs 
Cross sectional regression of CARs 
experienced upon merger 
announcements on changes in risk 
Mergers announcements between 
commercial banks and foreign banks 214 1985-1998 
Chen, Li, Moshirian and Tan (2007) 
Positive relation between relative deal 
size and CARs. Also positive relation 
between change in risk (Δβ) and 
CARs. 
Cross sectional regression of CARs 
on accounting, risk variables as well 
as cross border dummy 
Bank-insurance deals Not reported for cross section analysis. See event studies table 1983-2004 
Chiou and White (2005) 
Negative relation between intra-group 
alliances and CARs. Both domestic 
and cross-country alliances have a 
positive relation with CARs 
Cross sectional regression of CARs 
on dummy variables of strategic 
alliance characteristics 
Strategic Alliances 109 1997-1999 
Kim, Mayers and Smith (1996) 
Insurers that use exclusive agency 
systems are usually larger with lower 
costs, have more geographically 
concentrated operations, advertise 
more and sell less personal line 
insurance than insurers using 
independent agency systems. The 
most important variables determining 
the choice of distribution system is 
the lines of insurance operated. 
Logit Regression of exclusive vs 
independent distribution systems on 
ownership structure characteristics 
Property-liability insurers 1480 1981 
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Table B.3. Performance Related Studies 
 
Study Objective Findings Methodology Sample Characteristics/Size Sample Period Notes 
Berger, Humphrey and 
Pulley (1996) 
They examine the 
synergies arising from the 
joint consumption of 
deposit and loan services 
No revenue economies of 
scope in banking, as both 
their fixed and 
complementary 
components are 
insignificantly different 
from zero over 1978-1990. 
Composite translog cost 
function U.S. Banks 
683 ('78-'84) 
626 ('90) 1978-1984 and 1990 
The model used associates 
a quadratic composition for 
multiple outputs with a log-
quadratic composition for 
input prices. It also allows 
for the disintegration of 
scope economies into their 
fixed and complementary 
components. 
Chang and Lynge (1994) 
They examine the 
existence of multiproduct 
cost economies, in 
particular scale and scope 
economies. 
Constant overall and 
product specific returns to 
scale for average Savings 
Banks.  Scope economies 
are present at overall level 
but diseconomies arise at 
product specific level. 
Generalized translog cost 
function 
U.S. Savings Banks 
(all) 417 1986-1988 
Product specific scale and 
scope economies are 
investigated with respect to 
investments in real estate 
ventures. 
Hunter, Timme and Yang 
(1990) 
They examine the 
subadditivity of costs in 
US banks in the context of 
hypothetical mergers. 
The costs functions of large 
multiproduct banks are not 
subadditive, implying no 
cost complementarities in 
multi-product production 
among them. 
Hypothetical Mergers / 
Multi-product translog cost 
function using minflex 
Laurent functional form 
U.S. Largest Banks 311 1986 
Two different models are 
used for bank deposits, one 
treats them as outputs and 
second as inputs. 
Lang and Welzel (1996) 
They measure economies 
of scale and scope,  cost 
efficiency and rate of 
technical progress. 
Moderate economies of 
scale for all size classes.  
Some evidence for 
economies of scope for 
small size classes. Cost 
reductions are mostly due 
to technical progress. 
Sample banks are found to 
be cost inefficient. 
Multi-product translog cost 
function German Cooperative Banks 757 1989-1992 
They employ a non-
homothetic functional 
form. Scale economies are 
also measured using non-
contant output. 
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Vander Vennet (2002) 
He compares cost and 
profit efficiency measures 
across universal banks, 
financial conglomerates 
and specialized peers. 
Specialised institutions 
exhibit equal cost 
efficiency with financial 
conglomerates when non-
traditional activities are not 
taken into consideration 
but latter are more cost 
efficient when all activities 
are accounted for. While 
specialized banks have 
large unexploited scale and 
scope economies, financial 
conglomerates only have 
opportunities for scope 
economies and exhibit no 
scale economies. 
Cost function using both 
standard translog and 
Fourier-Flexible 
specification for functional 
form 
E.U. Banks 2,375 1995-1996 
Author suggests that 
further de-specialisation 
could lead to a more 
efficient banking system. 
Casu and Girardone (2004) 
They examine the cost and 
profit efficiency and 
changes in productivity of 
financial conglomerates. 
They also employ cross 
sectional analysis for 
determinants of cost and 
profit efficiency. 
Mixed results across two 
models for cost efficiency 
with 1st suggesting a 
constant improvement over 
the sample period and the 
2nd exhibiting an irregular 
cost efficiency trend over 
the sample period.  Profit 
efficiency estimates are 
consistent across both 
methodologies and exhibit 
a persistent upward trend 
over the sample time 
period. Cross section 
regressions reveal that cost 
efficient conglomerates 
have higher capital ratios, 
superior growth rates and 
lower degree of problem 
loans. There is also a 
significant negative 
relationship between cost 
efficiency and ROA. 
Positive relation between 
the capital ratio, non 
performing loans and profit 
efficiency but negative 
relation beween growth 
rates and profit efficiency.  
1. Parametric Stochastic 
Frontier Approach (SFA) 
2. Non-parametric Data 
Envelopment Analysis 
(DEA) 
3. Malquimist Total Factor 
Productivity Index (TFP).* 
4. Cross section analysis 
Italian Financial 
Conglomerates 168 groups** 1996-1999 
The authors argue that the 
increase in the profitability 
of the conglomerates is due 
to the fact that revenues 
have increased ahead of 
costs. Profit efficient 
groups are those with high 
risk-return profiles. 
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Wheelock and Wilson 
(2001) 
They analyse estimates of 
scale and product mix 
economies. 
Banks could achieve 
potential economies by 
expanding the size of their 
output and adjusting their 
output mix toward those of 
banks with at least $300–
$500 million of assets. 
Estimates of ray-scale and 
expansion path suggest that 
the size at which scale 
economies are exhausted 
has increased between the 
mid-1980s and mid-1990s. 
1. Parametric translog 
model 
2. Fourier 
flexible functional form 
3. Fully nonparametric 
kernel regression 
4. Local 
polynomial smoothing 
(LPS) 
All U.S. Commercial 
Banks  
(with available data) 
- 
1985 
1989 
1994 
- 
* 1 and 2 for Cost and profit efficiency estimates and 3 for productivity change. 
** The observations are distributed across the sample period in the following manner: 1996 - 36 groups, 1997 - 40 groups, 1998 - 44 groups and 1999 - 48 groups. On average there are 42 groups per year. 
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Table B.4. Risk-Return Studies 
 
Study Objective Findings Methodology Sample Characteristics/Size Sample Period Notes 
Allen and Jagtiani (2000) 
They analyse the impact of 
securities and insurance 
activities on bank total and 
systematic risk as well as 
on bank risk premiums. 
Nonbank activities reduce 
overall risk but increase 
systematic market risk. 
Both securities and 
insurance activities have no 
significant effect on market 
risk premiums of universal 
banks. Moreover, while the 
interest rate risk premiums 
seem to be lowered by 
securities activities, it is 
not affected by insurance 
activities 
Synthetic Universal Banks 
- Portfolio approach / 
multiple regression 
BHCs 
Securities 
Insurance 
9 companies from each 
industry. 
729 pairs generated 
1986-1994 Both accounting and stock market data are used. 
Baele, De Jonghe and 
Vander Vennet (2007) 
They examine the 
relationship between bank 
franchise value/risk and the 
degree of asset and 
functional diversification 
Strong positive relation 
between Tobin's Q and 
degree of functional 
diversification. Non-
interest revenue share is 
positively associated with 
systematic risk, but 
negatively related to 
idiosyncratic and total risk. 
The latter relationship is 
non-linear with a shift in its 
direction occurring when 
non-interest revenue share 
exceeds 22% and 36% for 
total and idiosyncratic risk, 
respectively. 
Regressions of bank 
Tobin's Q, betas, total and 
idiosyncratic volatility on 
measures of asset and 
revenue diversification 
Banks from 17 European 
countries 255 1989-2004 - 
Boyd and Graham (1986) 
They examine the 
relationship between risk 
and BHC involvement in 
non-bank activities 
No significant relationship 
between the profitability 
measure and non-bank 
activity or between any of 
the two risk measures and 
non-bank activity. 
Negative correlation 
between leverage and 
profitability and a strong 
positive relation between 
leverage, size and risk. 
Multiple Regression 
analysis (OLS).  Risk, 
profitability  are dependent 
variables 
U.S. Large Bank Holding 
Companies 64 1971-1983 
They use accounting data. 
Risk captured by 
variability of returns and Z-
scores. They also test two 
subperiods (1971-1977 and 
1978-1983) given that 
regulation of BHC was 
considerably tightened near 
the end of the sample 
period.  They find a strong 
positive correlation 
between nonbank share and 
risk only in the first 
subperiod. 
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Boyd and Graham (1988) 
They analyse the impact of 
a hypothetical expansion of 
BHCs into securities, life 
insurance, P/C insurance, 
real estate development   
and other real estate 
companies on BHC risk. 
Combinations between 
BHCs and securities firms, 
real estate developers and 
P/C insurance increase the 
volatility of returns and the 
risk of failure. On the other 
hand, evidence suggests 
that expansion of BHCs 
into life insurance reduces 
both the volatility of 
returns and risk of failure, 
thus rendering the latter 
industry an appealing 
partner for BHCs. 
Merger simulations / 
comparison with unmerged 
companies (benchmark) 
 
U.S.  
BHCs 
Life insurance 
P/C Insurance 
Insur. brokers/agents 
Securities firms 
Real estate dev/mnt 
Other real estate 
146  
30 
15 
5 
11 
31 
11 
1971-1984 
Accounting and market 
data are used. Merger 
simulations are conducted 
by randomly selecting 
BHC-nonbank pairs while 
100 hypothetical firms are 
generated for each of the 6 
possible combinations. 
Drawback is that BHCs 
combine only with one 
firm at a time. 
Boyd, Graham and Hewitt 
(1993) 
They analyse the impact of 
a hypothetical expansion of 
BHCs into securities, life 
insurance, P/C insurance, 
real estate development   
and other real estate 
companies on BHC risk. 
Mergers between BHCs 
and life or non-life 
insurance firms can be risk 
reducing when the 
appropriate asset portfolio 
weight combinations are 
chosen, whereas mergers 
with either securities or 
real estate companies are 
likely to increase BHC 
risk. 
Merger simulations / 
comparison with unmerged 
companies (benchmark) 
 
U.S.  
BHCs 
Life insurance 
P/C Insurance 
Insur. brokers/agents 
Securities firms 
Real estate dev/mnt 
Other real estate 
141  
30 
16 
20 
27 
69 
67 
1971-1987 
Methodology employed is 
relatively similar to Boyd 
and Graham (1988) in that 
random merger simulations 
between BHC and non-
bank financial firms are 
generated. However in 
contrast to the previous 
work this study accounts 
for various different 
portfolio combinations for 
each bank-nonbank pair. 
Brewer (1989) 
He examines the relation 
between BHC risk and 
diversification into non-
banking. 
No evidence of high BHC 
risk associated to non-bank 
activity. In addtion there is 
a strong negative relation 
between risk and non-bank 
activity for the high risk 
BHCs. 
Multiple Regression 
analysis (OLS and GLS).  
Risk is the dependent 
variable 
U.S. Bank Holding 
Companies 109 1978-1986 
Similar to Boyd and 
Graham (1986) only he 
uses both accounting and 
stock market data. 
Brewer, Fortier and Pavel 
(1988) 
They examine the relation 
between BHC risk and 
non-bank activities 
Negative relation between 
proportion of nonbank 
activity and BHC risk.  
Although individual 
nonbank activitities are 
riskier than banking the 
correlations suggest 
possible diversification 
benefits. Finally, merger 
simulations show that the 
risk of BHC increases 
substantially only when the 
nonbank activity accounts 
for more than 25% of the 
resulting company 
a. OLS regressions of 
variance of stock returns 
and ROA on proportion of 
assets devoted to nonbank 
activity.  
b. Variance analysis and 
hypothetical mergers 
a. BHCs 
b. Nonbanks and banks 
a. 40 
b. 325 and 170 
a. 1979-1983 
b. 1980, 1982 and 1996 
While the correlation of 
returns between health 
insurance and banking is 
low, suggesting 
diversification 
opportunities, the 
correlation between P&C 
insurance and banking 
returns is high.The paper 
also provides an excellent 
review of previous risk-
return studies. 
 232 
Study Objective Findings Methodology Sample Characteristics/Size Sample Period Notes 
Estrella (2001) 
He examines the potential 
diversification gains from 
combinations of banks with 
companies from various 
other sectors. 
Banking institutions and 
insurance companies can 
experience diversification 
benefits by converging. 
Option pricing/arbitrage 
pricing approach 
BHCs 
Life Insurance 
Fire, marine and Casualty 
Security brokers/dealers 
non-financial 
10 largers firms in each of 
the five industries and 10 
largest and smallest BHCs  
1989-1998 
Both accounting and stock 
market data are used. They 
also provide risk-return 
statistics at aggregate 
industry level. 
Genetay and Molyneux 
(1998) 
They analyse the impact of 
an expansion of UK banks 
into mutual and proprietary 
life insurance on bank risk. 
Mixed evidence on risk, 
with significantly lower 
probabilities of failure but 
insignificant changes in 
return on assets volatility 
for bancassurance 
combinations. 
Merger simulations 
U.K. 
Banks 
Building societies 
Life Insurance 
TBC 1988-1992 - 
Heggestad (1975) 
He examines the risk 
effects of combining banks 
with non-banks. 
Many non-bank activities 
are safer than banking and 
there are potential 
diversification benefits in 
some non-banking 
operations such as 
insurance agents and 
brokers, real estate agents, 
brokers and managers and 
combinations of real estate, 
insurance and loan and law 
offices. 
Variance-covariance and 
correlation analysis 
U.S. banks, real estate 
agents, brokers and 
managers, insurance agents 
and brokers, combinations 
of real estate, insurance, 
loan and law offices, 
lessors of railroad property 
and business credit 
agencies. 
Industry Level analysis 1953-1967 
As author points out, 
considerable care must be 
exercised in reflecting 
aggregate industry data and 
conclusions drawn from 
their analysis to the 
individual firm level. 
Kwast (1989) 
He examines the potential 
for risk diversification 
through bank securities 
activities. 
Limited potential for risk 
diversification depending 
on the sub-period 
examined.  
Portfolio theory 
Risk-return frontier 
analysis 
a. Commercial bank 
trading account assets 
b. Aggregate trading 
account assets 
a. 7410 
b. 40 1976-1985 (quarterly) 
Full sample is sorted in 
three ways: 
1. Three periods (policy 
regimes) 
2. Three groups depending 
on relative degree of 
trading activity 
3. Four size groups (assets) 
Data are also aggregated 
annualy for bias 
comparison purposes. 
Results show that the bias 
from industry aggregation 
is higher than the bias from 
time aggregation. 
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Laderman (1999) 
They analyse the impact of 
a hypothetical expansion of 
BHCs into various non 
bank activities on BHC 
risk. 
Life/ insurance 
underwriting, property and 
casualty insurance 
underwriting or securities 
underwriting, reduce the 
probability of bankruptcy 
of the BHC. 
Merger simulations 
 
All BHCs 
Large BHCs 
Life Insurance 
P/C Insurance 
Ins. Agents/Brokers 
Real estate devel. 
Other real estate 
Sec. broker/dealers 
Investment advice 
All securities 
79-'86   '87-'97
1979-1986 
1987-1997 
 
 200             422 
 151             126 
  29               50 
  33              103 
  17               44 
  32               26 
100              95 
  31              66 
   7              24 
  38              90 
Methodology similar to 
Boyd and Graham (1988) 
only analyses all possible 
combinations of BHC-
nonbanks. 
Laeven and Levine (2007) 
They examine the effect of 
activity diversification on 
bank valuation 
Diversification of bank 
based financial services 
firms is value destroying, 
since the market values of 
banks engaged in multiple 
activities are lower than the 
values those banks would 
have, if broken up into 
specialized firms. Also 
negative relation between 
diversity measures and 
excess and Q values. 
Analysis of excess value 
and Tobin's Q ratio of 
diversified banks. 
Regressions of excess 
value and Q estimates on 
diversification proxies and 
other control variables 
Banks from 43 countries 836 1998-2002 
Excess value is measured 
as the difference between a 
bank's actual q and its 
activity-adjusted q, 
whereas the latter 
represents the weighted 
average q of pure 
commercial banks and pure 
investment banks. 
Lepetit, Nys, Rous and 
Tarazi (2008) 
They examine the 
relationship between bank 
income diversification and 
both accounting- and 
market-based measures of 
bank risk 
Significant relationship 
between degree of income 
diversification and both 
accounting- and market-
based measures of risk. 
Relationship is stronger for 
smaller banks. Risk is more 
positively correlated with 
fee-based activities than 
with trading activities. 
OLS regressions of market- 
and accounting-based 
measures of risk on net 
non-interest share, net 
commission income share, 
and net trading income 
share plus other control 
variables 
European Banks from 14 
countries 734 1996-2002 - 
Lown, Osler, Strahan and 
Sufi (2000) 
They analyse the effects of 
a hypothetical expansion of 
BHCs into various non 
bank activities on BHC 
risk. 
Mergers between bank 
holding companies and 
either securities firms or 
property and casualty firms 
would likely modestly raise 
BHC risk. However, 
mergers between BHCs 
and life insurance 
companies lower the risk of 
both firms due to 
diversification benefits. 
Merger simulations 
BHCs 
Insurance 
Securities 
Largest 
10 
10 
10 
1984-1998 Accounting data are used. 
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Martin and Keown (1981) 
They examine shifts in 
systematic risk before and 
after announcements of 
BHC formation 
No evidence of significant 
changes in BHCs 
systematic risk prior to and 
following the 
announcement of their 
formation. 
Multiple regression Bank Holding Companies 25 1968-1974 
They use dummy variables 
to capture shifts in betas 
before and after the 
announcements. They also 
examine the effect of the 
announcements on the 
returns of BHCs (see event 
studies table) 
Martin and Keown (1987) 
They examine shifts in 
systematic risk before and 
after announcements of 
BHC formation 
No evidence that the 
passage of the 1970 Bank 
Holding Company Act 
amendment altered the 
systematic risk of BHCs. 
Multiple regression Bank Holding Companies 23 1968-1974 
They use dummy variables 
to capture shifts in betas 
before and after the 
announcements and the 
1970 amendment, 
controlling at the same 
time for industry wide 
effects.  Also conduct 
event study analysis (see 
event studies table) 
Mercieca, Schaek and 
Wolfe (2007) 
They examine the impact 
of diversification on the 
performance of small 
European banks 
Negative relation between 
non-interest income and 
both performance and risk. 
Small European banks do 
not benefit from 
diversification and should 
rather focus on core 
competencies.    
OLS regressions of 
profitability and revenue 
volatility measures on HHI 
measures of diversification 
Small European Banks 755 1997-2003 
The analysis also extends 
to the sensitivity of the 
models with respect to 
regulatory environment in 
which banks operated. 
Nurullah and Staikouras 
(2008) 
They examine the risk-
return effects of European 
banks’ diversification into 
life and non-life insurance 
underwriting, as well as 
into insurance broking 
businesses 
At the aggregate level life 
and non-life insurance 
underwriting are more 
risky than banking.  
Insurance broking has 
higher returns and does not 
affect crediworthiness. 
Synthetic structure analysis 
shows that general and life 
insurance significantly 
increase volatility and the 
probability of bankruptcy 
and that best candidate for 
bank expansion is 
insurance brokerage. 
Risk-return analysis / 
actual bank-insurance pairs 
E.U. 
banks 
life insurance 
non-life insurance 
insurance brokers 
 
45 
40 
12 
11 
1990-1999 
Analysis also provided for 
the aggregate industry 
level. 
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Schmid and Walter (2009) 
They examine whether 
functional diversification is 
creating or destroying the 
value of financial 
institutions 
Substantial and persistent 
conglomerate discount in 
financial firms. It is 
diversification that causes 
the discount and not that 
troubled firms choose to 
diversify in other areas. 
Interestingly, when 
combinations between 
banking and insurance or 
banking and investment 
banking are considered, 
they are found to offer a 
significant valuation 
premium. 
Comparison of excess 
values and measures of 
diversification of 
diversified firms versus 
those of focused firms. 
Regression of excess value 
measures on different 
diversification proxies and 
other control variables. 
Extra regressions with 
dummy variables for 
various activity 
combinations 
U.S. financial firms 664 1985-2004 
Excess value is calculated 
as the log of the ratio of a 
firm’s value to its imputed 
value. The imputed value 
of the firm is calculated as 
the sum of the imputed 
segment values, whereas, 
the imputed value for each 
segment is calculated by 
multiplying the segment’s 
sales (assets) by the median 
ratio of the market value to 
sales (assets) for single 
segment firms in the same 
industry. 
Stiroh (2004) 
He examines the relation 
between non-interest 
income and volatility of 
bank revenue and profits 
both at the aggregate and 
bank level 
Industry level analysis 
shows that while the 
volatility of bank revenue 
has dropped overtime, this 
decline was due to the 
reduction in the volatility 
of net-interest income. On 
the other hand, the 
volatility of non-interest 
income is found to have 
increased during the same 
period, together with the 
correlation between net and 
non-interest income. Latter 
correlation is also evident 
at bank level analysis. 
Negative relation between 
non-interest income and 
profits per unit of risk. 
Analysis of fluctuation in 
non-interest income and 
net interest income over 
time, examination of 
volatility of net operating 
revenue growth. 
Correlation analysis 
between net interest 
income and non-interest 
income across time and 
sample of banks. Also OLS 
regressions of bank net 
income growth and ROE 
on non-interest share proxy 
and other variables 
a. Aggregate U.S. banking 
industry data 
b. Bank-level data 
b. All U.S. commercial 
banks 
a. 1984:Q1 to 2001:Q3 
b. 1978-2000 
The author suggests that 
banks’ increasing focus on 
cross-selling might expose 
different lines of their 
business to the same 
shocks.  
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Stiroh (2006) 
He examines the 
relationship between non-
interest income and equity 
market measures of BHC 
return and risk 
Insignificant relation 
between bank mean return 
and non-interest activities. 
Positive correlation 
between non-interest 
income share and total, 
market and idiosyncratic 
risk. Relationship between 
non-interest share and total 
and idiosyncratic risk is 
non-linear. In effect, total 
risk can be minimized 
when non-interest share is 
between 18% and 27%, 
while idiosyncratic risk is 
minimized when the share 
remains under 16%. 
Pooled cross-section OLS 
regressions of stock 
returns, total risk, 
idiosyncratic risk and bank 
betas on non-interest share 
proxy, size and equity to 
assets ratio 
U.S. Bank Holding 
Companies 
3198 bank year 
observations from 635 
distinct banks 
1997-2004 - 
Stiroh and Rumble (2006) 
They examine impact of 
diversification on the 
performance of FHCs 
Increased risk adjusted 
performance due to 
diversification benefits 
across FHCs is offset by 
increased exposure to non-
interest activities. Within 
FHCs, increasing 
diversification does not 
bring improvements in risk 
adjusted performance. 
Negative ralation between 
non-interest income and 
risk adjusted performance. 
Cross section and panel 
regressions 
Financial Holding 
Companies 1816 
1997-2002 
(quarterly) 
They also examine the 
impact of diversification on 
regular performance 
measures such as ROE, 
ROA and their respective 
standard deviations. They 
only find a significant 
relation when standard 
deviations are used as 
dependent variables. This 
paper has two possible 
issues/biases. First, they 
use DIV and SHnon in 
regression which have a 
non-linear relation, Second 
similar issues arise through 
use of non-interest income 
and net income. 
Wall (1987) 
He compares the riskiness 
of BHC affiliates and the 
possible diversification 
benefits 
Mixed evidence regarding 
the effects of nonbank 
activities on BHC risk. 
Nonbank activities can 
either reduce or increase 
risk of BHCs depending 
upon the risk profile of 
existing bank affiliates. 
ROE mean, standard 
deviation and correlation 
analysis as well probability 
of failure analysis 
Bank Holding Companies 267 1976-1984 - 
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Table B.5. Qualitative Studies 
 
Study Objectives Conclusions/Implications 
Allen and Santomero (2001) The paper explores the changing role of financial intermediaries across time and across countries such as the U.S., U.K., France, Germany and Japan. 
The role of financial intermediaries across time and countries varies with the 
type of market and the type of assets held by households in each country.  The 
surge of innovation in financial markets in the last 25 years has radically 
changed the type of assets held by households, with those in market based 
economies (U.S. and U.K.) shifting towards riskier assets. This has transformed 
the way banks manage risk and forced them to move away from traditional 
banking activities and move towards fee generating activities. 
Artikis, Mutenga and Staikouras (2008) 
The article explores the bancassurance phenomenon from three perspectives: 
First, it reviews the main empirical findings on the bancassurance models. 
Second, it analyses the current market practices across the world and third 
provides a thorough discussion of the available products and modes of entry 
There is no clear answer in the literature with regards to whether financial 
conglomerates and bancassurance will succeed. The differences in the 
penetration of bancassurance across the globe further adds to the debate. There 
is no winner amongst the available modes of entry, the level of integration and 
structure depends on market characteristics. 
Benoist (2002) 
The article adeptly analyses the benefits, risks and vulnerabilities associated 
with the bancassurance model. It also provides a statistical overview of the 
penetration of bancassurance across selected nations across the world. 
Bancassurance presents a major opportunity for financial institutions if the 
inherent risks are taken into careful consideration and minimized. Successful 
bancassurers will be those able to 1) tailor the model to the context, 2) focus on 
quality, innovation, technology and low costs and 3) strong customer 
relationships. 
Benston (1994) 
The article provides an excellent discussion on the possible implications of a 
universal banking system in the US. These include effects on financial stability, 
economic development, other financial institutions, concentration of political 
and economic power, consumer choice, and conflicts of interest. 
Universal banking should benefit the financial system as a whole, without 
introducing any considerable problems to the economy and affecting financial 
stability. 
Bergendahl (1995) 
The article in general analyses the dynamics behind the profitability of 
bancassurance. It lays down several assumptions on how to render 
bancassurance profitable, especially through cost reduction. It builds a model 
that estimates this profitability for KredietBank and Deutsche Bank.  
Five key factors affecting bancassurance profitability 
1. Number of branches (positively correlated with investment costs) 
2. Number of insurance specialists per branch (as above) 
3. Number of customers (positively correlated with benefits) 
4. Cross-selling ratio (same) 
5. Degree of learning (negatively correlated with costs) 
Broome and Markham (2000)  
The paper provides a historical overview of the development of the insurance 
industry and its regulatory surroundings in the US.  The benefits and costs of 
bank involvement into the insurance business are also adeptly analysed together 
with a discussion of the regulatory firewalls that slowed down the phenomenon 
in the US and the various ways that the latter were circumvented. The paper 
concludes with an analysis of the aftermath of the Financial Services 
Modernization Act of 1999 (FSMA, 1999). 
Despite the regulatory restrictions banks and insurers have always found ways 
to combine their operations. On the regulatory side, the current functional 
approach is considered non-vital and changes must be made to replace the 
duplicative regulatory structure with a new one, adept to regulate modern 
financial services. 
Dorval (2002) The paper discusses the restrictions imposed on Canadian banks with regards to the promotion and sale of insurance products. 
The Federal regulatory system was behind the times in 2002 and should have 
been changed in order to give more freedom to banks with respect to the sale of 
insurance products. Note by Panagiotis Dontis-Charitos: In reality even 
nowadays the Bank Act prohibits Canadian banks from selling insurance 
through their branches. Despite this, an increasing number of banks including 
the Royal Bank of Canada and Bank of Montreal are circumventing restrictions 
by opening insurance outlets of their subsidiaries adjacent to their bank 
branches, or by providing insurance online. 
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Falautano and Marsiglia (2003) 
This paper explores the various ways in which financial institutions can enter 
bancassurance. The current trends and future prospects of the phenomenon are 
also discussed and its presence in key European markets analysed. 
Bancassurance is here to stay and the transformation of the financial institutions 
in order to adapt to it will draw a line between winners and losers. Winners will 
be those institutions that base their strategies on customers, the only factor that 
can promise value creation. 
Felgran (1985) 
The paper examines the rationale behind the entry of banks into the insurance 
business, the legal firewalls faced by banks and the various means used by them 
in order to circumvent these restrictions. 
Insurance brokerage is attractive for banks since it is complementary to banking 
products, requires low investment and carries low risk as it generates fee 
income. Both banks and insurers can lower their costs and increase efficiency 
via the cross-selling of their products. Insurance underwriting not attractive to 
banks because of high risk/low return profile and is capital intensive. Also few 
linkages between underwriting and banking services. 
Flur, Huston and Lowie (2001) 
The article explores the main drivers behind the bancassurance trend and 
discusses the potential benefits for banks, insurers and clients. Three different 
models of entrance to bancassurance are also adeptly analysed. 
- 
Herring and Santomero (1990) 
This article provides a detailed analysis of the public policy issues pertinent to 
the creation of financial conglomerates. It also explores the different corporate 
structures available to financial conglomerates in an effort to identify the most 
appropriate one. 
Although financial conglomerates may not dominate specialised firms they are 
better positioned as their diversity allows them to adapt easily to changing 
environments. In allowing financial conglomerates to be formed, regulators 
must pay special attention to issues such as monopoly power, excessive 
economic and political power, conflicts of interest, increased systemic risk, 
cross subsidies, and finally the possibility that conglomerates might become 
difficult to supervise and regulate. 
John, John and Saunders (1994) 
The paper explores the impact of universal banking on bank risk under two 
distinct scenarios. Under the first scenario the bank does not control the firm's 
investment decisions whereas under the second, the bank has control over 
investment decisions. 
Under the first scenario, increases in bank ownership of firms results in 
increased investment efficiency and reduced risk of the bank's portfolio. In the 
second scenario, while investment efficiency is still an increasing function of 
the equity held by the bank, the portfolio risk of the bank increases.  
Johnston (1922) 
The paper provides an extensive analysis of how banks in the state of 
Massachusetts in 1907 could establish insurance departments and offer a 
combination of banking and insurance products. More integrated products such 
as hybrid savings deposits and life insurance that appeared in the market are 
also adeptly analysed together with the reasons of their condemnation by the 
legal authorities. 
The collaboration of banks and insurers extends back to the beginning of the 
20th century. Combinations where bank and insurance divisions where kept 
financially separate were successful whereas more integrated approaches were 
condemned, mainly due to the risks involved. 
Kalotychou and Staikouras (2007) The paper explores the evolution of the bancassurance phenomenon and its characteristics and current practices in the Greek market. 
Despite de jure regulatory limits on the interface of financial institutions 
bancassurance existed in Greece since the early 1980s in a de facto mode, 
where state owned banks operated their own insurance subsidiaries with the 
latter structure still being the dominant bancassurance model. Factors such as 
demographics, economic and regulatory environment are identified as the 
drivers of the phenomenon whereas the hunt for superior performance is 
identified as the underlying motive. Finally the authors suggest that operational 
factors such as the product range, fee levels and the use of technology are 
crucial to the success of the phenomenon. 
Kane (1981) 
The paper examines the dynamics that lie behind the interaction between 
regulation, regulatory avoidance (circumvention of the rules), re-regulation and 
deregulation within the U.S. banking industry 
There is a cyclical pattern in the interaction between regulation, circumvention 
and re-regulation and/or deregulation. As a market becomes increasingly 
competitive, regulation tends to become stricter and regulatees are more willing 
to innovate in terms of finding loopholes, especially because regulation in a 
market imposes opportunity costs on banks. Re-regulation is not always the best 
practice after a series of cyclical interactions, since it can be a very complex 
procedure that imposes social costs. This is when deregulation becomes more 
and more attractive. The author points out that the market should be 
deregulated, in order to enable banks to exploit economies of scale, scope and 
become more efficient.  
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Kane (1988) See Kane (1981) 
A dialectical approach is used to analyse the pattern of regulation, avoidance 
and re-regulation. Dialectical (regulatory) outcomes are governed by the push 
and pull of the opposing forces of thesis (regulation) and antithesis (avoidance) 
and the idea that resolves the conflict is synthesis (re-regulation). 
Kist (2001) 
The article elaborates on the potential synergies generated by the combination 
of banking, insurance and asset management businesses into financial 
conglomerates. 
Successful financial conglomerates are superior to focused companies since 
they can use capital more efficiently. Moreover, they are better diversified and 
can easily offset risks. This diversity makes them more flexible to external 
changes.  As a result financial conglomerates are expected to generate a higher 
and more stable earnings stream. 
Lymperopoulos, Chaniotakis and Soureli (2003)  The paper examines the opportunities presented to Greek banks to cross-sell insurance products. 
There are great opportunities for Greek bancassurers as customers are found to 
be more unaware of these products than willing to buy them. 
McDaniel (1996) The article provides a summary of bancassurance figures and practices around Europe and briefly analyses the structural modes of entry. - 
Merton (1990) The paper discusses financial innovation and how the current regulatory system is inadequate to promote financial performance in markets.  
As the lines between financial institutions are blurring it is considered essential 
that regulation moves from the institutional approach to a functional approach. 
Morgan (1994) 
The paper explores the evolution and future of the bancassurance phenomenon 
in the UK and provides three case studies (for the same case studies see 
Morgan, Sturdy, Daniel and Knights, 1994) 
Although making bancassurance work is a difficult operation, the authors argue 
that the phenomenon will become more and more dominant in the UK in the 
future. This includes the move from the current tied agency system to a more 
integrated financial services arena. 
Morgan, Sturdy, Daniel and Knights (1994) The article examines the implementation of bancassurance and the problems that emerged in Britain and France  via 6 case studies. 
There are various operational difficulties in trying to combine deposit taking 
and insurance selling that mostly relate to cultural differences between the 
involved institutions. French banks and insurers have overcome these problems 
more easily than their UK counterparts which are more susceptible to change. It 
is stressed that successful organisations will be those who realise that 
bancassurance is part of a long-term process of change. 
Ryan (2001) 
The paper explores the drivers of consolidation in the financial services industry 
and the effects of this trend on various types of financial institutions. The paper 
also provides a good discussion on the regulatory framework in various regions 
of the world. 
Globalisation, technological advances, deregulation, changes in demographics 
and  increased customer sophistication are identified as the key factors driving 
convergence in the financial services industry. 
Santomero (1989) The paper reviews two volumes of conference articles on universal banks and financial change. 
The author argues that in order to gain a perspective on the changing structure 
of financial institutions one has to address what the changes are, what are the 
forces driving them and the implications of such changes. More specifically, the 
shift towards universal banking seems to be happening across every country, to 
the extent allowed by the permissiveness of each national regulatory 
environment. The main forces behind this, are advances in technology and 
telecommunications, financial products, globalization and deregulation. On this 
latter point the author points out the need for an analytic framework to explain 
the process of change and its effects, rather than simply analysing the proximate 
causes of change. Finally, it is pointed out that the effects of the changing 
landscape extend beyond mere concerns for the safety and soundness of the 
system.  The central issue is how to deal with the threats to the viability of each 
participant caused by alterations in their roles in the market.  
 240 
Study Objectives Conclusions/Implications 
Santomero and Eckles (2000) 
The article provides an excellent discussion on the effects of financial 
modernization. The analysis starts by analysing firm level effects and proceeds 
to the discussion of public policy issues. 
The synergies achieved via the universal firm system should drive the market 
towards the creation of an increasing number of such companies. Despite the 
synergies, the issues of the complexity, complacency and fragility of such 
universal firms remains serious. This is why the authors suggest that niche firms 
will not cease to exist, and that is more likely that a mix of specialised and 
universal firms will be the norm. On the public policy issues they suggest that 
regulatory intervention will be almost certain as these firms grow larger in size, 
yet competitive forces should to an extent auto-regulate the industry 
Saunders (1994) 
The article provides a discussion of the debate on the benefits and costs 
associated with the relaxation of the regulatory barriers that imposed restrictions 
on the affiliation between banks and commercial firms in the U.S. 
By considering the advantages of a potential integration between the two 
industries he identifies 4 possible sources of benefits. First, potential cost and 
revenue synergies that may be experienced through either increased scale and 
scope economies or superior revenue generation are evaluated. While scale 
economies can be realised at an optimal output level, the full potential from 
scope economies is somewhat hinged by the regulatory "product-mix" 
restrictions. There are considerable opportunities for revenue expansion via 
effective cross-selling, that, in contrary to cost reduction opportunities can be 
achieved at a less than full organisational integration level. Second, if there 
exists an imperfect correlation between banking and commercial firm returns, 
aggregate profits in a universal bank or conglomerate will be smoother than 
those of each of the standalone/specialised operations. Geographic spread is 
equally important in stabilising risk and returns. Third, by allowing banks to 
integrate with commercial firms, the former will be able to boost their capital 
levels and in this way not only experience a direct improvement in their 
financial status but also indirectly benefit the tax-payers through promoting a 
more stable and safe banking system. The last benefit considered is the 
improvement in agency costs and corporate control. Regulatory constraints act 
as a shelter for incompetent managers and elevate agency costs, and 
deregulation may lead to a more efficient banking system. 
The disadvantages of such an integration lead to three sources of concern. First, 
there is a risk that the banking system will become increasingly concentrated 
and that a few gigantic conglomerates could monopolize the market. However, 
this is unlikely given that the U.S. banking industry is less concentrated than 
other industries like life insurance, P/C insurance and securities. Second, 
although conflicts of interest may arise, they could be effectively be offset by 
the corrective forces of competition, market demand, and careful supervision. 
Last but not least, the effects on the safety and soundness of the banking system 
and on the safety net are assessed, and solutions with respect to the appropriate 
safeguards and reforms to the insurance system are proposed. 
Skipper (2000) This article thoroughly analyses the dynamics of financial services integration from an economic, managerial and public policy perspective. 
It is suggested that integration in the financial services is economically feasible 
if it leads to a reduction in operating costs and/or an increase in revenues. 
Staikouras (2006) 
The article provides a discussion of the market practices of bancassurance 
across Europe and an analysis of the various impediments in the successful 
integration of banking and insurance. Furthermore, it identifies the risk/success 
factors of the model and elaborates on various exogenous and idiosyncratic 
drivers that are crucial for the survival of hybrid institutions. 
 A three-dimensional, radar-shape approach for the distribution network of 
bancassurance model is proposed. The exogenous risk/success factors that are 
identified are economic growth, demographics, regulation and the tax 
environment. The endogenous risk/success factors are described as either 
strategic (business culture, corporate closeness, management initiative, 
corporate governance) or operational (branch environment, customer relations, 
range of services, financial management and brand awareness).  
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Szego (1986) 
The paper examines the asset management models of banks and insurers. He 
suggests that banking and insurance are becoming increasingly interdependent 
due to the complementarities found in the structure of their cash flows. 
The growing interaction between banks and insurers will manifest in the form 
of increasing competition and/or collaboration in the following ways: 1) 
Increased need for insurance cover by banks, 2) cross-selling of blended 
products and 3) in a form of competition in the areas of investment management 
and pension funds. 
Taylor (1999) 
The article briefly examines the causes and implications of the changes taking 
place in the financial services industry and provides a list of suggestions for 
managers of financial institutions. 
The causes indentified are deregulation, privatization, the introduction of new 
technologies, the development of new products and increased cross-industry 
and cross-border competition. To cope with the changes in the financial services 
arena, managers should focus in the areas of environmental scanning, 
competitive and political intelligence, contingency planning, treasury 
management, public affairs, crisis management, overhead cost reduction, 
employee involvement, international strategies, new channels and customer 
service. 
Thakor (1999) The paper explores the issue of information technology and its links with financial services consolidation. 
Traditional lines that kept information services and financial services apart are 
blurring. As such, financial services firms choose to consolidate instead of 
outsourcing their information technology in order to retain the strategic option 
of offering both financial and information services in the future. 
Todd and Murray (1988) 
The paper discusses whether banks should be allowed to enter insurance.  It 
provides an examination of the regulatory framework in the US as well as a 
thorough analysis of the issue of coercion through a set of questionnaires 
completed by consumers and industry participants. 
The authors report that coercion is not a significant factor in any of the 
questionnaires examined. They conclude that governments should not deal with 
coercion concerns by placing regulatory barriers between banks and insurance. 
Wagner (2008) The article presents a model where higher similarities are associated with lower externalities of bank risk-taking. 
Inefficiencies appear in the economy because of an inability of the interbank 
market to reallocate liquidity among banks efficiently, during a crisis. When 
banks are more similar the need for such a reallocation is smaller and, as such, 
the costs of a liquidity crisis are reduced. It is shown that a bank’s capital 
requirement can be lowered when the financial system overall is more 
homogenous. However, diversification can reduce welfare given the possibility 
that it can promote excessive risk taking by banks. 
Wagner (2010) 
The paper develops a theoretical model to analyse the impact of bank 
diversification and bank mergers on the risk of individual firms and that of the 
financial system. 
Even though diversification reduces each institution’s individual risk of failure, 
systemic crises are more likely to appear in the current financial industry, given 
that institutions are becoming increasingly similar through related 
diversification. 
Van den Berghe and Verweire (2001) The article provides an extensive analysis of the convergence between banking and insurance ranging from the simplest distributional level to full integration. 
The combination of banking and insurance via bancassurance is just the initial 
step towards a more integrated relationship, one that will redefine the core 
business of financial institutions from a product (technical) to a client-oriented 
(functional) approach.  
Van den Berghe, Verweire and Carchon (1999) See Van den Berghe and Verweire (2001) - 
Voutilainen (2005) 
The article explores the various aspects of bank-insurance alliances including 
the driving forces behind them. It then develops nine criteria to be followed for 
the creation of a successful alliance model.  
Criteria for alliance model success 
1) Maximisation of product development efficiency with focus on the design of 
hybrid products. 
2) Maximisation of effectiveness of one-stop-shopping 
3) Elimination of conflicting earnings logics between partners 
4) CRM efficiency maximisation (possibly through the effective integration of 
the members' CRM systems.) 
5) Cost and revenue synergy maximisation. 
6) Minimisation of channel conflicts. 
7) Optimisation of required solvency capital. 
8) Investor power maximisation. 
9) Maximisation of efficiency of sales management. 
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Walter (1997) 
This article provides an extensive analysis of the structure of universal banks 
and of the economic benefits and costs associated with their operation. Public 
policy issues relating to universal banks are also adeptly discussed and 
examined. 
Universal banks should not expect much gain from economies of scale, and 
supply side economies of scope. Instead, they should look out to exploit 
demand side scope economies and optimize X-efficiencies through the effective 
use of technology. The use of specialists and the elimination of conflicts of 
interest are also considered essential for universal banks that want to succeed. 
Walter (2009) 
The article provides an extensive analysis of the internal and external forces 
driving the changes in the financial services industry along with the 
consequences, such as the 2007-2009 financial crisis, and attempts to predict the 
future of the industry. 
The main external cause of the changes in the financial services industry is the 
growing trend towards the reallocation of financial flows from financial 
intermediaries to the capital markets. From a firm level perspective, the forces 
responsible are economies of scale and scope, operating efficiencies and 
diversification. Extended government guarantees for too-big-to-fail companies 
have led to acute moral hazard issues that have in turn created the current 
financial crisis. The future of the financial services industry is likely to involve 
tighter regulation along with industry self-correction that will possibly align the 
interests of shareholders with those of the taxpayers. Nevertheless, market 
discipline is unlikely to be sustained in a hyper competitive market that will 
soon reappear and lead to the next crisis. 
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Table C.1. List of US deals announced before the FSMA 1999 and had been subject to regulatory approval 
 
No Pre FSMA US deals Year Deal Synopsis (Thomson One Banker) 
1 Valley National - Western Security Life 1991 
Valley National Bank, Phoenix, Arizona, a unit of Valley National Bancorp, acquired the 51% of Western Security Life Insurance 
that it did not already own from Lincoln National for $7.2 mil. The transaction was approved by the Office of the Comptroller 
of the Currency. 
2 BB&T Financial Corp - West Insurance and Associates 1992 BB&T Financial acquired West Insurance & Associates in exchange for newly issued BB&T Financial common shares. The transaction had been subject to regulatory approval. 
3 First Bank System Inc. - American Bankshares of Mankato Inc. 1993 First Bank System acquired both American Bankshares of Mankato and Eagle Insurance Agency. Term were not disclosed. 
4 CNB Bancshares Inc. - Citizens Realty and Insurance Inc. 1994 CNB  Bancshares agreed to acquire Citizens Realty and Insurance in a stock swap merger transaction. 
5 First Financial Bancorp - Independent Bankers Life Insurance Co 1995 
First Financial Bancorp acquired Independent Bankers Life Insurance Company of Indiana. Terms were not disclosed. The 
transaction had been subject federal and state regulatory approval. 
6 Commerce Bancorp Inc. - Buckelew & Associates, Keystone National Insurance 1996 
Commerce Bancorp (CB), Cherry Hill, New Jersey, acquired Buckelew & Associates and Keystone National Insurance in 
exchange for .55 mil common shares valued at $13.2 mil. The shares were valued based on CB's closing stock price of $24 on July 
31, the last full trading day prior to announcement. The transaction had been subject to federal and state banking regulatory 
approval. 
7 Fort Wayne National Corp - Ambassador Group Inc. 1997 Fort Wayne National acquired Ambassador Group. Terms were not disclosed. 
8 Centura Bank Inc. - Betts & Co 1997 Centura Bank, located in Rocky Mount, North Carolina, acquired Betts. Terms were not disclosed. The transaction had been subject to federal and state banking regulatory approval. 
9 Citicorp - Travelers Group 1998 
Travelers Group Inc (TG) merged with Citicorp (CC) to form Citigroup Inc (CGI) in a merger-of-equals stock swap transaction 
valued at $72.558 bil. CC common shareholders received 2.5 CGI common shares and TG common shareholders received 1 CGI 
common share per share held. Based on TG's closing stock price of $61.6875 on April 3, the last full trading day prior to the 
announcement, each CC share was valued at $154.219. The transaction was accounted for as a pooling of interests and had 
been subject to regulatory approval. Upon completion, both TG and CC shareholders each owned 50% in CG. 
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10 Hibernia Corp - FPS Financial Services 1998 Hibernia Corp located in New Orleans, Lousiana, acquired FPS Financial Services. 
The table lists and presents further information on deals that are included in our sample and were announced before the FSMA (1999), in the United States. Given the restrictions on the bank-insurance interface prior to 
this Act, these deals had been subject to regulatory approval that was consequently given. 
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Table D.1. Determinants of bancassurance deal excess returns (all deals) 
               
Variable Model 1 Model 2 
 (-2,0) (-2,+1) (-2,+2) (0,0) (0,+1) (0,+2) (0,+5) (-2,0) (-2,+1) (-2,+2) (0,0) (0,+1) (0,+2) (0,+5) 
               
Intercept -0.012 0.078 0.132 -0.029 0.061 0.115 0.092 0.013 0.111 0.117 -0.016 0.063 0.065 0.095 
 -(0.20) -(1.29) -(1.86)a -(0.50) -(1.08) -(1.78)c -(1.54) -(0.27) -(2.62)a -(2.32)b -(1.16) -(1.59) -(1.40) -(1.97)b 
Market to book -0.001 -0.002 -0.005 -0.001 -0.002 -0.005 -0.007       -0.008 
 -(0.21) -(0.76) -(1.45) -(0.37) -(0.96) -(1.72)c -(2.84)a       -(3.34)a 
Leverage 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.001 -0.001 0.001      -0.001 
 -(1.32) -(0.79) -(0.42) -(0.59) (0.00) -(1.20) -(1.56) -(1.27)      -(2.30)b 
NII pct TOI -0.063 -0.082 -0.119 -0.047 -0.065 -0.102 -0.124 -0.076 -0.094 -0.122 -0.058 -0.066 -0.090 -0.123 
 -(1.61) -(2.14)b -(2.66)a -(1.28) -(1.84)c -(2.51)b -(3.27)a -(2.14)b -(2.74)a -(2.99)a -(1.81)c -(2.06)b -(2.40)b -(3.47)a 
Relative Deal 
size 0.044 0.047 0.051 0.048 0.050 0.055 0.063 0.048 0.053 0.050 0.054 0.054 0.052 0.062 
 -(2.50)b -(2.71)a -(2.53)b -(2.89)a -(3.12)a -(2.96)a -(3.69)a -(2.87)a -(3.36)a -(2.72)a -(3.54)a -(3.71)a -(3.07)a -(3.76)a 
Return on equity 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001     0.001 0.002 0.001 
 -(0.99) -(1.20) -(1.23) -(1.59) -(1.83)c -(1.83)c -(1.69)c     -(2.09)b -(2.38)b -(2.09)b 
DBB* -0.034 -0.108 -0.128 -0.012 -0.087 -0.107 -0.079 -0.038 -0.114 -0.118  -0.092 -0.100 -0.074 
 -(0.79) -(2.60)a -(2.62)a -(0.31) -(2.23)b -(2.39)b -(1.90)c -(0.95) -(3.02)a -(2.63)a  -(2.61)a -(2.41)b -(1.88)c 
DDOM* 0.009 0.008 -0.006 0.006 0.005 -0.010 -0.004         
 -(0.55) -(0.50) -(0.32) -(0.36) -(0.30) -(0.56) -(0.26)         
DUS* 0.050 0.032 0.027 0.046 0.028 0.023 0.019 0.050 0.028 0.033 0.038 0.027 0.032   
 -(3.06)a -(2.00)b -(1.42) -(3.02)a -(1.88)c -(1.33) -(1.19) -(3.32)a -(2.11)b -(2.08)b -(2.99)a -(2.24)b -(2.20)b   
DFSMA* -0.007 -0.001 0.001 -0.006 0.000 0.002 0.006         
 -(0.58) -(0.12) -(0.06) -(0.51) -(0.01) -(0.17) -(0.58)         
                 
N 47 47 47 47 47 47 47 47 49 49 49 49 49 47 
F-value 2.84 3.18 2.92 2.98 3.15 3.34 4.84 5.21 6.82 5.72 7.66 5.94 5.53 7.08 
Adjusted R2 0.27 0.30 0.27 0.28 0.30 0.31 0.43 0.31 0.33 0.28 0.29 0.34 0.32 0.44 
AIC -3.53 -3.58 -3.26 -3.66 -3.73 -3.45 -3.60 -3.66 -3.75 -3.40 -3.81 -3.89 -3.56 -3.67 
The sample here consists of 120 bancassurance deals announced between 1990 and 2006, excluding deals where the targets are insurance agencies. The unavailability of accounting or deal 
specific data for some companies/deals produces a final sample of 47 to 49 deals depending on the selected model. The abnormal returns are taken from the market model, where market risk is 
represented by the pertinent wide market index. The figures represent coefficient estimates while those in brackets indicate t-values (White errors). 
CAR stands for the bidder cumulative abnormal returns, α is the constant, F represents the exogenous factors listed in the first column of the table. 
* DBB is the dummy taking into account the fact that the bidder is a bank, DDOM is the dummy taking into account domestic deals, DUS is the dummy taking into account U.S. bidders and 
DFSMA is the dummy variable taking into account deals that were announced after the passage of the Financial Services Modernization Act (1999). 
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a/b/c denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level. 
 
Table D.2. Determinants of bank-insurance deal excess returns (bank bidders) 
               
Variable Model 1 Model 2 
 (-2,0) (-2,+1) (-2,+2) (0,0) (0,+1) (0,+2) (0,+5) (-2,0) (-2,+1) (-2,+2) (0,0) (0,+1) (0,+2) (0,+5) 
               
Intercept -0.046 -0.030 0.004 -0.042 -0.026 0.008 0.013 -0.036 -0.012 -0.015 -0.034 -0.030 -0.035 0.020 
 -(1.23) -(0.83) -(0.09) -(1.18) -(0.75) -(0.21) -(0.36) -(1.47) -(0.64) -(0.68) -(1.89)c -(1.72)c -(1.74)c -(0.83) 
Market to book -0.001 -0.002 -0.005 -0.001 -0.002 -0.005 -0.007  -0.002 -0.004    -0.008 
 -(0.21) -(0.76) -(1.45) -(0.37) -(0.96) -(1.72)c -(2.84)a  -(1.00) -(1.44)    -(3.34)a 
Leverage 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.001 -0.001 0.001      -0.001 
 -(1.32) -(0.79) -(0.42) -(0.59) (0.00) -(1.20) -(1.56) -(1.35)      -(2.30)b 
NII pct TOI -0.063 -0.082 -0.119 -0.047 -0.065 -0.102 -0.124 -0.071 -0.087 -0.111 -0.053 -0.066 -0.090 -0.123 
 -(1.61) -(2.14)b -(2.66)a -(1.28) -(1.84)c -(2.51)b -(3.27)a -(1.96)b -(2.53)b -(2.78)a -(1.59) -(2.06)b -(2.40)b -(3.47)a 
Relative Deal 
size 0.044 0.047 0.051 0.048 0.050 0.055 0.063 0.048 0.052 0.050 0.055 0.054 0.052 0.062 
 -(2.50)b -(2.71)a -(2.53)b -(2.89)a -(3.12)a -(2.96)a -(3.69)a -(2.88)a -(3.35)a -(2.76)a -(3.64)a -(3.71)a -(3.07)a -(3.76)a 
Return on equity 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.001 
 -(0.99) -(1.20) -(1.23) -(1.59) -(1.83)c -(1.83)c -(1.69)c -(0.77) -(1.26) -(1.70)c -(1.65)c -(2.09)b -(2.38)b -(2.09)b 
DDOM* 0.009 0.008 -0.006 0.006 0.005 -0.010 -0.004         
 -(0.55) -(0.50) -(0.32) -(0.36) -(0.30) -(0.56) -(0.26)         
DUS* 0.050 0.032 0.027 0.046 0.028 0.023 0.019 0.050 0.024 0.027 0.038 0.027 0.032   
 -(3.06)a -(2.00)b -(1.42) -(3.02)a -(1.88)c -(1.33) -(1.19) -(3.28)a -(1.82)c -(1.73)c -(2.94)a -(2.24)b -(2.20)b   
DFSMA* -0.007 -0.001 0.001 -0.006 0.000 0.002 0.006         
 -(0.58) -(0.12) -(0.06) -(0.51) -(0.01) -(0.17) -(0.58)         
                 
N 46 46 46 46 46 46 46 46 48 48 48 48 48 46 
F-value 3.16 2.93 2.88 3.35 3.21 3.57 5.41 5.21 4.82 5.02 6.55 6.68 6.50 8.43 
Adjusted R2 0.28 0.26 0.25 0.30 0.28 0.31 0.44 0.32 0.29 0.30 0.32 0.33 0.32 0.45 
AIC -3.54 -3.60 -3.27 -3.68 -3.74 -3.46 -3.61 -3.65 -3.73 -3.44 -3.81 -3.90 -3.58 -3.69 
The sample here consists of 100 bancassurance deals announced between 1990 and 2006 where the bidder is a bank and the target an insurance firm, excluding deals where the targets are 
insurance agencies. The unavailability of accounting or deal specific data for some companies/deals produces a final sample of 46 to 48 deals depending on the selected model.  The cumulative 
abnormal returns are taken from the market model, where market risk is represented by the pertinent wide market index. The figures represent coefficient estimates while those in brackets 
indicate t-values (White errors). 
CAR stands for the bidder cumulative abnormal returns, α is the constant, F represents the exogenous factors listed in the first column of the table. 
* DDOM is the dummy taking into account domestic deals, DUS is the dummy taking into account U.S. bidders and DFSMA is the dummy variable taking into account deals that were 
announced after the passage of the Financial Services Modernization Act (1999). 
a/b/c denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level. 
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Table E.1. Total risk regressions of bank-insurance deals 
All betas have been multiplied by 104 
Panel A: Period before announcement 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Constant 3.400 3.790 4.200 5.520 6.020 5.490 
 (3.67)a (4.18)a (2.60)a (3.74)a (4.29)a (3.15)a 
Non-interest income share -1.170 -1.390 -3.420    
 -(0.57) -(0.66) -(0.98)    
Loans to total assets    -3.430 -4.220 -3.530 
    -(1.65)c -(2.04)b -(1.43) 
Non-performing loans to total 
assets   -20.280   -15.690 
   -(0.51)   -(0.97) 
Provision for loan losses to total 
assets 209.640   189.150   
 (1.66)c   (1.47)   
Loan losses to total assets  0.655   0.429  
  (1.51)   (0.82)  
ROA 0.188 0.137 0.419 0.217 0.499 0.608 
 (0.42) (0.28) (0.68) (0.53) (1.45) (1.21) 
Leverage 0.012 0.009 0.009 0.008 0.005 0.011 
 (0.34) (0.24) (0.17) (0.24) (0.15) (0.22) 
Firm size -0.101 -0.087 0.191 -0.152 -0.137 -0.009 
 -(0.51) -(0.43) (0.94) -(0.79) -(0.69) -(0.05) 
N 85 85 66 85 85 66 
Adjusted R-squared 0.01 -0.01 -0.05 0.03 0.00 -0.04 
F-statistic 1.11 0.76 0.42 1.43 1.04 0.44 
Panel B: Period after announcement 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Constant 0.527 1.400 1.890 5.930 8.190 8.900 
 (0.42) (1.22) (1.06) (1.89)c (3.26)a (3.41)a 
Non-interest income share 1.280 -0.351 2.010    
 (0.62) -(0.15) (0.51)    
Loans to total assets    -6.590 -7.830 -8.680 
    -(2.11)b -(2.72)a -(2.55)b 
Non-performing loans to total 
assets   54.480   23.500 
   (1.29)   (0.65) 
Provision for loan losses to total 
assets 509.690   428.910   
 (2.03)b   (1.72)c   
Loan losses to total assets  2.630   2.010  
  (2.45)b   (1.80)c  
ROA 1.070 0.898 0.856 0.781 0.697 0.945 
 (1.86)c (1.51) (0.67) (1.35) (1.18) (0.81) 
Leverage -0.001 -0.009 0.052 -0.017 -0.021 0.029 
 -(0.05) -(0.33) (0.76) -(0.53) -(0.68) (0.53) 
Firm size -0.258 -0.323 -0.237 -0.319 -0.376 -0.428 
 -(0.95) -(1.19) -(0.75) -(1.29) -(1.54) -(1.55) 
N 73 73 55 73 73 55 
Adjusted R-squared 0.18 0.17 -0.02 0.24 0.20 0.14 
F-statistic 4.17 3.90 0.74 5.63 4.70 2.82 
The table presents OLS regressions of bank total risk, 2 iR , on measures of revenue and asset diversification, risk proxies, 
profitability and size variables, before and after the announcement of bank-insurance deals. Panel A presents the results from the 
pre-announcement regressions while Panel B presents the results from the post-announcement regressions. The sample consists 
of 100 bancassurance deal announcements between 1990 and 2006. The independent variables are presented in the first column, 
while columns 1 to 6 contain the results from different regressions. In particular, columns 1 to 3 present the regressions where 
non-interest income share is used as a proxy for revenue diversification, while columns 4 to 6 present the regressions where the 
ratio of loans to total assets is used as a proxy for revenue diversification. Within the two subsets, the risk measures vary, 
producing three sets of regressions. In all models a number of bank-specific characteristics are employed as control variables 
(ROA, leverage, firm size). In cases where independent variables are correlated with one another auxiliary regressions are 
employed in order to make them orthogonal. Non-interest income share is the ratio of non-interest income to total operating 
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income, ROA is the ratio of net income to total assets, Leverage is the ratio of total assets to common equity, and Firm size is the 
natural logarithm of total assets. The rest of the variables are self explanatory. All balance sheet and income statement variables 
for the pre- and post-announcement regressions are obtained at the year end prior to and after the announcement, respectively. 
The figures in brackets indicate t-values (White errors), while a/b/c denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10%, 
respectively. 
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Table E.2. Total risk regressions of bank-insurance agency deals 
All betas have been multiplied by 104 
Panel A: Period before announcement 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Constant 5.990 5.860 5.280 2.060 1.940 0.881 
 (3.70)a (4.44)a (3.14)a (1.07) (0.97) (0.47) 
Non-interest income share -9.560 -9.710 -9.860    
 -(1.97)b -(1.90)c -(1.98)b    
Loans to total assets    3.670 3.890 3.720 
    (1.40) (1.52) (1.44) 
Non-performing loans to total 
assets   168.410   171.520 
   (0.90)   (0.93) 
Provision for loan losses to total 
assets -62.450   -204.340   
 -(0.24)   -(0.71)   
Loan losses to total assets  -0.720   -1.400  
  -(0.44)   -(0.78)  
ROA 0.758 0.725 0.823 0.307 0.264 0.377 
 (0.80) (0.77) (0.86) (0.35) (0.31) (0.44) 
Leverage -0.020 -0.020 -0.022 0.003 0.004 0.005 
 -(0.40) -(0.38) -(0.46) (0.05) (0.08) (0.09) 
Firm size -0.530 -0.510 -0.537 -0.610 -0.610 -0.623 
 -(1.37) -(1.31) -(1.38) -(1.74)c -(1.73)c -(1.74)c 
N 79 79 79 79 79 79 
Adjusted R-squared 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 
F-statistic 0.94 0.92 1.03 0.98 0.98 1.09 
Panel B: Period after announcement 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Constant 4.880 4.930 3.170 1.890 1.540 -0.017 
 (4.82)a (5.01)a (1.65)c (0.78) (0.66) (0.00) 
Non-interest income share -4.110 -4.360 -3.970    
 -(1.23) -(1.32) -(1.19)    
Loans to total assets    2.540 3.400 3.250 
    (0.89) (1.18) (1.02) 
Non-performing loans to total 
assets   8.480   -18.940 
   (0.05)   -(0.09) 
Provision for loan losses to total 
assets 317.180   135.630   
 (1.32)   (0.73)   
Loan losses to total assets  2.240   0.813  
  (1.48)   (0.87)  
ROA -0.159 -0.015 0.105 -0.241 -0.153 -0.003 
 -(0.16) -(0.02) (0.09) -(0.25) -(0.16) (0.00) 
Leverage 0.006 0.005 0.143 0.021 0.026 0.167 
 (0.11) (0.08) (1.13) (0.34) (0.41) (1.25) 
Firm size -0.387 -0.342 -0.323 -0.436 -0.426 -0.360 
 -(1.83)c -(1.54) -(1.43) -(2.38)b -(2.35)b -(1.88)c 
N 74 74 73 74 74 73 
Adjusted R-squared 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.03 
F-statistic 1.49 1.46 1.33 1.38 1.37 1.50 
The table presents OLS regressions of bank total risk, 2 iR , on measures of revenue and asset diversification, risk proxies, 
profitability and size variables, before and after the announcement of bank-insurance agency deals. Panel A presents the results 
from the pre-announcement regressions while Panel B presents the results from the post-announcement regressions. The sample 
consists of 100 bancassurance deal announcements between 1990 and 2006. The independent variables are presented in the first 
column, while columns 1 to 6 contain the results from different regressions. In particular, columns 1 to 3 present the regressions 
where non-interest income share is used as a proxy for revenue diversification, while columns 4 to 6 present the regressions 
where the ratio of loans to total assets is used as a proxy for revenue diversification. Within the two subsets, the risk measures 
vary, producing three sets of regressions. In all models a number of bank-specific characteristics are employed as control 
variables (ROA, leverage, firm size). In cases where independent variables are correlated with one another auxiliary regressions 
are employed in order to make them orthogonal. Non-interest income share is the ratio of non-interest income to total operating 
income, ROA is the ratio of net income to total assets, Leverage is the ratio of total assets to common equity, and Firm size is the 
natural logarithm of total assets. The rest of the variables are self explanatory. All balance sheet and income statement variables 
for the pre- and post-announcement regressions are obtained at the year end prior to and after the announcement, respectively. 
The figures in brackets indicate t-values (White errors), while a/b/c denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10%, 
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respectively. 
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Table E.3. Market beta regressions of bank-insurance deals (completion) 
       
Panel A: Period before completion 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Constant 0.334 0.358 0.359 0.717 0.750 0.733 
 (3.95)a (4.25)a (3.59)a (4.18)a (4.35)a (3.05)a 
Non-interest income share 0.900 0.911 1.153    
 (5.26)a (5.16)a (3.68)a    
Loans to total assets    -0.212 -0.238 -0.187 
    -(1.04) -(1.17) -(0.55) 
Non-performing loans to total 
assets   -4.977   -5.352 
   -(0.79)   -(0.84) 
Provision for loan losses to total 
assets 4.193   5.379   
 (0.37)   (0.46)   
Loan losses to total assets  -0.017   -0.007  
  -(0.32)   -(0.13)  
ROA -0.037 -0.032 0.008 -0.041 -0.037 -0.005 
 -(0.66) -(0.53) (0.09) -(0.77) -(0.66) -(0.06) 
Leverage 0.013 0.012 0.010 0.013 0.013 0.011 
 (3.60)a (3.43)a (2.39)b (3.64)a (3.50)a (2.25)b 
Firm size 0.156 0.158 0.155 0.160 0.162 0.173 
 (8.41)a (8.33)a (6.32)a (9.55)a (9.26)a (7.78)a 
N 80 80 62 80 80 62 
Adjusted R-squared 0.47 0.46 0.45 0.47 0.47 0.44 
F-statistic 14.74 14.73 10.83 14.84 14.78 10.74 
Panel B: Period after completion 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Constant 0.882 0.870 1.023 0.975 0.958 0.778 
 (6.43)a (6.58)a (4.49)a (3.88)a (3.67)a (2.75)a 
Non-interest income share 0.201 0.197 0.336    
 (0.73) (0.71) (0.81)    
Loans to total assets    -0.065 -0.054 0.061 
    -(0.21) -(0.17) (0.17) 
Non-performing loans to total 
assets   -15.829   -14.504 
   -(3.14)a   -(2.65)a 
Provision for loan losses to total 
assets -3.502   -2.373   
 -(0.36)   -(0.25)   
Loan losses to total assets  -0.009   -0.001  
  -(0.18)   -(0.02)  
ROA -0.109 -0.109 -0.187 -0.112 -0.112 -0.191 
 -(2.53)b -(2.38)b -(2.27)b -(2.38)b -(2.31)b -(2.38)b 
Leverage 0.005 0.005 0.000 0.005 0.005 0.002 
 (1.56) (1.63) -(0.03) (1.50) (1.55) (0.25) 
Firm size 0.099 0.099 0.105 0.097 0.096 0.110 
 (3.62)a (3.50)a (3.58)a (3.58)a (3.50)a (3.81)a 
N 76 76 59 76 76 59 
Adjusted R-squared 0.14 0.14 0.18 0.14 0.14 0.18 
F-statistic 3.41 3.40 3.62 3.42 3.41 3.63 
The table presents OLS regressions of bank market beta, β, on measures of revenue and asset diversification, risk proxies, 
profitability and size variables, before and after the completion of bank-insurance deals. Panel A presents the results from the 
pre-completion regressions while Panel B presents the results from the post-completion regressions. The sample consists of 100 
bancassurance deal announcements between 1990 and 2006. The independent variables are presented in the first column, while 
columns 1 to 6 contain the results from different regressions. In particular, columns 1 to 3 present the regressions where non-
interest income share is used as a proxy for revenue diversification, while columns 4 to 6 present the regressions where the ratio 
of loans to total assets is used as a proxy for revenue diversification. Within the two subsets, the risk measures vary, producing 
three sets of regressions. In all models a number of bank-specific characteristics are employed as control variables (ROA, 
leverage, firm size). In cases where independent variables are correlated with one another auxiliary regressions are employed in 
order to make them orthogonal. Non-interest income share is the ratio of non-interest income to total operating income, ROA is 
the ratio of net income to total assets, Leverage is the ratio of total assets to common equity, and Firm size is the natural 
logarithm of total assets. The rest of the variables are self explanatory. All balance sheet and income statement variables for the 
pre- and post-completion regressions are obtained at the year end prior to and after the deals’ completion, respectively. 
The figures in brackets indicate t-values (White errors), while a/b/c denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10%, 
respectively. 
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Table E.4. Ιdiosyncratic risk regressions of bank-insurance deals (completion) 
All betas have been multiplied by 104 
Panel A: Period before completion 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Constant 3.660 3.870 5.000 2.700 3.440 3.900 
 (5.70)a (5.27)a (4.61)a (2.04)b (2.92)a (2.63)a 
Non-interest income share -3.510 -3.650 -5.410    
 -(2.20)b -(2.36)b -(1.78)c    
Loans to total assets    -0.551 -1.050 -0.134 
    -(0.30) -(0.60) -(0.06) 
Non-performing loans to total 
assets   -44.930   -42.990 
   -(1.49)   -(1.47) 
Provision for loan losses to total 
assets 128.030   114.570   
 (1.60)   (1.16)   
Loan losses to total assets  0.435   0.315  
  (1.01)   (0.70)  
ROA 0.470 0.412 0.351 0.475 0.451 0.467 
 (1.14) (1.15) (0.72) (1.59) (1.49) (1.04) 
Leverage -0.031 -0.033 -0.040 -0.034 -0.036 -0.039 
 -(1.36) -(1.59) -(1.35) -(1.76)c -(1.78)c -(1.50) 
Firm size -0.539 -0.532 -0.290 -0.571 -0.564 -0.454 
 -(3.68)a -(3.84)a -(1.76)c -(4.10)a -(3.90)a -(2.92)a 
N 80 80 62 80 80 62 
Adjusted R-squared 0.19 0.18 0.15 0.20 0.19 0.13 
F-statistic 4.80 4.49 3.21 5.06 4.71 2.86 
Panel B: Period after completion 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Constant 2.200 2.720 2.120 4.910 5.620 5.670 
 (2.90)a (3.60)a (1.67)c (2.42)b (3.31)a (3.26)a 
Non-interest income share -0.300 -0.169 0.685    
 -(0.16) -(0.10) (0.22)    
Loans to total assets    -3.820 -4.290 -4.910 
    -(1.73)c -(2.12)b -(2.14)b 
Non-performing loans to total 
assets   61.000   34.220 
   (1.90)c   (1.29) 
Provision for loan losses to total 
assets 139.520   110.720   
 (1.15)   (0.90)   
Loan losses to total assets  0.679   0.431  
  (1.37)   (0.91)  
ROA 0.092 0.033 0.089 0.032 0.010 0.206 
 (0.29) (0.11) (0.21) (0.12) (0.04) (0.54) 
Leverage -0.011 -0.014 0.009 -0.019 -0.021 0.002 
 -(0.54) -(0.75) (0.21) -(0.83) -(0.98) (0.07) 
Firm size -0.498 -0.520 -0.514 -0.526 -0.533 -0.578 
 -(2.44)b -(2.53)b -(2.23)b -(2.93)a -(2.97)a -(2.80)a 
N 76 76 59 76 76 59 
Adjusted R-squared 0.10 0.10 0.13 0.17 0.16 0.25 
F-statistic 2.59 2.59 2.66 4.14 3.90 4.78 
The table presents OLS regressions of bank idiosyncratic risk, 2 , on measures of revenue and asset diversification, risk proxies, 
profitability and size variables, before and after the completion of bank-insurance deals. Panel A presents the results from the 
pre-completion regressions while Panel B presents the results from the post-completion regressions. The sample consists of 100 
bancassurance deal announcements between 1990 and 2006. The independent variables are presented in the first column, while 
columns 1 to 6 contain the results from different regressions. In particular, columns 1 to 3 present the regressions where non-
interest income share is used as a proxy for revenue diversification, while columns 4 to 6 present the regressions where the ratio 
of loans to total assets is used as a proxy for revenue diversification. Within the two subsets, the risk measures vary, producing 
three sets of regressions. In all models a number of bank-specific characteristics are employed as control variables (ROA, 
leverage, firm size). In cases where independent variables are correlated with one another auxiliary regressions are employed in 
order to make them orthogonal. Non-interest income share is the ratio of non-interest income to total operating income, ROA is 
the ratio of net income to total assets, Leverage is the ratio of total assets to common equity, and Firm size is the natural 
logarithm of total assets. The rest of the variables are self explanatory. All balance sheet and income statement variables for the 
pre- and post-completion regressions are obtained at the year end prior to and after the completion, respectively. 
The figures in brackets indicate t-values (White errors), while a/b/c denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10%, 
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respectively. 
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Table E.5. Total risk regressions of bank-insurance deals (completion) 
All betas have been multiplied by 104 
Panel A: Period before completion 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Constant 2.880 3.340 4.980 3.180 5.130 5.880 
 (3.20)a (3.72)a (3.93)a (1.89)c (3.44)a (3.46)a 
Non-interest income share -0.749 -1.140 -2.390    
 -(0.44) -(0.66) -(0.71)    
Loans to total assets    -1.910 -3.170 -2.170 
    -(0.88) -(1.53) -(0.87) 
Non-performing loans to total 
assets   -50.430   -46.930 
   -(1.28)   -(1.19) 
Provision for loan losses to 
total assets 316.810   296.400   
 (2.11)b   (1.93)c   
Loan losses to total assets  1.180   1.070  
  (1.53)   (1.34)  
ROA 0.775 0.606 0.839 0.674 0.561 0.956 
 (1.61) (1.22) (1.31) (1.54) (1.23) (1.59) 
Leverage 0.011 0.007 -0.010 0.007 0.004 -0.011 
 (0.36) (0.23) -(0.24) (0.25) (0.14) -(0.28) 
Firm size -0.281 -0.274 -0.010 -0.261 -0.263 -0.025 
 -(1.50) -(1.35) -(0.24) -(1.40) -(1.30) -(0.13) 
N 80 80 62 80 80 62 
Adjusted R-squared 0.08 0.05 -0.03 0.09 0.05 0.00 
F-statistic 2.44 1.77 0.64 2.59 1.88 0.63 
Panel B: Period after completion 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Constant 2.570 3.560 2.580 7.990 9.420 8.020 
 (2.36)b (3.47)a (1.65)c (3.14)a (4.76)a (4.07)a 
Non-interest income share 1.840 2.080 3.420    
 (0.68) (0.83) (0.91)    
Loans to total assets    -6.860 -7.790 -7.430 
    -(2.57)a -(3.31)a -(2.98)a 
Non-performing loans to total 
assets   57.780   27.030 
   (1.41)   (0.81) 
Provision for loan losses to 
total assets 265.930   224.790   
 (1.51)   (1.27)   
Loan losses to total assets  1.320   0.989  
  (1.80)c   (1.37)  
ROA -0.137 -0.253 -0.190 -0.263 -0.322 -0.045 
 -(0.27) -(0.52) -(0.32) -(0.60) -(0.79) -(0.10) 
Leverage 0.013 0.008 0.044 -0.002 -0.005 0.038 
 (0.45) (0.30) (0.79) -(0.06) -(0.17) (0.87) 
Firm size -0.243 -0.286 -0.190 -0.272 -0.297 -0.257 
 -(1.09) -(1.32) -(0.75) -(1.44) -(1.61) -(1.20) 
N 76 76 59 76 76 59 
Adjusted R-squared 0.05 0.05 0.00 0.14 0.12 0.15 
F-statistic 1.72 1.78 1.04 3.36 3.04 3.04 
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The table presents OLS regressions of bank total risk, 2 iR , on measures of revenue and asset diversification, risk proxies, 
profitability and size variables, before and after the completion of bank-insurance deals. Panel A presents the results from the 
pre-completion regressions while Panel B presents the results from the post-completion regressions. The sample consists of 100 
bancassurance deal announcements between 1990 and 2006. The independent variables are presented in the first column, while 
columns 1 to 6 contain the results from different regressions. In particular, columns 1 to 3 present the regressions where non-
interest income share is used as a proxy for revenue diversification, while columns 4 to 6 present the regressions where the ratio 
of loans to total assets is used as a proxy for revenue diversification. Within the two subsets, the risk measures vary, producing 
three sets of regressions. In all models a number of bank-specific characteristics are employed as control variables (ROA, 
leverage, firm size). In cases where independent variables are correlated with one another auxiliary regressions are employed in 
order to make them orthogonal. Non-interest income share is the ratio of non-interest income to total operating income, ROA is 
the ratio of net income to total assets, Leverage is the ratio of total assets to common equity, and Firm size is the natural 
logarithm of total assets. The rest of the variables are self explanatory. All balance sheet and income statement variables for the 
pre- and post-completion regressions are obtained at the year end prior to and after the completion, respectively. 
The figures in brackets indicate t-values (White errors), while a/b/c denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10%, 
respectively. 
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Table E.6. Market beta regressions of bank-insurance agency deals (completion) 
       
Panel A: Period before completion 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Constant 0.121 0.131 0.018 -0.039 -0.080 -0.039 
 (1.03) (1.09) (0.14) -(0.16) -(0.35) -(0.17) 
Non-interest income share 1.771 1.765 1.731    
 (5.10)a (5.02)a (4.85)a    
Loans to total assets    0.804 0.642 0.623 
    (2.32)b (1.91)c (1.83)c 
Non-performing loans to total 
assets   35.369   38.715 
   (2.33)b   (2.57)a 
Provision for loan losses to total 
assets 48.315   58.073   
 (2.46)b   (2.96)a   
Loan losses to total assets  0.275   0.409  
  (2.11)b   (3.48)a  
ROA 0.177 0.181 0.175 0.214 0.224 0.216 
 (2.47)b (2.48)b (2.35)b (3.27)a (3.41)a (3.27)a 
Leverage 0.011 0.011 0.010 0.009 0.008 0.007 
 (1.55) (1.43) (1.53) (1.02) (0.95) (0.93) 
Firm size 0.091 0.095 0.088 0.122 0.121 0.115 
 (3.04)a (3.27)a (3.10)a (6.29)a (6.47)a (6.25)a 
N 79 79 79 79 79 79 
Adjusted R-squared 0.27 0.26 0.28 0.28 0.28 0.29 
F-statistic 6.68 6.62 7.04 7.08 7.07 7.39 
Panel B: Period after completion 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Constant 0.580 0.588 0.511 -0.102 -0.001 -0.291 
 (3.40)a (3.46)a (1.81)a -(0.30) (0.00) -(0.63) 
Non-interest income share 0.430 0.416 0.431    
 (1.06) (0.98) (1.05)    
Loans to total assets    1.142 1.000 1.114 
    (1.97)b (1.88)c (2.06)b 
Non-performing loans to total 
assets   27.665   25.519 
   (0.93)   (0.85) 
Provision for loan losses to total 
assets 13.743   9.995   
 (0.37)   (0.26)   
Loan losses to total assets  -0.137   0.196  
  -(0.59)   (0.93)  
ROA 0.098 0.106 0.195 0.128 0.128 0.162 
 (0.76) (0.81) (1.38) (0.95) (0.96) (1.12) 
Leverage 0.004 0.003 0.001 0.006 0.007 0.005 
 (0.72) (0.65) (0.10) (1.16) (1.29) (0.39) 
Firm size 0.095 0.094 0.094 0.099 0.093 0.095 
 (3.47)a (3.36)a (3.47)a (3.82)a (3.56)a (3.78)a 
N 74 74 73 74 74 73 
Adjusted R-squared 0.05 0.05 0.07 0.11 0.11 0.12 
F-statistic 1.76 1.80 2.02 2.89 2.83 2.92 
The table presents OLS regressions of bank market beta, β, on measures of revenue and asset diversification, risk proxies, 
profitability and size variables, before and after the completion of bank-insurance agency deals. Panel A presents the results from 
the pre-completion regressions while Panel B presents the results from the post-completion regressions. The sample consists of 
90 bancassurance deal announcements between 1990 and 2006. The independent variables are presented in the first column, 
while columns 1 to 6 contain the results from different regressions. In particular, columns 1 to 3 present the regressions where 
non-interest income share is used as a proxy for revenue diversification, while columns 4 to 6 present the regressions where the 
ratio of loans to total assets is used as a proxy for revenue diversification. Within the two subsets, the risk measures vary, 
producing three sets of regressions. In all models a number of bank-specific characteristics are employed as control variables 
(ROA, leverage, firm size). In cases where independent variables are correlated with one another auxiliary regressions are 
employed in order to make them orthogonal. Non-interest income share is the ratio of non-interest income to total operating 
income, ROA is the ratio of net income to total assets, Leverage is the ratio of total assets to common equity, and Firm size is the 
natural logarithm of total assets. The rest of the variables are self explanatory. All balance sheet and income statement variables 
for the pre- and post-completion regressions are obtained at the year end prior to and after the completion, respectively. 
The figures in brackets indicate t-values (White errors), while a/b/c denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10%, 
respectively. 
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Table E.7. Ιdiosyncratic risk regressions of bank-insurance agency deals (completion) 
All betas have been multiplied by 104 
Panel A: Period before completion 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Constant 5.790 5.760 5.590 1.900 2.340 1.230 
 (4.40)a (4.41)a (3.51)a (0.99) (1.10) (0.58) 
Non-interest income share -11.110 -11.030 -11.230    
 -(2.19)b -(2.20)b -(2.30)b    
Loans to total assets    2.590 3.540 3.320 
    (0.93) (1.30) (1.22) 
Non-performing loans to total 
assets   49.590   20.270 
   (0.26)   (0.10) 
Provision for loan losses to total 
assets -205.230   -384.250   
 -(0.71)   -(1.24)   
Loan losses to total assets  -2.140   -2.930  
  -(1.20)   -(1.50)  
ROA 0.259 0.175 0.338 -0.199 -0.275 -0.119 
 (0.30) (0.21) (0.39) -(0.26) -(0.37) -(0.16) 
Leverage -0.038 -0.036 -0.035 -0.014 -0.010 -0.005 
 -(0.96) -(0.86) -(0.97) -(0.32) -(0.22) -(0.11) 
Firm size -0.677 -0.611 -0.713 -0.727 -0.699 -0.780 
 -(1.78)c -(1.61) -(1.81)c -(2.13)b -(2.03)b -(2.19)b 
N 79 79 79 79 79 79 
Adjusted R-squared 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.04 
F-statistic 1.42 1.43 1.51 1.48 1.49 1.58 
Panel B: Period after completion 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Constant 4.400 4.410 3.420 1.860 1.060 0.229 
 (4.77)a (4.79)a (1.92)c (0.89) (0.53) (0.07) 
Non-interest income share -5.230 -5.320 -5.060    
 -(1.86)c -(1.81)c -(1.82)c    
Loans to total assets    2.130 3.070 2.570 
    (0.84) (1.16) (0.95) 
Non-performing loans to total 
assets   -100.120   -137.730 
   -(0.60)   -(0.76) 
Provision for loan losses to total 
assets 112.900   -66.350   
 (0.46)   -(0.33)   
Loan losses to total assets  1.510   0.023  
  (1.04)   (0.02)  
ROA -0.029 0.021 -0.172 -0.101 -0.135 -0.113 
 -(0.03) (0.02) -(0.18) -(0.12) -(0.17) -(0.14) 
Leverage -0.012 -0.012 0.097 0.001 0.006 0.118 
 -(0.24) -(0.25) (0.85) (0.02) (0.11) (1.02) 
Firm size -0.577 -0.545 -0.529 -0.614 -0.608 -0.564 
 -(3.20)a -(2.86)a -(2.83)a -(3.80)a -(3.84)a -(3.41)a 
N 74 74 73 74 74 73 
Adjusted R-squared 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.14 
F-statistic 3.22 3.22 3.19 3.14 3.16 3.38 
The table presents OLS regressions of bank idiosyncratic risk, 2 , on measures of revenue and asset diversification, risk proxies, 
profitability and size variables, before and after the completion of bank-insurance agency deals. Panel A presents the results from 
the pre-completion regressions while Panel B presents the results from the post-completion regressions. The sample consists of 
90 bancassurance deal announcements between 1990 and 2006. The independent variables are presented in the first column, 
while columns 1 to 6 contain the results from different regressions. In particular, columns 1 to 3 present the regressions where 
non-interest income share is used as a proxy for revenue diversification, while columns 4 to 6 present the regressions where the 
ratio of loans to total assets is used as a proxy for revenue diversification. Within the two subsets, the risk measures vary, 
producing three sets of regressions. In all models a number of bank-specific characteristics are employed as control variables 
(ROA, leverage, firm size). In cases where independent variables are correlated with one another auxiliary regressions are 
employed in order to make them orthogonal. Non-interest income share is the ratio of non-interest income to total operating 
income, ROA is the ratio of net income to total assets, Leverage is the ratio of total assets to common equity, and Firm size is the 
natural logarithm of total assets. The rest of the variables are self explanatory. All balance sheet and income statement variables 
for the pre- and post-completion regressions are obtained at the year end prior to and after the completion, respectively. 
The figures in brackets indicate t-values (White errors), while a/b/c denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10%, 
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respectively. 
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Table E.8. Total risk regressions of bank-insurance agency deals (completion) 
All betas have been multiplied by 104 
Panel A: Period before completion 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Constant 5.700 5.680 5.120 2.500 2.680 1.490 
 (4.01)a (4.04)a (3.01)a (1.23) (1.21) (0.70) 
Non-interest income share -9.520 -9.460 -9.810    
 -(1.74)c -(1.74)c -(1.91)a    
Loans to total assets    2.000 2.910 2.630 
    (0.70) (1.05) (0.95) 
Non-performing loans to total 
assets   174.070   148.760 
   (0.91)   (0.76) 
Provision for loan losses to total 
assets -117.440   -268.020   
 -(0.39)   -(0.82)   
Loan losses to total assets  -1.430   -2.120  
  -(0.75)   -(1.01)  
ROA 0.643 0.581 0.741 0.254 0.191 0.349 
 (0.70) (0.64) (0.80) (0.30) (0.23) (0.42) 
Leverage -0.008 -0.007 -0.008 0.012 0.015 0.018 
 -(0.17) -(0.15) -(0.19) (0.23) (0.28) (0.40) 
Firm size -0.576 -0.522 -0.634 -0.633 -0.607 -0.690 
 -(1.44) -(1.30) -(1.51) -(1.78)c -(1.69)c -(1.85)c 
N 79 79 79 79 79 79 
Adjusted R-squared 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01 
F-statistic 0.91 0.90 1.15 0.93 0.93 1.19 
Panel B: Period after completion 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Constant 4.510 4.530 3.400 2.170 1.620 0.127 
 (4.68)a (4.82)a (1.83)c (0.97) (0.76) (0.04) 
Non-interest income share -3.650 -3.770 -3.480    
 -(1.21) -(1.24) -(1.16)    
Loans to total assets    2.170 2.920 2.630 
    (0.81) (1.06) (0.90) 
Non-performing loans to total 
assets   -48.050   -58.910 
   -(0.27)   -(0.30) 
Provision for loan losses to total 
assets 141.300   -0.042   
 (0.54)   (0.00)   
Loan losses to total assets  1.760   0.613  
  (1.18)   (0.65)  
ROA 0.261 0.324 0.318 0.218 0.210 0.293 
 (0.28) (0.35) (0.29) (0.24) (0.24) (0.33) 
Leverage 0.018 0.018 0.122 0.029 0.035 0.139 
 (0.35) (0.35) (1.01) (0.53) (0.65) (1.13) 
Firm size -0.387 -0.357 -0.341 -0.415 -0.420 -0.366 
 -(1.91)c -(1.69)c -(1.62) -(2.30)b -(2.38)b -(2.00)b 
N 74 74 73 74 74 73 
Adjusted R-squared 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.04 
F-statistic 1.35 1.46 1.41 1.35 1.47 1.58 
The table presents OLS regressions of bank total risk, 2 iR , on measures of revenue and asset diversification, risk proxies, 
profitability and size variables, before and after the completion of bank-insurance agency deals. Panel A presents the results from 
the pre-completion regressions while Panel B presents the results from the post-completion regressions. The sample consists of 
90 bank-insurance agency deal announcements between 1990 and 2006. The independent variables are presented in the first 
column, while columns 1 to 6 contain the results from different regressions. In particular, columns 1 to 3 present the regressions 
where non-interest income share is used as a proxy for revenue diversification, while columns 4 to 6 present the regressions 
where the ratio of loans to total assets is used as a proxy for revenue diversification. Within the two subsets, the risk measures 
vary, producing three sets of regressions. In all models a number of bank-specific characteristics are employed as control 
variables (ROA, leverage, firm size). In cases where independent variables are correlated with one another auxiliary regressions 
are employed in order to make them orthogonal. Non-interest income share is the ratio of non-interest income to total operating 
income, ROA is the ratio of net income to total assets, Leverage is the ratio of total assets to common equity, and Firm size is the 
natural logarithm of total assets. The rest of the variables are self explanatory. All balance sheet and income statement variables 
for the pre- and post-completion regressions are obtained at the year end prior to and after the completion, respectively. 
The figures in brackets indicate t-values (White errors), while a/b/c denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10%, 
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F) APPENDIX F 
 
 
Table F.1. Bidders’ excess returns due to bank-insurance mergers: Standard approach 
     
 1 2 3 4 
 Event windows for up to 
 3 days 5 days 7 days 9 days 
     
1 
Pre-event  window [-1  0] [-2  0] [-3  0] [-4  0] 
CAAR 1.58% 1.44% 1.27% 1.27% 
t-test (4.64) a (3.45) a (2.63) a (2.37) b 
     
2 
Post-event  window [0  +1] [0  +2] [0  +3] [0  +4] 
CAAR 1.63% 0.37% 0.42% 0.27% 
t-test (4.77) a (0.89) (0.87) (0.49) 
     
3 
Event  window [0  0]  [-2 +1]  [-3 +1]  [-4 +1] 
CAAR 1.45% 1.61% 1.44% 1.45% 
t-test (6.02) a (3.35) a (2.68) a (2.46) b 
     
4 
Event  window [-1  +1] [-2  +2] [-3  +3] [-4  +4] 
CAAR 1.75% 0.36% 0.24% 0.09% 
t-test (4.20) a (0.67) (0.37) (0.12) 
     
The sample used consists of 50 bancassurance deals announced between 1990 and 2006.  The reported values are 
cumulative average abnormal returns (CAAR). Abnormal returns are calculated using standard event study 
methodology. As a proxy for market risk, the general market index is employed. The figures in brackets indicate t-
values. 
a/b/c denote significant CAAR at the 0.01/0.05/0.10 level (two-tailed test) for the pertinent event period. 
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Table F.2. Spillover effects to bank and insurance peers: Standard approach 
     
 1 2 3 4 
Panel A: Bank Peers Event windows for up to 
 3 days 5 days 7 days 9 days 
     
1 
Pre-event  window [-1  0] [-2  0] [-3  0] [-4  0] 
CAAR 0.33% 0.53% 0.45% 0.53% 
t-test (1.53) (2.05) b (1.48) (1.58) 
2 
Post-event  window [0  +1] [0  +2] [0  +3] [0  +4] 
CAAR 0.41% 0.72% 1.01% 0.78% 
t-test (1.91) c (2.78) a (3.37) a (2.31) b 
3 
Event  window [0  0]  [-2 +1]  [-3 +1]  [-4 +1] 
CAAR 0.36% 0.58% 0.49% 0.58% 
t-test (2.41) b (1.92) c (1.46) (1.56) 
4 
Event  window [-1  +1] [-2  +2] [-3  +3] [-4  +4] 
CAAR 0.37% 0.89% 1.10% 0.95% 
t-test (1.42) (2.66) a (2.76) a (2.10) b 
     
  
Panel B: Insurance Peers Event windows for up to 
 3 days 5 days 7 days 9 days 
     
1 
Pre-event  window [-1  0] [-2  0] [-3  0] [-4  0] 
CAAR 0.49% 0.80% 0.65% 0.46% 
t-test (1.73) c (2.29) b (1.61) (1.02) 
2 
Post-event  window [0  +1] [0  +2] [0  +3] [0  +4] 
CAAR 0.47% 0.35% 0.76% 1.45% 
t-test (1.65) c (0.99) (1.90) c (3.24) a 
3 
Event  window [0  0]  [-2 +1]  [-3 +1]  [-4 +1] 
CAAR 0.30% 0.97% 0.82% 0.63% 
t-test (1.48) (2.41) b (1.83) c (1.28) 
4 
Event  window [-1  +1] [-2  +2] [-3  +3] [-4  +4] 
CAAR 0.66% 0.84% 1.11% 1.61% 
t-test (1.91) c (1.88) c (2.10) b (2.68) a 
    
The sample consists of 40 bank and 33 insurance peer portfolios pertinent to the bank-insurance announcements.  The reported 
values are cumulative average abnormal returns (CAAR). Abnormal returns are calculated using standard event study 
methodology. As a proxy for market risk, the general market index is employed. The figures in brackets indicate t-
values. 
a/b/c denote significant CAAR at the 0.01/0.05/0.10 level (two-tailed test) for the pertinent event period. 
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